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SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND PERSONAL  
RESPONSIBILITY IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
Wendy K. Mariner 
 
In the United States, calls to expand access to health care, when not 
simply ignored, typically result in bills or legislation to reform health 
insurance.  We are in the midst of just such a cycle today. Several states 
have adopted reform laws to make insurance available to most of their 
residents.1 Presidential candidates are offering their own proposals for the 
nation’s health care system.2  Former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill even 
declared that health care should be a right, adding that wealthier people 
should help pay for those who will never be able to afford their own care.3  
Most Americans cannot afford to pay for more than minor medical 
procedures out of their own pockets. Insurance is the vehicle that finances 
the rest.4 Thus, insurance has come to stand for health care. 5  
                                                                                                                 
1. See, e.g.,  An Act to Provide Affordable Health Insurance to Small Businesses and 
Individuals and to Control Health Care Costs, 2003 Me. Laws 469 (codified in scattered 
sections of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 2, 5, 22, and 24); An Act Promoting Access to Affordable, 
Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass. Acts 58 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS 6A, 10, 17, 26, 29, 32, 62, 111, 111M, 118E, 118G, 118H, 
149, 151F, 175, 176A, 176B, 176G, 176J, 176M, 176N, and 176Q.): Act Relating to Health 
Care Affordability for Vermonters, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 191 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN 2, 3, 8, 18, 32, and 33); Act Relating to Catamount 
Health 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 190 (amending 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 191). See John 
McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform, 25 
HEALTH AFF., Sept. 14, 2006, at w420, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w420 
(describing the Massachusetts law and its development); State of Maine, Dirigo Health – 
Working for Maine, http://www.dirigohealth.maine.gov (describing Maine’s program).  See 
generally Alice Burton et al., State Strategies to Expand Health Insurance Coverage: 
Trends and Lessons for Policymakers (2007), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=461903. 
2. For summaries of the candidates’ proposals, see Farhana Hossain, The 
Presidential Candidates on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/us/politics/HEALTH_POSITIONS_2.html.  
3. David Wenner, O’Neill Advocates Health Care as a Right, The Patriot-News 
April 19, 2007; available at  
http://www.pennlive.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/business/117694502191220.xml&coll=1. 
4. See generally, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
UNINSURANCE, COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001).  Here I use the 
concept of insurance rather liberally to include government health benefit programs, such as 
Medicare, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq., Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., and the State 
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Yet buying health insurance is not the same thing as buying health 
care. Conflating the two can exacerbate disagreements about the 
responsibilities of government, business, and individuals for health and 
health care.6  Health reform proposals reflect different philosophies about 
who should be responsible for certain health conditions—society at large, 
employers, or the individual herself. Current health insurance reform 
proposals borrow from both camps, combining provisions promoting social 
solidarity with provisions based on actuarial fairness.  
This essay argues that amalgamating reforms that serve inconsistent 
goals can perpetuate, rather than resolve, conflict. Part I suggests that 
joining social insurance with  commercial indemnity insurance provisions 
forges a contract for traditional indemnity coverage plus discretionary 
personal services—an “insurance + services” contract—which pulls the 
system in opposite directions, forcing insurers to act as both insurers and 
service providers. Part II examines a recent example of the service side of 
this insurance + services contract—coverage of so-called “wellness 
programs,” which offer rewards for meeting specific standards of behavior. 
Often justified on grounds of actuarial fairness, they foster the idea that 
certain health conditions are matters of personal responsibility. Yet there 
has been virtually no discussion of what principles ought to govern the 
choice of conditions targeted by wellness programs. Experience to date 
suggests that such programs are likely to disadvantage those most in need 
of social assistance.  
I conclude that the use of commercial insurance to provide access to 
care encourages reforms based on actuarial fairness instead of social 
solidarity. In the context of rising health care costs, the renewed emphasis 
on personal responsibility for health may unravel the social solidarity that 
                                                                                                                          
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa et seq., which also 
finance care. 
5. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. 
INS. L. J. 11, 34 (1999/2000). 
6. See, e.g., ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO 
THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980) (proposing competing health maintenance 
organizations); REGINA HERZLINGER, WHO KILLED HEALTH CARE? (2007) (arguing for a 
consumer-oriented system, with mandatory health insurance for all, subsidies for low-
income people, and consumers choosing private plans with better information); MICHAEL E. 
PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE (2006) (arguing for 
value-based competition); JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: 
HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT (2005) (arguing for gradually 
expanding Medicare eligibility as a second best but politically feasible approach); Paul M. 
Ellwood et al., The Jackson Hole Initiative for a Twenty-First Century American Health 
Care System, 1 HEALTH ECON. 158 (1992). 
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prompted reform in the first place, especially for certain disfavored 
conditions or groups.7 These reforms may return us to the days before 
health insurance, and have the potential to undermine social solidarity 
beyond the insurance sphere. 
 
I. SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
IN HEALTH INSURANCE  
 
When Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) proposed federal legislation to 
cover all Americans with insurance in December 2006, he was hoping to 
break “60 years of gridlock on a desperately needed overhaul of the 
nation’s health care system.”8  Like several recent state reforms, his 
proposal offered both universal coverage and more personal responsibility 
in making health care choices.9 Yet, without greater clarity about whether 
insurance should reflect social solidarity or personal responsibility, or 
which health conditions deserve social insurance coverage and which do 
not, gridlock is likely to continue.10 
Underlying much of the political disagreement are very different views 
about the nature of health care.   At one end of a wide spectrum is the view 
                                                                                                                 
7. Stone, supra note 5 at 46 (“Insurance is a social institution that helps define norms 
and values in political culture, and ultimately shapes how citizens think about issues of 
membership, community, responsibility, and moral obligation.”). See Tom Baker, Risk, 
Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING 
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 27 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds. 2002) 
(how insurance reflects and influences cultural norms of accountability). 
8. Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Proposes Historic New Health Care 
Plan (Dec. 13, 2006), available at 
http://wyden.senate.gov/media/2006/12132006_Healthy_Americans_Act.htm (announcing 
proposal of The Healthy Americans Act). 
9. News Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Leads Federal Debate on Health Care 
Reform (Jan. 16, 2007), available at 
http://wyden.senate.gov/media/speeches/2007/01162007_Healthy_Americans_Act.html.  
10. For a selection of explanations why the United States has never adopted a system 
for universal access to health care, much less national health insurance, see, e.g., JACOB 
HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE (2002); JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: 
THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY (1997); DAVID 
MECHANIC, THE TRUTH ABOUT HEALTH CARE: WHY HEALTH REFORM IS NOT WORKING IN 
AMERICA (2006); JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (2005); JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH 
CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT (2005). See also 
Mark A. Peterson, The Congressional Graveyard for Health Care Reform, in HEALTHY, 
WEALTHY & FAIR: HEALTH CARE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 205, 211-17 (James A. Morone & 
Lawrence R. Jacobs eds., 2005) (describing barriers to coalition building in Congress). 
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a person is (or ought to be) responsible for her own health and pay for her 
own medical care like other ordinary consumer goods.11 At the other end 
are those who find health is somehow special so that society should be 
responsible for ensuring everyone access to care, regardless of ability to 
pay.12  The difficulty of reconciling these opposing views of health care 
and the purpose and function of insurance has undoubtedly stymied 
agreement on reform. 
Recent trends in health insurance in the United States reflect both of 
these competing views. On one hand, there are several signs that the 
country is moving toward universal health insurance coverage for reasons 
of social solidarity. Public opinion polls report that a large majority of 
Americans favor universal access to care.13 Health care is no longer 
affordable for most Americans without insurance.14 Employment-based 
health insurance covers a slowly declining proportion of nonelderly 
Americans.15  This decline has been offset by expansions in state Medicaid 
                                                                                                                 
11. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE? (1997) (arguing against redistribution of income and regulated markets); CLARK C. 
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH 
REFORM (1995); NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT NOW? WHAT LATER? WHAT NEVER? 
(Mark V. Pauly ed. 1980) (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of national health 
insurance). 
12. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985) (arguing that health care is 
special because it promotes equality of opportunity within the meaning of Rawls’ theory of 
justice); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, 
INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH (2004); Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for 
Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2004). 
13. See, e.g., CBS News & New York Times, Poll, U.S. Health Care Politics, Feb. 23-
27, 2007, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/health_care.pdf 
(last visited March 2, 2007); Frank Newport, Prescription for Healing Healthcare from the 
People, The Gallup Poll, April 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.galluppoll.com/content/Default.aspx?ci=27322&VERSION=p (last visited 
March 2, 2008). 
14. See Aaron Catlin et al., National Health Spending in 2006: A Year of Change for 
Prescription Drugs, 27 HEALTH AFF. 14 (Jan/Feb 2008) (reporting on public and private 
national expenditures, which total about $2.1 trillion); A. Bruce Steinwald, Director, Health 
Care, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Health Care Spending: Public Payers Face 
Burden of Entitlement Program Growth, While All Payers Face Rising Prices and 
Increasing Use of Services, GAO-07-497T (Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 
Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Feb. 15, 2007).  
15. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: 
Analysis of the March 2007 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 310 (Oct. 
2007), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-20073.pdf; Marsha 
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and SCHIP programs, but those public programs risk future cutbacks.16  
Recognizing these trends, several states have adopted or are considering 
legislation to increase insurance coverage.17 But state level reforms are 
limited by ERISA preemption,18 and recent proposals for national reform at 
the federal level suggest that momentum for universal coverage is 
building.19 Even employers may support reforms that include universal 
coverage.20 
                                                                                                                          
Gold, Commercial Health Insurance: Smart or Simply Lucky?, 25(6) HEALTH AFF. 1490, 
1490 (2006).  
16. See Paul Fronstin, Uninsured Unchanged in 2004, But Employment-Based Health 
Coverage Declined, 26 EBRI Notes 2, October 2005, available at 
www.ebri.org/pdf/noptespdf/EBRI_Notes_10-20051.pdf; Stephen Zuckerman, Gains in 
Public Health Insurance Offset Reductions in Employer Coverage Among Adults, 8 
SNAPSHOTS III, Sept., 17, 2003, available at 
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310850_snapshots3_no8.pdf; Sara Rosenbaum, The Proxy 
War—SCHIP and the Government’s Role in Health Care Reform, 358 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 
869 (2008). 
17. See supra note 1. See generally MARGARET TRINITY ET AL., STATE COVERAGE 
INITIATIVES, STATE OF THE STATES 2008, available at 
http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/StateofStates2008.pdf (describing past and present state-
based attempts at health care reform). 
18. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Section 
514(a), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), generally preempts state laws that require private 
employers to provide health benefit plans for their employees, Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 
633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (holding that ERISA 
preempted Hawaii’s Prepaid Health Care Act requiring employee benefit plans with 
prescribed health coverage), as well as reforms that alter the benefit structure or 
administration of such plans, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (a state 
law relates to an ERISA plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."). Two 
recent lower court decisions found that ERISA preempts employer pay-or-play legislation in 
Maryland, Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 475 F. 3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), and 
the city of San Francisco, Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 
No. C 06-06997 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2007), stay granted pending appeal, No. 07-17370 (9th 
Cir. Jan. 9, 2007). But see N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (surcharges imposed on commercial health plans for hospital 
bills not preempted, because they do not preclude uniform benefits or administrative 
practices).  
19. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2004); and supra notes 3 and 9. But see Uwe Reinhardt, Uninsured 
Americans and the new Democratic Congress, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1133, 1135 (2006) 
(arguing that the current “flurry of activity” will produce “big talk” but “little action”). 
20. See Robert S. Galvin & Suzanne Delbanco, Between A Rock and A Hard Place: 
Understanding The Employer Mind-Set, 25(6) HEALTH AFF. 1548 (Nov./Dec. 2006) 
(arguing that employers are looking for ways to get out of the health benefits business but 
reluctant to have government control costs); Jonathan Cohn, What’s the One Thing Big 
Business and the Left Have in Common?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 45, April 1, 2007 
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At the same time, a competing trend has emerged favoring increased 
personal responsibility for health and health insurance. The beginning of 
the twenty-first century saw a return to more traditional indemnity health 
insurance following the late 1990’s backlash against managed care.21  
Although most health insurance plans still include procedures for managing 
care, most private insurance companies see their plans as a commercial 
insurance product covering specified losses, rather than a mechanism for 
financing universal access to care.22  Continuing health care cost increases 
also put pressure on insurers, government, and employers to reduce the 
need for care, tie premiums to claims experience, and shift more costs onto 
insureds. 23 Health savings accounts are popular among some employers, 
because they make employees responsible for a portion of their health care 
expenses.24  A recent innovation, wellness coverage, offers discounted 
                                                                                                                          
(describing a business leader’s cooperation to develop a federal reform bill); Jordan Rau, 
Healthcare Reform’s Unlikely Ally: Big Business, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2007 (describing a 
coalition of 26 large companies including insurers to advocate for universal health insurance 
in California). If true, this represents a change in business attitudes. See Jon R. Gabel, 
Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas Rice, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are They More 
Than Talk Now? HEALTH AFF., Nov. 20, 2002, at w395 (survey results finding general lack 
of interest among insurers and employers in insurance divorced from employment), at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.239v1.pdf. 
21. See, e.g., James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing in 
Health Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 20, 2002, at w139, at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.139v1.pdf;  Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash 
as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1115 (1999) 
(describing the “backlash” of consumer objections to limits imposed by managed care); 
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Consumer Choice under “Private Health Care Regulation,” in 
REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS 91-116 (Stuart H. 
Altman et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that employees resisted such limits in part because they 
perceived their care as free in the past). For a more personalized description of objections to 
managed care, see GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOS AND THE 
BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996). 
22. This picture can be complicated by managed care practices, such as preferred 
provider networks and referral requirements, that limit services covered by claims. See 
generally MICHAEL MORRISEY,  HEALTH INSURANCE 131-145 (2007). 
23. Insurance premiums also continue to rise (6.1% from 2006 to 2007). Gary Claxton 
et al., Health Benefits in 2007, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1407 (2007); KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 
& HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 
ANNUAL SURVEY, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf (last 
visited March 1, 2008). 
24. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? 
Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485 
(2004) (describing consumer-driven plans and arguing that they effectively ask patients to 
ration their own care) [hereinafter Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?].  
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premiums or rewards for employees who participate in programs to prevent 
health risks, such as smoking cessation programs, exercise programs, and 
blood pressure and cholesterol screening programs. These programs can 
expand personal responsibility beyond financial liability to responsibility 
for one’s own health status. 25  
 
 Social Solidarity 
 
Given the complexity of medicine and disease, there may be good 
reason to create health insurance structures that aim for both universality 
and some degree of personal responsibility in coverage.26 Nonetheless, 
those two goals pull insurance in opposite directions. This tension affects 
both private commercial insurance and public benefit programs, like 
Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans and military health benefit programs that are 
not formal insurance plans. 
The concept of social solidarity embodies goals of mutual aid and 
support.27 The idea is that we are all in this together, and no one should be 
abandoned. Such aspirations inspired early mutual aid societies to create 
insurance systems.28  Where people are considered to be equally and 
randomly at risk for all types of medical problems, it makes sense for 
everyone to chip in and make sure that, when injury or illness occurs, help 
is available to anyone who needs it.29 To fulfill their responsibilities to their 
populations, governments often adopt social insurance systems to finance 
health care.30  The principle of mutual aid and support is evident in rules 
                                                                                                                 
25. See Part II infra. 
26. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Americans’ Views of the Uninsured: An Era for 
Hybrid Proposals, HEALTH AFF. w3-405, Aug. 27, 2003, at, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.405v1/DC1 (reporting on public 
opinion surveys finding ambivalent views). 
27. The concept of social solidarity may have originated with Émile Durkeim and his 
1893 book, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, describing social cohesion. 
28. DAVID MOSS, SOCIALIZING SECURITY: PROGRESSIVE ERA ECONOMISTS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY (1996); Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard, supra note 5 at 
23-24; CAROL WEISBROD, FAMILY, INSURANCE AND THE STATE (2006). 
29. See Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 287 (1993); Francois Ewald, The Return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: 
An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution, EMBRACING RISK 273 (Tom Baker & Jonathan 
Simon eds. 2002). 
30. See generally IN SEARCH OF RETIREMENT SECURITY: THE CHANGING MIX OF 
SOCIAL INSURANCE, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY (Teresa 
Ghilarducci et al. eds., 2005); STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY: SOCIAL INSURANCE IN A 
DIVERSE AMERICA (Kathleen Buto et al. eds., 2004); Western European countries have well-
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for universality of coverage and community rating. Most systems bar 
medical underwriting that excludes people from coverage and prohibit or 
limit segmented markets and risk classification. The defining feature is that 
people are not excluded or asked to pay more because of their own health 
status, health risks or medical claims experience. 
Even in the absence of universal social insurance, state and federal 
laws move commercial insurance toward social solidarity goals. For 
example, laws requiring guaranteed issue preclude insurers from excluding 
certain people from the pool.31 State laws requiring coverage of specific 
services (mandated benefits) embody social policies about what coverage 
must be available to all (except self-insured employee group plans 
exempted under ERISA). Most state laws forbid charging higher premiums 
to women, even if women are more likely than men to use medical care, at 
least during the child-bearing years.32 Many states also prohibit premium 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information.33  
The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)34 prohibits certain group health plans from discriminating in 
eligibility or premiums on the basis of health status factors, such as medical 
condition and claims experience.35 More general anti-discrimination laws 
also foster social solidarity. For example, the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination solely on the basis of disability in 
employee health insurance.36 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
                                                                                                                          
known social insurance systems, with most using either a Bismarck model or a Beveridge 
model. Because they were created before private commercial health insurance developed a 
significant market, commercial insurers adapted their products to the goals of the 
government program. In contrast, American commercial health insurance established a 
strong commercial market largely independent of social insurance programs. See RICHMOND 
& FEIN, supra note 6.  
31. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (guaranteed availability for employers in small 
group market and requirement to accept all eligible individuals in the small employer’s 
group). 
32. Most states also prohibit coverage exclusions or risk adjustment for women who 
are victims of domestic violence. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 20-448G; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
626.9541(g)(3); N.Y. Ins. Law § 2612.  See also 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(1)(G). 
33. State law definitions of genetic information vary. See National Conference of 
State Legislatures, Genetics & Health Insurance State Anti-Discrimination Laws, June 
2005, http://wwww.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm (last visited July 6, 
2007). 
34. 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996), as amended (codified in scattered U.S.C. 
sections). 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1182.  See note 81 infra and accompanying text. 
36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 328, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
2008] HEALTH REFORM 207 
 
prohibits discrimination in employee benefits on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.37 Employee group health plans generally 
offer the same premium rate to all employees, regardless of age, health 
status, or claims experience.38 Offering the same coverage for the same 
premium regardless of age is a significant example of solidarity, since 
health costs tend to increase with age and increase substantially among the 
elderly.39  
 
 Personal Responsibility 
 
Commercial insurance captures the concept of personal responsibility 
in efforts to achieve actuarial fairness. Here, the idea is that each person 
should pay for his own risks and no others. In contrast to social solidarity, 
the personal responsibility principle is that people are different and we 
should not be responsible for those who are different from us. Actuarially 
fair insurance policies classify and segregate insureds into groups 
according to the type and amount of risk they represent, with different 
coverage, exclusions, and premiums.40 In health insurance, this means that 
the market for insurance is segmented into multiple categories with distinct 
products and pricing. 
Commercial insurers may use medical underwriting and risk rating to 
classify people. Medical underwriting, used primarily in individual and 
small group policies in the United States, avoids insuring specific 
individuals or groups for non-fortuitous risks.41 They must have their own 
                                                                                                                 
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
38. But see Part II infra, discussing discounted premiums for participating in wellness 
programs. 
39. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & The Merck Company 
Foundation, State of Aging and Health in America 2007 Report, at 5 (2007) (reporting that 
the “cost of providing health care for one person aged 65 or older is three to five times 
greater than the cost for someone younger than 65”), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/aging/saha.htm; Christine Borger et al., Health Spending Projections 
Through 2015: Changes on the Horizon, 25 HEALTH AFF. w61 (2006).  But see Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, Does the Aging of the Population Really Drive the Demand for Health Care?, 
22(6) HEALTH AFF. 27, 34-35 (2003),  (arguing that research shows that a gradually 
increasing elderly population is not likely to cause disproportionate national cost increases, 
and that labor and administrative costs may play more important roles in raising costs). 
40. ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1996); MALCOLM 
CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE 256-57 (1997). 
41. Medical underwriting may include investigating an applicant’s medical history, 
using information submitted on the application, medical claims, and prescription drug use. 
Insurers can deny the application entirely, refusing to cover the person. More commonly, 
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personal resources to pay for their most likely health problems. For 
coverage of other risks, actuarial fairness aligns premium rates with the risk 
profile of the person or group. Other payments, like the cost-sharing 
devices of deductibles and co-payments, serve both to discourage 
unnecessary medical care (and claims) and to engage the insured in 
effectively “insuring” her own losses to some degree.42 Coverage limits, 
which restrict the number of covered services, such as inpatient hospital 
days or specialist visits, can also discourage unnecessary care and claims.43 
Caps on paid claims, such as annual or lifetime limits on the dollar amount 
of health care expenditures covered, provide a ceiling on the insurer’s risk. 
The complicated terms of commercial health insurance policies may be 
an inevitable consequence of the difficulty of determining what should 
count as a covered loss. While a broken limb or heart attack presents an 
unmistakable need for medical care, other health conditions are more 
ambiguous. What, if any, care is needed can often be debated, making the 
insurer’s risk more difficult to calculate.44 Moreover, the cost of care varies 
significantly around the country.45 Such concerns may not be unique to 
health insurance, but are undoubtedly more intense in assessing health 
insurance claims.   
 
                                                                                                                          
insurers exclude coverage for specific medical conditions (rider out those conditions) or 
increase premium rates to cover the conditions. They may also postpone coverage for pre-
existing conditions. See Milliman, INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES, AND 
SMALL GROUP MEDICAL UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES (updated periodically). 
42. See, e.g., Herzlinger, supra note 6; John C. Goodman, National Center for Policy 
Analysis, Characteristics of an Ideal Health Care System, Policy Report No. 242 (April 
2002), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st242/. 
43. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Selection, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. 371 (2002/2003) (arguing that insurers can practice a form of 
adverse selection). 
44. Examples include disputes over what services are “medically necessary” or 
“experimental.” Peter D. Jacobson et al., Defining and Implementing Medical Necessity in 
Washington State and Oregon, 34 INQUIRY 143 (1997); Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice 
Plans Satisfy Patients?, supra note 24 at 537-38 (collecting studies). 
45. John E. Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care 
Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102 (1973).  For a recent collection of articles on variation in 
medical practice, see Variations Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 7, 2004, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.var.1/DC1. 
2008] HEALTH REFORM 209 
 
 Insurance Policies and Service Contracts 
 
Fundamental to the concept of insurance is the premise that covered 
risks should be fortuitous—that is, unplanned and unanticipated.46 State 
laws and market demand, however, have introduced exceptions to the 
fortuity principle in many health insurance policies. The result may be 
confusion about what counts as an insurable risk.  
The best known exception is coverage of preventive services, such as 
immunizations, disease screening (e.g., mammograms), dental cleaning, 
prenatal care, well baby visits, and annual physical examinations. There are 
undisputed social policy reasons for these exceptions; such services can 
prevent disease and keep people healthy.47  Statutory requirements for 
insurance coverage are generally based on concerns that many people, 
especially in low-income groups, would not obtain such services if they 
had to pay for them out of pocket. Insurance coverage encourages 
prevention by paying for it.48 Moreover, preventive services typically cost 
less than treatment for the disease they prevent.49 These are sound 
rationales for encouraging prevention, but they do not fit insurance well. 
                                                                                                                 
46. Classic elements of an insurable risk are a measurable probability of loss 
(predictable within a defined population) and individual uncertainty of loss (the fortuity 
principle). ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, 1 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §1.4 (2d 
ed. 1996) (“The fortuity principle is central to the notion of what constitutes insurance. The 
insurer will not and should not be asked to provide coverage for a loss that is reasonably 
certain or expected to occur within the policy period.”); GEORGE J. COUCH, 2 COUCH ON 
INSURANCE 2D § 2:7 (rev. ed. 1984) (“Risk . . . is the very essence of insurance. . . . It should 
relate to a possibility of real loss which neither the insured nor the insurer has the power to 
avert or hasten.”); LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE §101.2 (3d 
ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999) [hereafter “COUCH”] (“In general, the loss must occur as a result of 
a fortuitous event, not one planned, intended, or anticipated.”).  See also Stephen A. Cozen 
& Richard C. Bennett, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclusion, 20 FORUM 222 (1985) (noting that 
the fortuity principle is so essential to insurance that it does not explicitly appear in the text 
of insurance policies). 
47. See generally HANDBOOK OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION (James 
M. Raczynski & Ralph J. DiClemente eds., 1999); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, I HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING HEALTH AND 
OBJECTIVES FOR IMPROVING HEALTH (2000), available at 
http://www.health.gov/healthypeople/document/. 
48. The alternative to requiring everyone to obtain or pay for their own preventive 
services would undoubtedly provoke a public outcry, especially in light of the individual’s 
well-settled right to refuse medical treatment of any kind. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE 
RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 277-8 (3d ed. 2004). 
49. But see Pieter H. M. van Baal et al., Lifetime Medical Costs of Obesity: 
Prevention No Cure for Increasing Health Expenditure, 5(2) PLOS MEDICINE e29 (2008) 
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The use of insurance to achieve desirable public policy goals 
challenges the nature of commercial insurance. Preventive care is not a 
typical insurable risk, because it is predictable and under the control of the 
insured.50 The specific services are explicitly paid for whenever the insured 
chooses to obtain them. Insurers can predict the cost of such coverage, but 
assume no risk, removing the agreement from of the realm of insurance. 
Instead, the insurance payments to health providers function like assets of 
the insured to pay for a defined set of services. The result looks more like a 
service contract than an insurance policy. 
Health reimbursement accounts (HRAs) expand the service contract 
concept beyond preventive care.51 A particular type of HRA, the health 
savings account (HSA), has become more attractive to individuals and 
employee group health plans since receiving favorable tax treatment.52 
Although not yet widespread,53 HRAs and HSAs are the current paradigm 
                                                                                                                          
(lifetime health care expenditures were higher for “healthy-living” persons than for 
overweight and obese persons and smokers, because the former lived longer). 
50. See, e.g., SCA Servs. Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 419 Mass. 528, 532, 646 
N.E.2d 394, 397 (1995) (explaining that a risk that the insured knows is likely to happen 
“ceases to be contingent and becomes a probable or known loss”). See generally 7 COUCH 
§102.9 (p. 102).  
51. A health reimbursement account is a dedicated fund (from the employer and/or 
employee contributions) that can be used by a plan participant to pay certain medical 
expenses. For a description of such plans, see Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins, The 2nd 
Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumerism in Health Survey 2006: Early Experience 
with High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Plans, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 300 (Dec. 2006), 
available at www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=3769. 
52. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. 108-173, §101, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), allows taxpayers to exclude from taxable 
income funds placed in an HSA, provided that it is coupled with a high deductible health 
plan (HDHP). See also Revenue Ruling 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75 (employer’s 
contribution to HSA is not taxable if funds are used to pay certain medical expenses). See 
Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health 
Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED 395 (2005). 
53. See America’s Health Insurance Plans, HSAs and Account-Based Health Plans – 
An Overview of Preliminary Research, June 2006 (reporting 3.2 million people enrolled in 
HSA-qualified plans in January 2006), available at 
www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/HSAsOverviewJun2006.pdf ; and Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et 
al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early Evidence About Effects on Cost and Quality, 
HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive w516, w518 (Oct. 24, 2006) (reporting 2.9 million enrolled in 
HRAs in January 2006). Together, the 6.1 million may account for “about 3 percent of the 
commercial insurance market”. Id. at w518. But see Fronstin & Collins, supra note 51 
(finding 1.3 million nonelderly adults enrolled in consumer-directed health plans); Gary 
Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2006: Premium Increases Moderate, Enrollment in 
Consumer-Directed Health Plans Remains Modest, 25 HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive w476 
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for so-called “consumer-directed” care, described as giving consumers 
more choice than they had with regular health insurance, primarily 
managed care plans. Both supporters and critics agree that such accounts 
are designed to make consumers more cost-conscious by forcing them to 
pay for a portion of their care.54 Although there is as yet little data about 
how most individuals spend their account funds, it is likely that most are 
spent on preventive care and less expensive, less costly, discretionary 
medical services, such as treatment for colds and influenza. 55  Shifting this 
kind of care out of the defined benefit package trims health plans of their 
coverage of some non-fortuitous risks. While there are limits on the type of 
care for which the funds can be used, HRA accounts move responsibility 
for choosing and paying for care back onto the individual.  
Health reimbursement accounts embody the view of some health 
economists and policy analysts that health insurance is a personal financial 
asset that can be used to buy medical care at the consumer’s discretion, a 
view at odds with that of insurance purists. In this economic view, 
insurance distorts the market for health care by enabling, even encouraging, 
individuals to buy more care than they need, or at least more care than is 
economically efficient for the country.56 Here, the focus of analysis is the 
purchase of health care; insurance is merely a source of funds for payment.  
                                                                                                                          
(Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w476?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&R
ESULTFORMAT=&author1=Claxton&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDE
X=0&resourcetype=HWCIT. 
54. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?, supra note 24. See also 
Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?, HEALTH 
AFF. May 28, 2003, at w3-237, w3-239 (“The popular ‘consumer-driven’ or ‘defined 
contribution’ models are no more than a cover for high deductibles, intended to make 
consumers cost-conscious shoppers.”), at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hltaff.w3.237v1.pdf; and Vanessa Fuhrmans, 
Health Savings Plans Start to Falter, WALL STREET J. D1, June 12, 2007 (reporting 2.7 
million enrolled in 2006, and lower satisfaction with such plans among participants). 
55. See Buntin, Consumer-Directed Health Care, supra note 53 at w519 (reporting on 
studies showing that people who enroll in high-deductible consumer-directed plans are 
healthier and have higher incomes than those who remain in more traditional plans); U.S. 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: EARLY 
ENROLLEE EXPERIENCES WITH HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND ELIGIBLE HEALTH PLANS 
(2006) (younger and higher income federal employees joined CDHPs in the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program). 
56. See, e.g., Herzlinger, supra note 6; CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE 
CHOICES, supra note 11; Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare 
Loss?, 6(3) J. of ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 321 (1992).  
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In contrast, the traditional insurance industry view is that its product is 
a promise to pay only for specified losses. In this view, an insurance policy 
is not a cash equivalent to pay for whatever the insured chooses to buy. 
Therefore, HRAs, like coverage of preventive services, distort insurance.  
While health economists argue that consumers should be deliberate, 
rational purchasers of care, insurers expect to pay only for fortuitous losses. 
Pairing HRAs with defined benefit insurance policies couples very 
different conceptions of the function of insurance.    
Some economists concerned about national health expenditures object 
to generous insurance policies on the ground that they buy too much care.57 
But, the reason we have insurance is to pay for losses that we could not 
otherwise afford. If health care is a consumer good, freely bought and sold 
in the marketplace, then it should not matter what resources consumers use 
to buy it. Wages, daddy’s trust fund, and health insurance are all cash 
equivalents. Moreover, if health care is a consumer good, who cares what 
people buy? Why not let the market determine what services people value? 
Of course, the main reason for objecting to unrestrained spending is that it 
raises the price of care so that not everyone can afford it.58 Yet 
unaffordability matters only if health care is something more than an 
ordinary consumer good, something that should be available to everyone 
regardless of ability to pay.59 Thus, the economic argument against buying 
too much care supports the idea of social solidarity in ensuring access to 
                                                                                                                 
57. See generally THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 
2003). Some commentators argue that consumers should buy insurance that limits their 
freedom to choose expensive care. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING 
DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997). 
58. Some commentators argue that insurance creates moral hazard, encouraging too 
much care. Peter Zweifel & William G. Manning, Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives, 
1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 
2000); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 
(1968).  But moral hazard addresses the effects of insurance, not ordinary consumer 
contracts. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
Moral hazard may corrupt insurance claims for property losses, but is probably less 
significant in health insurance than in other types of insurance.  
59. For arguments that health care is special in this sense, see supra note 12. Although 
an insurance policy may be a consumer product, the insurer’s purchase of services to pay an 
insurance claim differs from the consumer/patient’s direct purchase of services. The latter 
may come into play for the deductible amount in a high-deductible plan or HRA. See Sara 
R. Collins, Consumer-Drive Health Care—Why It Won’t Solve What Ails the United States 
Health System, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 53 (2007) (summarizing studies finding that higher cost 
sharing discourages people from getting care, with people with incomes lower than $50,000 
twice as likely to avoid or delay care as those in other plans). 
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care for everyone.60 Paradoxically, however, the solution offered to rising 
health care costs—making people responsible for more of their care—
weakens social solidarity. 
 
Summary 
 
The exceptions to traditional indemnity insurance for insurable risks 
are usually justified on one of two grounds:  cost (to society at large, 
government or private insurers, or employers who contribute to premiums); 
or social policy (to improve health, encourage “good” behavior or 
discourage “bad” behavior). In many cases, both reasons are intertwined, so 
that is difficult to disentangle one from another, as may be seen in the 
example of wellness programs discussed below. Adding exceptions for 
these reasons may make some sense in a universal social insurance system, 
where everyone is in the pool, to remove financial barriers to important 
services. Adding them to private insurance sold in the commercial market 
outside the context of a universal social insurance system, however, may 
simply widen the sphere of personal responsibility. 
Neither social solidarity nor personal responsibility principles, by 
themselves, can explain or justify the package of health insurance reforms 
put forward today. Coverage of some conditions and services reflect social 
solidarity, while other provisions encourage personal responsibility and 
treat health care as a consumer good. Implicit in this division of reform 
provisions is the idea that some conditions are socially acceptable, such 
that all society ought to share (at least financial) responsibility for their 
prevention or consequences, while other conditions are socially 
unacceptable, such that individuals should shoulder the burden 
themselves.61 Yet there has been little debate about what principles ought to 
govern classifying particular health conditions as either an individual 
responsibility or a social responsibility.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
60. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in 
American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 38-39 (2006) (arguing that the goal of 
reducing consumer demand for health services might have been better met by capping the 
“tax subsidy” or issuing government vouchers). 
61. It brings to mind the concept of the “deserving poor,” used to distinguish those 
who deserved charity or government benefits from those who did not. See JOEL F. HANDLER 
& ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, THE DESERVING POOR (1971); CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, 
THE CARE OF STRANGERS 23 (1987). 
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II. THE PECULIAR CASE OF WELLNESS PROGRAMS  
 
The most recent examples of allocating health conditions to the 
personal responsibility side of the equation are wellness programs. When 
offered as part of a health insurance plan, such programs fall on the 
services side of the insurance + services contract, with the individual 
earning rewards for performing specific tasks or incurring a loss for failing 
to do so. For example, those who get screened for hypertension or high 
cholesterol might receive a discount on their health plan premium. Those 
who attend regular exercise programs might avoid paying the plan’s 
deductible. Those who take medication as prescribed might have their drug 
co-payment waived. Those who fill out a personal health history and agree 
to be called by a disease management company may get cash prizes. The 
specific conditions for which financial differences are allowed offer some 
insight into what we hold people personally responsible for.   
First adopted by a small (now growing) number of employee group 
health plans, wellness programs are intended to keep employees healthy 
and productive and to reduce health insurance costs. 62  It is not clear which 
goal takes precedence. Private employers who support health goals may 
also need to see a financial return in order to sustain wellness programs.63 
Some employees welcome the programs, while others object that they are 
intrusive and unrelated to job performance or consider them a mechanism 
to get rid of the employees most likely to incur expensive medical claims.64 
Even the Wall Street Journal worried that employers who monitor their 
employees’ health may be overreaching.65 
                                                                                                                 
62. See Susan Okie, The Employer as Health Coach, 357 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1465 
(2007); Ellen Simon, Survey: Large Firms to Offer Health Care, WASH. POST, April 19, 
2007 (reporting survey finding that 63% of 448 large companies plan to cut costs by 
improving employee health); available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/19/AR2007041800103.html. Anecdotal reports suggest that 
some companies save money on hospital and productivity costs. M.P. McQueen, Wellness 
Plans Reach Out to the Healthy, WALL STREET J. D1, March 28, 2007.  
63. Patty Enrado, ROI on Health Management Programs Difficult to Measure, 
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS, June 22, 2007 (reporting that 70% of employers surveyed believe 
that programs must produce a financial return on investment greater than break-even to be 
acceptable), available at http://www.healthcareitnews.com/story.cms?id=7321. 
64. Tresa Baldas, Wellness by Decree, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL at 1, 18, Nov. 26, 
2007; Workers Penalized on Issues of Health, BOSTON GLOBE at E3, Sept. 10, 2007. 
65. M.P. McQueen, Look Who’s Watching Your Health Expenses, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Sept. 25, 2007. 
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Public health agencies generally support programs for smoking 
cessation, screening for diseases, losing weight, and regular physical 
exercise for general health goals.66 However, such groups are not 
responsible for offering or regulating insurance. State Medicaid and 
commercial insurance reform laws that allow financial incentives for 
wellness programs might have been adopted for either health or financial 
goals.67  
Whether wellness programs can justify themselves with cost savings 
remains to be seen. Estimates of financial savings are often based on 
general population data.68  Research on the costs and savings from specific 
preventive measures is limited.69 Recent reports find that most 
interventions produce little or no reduction in total health care spending, 
while many increase costs.70 Some well constructed health promotion 
programs that positively engage individuals and some specific preventive 
                                                                                                                 
66. See, e.g., Press Release, American Public Health Association (APHA), APHA 
Encourages All to Participate in Take a Loved One for a Checkup Day (Sept. 18, 2006), 
available at http://www.apha.org/about/news/pressreleases/2006/06checkup.htm. See 
generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF OBESITY IN CHILDREN 
AND YOUTH, PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE (2005); Michael 
McGinnis, The Case for More Active Policy Attention to Health Promotion, 21 HEALTH 
AFF. 78 (Mar.-Apr. 2002); Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency 
Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 259 (2005) (noting increased support for health 
promotion among public health professionals). 
67. See, e.g., 2006 Mass. Acts 58, §54 (authorizing the Massachusetts Medicaid 
program to create wellness programs and to reduce MassHealth premiums or co-payments 
for “enrollees who comply with the goals of the wellness program”); §§ 76-79 (requiring 
community rating for commercial insurance without regard to health status but permitting 
premiums to vary based on wellness program usage, tobacco usage age, group size, 
industry, participation rate, geographic area, and benefit levels). However, the Medicaid 
program does not charge premiums to enrollees, so the legislature may consider alternative 
mechanisms for encouraging compliance. 
68. See Paul Fronstin, Can “Consumerism” Slow the Rate of Health Benefit Cost 
Increases?, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 247, July 2002 (reporting that 10% of the population 
accounted for 58% of health expenditures). 
69. See generally PREVENTION EFFECTIVENESS: A GUIDE TO DECISION ANALYSIS AND 
ECONOMIC EVALUATION, 2d ed. (Anne C. Haddix et al. eds., 2003). 
70. Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics 
and the Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 661, 662-3 (2008); Louise B. 
Russell, Prevention’s Potential for Slowing the Growth of Medical Spending (National 
Coalition on Health Care, Oct. 2007), available at www.nchc.org/nchc_report.pdf; Matthew 
G. Marin & Jessica Nutik Zitter, Expenditures Associated with Preventive Health Care, 39 
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 856 (2004). 
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measures, like immunizations, can save medical expenses.71  However, the 
promise of broader wellness programs may not be realized without a long-
term investment. Set up costs are concentrated in the early years, with 
savings beginning years later when (and if) participants avoid expensive 
services. Full benefits to the insurer or employer depend on long-term 
enrollment by individual participants. In private health plans, about 17 
percent of participants change plans every year.72 This weakens the 
financial incentive to offer wellness programs, unless competing plans have 
similar programs.73  
While wellness programs may produce better health, one probably 
ought not to expect financial miracles. Unless such programs stave off 
illnesses that are more expensive than other diseases not targeted, they may 
simply shift the causes, not the costs, of illness.74 Preventive measures 
                                                                                                                 
71. S.G. Aldana, Financial Impact of Health Promotion Programs: A Comprehensive 
Review of the Literature, 15 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 296 (2001); Sheila Leatherman et 
al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies and an Analysis, 22(2) HEALTH AFF. 17, 21 
(2003) (reporting total expenditures of $330 per patient and $405 in savings over a 9-year 
period in a diabetes management program); Reducing Health Care Costs Through 
Prevention – Working Document, Prevention Institute and The California Endowment with 
The Urban Institute (2007), available at 
www.preventioninstitute.org/documents/HE_HealthCareReformPolicyDraft_091507.pdf. 
72. Peter J. Cunningham & Linda Kohn, Health Plan Switching: Choice or 
Circumstance?, 19(3) HEALTH AFF. 158, 159 (2000) (also finding that more that 2/3 
changed plans because they changed employment or their employer changed the plans 
offered; 16% switched to a less expensive plan and about 8% moved to a plan they liked 
better).  
73. Since patients change physicians less often than they change health plans, 
wellness programs might improve their results by rewarding physicians (instead of patients) 
who educate their patients about prevention and manage medical conditions well. See, e.g., 
Massachusetts Blues Expanding Incentives for Preventive Care, Disease Management, 11(1) 
BNA’s HEALTH CARE POLICY 22 (Jan. 6, 2003) (describing providing information to 
primary care physician groups about their patients, such as mammograms conducted, and 
paying higher fees to groups that provide preventive services). 
74. Targeting particular conditions may have unintended consequences. See, e.g., 
Steven E. Nissen & Kathy Wolski, Effect of Rosiglitazone on the Risk of Myocardial 
Infarction and Death from Cardiovascular Causes, 356 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2457 (2007) 
(meta-analysis of studies, concluding that a drug widely used to treat type 2 diabetes may 
slightly increase the risk of risk of myocardial infarction and death from cardiovascular 
disease); ‘Diabulima’: Some Diabetic Girls Skip Insulin in Dangerous Effort to Lose 
Weight, APA OnLine, June 17, 2007, available at 
http://psycport.apa.org/showArticle.cfm?xmlFile=ap%5F2007%5F06%5F17%5Fap%2Ewor
ldstream%2Eenglish%5FD8PQO2HG0%5Fnews%5FFap%5Forg%2Eanpa%2Eew%2Exml
&provider=Associated%20Press. 
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cannot guarantee good health or immortality.75 Nor do they affect the cost 
of care that is provided, which continues to rise.76 Indeed, there is some 
evidence that the lifetime costs are greater for healthy people than for 
smokers or obese people.77 The best that may be hoped for is disease 
compression—postponing debilitating illness to very short period before 
death at a ripe old age.78  
 
 Wellness Programs within Health Insurance Plans 
 
The key difference between indemnity insurance and wellness 
programs is how risk information is used. Insurers typically use risk data to 
set rates. A risk-rated insurance policy would base the premium on the 
individual’s risk factors or, in the case of a group policy, on the group’s 
overall risk. A wellness program uses risk data to selectively modify rates 
for individuals who are already in the risk-rated pool. In theory, it is the 
insured, instead of the insurer, who changes the rate—by complying with 
the program’s requirements. Generally, however, everyone in the group 
who does not have a particular risk factor, like smoking or diabetes, 
receives a discount or reward. The effect is to charge higher rates to 
individuals based on their personal health risks.  
A well-publicized example was the plan adopted by Clarian Health, an 
Indiana hospital system, to charge employees bi-weekly fees if they failed 
                                                                                                                 
75. See SARA ALLIN et al., MAKING DECISIONS ON PUBLIC HEALTH: A REVIEW OF 
EIGHT COUNTRIES (2004) (finding little empirical evidence on the effectiveness and costs of 
prevention programs); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE 
ON DISEASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS (Oct. 2004); David Ogilvie, Interventions to Promote 
Walking: Systematic Review, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 1204 (2007) (finding that the sustainability 
and clinical benefits of walking programs are uncertain); LOUISE B. RUSSELL, IS PREVENTION 
BETTER THAN CURE? (1986) (questioning broad prevention claims).  
76. David Leonhardt, Free Lunch on Health? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES 1, 9 (Aug. 8, 
2007) (quoting former New York state health commissioner as saying preventive care 
“reduces costs, yes, for the individual who didn’t get sick. But that savings is overwhelmed 
by the cost of continuously treating everybody else.”).  See also HENRY J. AARON & 
WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984) 
(describing the role of technology in increasing costs and the need for rationing care). 
77. Van Baal, supra note 49 (estimating lifetime expenditures for health care for three 
groups of people, with healthy having the highest costs, obese medium costs, and smokers 
lowest costs). 
78. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 123 (1993) (“To be mortal 
is to live a life that will be marked by illness, injury, aging, decline, and death. . . . We can 
reasonably hope that the decline of our bodies that will come with age can be lessened, 
delayed, and compensated for. . . .  Though we will and must die, we can hope that we will 
not die sooner than necessary. . . .”). 
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to meet target health standards, beginning in 2009:79 US$10 if BMI ≥ 30; 
$5 for blood pressure >140/90; $5 for glucose levels > 120; $5 for low 
density lipoprotein cholesterol > 130; $5 for smoking; and $5 for not 
completing a health assessment. After public opposition to its plan, Clarion 
made the program voluntary and withdrew the penalties on those who fail 
to meet the targets. Instead, it will offer the same amounts as bonuses to 
those who voluntarily meet the targets.80 The effect, however, may be the 
same.   
Laws forbidding medical underwriting and basing premium rates on 
individual health risks would seem to prohibit this result. Nevertheless, as 
discussed below, wellness programs have joined preventive services as an 
exception to the fortuity principle in many health insurance plans. 
However, unlike coverage of preventive care, wellness program coverage 
costs participants different amounts depending upon their behavior. The 
specific conditions for which financial differences are set offer some 
insight into what we hold people personally responsible for.   
 
Discrimination on the Basis of Health Factors and the HIPAA 
Wellness Exception 
 
The tension between rewarding wellness and banning discrimination 
based on health risks may be reflected in the fact that it took the federal 
government more than a decade to issue final HIPAA regulations 
governing group health plan wellness programs.81 Like several health 
insurance reform proposals, the Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
health factors while simultaneously allowing group health plans to offer 
financial rewards for “adherence to programs of health promotion and 
                                                                                                                 
79. Jena McGregor, Being Unhealthy Could Cost You—Money, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 
5, 2007, available at 
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/aug2007/db2007081_804238.htm?chan=s
earch. 
80. Clarian Won’t Dock Workers Who Fail to Meet Health Standards, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Nov. 1, 2007, available at www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/11/01/3064048.htm. 
81. Dept. of Treasury, Dept. of Labor, Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market; Final 
Rules, 71 FED. REG. 75013 (Dec. 13, 2006). The final rules add parallel provisions to 
regulations implementing the Internal Revenue Code, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and HIPAA requirements for certain small group and 
individual plans added to the Public Health Service Act. Id. 
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disease prevention.”82 Health factor is broadly defined and includes health 
status (physical or mental), claims experience, receipt of health care, 
medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, or 
disability.83 Forms of discrimination include rules imposing waiting 
periods, coverage exclusions and limits, benefit restrictions, premium 
contributions, and cost-sharing mechanisms (such as coinsurance, co-
payments, and deductibles), as well as exclusions from participation in a 
plan.84 The final regulations, issued in December 2006, attempt to reconcile 
the exception for wellness programs with the general prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of any health factor.85 The difficulty of doing so 
can be seen in the examples of acceptable programs described in the 
regulations and discussed below. 
A wellness program (defined as “any program designed to promote 
health or prevent disease”) will qualify for the exception if “none of the 
conditions for obtaining a reward under a wellness program is based on an 
individual satisfying a standard that is related to a health factor” as long as 
“participation in the program is made available to all similarly situated 
individuals.”86  Among the rule’s examples of acceptable wellness 
programs are those that reimburse all or part of fitness center membership 
fees or smoking cessation programs; provide rewards for participating in 
diagnostic testing programs (and do not base rewards on test outcomes) or 
monthly health education seminars; and waive co-payments or deductibles 
for prenatal care or well-baby visits.87  
Nonetheless, programs that do base rewards on an individual satisfying 
a health-related standard can still qualify for the exception if they meet four 
criteria: (1) the value of the reward is not more than 20 percent of the 
                                                                                                                 
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (prohibiting group health plans from conditioning eligibility 
on a health factor); 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (b)(1) (forbidding group health plans from requiring 
“any individual (as a condition of enrollment or continued enrollment under the plan) to pay 
a premium or contribution which is greater than such premium or contribution for a 
similarly situated individual enrolled in the plan on the basis of any health status-related 
factor”); and 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (b)(2)(B) (providing that paragraph (1) shall not be construed 
“to prevent a group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering group health 
insurance coverage, from establishing premium discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise 
applicable copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to programs of health 
promotion and disease prevention.”). 
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (a). 
84. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702.  
85. Id. 
86. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f) 
87. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f)(1). 
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premium for the participant (including both employer and employee 
contributions); (2) the program must be “reasonably designed to promote 
health or prevent disease”; (3) eligible individuals must be able to qualify 
for the reward at least once a year; and (4) the program must be available to 
all similarly situated individuals.88 Even this exception to the exception has 
its own exception. Individuals cannot be required to meet the health 
standard if to do so is “unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition” 
or “medically inadvisable”.89 Such individuals must be given “a reasonable 
alternative standard.”90 
The rules’ examples indicate that it should be easy to qualify for these 
exceptions, even if the program requires participants to achieve specific 
health targets. Two examples approve wellness programs that require 
patients to obey a physician’s recommendations in order to qualify for 
discounts. In one example, a wellness program offers a 20 percent premium 
discount to employees who achieve a cholesterol count under 200. The plan 
offers to “work with” employees who are unable to achieve that goal. One 
employee, “D”, begins a diet and exercise program, but his physician 
determines that D cannot lower his cholesterol below 200 without taking 
prescription medication. The plan “accommodates D by making the 
discount available to D, but only if D follows the advice of D’s doctor 
regarding medication and blood tests.”91  The rules conclude that this 
program qualifies for the exception and is permissible. 
A second example describes a wellness program that waives the $250 
annual deductible for participants who have a body mass index (BMI) 
between 19 and 26. Those who are unable to lose enough weight for 
medical reasons can earn the reward by walking 20 minutes a day 3 days a 
week. A medical condition prevents individual E from meeting either 
standard. The rules approve a result in which the “plan agrees to make the 
discount available to E if E follows the physician’s [unspecified] 
recommendations.”92 
It is hard to argue that these examples do not discriminate on the basis 
of a health factor. The conclusion that they are not discriminatory appears 
to rely on the assumption that, if all else fails, health plans can force 
participants to follow a physician’s recommendations. Although it is 
doubtful that employers could require employees to obey their physicians 
                                                                                                                 
88. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f)(2). 
89. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f)(2)(A). 
90. Id. 
91. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f) Example 3. 
92. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f) Example 4. 
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as a general condition of employment, some employers are refusing to hire 
smokers on the ground that they have higher health insurance claims than 
non-smokers.93 The same reasoning could be applied to similarly costly 
conditions, such as obesity.94 Conditions like hypertension are not likely to 
be considered disabilities for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act to preclude employers from not hiring individuals with those 
conditions.95 Nonetheless, they are certainly considered health conditions 
for purposes of wellness programs. 
One might argue that these examples simply involve eligibility for 
rewards (in the form of discounts) that would not otherwise be available. 
The distinction between rewards and penalties, however, is often in the eye 
of the beholder.96 Moreover, some programs do impose penalties. The 
HIPAA rules approve the example of a wellness program that imposes an 
explicit financial penalty—a surcharge of 20% of the premium—on 
participants who do not certify that they have not used tobacco products in 
the past year.97 The surcharge can be avoided if a participant is addicted to 
nicotine and participates in a smoking cessation program.98 
                                                                                                                 
93. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. The Scotts Company, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, CA 07-101104-
GAO (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2008) (denying company’s motion to dismiss claims of invasion of 
privacy under state law and discrimination under ERISA § 510 by employee who was fired 
for smoking off the job); WHO Extinguishes Smokers’ Job Prospects, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED, Dec. 2, 2005, available at 
http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/news/archives/2005/12/02/who_extinguishes_smokers_job_pros
pects.html; Jeremy W. Peters, Company’s Smoking Ban Means Off-Hours, Too, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2005, at C5. See also Daniel M. Warner, “We Do Not Hire Smokers,” 7 EMP. RESP. 
& RTS. J. 129 (1994) (explaining discrimination against smokers as both legal and good 
policy). But see Leonard Glantz, Smoke Got in Their Eyes, WASH. POST at B07, Dec. 18, 
2005 (criticizing WHO’s decision not to hire smokers as endorsing the principle that 
“employers can impose job requirements based on what employees do off the job”). 
94. See Truls Ostbye, Obesity and Workers’ Compensation: Results from the Duke 
Health and Safety Surveillance System, 167 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 766 (2007) 
(finding that obese workers had higher medical costs and worker compensation claims than 
non-obese employees). 
95. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002). 
96. Daniel I. Wikler, Persuasion and Coercion for Health: Ethical Issues in 
Government Efforts to Change Life-Styles, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 303 (1978). 
97. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f) Example 5. 
98. One might ask what counts as addiction and how long a participant will be 
allowed to avoid the surcharge in practice. The majority of smokers enrolled in smoking 
cessation programs fail to quit. Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality, supra note 
71 at 21 (describing quitting rates of 25 to 30% among smokers in a well regarded smoking 
cessation program). See also H.A. Tindle et al., Cessation among Smokers of “Light” 
Cigarettes: Results from the 2000 National Health Interview Survey, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1498 (2006) (finding that 53% of smokers quit, while 37% of light cigarette smokers quit). 
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Much of the justification for these programs depends on the idea that 
rewards and penalties are equally available to “all similarly situated 
individuals.” Yet rewards are available only to people who do not have the 
health condition at issue and to people who conform to the program’s 
requirements.99 Thus, they function as incentives to conform to specific 
standards as a condition of employment or as a condition of obtaining 
insurance coverage. In principle, it is only the price of coverage, not 
coverage itself, that is conditional on compliance. Yet, if the costs of 
coverage depend on satisfying specific health standards, then costs are 
based on health factors. They are the same risk factors that insurers would 
ordinarily take into account in determining premium rates, absent the 
statutory prohibition against discrimination. In effect, therefore, wellness 
programs reintroduce the very risk rating that legislation aimed at social 
solidarity initially forbade. 
 
 Implications for Social Solidarity 
 
In addition to introducing selective personal responsibility into 
insurance pools, the focus on wellness programs’ ability to save costs has 
two disadvantages. First, as noted above, such programs may not save 
significant sums, especially if healthy people cost more in the long run. 
More importantly, it discounts improved health and wellbeing as valuable 
for their own sake. This may discourage independent initiatives to promote 
health unless they prove financially rewarding. 
Wellness programs depart from social solidarity in at least two other 
ways. First, to the extent that they succeed in improving health and 
reducing costs, they may benefit the federal government more than the 
private sector, further dividing the country along lines of coverage. 
Although employers and insurers may take short-terms health care costs 
into account, government may pay closer attention to total lifetime costs of 
all benefits.100 
Current wellness programs target risk factors for chronic diseases, 
which account for about three-quarters of the costs of medical care in the 
                                                                                                                 
99. After non-smokers took up smoking to get paid for stopping, one employer was 
quoted as saying, “It was not our intention to encourage people to start smoking. It was 
aimed at people who already had a bad habit.” M.P. McQueen, Wellness Plans Reach Out to 
the Healthy, WALL ST.  J. at D1, March 28, 2007. 
100. Timothy Westmoreland, Can We Get There from Here? Universal Health 
Insurance and the Congressional Budget Process, 96 GEO. L. J. 523, 529 (2008). 
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U.S.101  In 2004, 62 percent of adult respondents, age 50 to 64, reported 
having at least one of six chronic conditions (hypertension, heart disease, 
cancer, diabetes, arthritis, or high cholesterol).102 National data for the same 
year show that the percentage of adults with three or more chronic 
conditions was 7 percent for those age 45 to 54, and 36 percent for those 
over 75 years of age.103 Because the incidence of chronic conditions 
increases with age, older adults face higher medical costs. Moreover, the 
percentage of adults between 45 and 75 years of age with chronic 
conditions rose as their income declined.104 
Type 2 diabetes, a current target of wellness programs, is expected to 
generate rising costs, accounting for almost 92 billion dollars in public and 
private health care spending in 2003.105  About 6.5 percent of Americans 
over age 20 have diabetes,106 which is now the sixth leading cause of death 
in the U.S.107 The federal government pays about 61 percent ($77 billion) 
of national health care expenditures for diabetes treatment, most through 
Medicare ($61 billion).108 In general, chronic diseases and disabilities are 
more prevalent among populations who are low income, uninsured, or 
                                                                                                                 
101. See Catherine Hoffman, Dorothy Rice & Hai-Yen Sung, Persons with Chronic 
Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1473 (1996) (reporting 
that 76% of direct medical care costs in the U.S. are for chronic conditions); Martin Sipkoff, 
Health Plans Begin to Address Chronic Care Management, MANAGED CARE MAG., Dec. 
2003, 24, 25 (reporting approximately 78% of health care spending is on behalf of 
individual’s with chronic conditions). 
102. SARA COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH COVERAGE FOR 
AILING BABY BOOMERS, PUBL’N NO. 884 (Jan. 2006) available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/884_Collins_hlt_coverage_aging_baby_boome
rs.pdf?section=4039. 
103. National Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006 42 (2006); 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf#088 (last visited July 16, 2007).  
104. Id. at 42. 
105. MARSHA GOLD ET AL., STUDY OF FEDERAL SPENDING ON DIABETES: AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE 1, 21-22 (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., June 2007) 
(monograph report of study also finding that the federal government expenditures on 
diabetes care accounted for “12 percent of the $645 billion in total federal health spending” 
in 2005), available at http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/publications/PDFs/FederalSpending.pdf.  
106. Catherine C. Cowie et al., Prevalence of Diabetes and Impaired Fasting Glucose 
in Adults in the U.S. Population: National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 1999-
2002, 29 DIABETES CARE 1263, 1265 tbl. 1 (2006). 
107. Melanie P. Heron & Betty L. Smith, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2003, 55 (10) 
NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 1, 7 (Mar. 15, 2007) (reporting 74,214 deaths from 
diabetes in 2003, the latest year for which final data were available); available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_10.pdf.  
108. Id. at 21. 
224 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
covered by Medicaid or Medicare (including the elderly), than among those 
with commercial insurance.109 This suggests that government has a larger 
financial stake in reducing the cost of diabetes and other chronic conditions 
than the private sector.110 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid and 
presidential candidates are already emphasizing disease prevention over 
expanding insurance coverage.111 If these efforts do not reduce costs, 
government may consider more direct measures to ensure compliance with 
health standards, such as mandatory participation in wellness programs.112 
Wellness programs also depart from social solidarity by targeting risk 
factors that are more prevalent among disadvantaged populations than 
among those of higher socio-economic status. Health status is strongly 
                                                                                                                 
109. Services for people with disabilities account for a disproportionately large share of 
Medicaid spending. Anna Sommers & Mindy Cohen, Medicaid’s High Cost Enrollees: How 
Much Do They Drive Spending? 6, 8 (The Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Commission 
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Issue Paper 7490, March 2006), available at 
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7490.pdf (3.4% of all Medicaid enrollees were 
institutionalized and accounted for 31.6% of expenditures; non-institutionalized enrollees 
with disabilities represented 14.2% of enrollees and 30.6% of expenditures). 
110. See Linda Blumberg & John Holahan, Government as Reinsurer: Potential 
Impacts on Public and Private Spending, 41(2) INQUIRY 130 (2004). See also Ron Z. 
Goetzel et al., Can Health Promotion Programs Save Medicare Money?, 2(1) CLINICAL 
INTERVENTIONS IN AGING (2007) (concluding that well-designed health promotion programs 
for older people could save Medicare money). But see The Care of Patients with Severe 
Chronic Illness: A Report on the Medicare Program by the Dartmouth Atlas Project (John E. 
Wennberg & Elliott S. Fisher eds., 2006) (finding that Medicare could reduce chronic care 
costs by up to 30% by reducing the variability and inconsistency of services provided), 
available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/2006_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf 
111. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Senior Risk Reduction 
Demonstration, 
www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/Senior_Risk_Reduction_Solicitation.
pdf (experimental program of health promotion services for Medicare beneficiaries) (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2008); Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health 
Economics and the Presidential Candidates, supra note 70; David S. Broder, A Route to 
Better Care, WASH. POST at B7, June 3, 2007 (describing the candidates’ statements). See 
also West Virginia Medicaid Member Agreement, 
www.wvdhhr.org/bms/oAdministration/bms_admin_WV_SPA06-02_20060503.pdf (tiered 
benefit packages based on compliance with health goals). 
112. See Anderson v. City of Taylor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38075 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(city fire department’s mandatory fitness program, requiring employees to submit to blood 
draws to check cholesterol levels, was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth 
Amendment).  See generally SYLVIA N. TESH, HIDDEN ARGUMENTS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
AND DISEASE PREVENTION POLICY 46 (1988) (arguing that state laws targeting individual 
conduct were prompted by a need to reduce health care costs or to lower mortality rates); 
DEBORAH LUPTON, THE IMPERATIVE OF HEALTH: PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE REGULATED BODY 
(1995). 
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correlated with income.113 Chronic conditions are more common among 
lower income populations.114 Diabetes disproportionately affects African 
Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Alaska Natives.115 Smoking 
is also more prevalent among lower income groups.116 Thus, the people 
most likely to be subject to wellness program requirements may be those 
who need insurance the most and can least afford higher costs.117  While 
such groups may benefit from the improved health promised by such 
programs, their circumstances raise questions about whether their 
participation is truly voluntary. 
Risk factors that wellness programs target can be seen as conditions for 
which society holds individuals personally responsible. Such conditions 
change as science identifies new sources of risk and society alters its norms 
of behavior.118 For example, smoking moved from a relatively common 
habit to pariah status in a few decades.119 The fact that obesity is now called 
an epidemic suggests little public tolerance for the overweight.120 Diabetes, 
                                                                                                                 
113. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
UNINSURANCE, A SHARED DESTINY: COMMUNITY EFFECTS OF UNINSURANCE (2003); SOCIAL 
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (Michael Marmot & Richard G. Wilkinson eds., 1996); RICHARD 
G. WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES: THE AFFLICTIONS OF INEQUALITY (1996); National 
Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006, at 32-41 (2006). 
114. National Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006, at 42 (2006); 
M.K. Islam et al., Social Capital and Health: Does Egalitarianism Matter? A Literature 
Review, 5 INT. J. EQUITY HEALTH 3 (2006); Mererdith Minkler et al., Gradient of Disability 
Across the Socioeconomic Spectrum in the United States, 355 N. ENGL. J. MED. 695 (2006). 
115. GOLD ET AL., STUDY OF FEDERAL SPENDING ON DIABETES, supra note 105 at 1. 
116. See Elizabeth M. Barbeau et al., Working Class Matters: Socioeconomic 
Disadvantage, Race/Ethnicity, Gender, & Smoking in NHIS 2000, 94 AM. J. PUB. H. 269 
(2004) (reporting smoking is associated with working class jobs, low educational levels, and 
low income). 
117. See Shiriki Kumanyika, Obesity, Health Disparities, and Prevention Paradigms: 
Hard Questions and Hard Choices, 2 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 6 (Oct. 2005), 
available at www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2005/oct/05_0025.htm (arguing that it is unfair “to put 
the burden entirely on consumers to foster the shift in the demand-supply curves that relate 
to obesity, particularly for consumers in disadvantaged communities where the range of 
choices may be especially unfavorable and where most of the economic and political forces 
are far beyond their personal control”). 
118. See generally ARTHUR J. BARSKY, WORRIED SICK: OUR TROUBLED QUEST FOR 
WELLNESS (1988) (arguing that as population health improves, Americans focus on lesser 
risks). 
119. See SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLICY & CULTURE 3-21 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen 
D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (describing how public perceptions of personal responsibility for 
risk creation affect policy choices). 
120. See Alison A. Hedley et al., Prevalence of Overweight and Obesity Among US 
Children, Adolescents, and Adults, 1999-2000, 291 JAMA 2847 (2004). But see Katherine 
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once considered out of anyone’s control, also appears to be moving into the 
realm of personal responsibility. One might ask whether wellness programs 
will target other health risk factors, such as job stress and shift work.121 
It is instructive to examine the conditions that are not (yet) considered 
suitable for personal responsibility.  Among the health factors on which 
HIPAA prohibits discrimination is “evidence of insurability,” which is 
defined to include “(i) conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence; 
and (ii) participation in activities such as motorcycling, snowmobiling, all-
terrain vehicle riding, horseback riding, skiing, and other similar 
activities.”122 Victims of domestic violence may be encouraged to seek 
medical care (and obtain help) if they are not charged higher premiums. It 
is not clear whether sports enthusiasts use less medical care or less costly 
care than people with chronic diseases.123  One might suspect that their 
exclusion from risk calculations is based more on social preference than on 
financial considerations. Making sure that victims of injuries are covered 
for medical care seems like simple justice, even if they assume the physical 
risk of injury. But, then, why single out other conditions, especially those 
that are less likely to be voluntarily assumed? The most plausible reason 
would be the comparative cost of coverage. Yet, if cost is the real reason, 
then any comparably expensive condition, regardless of how acquired, 
should be treated in the same manner.124  Of course that would return the 
entire enterprise to classifications based on health risks. 
                                                                                                                          
M. Flegal et al., Excess Deaths Associated with Underweight, Overweight, and Obesity, 293 
JAMA 1861 (2005) (finding obesity, but not overweight, associated with excess mortality). 
121. See Ichiro Kawachi, Injustice at Work and Health: Causation or Correlation?, 63 
OCCUP. ENVIRON. MED. 578 (2006) (analyzing the literature); Bruce S. McEwen, Protective 
& Damaging Effects of Stress Mediators, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 171 (1998) (explaining the 
physiologic response to stress and its links to obesity and hypertension). 
122. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f); 45 C.F.R. § 146.121(f). 
123. See, e.g., List of Top 10 Summer Sports with Most Injuries Provides Warning for 
Olympic Enthusiasts, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2000, 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/412143 (listing the top 10 summer recreational 
activities, with number of injuries, and total costs of injury, including medical, legal and 
other costs:  Basketball (1,633,905; $19.7 billion); Bicycles (1,498,252;  $28.6 billion); 
Baseball  (492,832; $6.6 billion); Soccer (477,647; $6.7 billion); Softball (406,381; $5.1 
billion); Trampolines (246,875; $4.1 billion); Inline Skating (233,806; $4.2 billion); 
Horseback riding (196,260; $4.9 billion); Weightlifting (189,942; $2.7 billion); Volleyball 
(187,391; $2.1 billion). 
124. See Gar L. Olin & Jeffrey A. Rhoades, The Five Most Costly Medical Conditions, 
1997 and 2002: Estimates for the U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, Medical 
Care Expenditure Panel Survey Statistical Brief No. 80 (AHRQ, May 2005). 
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The absence of empirical support for distinguishing among conditions 
on the basis of costs and savings suggests that wellness programs may rely 
on unstated, perhaps unrecognized, bias against disadvantaged groups of 
people. There is a remarkable lack of empathy for people who are believed 
to be personally responsible for their medical conditions. For example, 
when asked to choose among seven options for reducing health care costs, 
41 percent of people in a Sacramento (California) Healthcare Decisions 
discussion group chose “requir[ing] patients to pay higher rates if they do 
not follow medical advice that will keep them healthier”.125 Similar 
attitudes can be seen in the policies of private organizations that refuse to 
hire individuals who smoke or are overweight. It is not clear whether such 
attitudes reflect assumptions that such behaviors and conditions generate 
higher costs of care or prejudice against certain behaviors and conditions. 
In either case, they encourage segmenting the population on the basis of 
health risks not only in insurance pools, but also in society at large. 
 
III.   CONCLUSION 
 
The peculiarly American mix of entitlement and personal responsibility 
in today’s health reform proposals may be evidence of our ambivalence 
about social solidarity and personal responsibility for health. It may also 
mask deep divisions in beliefs about whether society or the individual 
ought to be responsible for health. Trying to have it both ways may make it 
impossible to agree on sustainable reform. 
What is missing from current health reform debates is serious 
discussion of the role of insurance in defining responsibility for health. Is 
insurance a way to spread specific risks or a mechanism for financing 
health care for all? The use of market-based private insurance to provide 
universal access to care has encouraged reforms based on actuarial fairness, 
which make everyone responsible for his own risks. A focus on medical 
care costs confuses the use of insurance with the purchase of consumer 
goods. Attempts to cabin the cost of medical services by selectively 
inserting elements of risk-based cost-sharing into insurance policies chip 
away at the general goal of universal coverage. Increased cost sharing 
                                                                                                                 
125. Marjorie Ginsburg, Rearranging the Deck Chairs, HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive 
w537, w539 (Oct. 24, 2006), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w537 (the 3 options with more support were: 
restricting coverage of treatment that is not effective or is not critical for basic functioning 
and longevity, and limiting the use of expensive care with little benefit.). 
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encourages the belief that health is the personal responsibility of 
individuals, and not the responsibility of all society.  
So far, increased cost sharing has been applied selectively, like 
redlining. People are slotted into the actuarial fairness side of the equation 
ostensibly for reasons of public health or social costs. But, an underlying 
motivation may be prejudice against historically disenfranchised groups. 
Combining wellness programs with insurance tends to disadvantage those 
most in need of assistance, undermining social solidarity.  In the long run, 
people may be excluded not only from affordable premiums, but also from 
jobs or government services and benefits. In the absence of a defensible 
standard for selecting the conditions subject to higher payments, there is no 
principled limit to the scope of personal responsibility for one’s health. If 
the standard is cost, then efforts to insert personal responsibility for health 
into social insurance reforms may presage the return to an era in which 
everyone was responsible for his own costs. After all, the original argument 
for coverage based on cost was actuarial fairness. 
Alternatively, if services to prevent illness and promote health and 
fitness become an accepted part of health insurance coverage, the role of 
insurance may be converted from risk spreading into financing personal 
services. In such circumstances, it will be difficult to place any boundaries 
on the demand for services or their costs. If preventive measures push 
expensive illness to later ages, then the federal government will have a 
strong incentive to bring younger, healthier people into its risk pool to 
spread the costs of the population it finances. That case would produce a 
final paradox:  efforts to increase personal responsibility may ultimately 
yield a form of government-sponsored social insurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADAM, MARTIN AND JOHN: 
  ICONOGRAPHY, INFRASTRUCURE, AND AMERICA’S 
PATHOLOGICAL INCONSISTENCY ABOUT MEDICAL 
INSURANCE 
 
Jeffrey W. Stempel٭ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the ongoing health care and insurance debate, which has 
once again moved toward center stage in American politics, one might 
                                                                                                                 
٭     Jeffrey W. Stempel, Doris & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd 
School of Law,   University of Nevada Las Vegas.  © Copyright 2008.  Jeffrey W. Stempel. 
Special thanks to Symposium authors Mary Anne Bobinski, David Hyman, Tim 
Jost, Wendy Mariner, Dayna Bowen Matthew, whose contributions to this Symposium grew 
out of their participation in the 2007 AALS Annual Meeting Insurance Law Section 
Program, Health Insurance: Crossroads or Gridlock, Jan 7, 2007, Washington, DC.  Thanks 
also to commentator Amy Monahan and to Seth Chandler, Nan Hunter, Angie Johnson, and 
Ann McGinley.  Regarding the title of this comment, my apologies of course  extend to 
Dick Holler and Dion DiMucci, respective author and performer of the 1968 hit song 
Abraham, Martin & John memorializing the assassinations of Presidents Abraham Lincoln, 
John Kennedy and civil rights activist Martin Luther King as well as to readers too young to 
remember either the song or its bygone era of optimism and enthusiasm for government 
activity and infrastructure.  In perhaps some evidence that the 1960s are not completely 
eradicated, DiMucci, who also performed pop hits such as Teenager in Love, Run-Around 
Sue and The Wanderer, subsequently overcame a heroin addiction and continues to record to 
favorable reviews.  See, e.g., Son of Skip James (Verve Forecast Records 2007).  See also 
Patrick Reardon, Keepsakes of Lincoln, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2005, p. 1, col. 1 (original sheet 
music for Abraham, Martin & John on display at Lincoln presidential library in Springfield, 
Illinois); Kevin O’Hare, Singer Dion still romas around-around-around, NEW ORLEANS 
TIME-PICAYUNE, July 11, 2004, p. 10. 
In this article, I shall use the terms “medical insurance” and “health insurance” 
interchangeably.  But my preferred term (in contrast that of most everybody else) is medical 
insurance.  What is popularly and euphemistically labeled health insurance of course does 
not assure health.  One can be fully covered and experience horrendous health.  Similarly, 
coverage does not assure that medical care received will be adequate, competent, or 
successful (no matter how adequate or competent).  More precisely, what we generally label 
health insurance is simply insurance that provides coverage for medical care expenses 
(however defined and restricted under the terms of a medical insurance policy).  As 
becomes apparent in this article, I find the nomenclature unfortunate in that it helps to feed 
the subconscious misconception that people have some significant control over their own 
health.  The best we can do is to reasonably maximize sound preventive care and assure that 
when adverse health events strike, the victim will be accorded reasonable medical care 
without regard to personal wealth.          
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understandably get the impression that the most important names in the 
area are politicians such as Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, John Edwards, 
John McCain, or Mitt Romney.1  Similarly, public intellectuals and pundits 
                                                                                                                 
1. All of these persons are, of course, presidential candidates who have each 
proposed various solutions for the perceived deficiencies of American health care and 
medical insurance.  Democrats Clinton, Obama and Edwards have suggested quite similar 
plans modeled to some degree upon the mandated private coverage plan adopted by 
Massachusetts in 2006.  Republicans McCain and Romney, have proposed less regulatory 
and government inverventionist models relaying primarily on tax credits and incentives.  
See Farhana Hossain, Where The Democrats Stand/Where the Republicans Stand, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Sun., Dec. 30, 2007 at 14-15.  See, e.g., John Edwards, Building one America 
– through tax-funded health care, LAS VEGAS REVIEW, Jan. 18, 2008, at 9B, col. 1.  None of 
the major candidates has proposed a single payer plan, in spite of earlier predictions to the 
contrary.  See, e.g., Fred Bannister, November Is Coming And Single-Payer Proposals 
Could Follow, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health ed.), June 5, 2006, 27.  As discussed 
herein, this is largely a reflection of the success with which market-based ideology favoring 
private insurers has dominated the public policy debate.  See Cynthia Crossen, Before WWI 
Began, Universal Health Care Seemed a Sure Thing, WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007, B1, col. 1 
        Ironically, Romney as Governor of Massachusetts supported that state’s plan, 
which is quite similar to the major Democratic intitatives, albeit after opposing some 
provisions sought by the legislature, which overroad his veto before he signed the final bill 
into law.  See Sally C. Pipes, Intensive Care for RomneyCare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, 
A19, col. 3 (CEO of conservative policy institute critical of  Massachusetts plan identified 
with Romney); Steve LeBlanc, Mass. House Overrides Gov. Romney Veto of Health Care 
Fee, INS. J., April 26, 2006, available at 
www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2006/04/26/67613.htrm (describing peculiear 
circumstances and limited nature of veto as well as Romney’s overall support for and 
advocacy of the law); Edit., Romney Care, WALL ST. J., April 12, 2006,  A14, col. 1 
(identifying Romney as proponent of plan, which Journal criticized as failing to “measure 
up to the political and media hosannas.”).   
See also, David Leonhardt, A Health Fix That Is Not a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, April 
12, 2006, at C1, col. 1 (praising Masschusetts plan as prudent compromise between 
Canadian-style system and status quo in U.S.); see also Steve Piontek, O Massachusetts!, 
NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health ed.), April 10, 2006 at 4;   
 Although Massachusetts has received the most attention, the past two years have 
seen a number of state-based initiatives to address a perceived shortage of sufficient medical 
coverage and federal failure to act.  See Joanne Wojcik, Drive to force health coverage 
gains traction, 18 states consider measures, BUS. INS., May 29, 2006 at 11.  See, e.g., Kevin 
Sack, San Francisco to Offer Care For Every Uninsured Adult, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007, 
A1, col. 1; Kan. Governor Calls for  Universal Health Care, Tax Cuts, INS. J., Jan. 12, 2007, 
available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2007/01/12/75813.htm; Tom Breen, 
W. Va. Seeks Fix for Soaring Health Insurance Costs, INS. J., Jan. 3, 2007, available at 
www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2007/01/03/75544.htm;  Bredesen:  Tennessee 
Health Plan `Opposite’ of Massachusetts, CLAIMS GUIDES, April 19, 2006, available at 
www.claimsguides.com/news/southeast/2006/04/19/67413.htm.  See also Kevin Freking, 
Sen. Kennedy Urges Universal Health Plan, Solicits Recommendations, INS. J., Jan. 11, 
2007, available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/natioanl/2007/01/11/75809.htm. 
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such as David Broder, David Brooks, Paul Krugman (or at least the New 
York Times and Wall Street Journal editorial pages) come to mind.2  
Alternatively, health care scholars such as the instant Symposium 
participants or other health policy scholars such as Uwe Reinhardt, Troyen 
Brennan or Theodore Marmor, although not quite household words in most 
of the United States, are well known to even the casual traveler in the 
region and might be advanced as important figures in the debate.3 
But these people, however accomplished, important or wise they may 
be, arguably have less to do with the ongoing health insurance status quo in 
American than two dead men.  The arguably most important people, at 
least iconographically, for American Health Care are John Wayne and 
Adam Smith.4  More precisely, the characteristics they have come to 
                                                                                                                          
See also Leonhardt, supra, at C1, col. 1 (“To a lot of thoughtful people, the only 
way to fix the health insurance crisis is to get the federal government to cover everyone.  
Britain, Canada, Japan and a number of other rich countries do so, and they each spend less 
many on health care than this country does.  They also don’t have major companies, like 
General Motors, flirting with bankruptcy in large part because of the cost of health benefits.  
It is a pretty good argument, but it has an undeniable flaw.  There is almost no chance of 
universal coverage happening anytime in the foreseeable future.  Health insurers made $100 
billion in profits last year, and industries of that size are just not legislated out of 
business.”). 
2. Broder, Brooks, and Krugman are all syndicated columnists and authors who 
frequently write on public policy and health care issues.   See, e.g., David S. Broder, Health-
care hybrid connects with officials, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 2006, available at 
www.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story (specifically commentiong on Romney’s role in 
Massachusetts).  Although faceless, the editorial pages of the Times and the Journal, as well 
as those of other major American newspapers, arguably are the leading public intellectuals 
in the health care debate and politics generally.   
3. Reinhardt is a well known economist and health care expert at Princeton.  Brennan 
teaches at Harvard Medical School and writes frequently on health care issues.  Marmor, a 
similarly well-known author, is professor of politics, public policy and law at Yale 
University.  See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Troyen A. Brennan, The Swinging Pendulum:  
The Supreme Court Reverses Course on ERISA and Managed Care, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y & ETHICS 451,451 (2005); Troyen A. Brennan, et al., Identification of Adverse Events 
Occurring During Hospitalization, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 221, 221 (1990); Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, The Economist’s Model of Physician Behavior, J.AM. MED. ASS’N, Vol. 281, No. 
5, Feb. 3, 199 at 462; Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System:  The Universal 
Dilemma, 19, AM. J. L. & MED., 21, 21 (1993); Theodore Marmor, Wanting It All:  The 
Challenge of US Health System Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2007); Theodore R. 
Marmor, How Not to Think About Medicare Reform, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 107 
(2001).  
4. Other now-dead men, many of them largely anonymous, have of course also 
played a key role because of past decisions that shaped the current health care status quo.  
See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea?  The Consumer-Driven 
Perspective, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 377 (2008) (hereinafter Jost, Bad Idea?) (noting tax 
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embody and personify in the historical and public mind drive much of the 
reflexive thinking about American health care and medical insurance – 
largely in unfruitful directions.  A third long-deceased icon personifies a 
different vision, but one that has never taken center stage in the medical 
insurance debate. 
John Wayne needs little introduction, even to the members of 
Generations X & Y.  His movies, most of them westerns, continue to 
populate cable movie channels.  More than thirty years after his death, he 
continues to be the paradigmatic representation of the myth of American 
rugged individualism and self-sufficiency.5  Under the Wayne model, the 
individual is both charged with controlling his own destiny and expected to 
succeed in doing so, in spite of long odds, with little or no help from others 
(save or a possible gunslinging sidekick or two).  This archetype is 
expected to engage in effective self-help without hesitation (or 
guilt)(what’s a few dead bodies in the service of a greater cause?), 
complaint, or self-pity.  Even things like being shot are only minor setbacks 
to this archetype.  Certainly, acute or chronic illness would not break his 
stride and he would not expect government to provide him any health care 
safety net. 
Adam Smith, who needs perhaps even less introduction to readers of a 
scholarly journal, was the Eighteenth Century Scottish philosopher and 
economist who persuasively argued that largely unregulated private 
                                                                                                                          
subsidies for particular types of medical insurance); David A. Hyman, Health Insurance:  
Market Failure or Government Failure?, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 307 (2008) (hereinafter 
Hyman, Government Failure?) (noting role of World War II wage and price controls, 1943 
IRS Ruling, and 1954 legislation, and labor union demands  encouraging use of employer-
provided medical insurance as fringe benefit that was not taxed when received by workers 
but could be deducted by employers as a business expense).  Accord, John V. Jacobi, 
Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 531 
(2004) (addressing more recent “path to consumer-driven health care”); David. A. Hyman & 
Mark Hall, Two Cheers for  Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
& ETHICS 23, 25-26 (2001) (describing development of employer-provided group insurance 
in more detail).  As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic and outcomes are to a large extent path dependent.  See, New York Trust 
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).  
5. Typically, Wayne portrayed a strong, silent type good guy who when pressed 
would fight (with quite deadly force) for his rights and those of anyone oppressed by the bad 
guys de jour in his movies, who where most often ordinary criminals or business thugs 
along with the occasional Indian (Wayne would never have used the words “native 
American”) renegade (e.g., The Comancheros).  In occasional forays outside the Western 
movie genre (e.g., The Quiet Man), Wayne largely portrayed the same character, albeit 
unarmed and less prone to violence. 
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markets were the key to economic growth and prosperity.  According to 
Smith, the pursuit of private gain by individuals and entities throughout 
society would, as if guided by an “invisible hand,” lead to the optimal 
allocation of goods and services.  This, in turn, would create an optimally 
efficient state of affairs and maximum aggregate wealth for society.6   
Implicit in Smith’s assessment, but underemphasized relative to wealth, 
was the inevitability that some market participants would fare better than 
others.  A tacitly paid price for greater overall wealth and economic growth 
was relative poverty and failure for some.  During much of post-Smith 
history, the “fallout” from his market-oriented approach, which was largely 
accepted in Europe and North America, was treated as a necessary evil 
required to obtain the benefits of a vibrant mercantile system.   
During the Twentieth Century, politics and government moved to 
soften the edges of inequality through social welfare programs and 
infrastructure designed to foster greater equality of opportunity (e.g., public 
schools).  In addition, it became recognized that on occasion the invisible 
hand faltered and market failure or imperfection justified regulatory 
correction.7  Thus, notwithstanding the demi-god status of Smith (to the 
intellectual public) and Wayne (to the general public), there is a strong 
social justice strand in American thought that emphasized communitarian 
norms such as equal access, solidarity against life’s greatest threats, and 
assistance to the less fortunate.  Arguably, no particular person epitomizes 
this school of American thought to the degree Wayne embodies rugged 
individualism and Smith market efficiency.  As this article argues, that’s 
part of the problem:  the iconic status of rugged individualism and market 
efficiency is so firmly established in the American psyche that it works to 
the occasionally unfortunate detriment of social justice and communitarian 
                                                                                                                 
6. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776). 
7. This revision to the pure laissez faire or invisible hand ideology that dominated 
the U.S during the late 19th Century is most associated with Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
“New Deal,” which established significant regulatory infrastructure for many business 
activities.  However, the administrations of predecessor Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson had also made considerable strides in this direction, as had Congress.  
After Republican challenges by Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey to Franklin Roosevelt 
and Harry Truman, respectively failed, many of the basic New Deal principles and 
structures were accepted, at least tacitly, by all major political actors, including Dwight 
Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman as president.  See PAUL KRUGMAN, A LIBERAL 
CONSCIENCE Chs. 1-3 (2007); Suzzanne Bilyeu, FDR:  how he changed America – and still 
affects your life today; no President has had as great an impact on everyday life in America, 
N.Y TIMES UPFRONT, Jan. 14, 2008, p. 24. 
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values.  American resistance to a government-administered single-payer 
system of medical insurance is one of those unfortunate occasions. 
Perhaps the closest thing to a Wayne or Smith-like secular icon 
embodying social justice and community compassion values is Martin 
Luther King, although others might prefer Abraham Lincoln, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, Robert Kennedy, some other progressive politician, 
military leader (George C. Marshall or Dwight Eisenhower would be 
credible candidates), or social welfare advocate (e.g., Marian Wright 
Edelman) as the symbol of this segment of national thought.8   
                                                                                                                 
8. To (I hope) state the already known:  Lincoln was President of the United States 
during the Civil War; Kennedy was Attorney General of the United States and U.S. Senator 
from New York during the 1960s; Army General Marshall was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff during World War II and the driving force behind the Marshall Plan to rebuild 
Europe after the War; Army General Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe during the War and later President: Edelman is founder of the Children’s Defense 
Fund (and a sufficiently iconic figure that Hillary Clinton took pains to mention her status as 
Clinton’s first employer after law school during the Democratic candidates’ debate in South 
Carolina on Jan. 21, 2008).  Certainly, the author of Abraham, Martin and John saw Lincoln 
and Kennedy as united in common cause with King as well as by their violent death’s form 
assassin’s bullets.  See introductory note, supra.   
In attempting to identify a personification of social justice and communitarian 
values, I am specifically overlooking religious figures.  My selection of King as icon for the 
social justice school of American thought could be viewed as a religious figure in that King 
was a Protestant Minister and frequently invoked religious themes in his speeches.  See 
Sarah Vowell, Radical love gets a holiday, N.Y. TIMES,  Jan. 22, 2008, A19, col. 1 (noting 
King’s use of biblical themes and comparison of his speeches, particularly “I Have a 
Dream” speech, to Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount).  See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter 
From Birmingham City Jail (April 12, 1963) (making repeated religious references to Jesus 
Christ and other religious figures in writing to addressees “as a fellow clergyman and a 
Christian brother” hoping to find them “strong in the faith”), reprinted in JAMES M. 
WASHINGTON (ED.), A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:  THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 289 (1986) and (perhaps more accessible to the legal profession) 
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS O. MAIN, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE:  DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT 149 (2d ed. 2004).  See also Walker v. 
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (reprinting as Appendix King’s speech in 
connection with efforts to stage protest march) (‘We believe in a system of law based on 
justice and morality.”). 
In spite of this, I view King as primarily a socially secular figure.  Certainly, he 
tried hard to be inclusive and non-denominational even as he invoked religious themes.  For 
example, his Letter from a Birmingham Jail takes plain to include reference to his “Christian 
and Jewish brothers” and he specifically discusses the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber.   
More important, King’s legacy today is a secular one of racial and social justice 
founded on rational concepts of fair treatment of individuals and retains little of its once 
more overtly religious air or rhetoric.  As testament, I am writing this on the national King 
holiday (Monday, Jan. 22, 2008), one widely observed in an overwhelmingly secular 
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In addition, there is a “professionalism” paradigm for conceiving health 
care that competes with an economic/market competition model, a social 
justice/rights-based model, and an institutional model.9  Peter Jacobson has 
characterized the field as reflecting “an ongoing struggle between market 
proponents (a consumer-driven health care system), proponents of a social 
justice model (largely governmentally determined), and medical 
professionals” with the social justice model in at least temporary ebb while 
“the real struggle for doctrinal supremacy in health law is between the 
market and professional models.”10   
Interestingly and ironically, Adam Smith can perform double duty on 
as a representative of the professionalism model as well.  Smith supported 
professional self-regulation (and substantial remuneration for 
                                                                                                                          
manner.  In a widely televised CNN Democratic presidential earlier in the day, there was 
considerable reference to King, including a concluding Wolf Blitzer question regarding 
which candidate King would endorse were he still alive (and not assassinated on April 4, 
1967 in Memphis, Tennessee, an event noted in the 1983 U2 song Pride in the Name of 
Love), further testament to King’s place in secular popular culture).  All of the discussion 
was secular and did not mention King’s religious roots or rhetoric.  See also Martin Luther 
King, III and John Edwards, email from Edwards for President campaign, Jan. 21, 2008 
(Democratic presidential candidate attempts to use favorable comments by King’s eldest son 
to win votes and contributions in secular manner). 
 Perhaps the ultimate proof of King’s secular status, albeit kitschy and perhaps 
offensive to veterans of the civil rights movement, is an email I received on January 21, 
2008 announcing a “Martin Luther King Day Special” on continuing legal education 
through which an attorney could pay “only $199 to fulfill your California MCLE” as part of 
the vender’s desire to “celebrate [King’s impact on American life.”   See Martin Luther 
King Day Special:  Only $199 to Fulfill Your Entire California MCLE, Law.com CLE 
Center, Jan. 21, 2008.  Just as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln became associated 
with winter furniture sales, King’s legacy has been appropriated, in at least some part, by 
commercial interests.  Once again, the Smith/Wayne iconography of market and individual 
consumerism exhibits an imperialism that attempts to impose itself on social justice and 
professionalism.    
9. See Peter D. Jacobson, Health Law 2005:  An Agenda, J. L. MED. & ETHICS 725, 
734-35 (Winter 2005), quoting LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & PETER D. JACOBON, LAW AND THE 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2005).  See also PETER D. JACOBON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT:  LAW 
AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 212 (2002). 
10. See Jacobson, supra note 9, at 735.  For examples of a social justice perspective 
on health care issues, see, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, Assessing Patient Protection Laws, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 302 (2003); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” 
Approach to Medicaid:  Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the 
States Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 934 (2002); Dayna Bowen Matthew, 
Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance:  Of markets, 
Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1502 (1996) (also 
making economic and behavioral analysis of issues). 
236 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
professionals) in order to achieve high professional standards and quality 
that would in turn redound to the benefit of society.11  In effect, a good part 
of the current health care debate can be characterized as one waged by the 
ghosts of the Market Smith and the Professionalism Smith. 
Regarding the competing paradigms outlined by Jacobson, I am 
arguably adding rugged individualism and personal responsibility to the list 
rather than treating it solely as a subset of the economic/market model.  On 
the issue of institutional competence, I accept Jacobson’s assessment that 
this is an important framing device in debating health policy, one that (as 
discussed later in this article) weighs in favor of a greater government role 
in providing medical coverage.  But institutional competence as a school of 
thought is less prominent in the American psyche.  No particular icon of 
institutional competence emerges in national folklore, although it is 
perhaps personified to an extent by FDR, who popularized government as a 
competent institution to respond to economic and social concerns and to 
provide a safety net and springboard for the citizenry.  Perhaps a better 
human representation of the institutional aspect of health policy debate 
would be Lyndon Johnson, whose political skill and electoral power in the 
wake of his 1964 landslide over Barry Goldwater brought about 
Medicare.12  
The trio of Smith, Wayne and King, of course, played no direct role in 
the development of health care and medical insurance policy.  But the 
perceptions and attitudes they represent have driven much of American 
                                                                                                                 
11. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 111. 
 
We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our 
life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney.  Such confidence could 
not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition.  Their 
reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the 
society which so important a trust requires.  The long time and the great 
expence which must be laid out in their education, when combined with 
this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their 
labour. 
 
Id. (spelling in original). 
12. See Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism:  Do We 
Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 660, 725 n.297 (2001).  Looking 
abroad, Otto von Bismarck, who as chancellor of Germany established social welfare 
programs in the late 19th Century would be a similarly apt representative, as would the 
political “fathers” of the health care systems in other European countries and Canada.  See 
Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of Social Security:  A Legal and 
Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 11 (1995). 
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opinion that does directly affect the long-running debate and attitudes 
toward the status quo and proposed alternatives.  Because of Waynian 
rugged individualism, there is resistance to communal insurance programs, 
even to the point where the old bogeyman of “socialized medicine” remains 
a standard part of the stump speeches of at least Republican presidential 
candidates (at least during the primary season when preaching to the 
faithful).13  This strand of the American character has also given much 
rhetorical force to terms like “consumer-driven,” “ownership society,” 
“freedom,” and “choice.”14  Working in tandem with the rugged 
individualism ethos of “freedom,” Smithian fidelity to private markets 
makes even Democrats flinch from advocating a single-payer, government 
administered medical insurance system, although this is largely the norm in 
                                                                                                                 
13. See Mary Anne Bobinski, The Health Insurance Debate in Canada:  Lessons for 
the United States?,   14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 341 (2008) (“The very terms of the debate [in the 
U.S.] – `socialized medicine’ and `government bureaucrats’ – reveal more about the 
signposts of American political discourse than they do about the reality of the [Canadian] 
system they seek to describe”) (footnote omitted).  Mitt Romney, in particular, has used the 
phrase as a criticism of the proposals of Democratic candidates notwithstanding his support 
for significant government intervention in the medical care market when he was governor of 
Massachusetts.  See Broder supra note 2.   
14. See Barry R. Furrow, Access to Health Care and Political Ideology:  Wouldn’t 
You Really Have a Pony?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405, 412 (2007) (“Americans love 
efficiency and consumer choice”).    
As illustrated in Furrow’s article, there is often a substantial tension between the 
goals of personal autonomy and the quality and availability of medical coverage.  Furrow’s 
primary target in that piece is Hyman, who provided the pony metaphor of choice-versus-
health safety net in a cartoon published in an issue of the Journal of Health Policy, Politics 
and the Law focusing on the FTC’s Report on Health Care and Competition for which 
Hyman was a primary author.  Id. at 414. (characterizing market choice position on health 
care, including HSAs as “plausible in the abstract but flawed for too many Americans who 
need health care, yet still appealing to those ideologically blinded to the costs of the market 
in health care and the human waste generated by ideology ungrounded in complex reality”).  
In this Symposium, Jost and Mariner are not as directly in focused combat with Hyman (a 
role that perhaps falls to me) but they reflect a perspective akin to Furrow’s.  See also 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Massachusetts Health Plan:  Public Insurance for the Poor, 
Private Insurance for the Wealthy, Self-Insurance for the Rest, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1091, 1092 
(2007) (writing from perspective similar to Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2-
3)); David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 
55 KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2007) (writing from perspective similar to Hyman, Government 
Failure, supra note 4) (and apparently preferring Clint Eastwood  to John Wayne as an icon 
of rugged individualism). 
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Canada and the Western European societies most analogous to the U.S.,15 
societies that seem to be quite productive and free.   
Pushing back, with mixed success, against these social and 
psychological forces (that also have great political and financial support 
from special interests such as private insurers and drug manufacturers) are 
the professionalism strand of Smith and King’s social justice perspective.  
These push in largely the opposite direction, seeking universal, community-
wide medical coverage and greater government involvement to achieve this 
goal.16   
The iconic pull of market and individualism notions and personas is so 
strong that it has prevented full progression of health coverage in the U.S. 
and today supports a strong counter-revolution in the form of Health 
Savings Accounts (HSAs) and other types of allegedly “consumer-driven” 
health coverage as part of an “ownership” society.17  Despite increasing 
                                                                                                                 
15. In the field of eight Democratic hopefuls (Clinton, Obama, Edwards, Biden, 
Dodd, Richardson, Gravel and Kucinich) prior to the January 2008 Iowa caucuses, only 
Kucinich backed a government-administered single payer system. See Molly Ball, Meet the 
Candidates:  10th in a Series, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 1, 2008, at B1. 
16.  As Hyman would undoubtedly note, the professionalism perspective receives 
substantial special interest support from doctors and to some extent from other medical 
providers.  See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care 
Quality in the U.S.:  Is Malpractice Liablity Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 893 (2005).  But unlike Hyman (at least as I read his work), I do not see 
physicians and other medical providers (hospitals, labs, diagnostic services, equipment 
makers) as uniformly in lockstep in their drive (strongly emphasized by Hyman) to extract 
more money from the pockets of patients or payers (be they government or private insurers).  
The relative interests and preferences of medical providers may well diverge.  For example, 
hospitals might rationally conclude that they will do better under a private insurance regime 
than a government single payer regime of medical insurance.  As discussed below (TAN 65-
75, infra), I have a strong suspicion that this is the case given the degree to which private 
insurance has not in my view done as much to tamp down hospital charges as it has done to 
extract discounts from physicians. 
17. See Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (observing trend but criticizing concept and 
current operationalization); Russell B. Cate, Move Over Managed Care – Health Savings 
Accounts, Small Businesses, and Low Wage Earners:  Cost, Quality, and Access, 4 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 287, 288 (2007) (praising HSAs and consumer-driven movement 
generally); John A. Nyman, Consumer-Driven Health Care:  Moral Hazard, the Efficiency 
of Income Transfers, and Market Power, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 17 (2006) (taking a critical 
stance);. Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care 
Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 777 (2006) (expressing interest in concept but finding current 
practice unlikely to accomplish goals of consumer-driven movement); Edward J. Larson & 
Marc Dettmann, The Impact of HSAs on Health Care Reform:  Preliminary Results After 
One Year, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1123 (2005) (positing positive but not large 
impact of HSAs); Jacobi, supra note 4 (finding consumer-driven initiatives such as  Health 
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evidence that America would be better off moving toward a single payer 
system similar to the Canadian-European models,18 political reality 
continues to serve up either market-based or hybrid systems that at best 
provide only halting progress and at worst resemble a private-public 
bureaucracy seemingly designed by Franz Kafka and Rube Goldberg.19 
                                                                                                                          
Savings Accounts apt for relatively inexpensive, predictable, routine medical treatment costs 
but not for chronic and catastrophic medical costs); Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The 
Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395 
(2005); Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with 
Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 508 (2003) 
(expressing concerns regarding efficacy of consumer-driven initiatives for actual 
consumers); Comment, Employee Driven Health Care:  Health Savings Accounts, More 
Harm Than Good, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 219, 236 (2005) (attacking the concept).  See 
also Mark V. Pauly, Patricia Danzon, Paul Feldstein & John Hoff, A Plan for `Responsible 
National Health Insurance’, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 5, 7 (Spring 1991), (early argument in favor 
of variant of consumer-driven approach much like mandated private insurance purchases of 
Massachusetts plan). 
18. Studies consistently show that countries with government-administered national 
medical insurance have per capita health care costs of approximately half those in the 
United States and that by almost all measure, their populations are at least as healthy as 
Americans.  See PAUL KRUGMAN, CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL  218 (2007) (2004 per capita 
health care spending in U.S. is $6,102, as compared to $3,165 in Canada, $3,150 in France, 
$3,043 in Germany, $2,508 in Great Britain); Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4;  Justin Lahart, 
Rethinking Health Care and the GDP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at C1 (U.S. spends 16 
percent of its gross domestic product on health care, as compared to much lower proportions 
for Germany (10.6 percent of GDP), France (10.5 percent), Canada (9.9 Percent), Italy (8.8 
percent), the U.K. (8.4 percent), and Japan (8.0 percent) but “Americans don’t seem to be 
getting much for the money.  In both France and Japan, the average life expectancy is higher 
than in the U.S., and the infant mortality rate is lower.  This is true in most other 
[developed] countries . . . .”).  Accord, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Gerard F. 
Anderson, U.S. Health Care Spending In An International Context, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 10, 
11 (2004); Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, 
It’s the Prices, Stupid:  Why the United States Is So Different From Other Countries, 22 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 89 (2003) (contending that “[h]igher health spending but lower use of 
health services adds up to much higher prices in the United States than in any other 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] OECD [a/k/a/ developed] 
country.”)  But see Bobinski, supra note 13 (manuscript at 7-8). (Canadian expenses 
recently rising more rapidly than in the past, reaching $4,548 per capita and 10.3 percent of 
GNP in 2006); Patricia M. Danzon, Hidden Overhead Costs:  Is Canada’s System Really 
Less Expensive?, 11 HEALTH AFFAIRS 21, 22 (1992).  See also Troyen Brennan, Transcribed 
Speech of Troyen Brennan, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 339,  Appendices B, C (2006) (U.S. 
health insurance premiums nearly doubled between 1999 and 2005, far outpacing both 
medical inflation and overall inflation). 
19. The 1993 proposal of the Clinton Administration (dubbed “Hillarycare” by critics) 
provides perhaps the best example.  Diagramming the plan resembled a Jackson Pollock 
painting.  But other popular proposals such as the Massachusetts plan and those of the 
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This comment addresses the legacy of what I term the Wayne-Smith 
(market) mindset and its effect on the modern medical coverage debate, 
focusing in particular on several misconceptions, overstatements, and 
cognitive errors that have prevented the U.S. from embracing a modern, 
government-administered universal medical coverage along the lines of the 
Canadian-European model.  These concepts too greatly dominate American 
views on the issue, obstructing progress toward a Canadian or European 
model that would dramatically improve the overall cost and quality of 
American medical care.  A government-administered single-payer system 
more consistent with the Smith (professionalism) and King social justice 
models would provide more productive templates for expanding, 
improving, and streamlining United States medical care.20 
The legacy of uncritical acceptance of the Wayne-like individualism 
and Smithian world of omniscient markets include: the legal fictions that 
individuals consistently best know their own interests and can effectively 
shop for insurance coverage and medical care;21 the legal friction or tension 
                                                                                                                          
leading Democratic presidential candidates also contain considerable complexity.  See 
SUSAN ESTRICH, THE CASE FOR HILLARY CLINTON 104 (2005). 
20. I use the term “single-payer” both literally (I would prefer a program more like 
that of France or an expanded version of Medicare) and as a short-hand reference meaning a 
national government mandated system of public medical insurance even if in distribution 
multiple loci of payment are used.  See Jost, supra note 14, at 1091 (“This model is often 
characterized as a single-payer model, although universal public coverage does not, of 
course, require a single payer.  Many of the world’s social insurance programs in fact have 
multiple payers”). 
Considering costs and benefits in totality, I operate with the premise that the 
quality of care increases if, on the whole, a higher quantum of competent medical service is 
provided throughout society.  Thus, I would consider a system “better” if it served all people 
with B+ level care and eliminated noncoverage and reduced substandard care even if some 
persons who formerly received A+ or gold-plated care with shorter waiting times would 
have preferred the current system.  Taking this broad view, there is almost no question that 
the Canadian and Western European systems are “better” than that of the U.S.  See 
Bobinski, supra note 13, (“In the aggregate, the result is that Canadians fare better than 
Americans” and noting that as compared to Canadians, Americans “are one third less likely 
to have a regular medical doctors, one fourth more likely to have unmet health care needs, 
and more than twice as likely to forego necessary medicines.” (quoting Karen E. Lasser, et 
al., Access to Care, Health Status, and Health Disparities in the United States and Canada:  
Results of a Cross-National Population-Based Survey, 96 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1300, 1303 
(2006). 
21. See TAN 27-53, infra.  I realize I am using a modified version of the term “legal 
fiction,” which most commonly is used to describe a legal rule that, although demonstrably 
untrue as an empirical matter, is treated as true under the law in order to achieve a legal-
social end.   
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between individualism and communitarian empathy;22 undue veneration of 
markets, failure to appreciate the current system’s adverse pressures on 
medical professionals;23 failure to realize the degree to which the evolved 
status quo already severely compromises market efficiency and medical 
professionalism;24 and unduly credulous acceptance of the supposed 
efficiency of private insurance as a vehicle for fair cost control.25   
In addition, the body politic has paid insufficient attention to the 
manner in which private insurers have adversely impacted medical 
professionalism and the quality of care while at the same time failing to 
provide sufficient cost containment.26  Assessing these aspects of the 
current debate leads to rejection of the supposedly consumer-driven 
approach and toward support for a national, government-administered 
single payer program as the preferred alternative to the private insurance 
mandates, markets and tax incentives largely suggested as the means of 
reforming the American status quo. 
 
                                                                                                                          
   For example, the legal rule that a corporation is a “person” under the law for 
purposes of constitutional analysis is factually incorrect.  The corporate entity is clearly not 
a human being.  The law treats it, however,as if it was a human being for purposes of 
application of the Due Process Clause and other parts of the law.  By contrast, the notion 
that people are more rational, energetic, ambitious, intelligent, consistent, and careful than 
they really are is a misconception of fact rather than a total rejection of the empirical world.  
In the real world, people are negligent more often, lazier, dumber, less rational, and more 
inconsistent than is assumed by defenders of the U.S. health care status quo or consumer-
driven alternatives.  But rather than labeling this a factual fiction, I term it a legal friction 
because it has become relatively hard-wired into much of the law reform and public policy 
discussion surrounding medical care and insurance issues and is in tension with empirical 
reality that would normally be more determinant of public policy outcomes. 
22. See TAN 54-58, infra.  This friction or tension is explored in Jost, supra note 4, 
and Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 
CONN. INS. L.J. 199 (2008).  Jost refers to the divide as one of solidarity-vs-individualism 
while Marine speaks larges of a social solidarity-vs-personal responsibility dichotomy. 
23. See TAN 84-89, infra. 
24. See TAN 90-100, infra. 
25. See TAN 59-76, infra. 
26.  See TAN 59-84, infra. 
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I. LEGAL FICTIONS AND LEGAL FRICTIONS    
 
A.      THE LEGAL FICTION OF THE CONSISTENTLY-RATIONAL, 
EMPOWERED CONSUMER 
 
In reality, of course, the strong American values of rugged 
individualism and preference for private markets are often compromised, 
so much so that we do not even appreciate the degree to which the 
America’s secular church of public opinion has engaged in heretical 
behavior.  For many Americans, there is already a largely government-run 
medical care system – the Veteran’s Administration system of hospitals 
and medical care in that arena that is not much different from the socialized 
medical system of Great Britain.  Similarly, we notice with some alarm 
when insurers and their executives earn high profits even if we are hesitant 
to raise taxes, stop potentially anticompetitive consolidation or take 
regulatory action that might impinge on the profitability of health insurers 
or health care providers.  Most prominently, through programs like 
Medicare and Medicaid (and the Federal Employees Insurance Program), 
the government has become deeply involved in medical insurance 
notwithstanding purported American fidelity to private markets and 
minimalist regulation. 
In general, however, the United States has largely resisted Canadian-
European style universal health care and medical insurance out of 
deference to the mythology of rugged individualism and efficacy of 
markets.  In addition, these perceptions have fueled collateral norms and 
beliefs that have impeded any move toward a national single payer 
approach to health insurance.  First, there is what I regard as the erroneous 
legal fiction that people are more discerning about their health care and 
insurance choices than is actually the case.  In addition, we operate under a 
legal fiction that to some extent a large percentage of persons afflicted with 
medical problems are themselves responsible for their plight through 
personal failure.  Both of these presumptions, if not completely erroneous, 
are at least far more problematic than acknowledged. 
First, the issue of whether prospective patients really know what is best 
for them regarding medical care and insurance coverage.   A large amount 
of psychological research suggests that people in general are not nearly as 
good at decision-making as is commonly supposed.  Rather than being 
consistently wise, calculating, rational decisionmakers, people are subject 
to a host of cognitive biases that may often warp their assessments.  Among 
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them are self-serving bias, optimism bias, status quo bias, hindsight bias, 
and extremeness aversion.27  In addition, various heuristic traits of humans 
govern their decisionmaking process, sometimes in ways that make for sub-
optimal analysis.  Among these are the availability heuristic, social 
influence, anchoring, and case-based decisions.28  Further, people 
sometimes make irrational decisions because of loss aversion and the 
“mental accounting” of excessively compartmentalizing money rather than 
viewing it as fungible, which impedes good cost-benefit analysis.29 
In general, people are only able to focus on one or two salient factors at 
a time when making decisions.  They are rational, but only have “bounded” 
rationality that is shaped to a large degree by the choices presented, the 
manner in which the choices are presented, and the overall context of the 
situation requiring a decision.30   Thus, even under the best of 
circumstances, people are often not optimal decisionmakers.  They are 
often more Britney Spears than John Wayne or Adam Smith. 
This becomes particularly problematic regarding medical care and 
insurance because these situations seldom present optimal settings for 
sound decisionmaking.  The process of seeking and evaluating medical care 
and advice is often complexity and usually unfamiliar to laypersons.  Most 
people are not well educated about either medicine or insurance, both of 
which are complex.  As a result, they will have inherent difficulty making 
assessments about competing medical care or insurance alternatives.   
As Wendy Mariner has noted, there exist significant differences 
between ordinary consumers engaged in regular retail activity and health 
care patients.  Consumers are active buyers while patients are often 
required to be more passive “recipients” of medical services (if they can 
afford the services).  Consumer spending is more strictly limited by 
personal resources while patient expenditures, at least for the insured, are 
not strictly tied to patient wealth.  Consumers tend to have something 
closer to bargaining equality with vendors while patients have “unequal 
                                                                                                                 
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed. 2000);  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Not-So-Peaceful Coexistence:  Inherent Tensions 
in Addressing Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337, 350-51 (summarizing concepts in condensed 
fashion).                
28. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 5; Stempel, Coexistence, supra note 27, at 351-52. 
29. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 5; Stempel, Coexistence, supra note 27, at 353. 
30.  See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE:  WHY MORE IS LESS 19-20 
(2004); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of 
Managed Care, “Patient Protection” Laws:  Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, 
and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999).    
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skill and knowledge of health care” relative to medical providers.  
However, medical providers have at least a quasi-fiduciary duty to the 
patient while vendors ordinarily have no fiduciary duty to buyers (but often 
do have obligations sounding in statute, regulation or tort law).  Most 
important, a standard issue consumer makes purchases “based on voluntary 
choice” while the medical patient seeks care “based on need.”31 
Although they may have tools for mitigating the patients’ informational 
disadvantage relative to medical care providers and insurers (e.g., WebMD, 
word-of-mouth, local reputation),32 these hardly level the playing field for 
obtaining medical care.  Particularly if a need for medical care arises 
suddenly, the consumer is effectively stripped of even the illusion of 
choice.  In extreme cases (e.g., an auto accident that disables the 
consumer), the choice of medical care is made by others.  Even when 
making conscious choices, the prospective patient is usually limited by 
insurance coverage and the treating physician’s hospital privileges as well 
as the availability of facilities.  Once admitted to a hospital for care (which 
may take hours if arising unexpectedly, the patient is able to change venue 
only if he or she has picked up a few tips from watching Prison Break, 
Escape from Alcatraz, or similar media fare. 
But the problems of shopping for doctors pale in comparison to the 
problems of shopping for insurance.  Because many medical events are not 
serious, consumers have some chance to gain experience that they can 
deploy in obtaining medical care.  For example, if the first doctor one sees 
is uninformed or unfriendly, the patient can go elsewhere for the next office 
visit (although this may be difficult in areas with a shortage of physicians 
                                                                                                                 
31.  See Wendy K. Mariner, Theory and Practice, supra, note 17, at 495 fig.1. 
32. Tools such as WebMD and a home copy of the Physician’s Desk Reference can be 
wonderful aides in managing one’s own medical care.  But self-directed reading and study 
alone can of course not even approach the training and expertise of medical professionals.   
A consumer can become better informed about medical issues but will never be as 
discerning a consumer of medical services as she is of grocery stores, restaurants, or even 
more esoteric everyday fare such as auto repair. 
         Word of mouth and reputation are helpful but suffer a severe limitation in that the 
sources of this information usually suffer from the same limitations of expertise that make it 
difficult for the instant consumer.  In particular, because of the complexity of medical care, 
consumers may evaluate medical providers by factors relatively unrelated to the quality of 
care.  For example, a given medical provider may have an undeservedly good reputation 
because of friendly office staff, spacious facilities, and short waiting times even if the doctor 
is borderline incompetent as a diagnostician or unwilling to immediately prescribe useful 
treatment for fear running afoul of insurers.  Conversely, a technically excellent physician 
may have only a so-so reputation because weak interpersonal skills or because she is a 
woman, member of a racial or ethnic minority, or of foreign origin. 
2008] ADAM, MARTIN AND JOHN 245 
 
where doctors are not taking new patients).  Routine doctor visits, 
prescription fills, or diagnostic tests, although different than a trip to the 
supermarket, are not so different that the consumer can not make 
observations, gather experience, and adjust “buying” behavior.  Where 
medical care is urgent, medical events infrequent, and care decisions highly 
complex or specialized, consumers have little real chance to perform as 
intelligent consumers.  But in many situations, they do. 
Contrast this with health insurance.  First, for many working 
Americans, the choice of health insurer is as a practical matter severely 
truncated.  The good news is that for workers who receive health insurance 
as a fringe benefit, they have health insurance that is “free” or at least 
heavily subsidized by the employer.33  The bad news is that they are at the 
                                                                                                                 
33. But the cost of group health care is of course anything but free.  See Health 
Premiums Rise 6.1%; Average Family Coverage Costs $12,000, INS. J., Sept. 12, 2007, 
available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/09/12/83416.htm. 
(discussing Employer Health Benefits Survey by Kaiser Family Foundation and Health 
Research and Educational Trust).  Accord, Emily Fredrix, Costs rise for health insurance, 
L.V. REV. J., Sept. 12, 2007 at D1, col 4.   See also  Milt Freudenheim, At a Small Business, 
One Illness Can Send Insurance Costs Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007, A1, col. 4. Jerry 
Geisel, HMO rate hikes to decelerate again in 2007:  Survey, BUS. INS., Mar. 15, 2007, p. 
25 (HMOs report “seeking rate increases averaging 11.7% for 2007;” despite the double-
digit increase, it was “the forth consecutive year of declining rate increases, according to a 
consulting firm’s analysis.”).   In addition, the amount employer-subsidized group insurance 
in force is shrinking.  See Krugman, supra note 18, at 231 (declining from 62.1 percent in 
1987 to 59.5 percent in 2005). 
Most families, of course, do not realize that they are paying an average of $12,000 
per year in insurance premiums because much of the cost is borne by the employer of at 
least one of the adult family members.  But they “pay,” of course in that the employer-
funded portion of insurance is taken out of the employee’s paycheck prior to receipt by the 
employee, as is the employee’s portion of the premium payment.  As market-oriented 
commentators are correct to point out, this has the effect of shielding the true cost of 
insurance from workers and consumers, with many thinking of it as a “free” perk that comes 
with the job.  This in turn undoubtedly makes the worker/consumer less cognizant of price 
increases and less reactive than would be the case in a normal over-the-counter market 
transaction.   
My point, however, is that even if the consumer was slapped in the face with these 
premium costs, the market for insurance would be a very imperfect one.  First, as discussed 
in text, individual consumers are pretty ill-equipped to be intelligent and effective 
purchasers of medical insurance.  Second, when actually feeling the pain of $1,000 a month 
in premiums, many consumers will be reluctant to purchase the type of medical insurance 
they need and will often foolishly forgo insurance altogether both because of other pressing 
financial needs and because the “endowment effect” of having the money in their pockets 
will make it more painful for them to purchase the insurance with after-tax dollars than to 
suffer indirectly through the largely employer-funded group health system.  In addition, 
there is the problem of individual consumer loss of buying power when converted to 
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mercy of whatever group health insurer(s) or plan(s) the employer has 
arranged.34  At most, the typical employer will have arranged for one or 
two HMO options and one or two different preferred provider networks 
from which the consumer can choose.35  If the employee is dissatisfied with 
the work-related group insurance options, he can in theory go to a different 
insurer, but it will cost him foregone benefits (the employer subsidy is 
wasted) as well as substantial out-of-pocket costs in addition to significant 
search costs spent selecting a competing insurer.  As a practical matter, 
then, there is no effective choice of insurers for many workers, although 
they are the “lucky” ones in the United States because they at least have 
medical insurance. 
Where the individual consumer is shopping for individual medical 
insurance, the problems are daunting.  Many insurers will simply not be 
interested in serving this market at all.  Those that are by definition are not 
doing as well as they would like selling more lucrative group insurance or 
stop-loss policies to self-insuring employers.  The insurance products 
offered will be complex and difficult for the average consumer to 
understand or obtain information regarding the proposed policy and its 
applications.   
Consider the matter of pre-existing conditions.  By now, most educated 
Americans have at least heard about restrictions on coverage for pre-
existing conditions.  But they are unlikely to know how the restriction will 
be applied in practice.  Even a trained lawyer reading judicial opinions on 
                                                                                                                          
purchasing individual insurance rather than participating through an employer-sponsored 
group plan. 
34. See Charles Duhigg, Aging, Frail and Fighting Insurers to Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 2007, A1, col. 3 (describing travails of insured attempting to obtain coverage (to 
which she pretty clearly seems entitled) from long-term care insurer); Robert Pear, Loss of 
Competition Is Seen in Health Insurance Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday, April 30, 2006, 19, 
col. 4; Report Finds Limited Competition In Nation’s Health Insurance Market, INS. J., April 
21, 2006, available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/nationa/2006/04/21/67456.htm.   
35.  And if the employer-provided group health plan is not sufficient for the patient’s 
needs, the patient or her family may face substantial uninsured medical bills.  See John 
Carryrou, As Medical Costs Soar, The Insured Face Huge Tab:  Jim Dawson Hit Cap After 
Hospital Padding; The $1.2 Million Bill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007 at A1, col. 4; Chad 
Terhune, Covering the Uninsured, But Only up to $25,000, WALL ST. J., April 18, 2007, A1, 
col. 4 (describing limits of Tennessee program to provide private medical insurance to the 
uninsured); Milt Freudenheim, The Check is Not in the Mail:  Late Payment of Medical 
Calims Adds to the Cost of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006 at C1, col. 2.  See also 
Benesowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 870 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 2007) (enforcing medical 
insurance coverage limitation for pre-existing conditions; rejecting insured argument of 
violation of state regulation). 
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the subject would have difficulty giving a client ironclad advice about 
whether his or her prior medical problems make the exclusion or restriction 
applicable, much less whether the insurer will force the policyholder to 
litigate seeking coverage under various possible scenarios.36 
Contingency is of course at the heart of insurance.  People buy medical 
insurance because of the contingent risk of developing health problems.  
Even with the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard (both which tend 
to be overstated in this context),37 consumers are unlikely to have any real 
idea of whether they will be health “winners” (who have only a few 
significant adverse medical events in their lives) or health “losers” (who 
have more than their share of health problems or injuries).  They are 
certainly unlikely to be able to predict the cost of these events and the 
outcomes.  A buyer of health insurance may skate through life without 
more than annual check-ups or may become a regular prescription user 
subject to several expensive operations or chronic expensive treatment.  
Thus, right at the outset, a prospective purchaser of insurance is at a 
practical loss to know what type of coverage and what amount of coverage 
is needed. 
The consumer thus depends on the insurer to put together and market 
an apt product for the contingencies facing the consumer.  To the extent the 
product is standardized, comparison shopping, at least according to 
premiums charged, is facilitated.  But where policies differ at the margin 
(and medical insurance is less standardized than life, auto, and general 
liability insurance), comparison again becomes difficult because the 
differences will be hard to detect and hard to decipher when detected.  
Unlike large businesses, individuals are far less likely to have the services 
of a knowledgeable broker, independent agent, or attorney who can note 
and explain the differences. 
Most difficult, however, for comparison purposes is that the consumer 
will not readily be able to predict the insurer’s behavior in the event of a 
claim.  Among insurance insiders, certain carriers are known to be more 
hospitable, even magnanimous, toward claims while other insurers have a 
reputation for fighting many claims on technicalities and even lapsing 
toward bad faith too often in an effort to maximize profits at the expense of 
the insurer’s fiduciary-like duty to its insureds.  But most consumers lack 
any such information.  Like lambs led to the slaughter, they may joyously 
                                                                                                                 
36.  See, e.g., Benesowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 870 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 2007). 
37. See Peter Siegleman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets:  An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).    
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march into the arms of an insurer that offers a seemingly comprehensive 
product at relatively low cost only to find that if a claim arises (particularly 
a big claim), the insurer fights it with a ferocity typically found among 
revolutionary guerillas.   
Even for sophisticated business consumers of insurance, it is hard to 
predict whether the insurer will be difficult or reasonable regarding claims.  
Individual claims adjusters may vary.  The insurer may have personnel 
changes at the top that convert a formerly reasonable insurer to one that 
fights every claim tooth and nail.  The insurer may decide to outsource its 
claims function to a third party administrator (TPA), managing general 
agent (MGA), or independent adjuster.  The chosen entity may be 
competent and reasonable or may be incompetent and excessively stingy, 
owing to either its low cost and lack of training/expertise38 or to a 
philosophy holding that a tough claims stance will increase insurer profit 
and future use of the claims entity.  The situation may get better or worse 
depending on intervening judicial decisions.  A jurisdiction that put 
constraints on insurer self-dealing at the beginning of a policy period may 
issue a new opinion giving insurers more discretion that may in turn result 
in more obstreperous claims stances. 
Most important, the insurance contract is aleatory, no matter how 
sophisticated the consumer or business purchasing insurance.  An aleatory 
contract is one in which the exchange is, unlike most contracts, not equal.  
The insurance policy could be anything from a great deal to an abysmal 
bargain for the participants.39  For example, if the insurer has no claims 
                                                                                                                 
38. See, e.g., Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So.2d 777, 779-80 
(Miss. 2004) (describing independent adjuster retained by insurer and its performance, 
which included assigning an individual adjuster to the case who was not licensed in the 
relevant state, had no training in matters pertinent to the claim, was unaware of relevant 
state law regarding “stacking” of insurance benefits until advised by claimant’s counsel, 
failed to obtain necessary legal opinion, misrepresented her efforts to claimant, and failed to 
obtain relevant coverage documentation necessary to make determination of claim; 
Incredibly, court deems this litany of failing mere negligence as a matter of law and 
insufficient evidence of gross negligence necessary to maintain claim against adjuster, 
overturning jury verdict finding gross negligence). 
39.  Regarding insurance policies as aleatory contracts, see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE. CONTRACTS § 1.06 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008); EMERIC FISCHER, 
PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 2.02 (Rev. 
3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2006); GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
INSURANCE  99 (9th ed. 2005) (“An aleatory contract is a contract where the values 
exchanged may not be equal but depend on an uncertain event.  Depending on chance, one 
party may receive a value out of proportion to the value that is given.”) (emphasis removed); 
MARK DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 163 (8th ed. 2005) 
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during a policy period, the premium received is almost pure profit that 
earns investment income forever more.  Alternatively, the insured may be 
severely injured the day after becoming subject to coverage.  Even if the 
insurer behaves dishonorably in response to this type of claim, it will 
almost certainly pay far more in benefits and disputing costs than it ever 
received in premiums from the particular claimant in question.40  
Conversely, the policyholder may in some cases receive coverage far in 
excess of premiums paid or in other cases pay premiums for decades and 
receive nothing in return.  (This is not impossible even though everyone 
gets sick once in awhile.  The insured may never be sick enough, often 
enough to exceed the deductible amount of the policy, which is shouldered 
by the insured).   
In short, one does not know who wins or loses regarding an insurance 
purchase until years or even decades letter.  Contrast this to most other 
consumer purchases.  Even where the good or service bought is complex or 
expensive (e.g., a car, a home), the exchange is thought to be equal, 
because the parties are able to make a real time comparative evaluation of 
value.  A resident of Omaha, Nebraska may think the consumer is nuts to 
have paid $500,000 for a two-bedroom house in Silicon Valley, but this is 
the price the market has set and it may make sense in light of the 
consumer’s objectives (e.g., a short commute to Google headquarters in 
which he not only works but effectively lives for twenty hours each day), 
                                                                                                                          
(“The aleatory feature of insurance policies differs from other [commutative] business 
contracts where consideration of equal value is exchanged.”) (emphasis removed). 
40.  But applied to its book of business as a whole, insurers may find that acting 
dishonorably is profitable.  Although they may ultimately pay far more in benefits than was 
received in premiums for a particular policyholder, the insurer’s war-of-attrition may 
succeed in getting insureds to drop meritorious claims or settle them at pennies on the 
dollar.   
Unless the claim is sufficiently large, the insured will have trouble finding an 
attorney willing to take the case on a contingent fee basis (unless the insurer’s position is so 
clearly unreasonable that it makes a bad faith suit with punitive damages likely, but caps on 
such damages may make a small dollar case of even egregious insurer misconduct 
unattractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers).  For most people, this means they cannot obtain legal 
representation because their budgets preclude them from paying counsel’s normal hourly 
rate.  In addition, the insurer’s “tough” stance on claims may become sufficiently known to 
further discourage lawyers from becoming involved and to prompt early, “lowball” 
settlements with policyholders. 
Perhaps most important, an insurer-wide policy of stringing out claims payments 
as long as possible permits the insurer to reclaim through investment income whatever 
underwriting loss it may have suffered in connection with individual instances of insureds 
who incur covered medical costs in excess of the amount of premiums paid to insurers. 
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which are not contingent in the manner of fortuitous health problems or 
other loss events.  As a general rule of economics, we do not look past the 
observed purchasing preferences of consumers.  If a thirteen-year-old 
thinks that a Hannah Montana album is worth $14.99, that’s its value, no 
matter how much one’s own taste may run in a different musical direction.  
The parties can value the exchange as they see fit even if third parties may 
question their taste or valuation. 
But insurance is different – particularly for the consumer – because it is 
an economic transaction centered on risk and contingency.  Insurers and 
more sophisticated business entities can mitigate the uncertainty of the 
aleatory contract by making actuarial calculations based on experience, 
comparable population data, or longitudinal studies.  Most important, they 
pool contingent risks and through the law of large numbers can make 
reasonably well-calculated estimates regarding future medical care needs.  
By contrast, consumers will either lack access to such information or as 
practical matter be unable to expend the money and time necessary for such 
evaluations.  The typical individual is simply not in a position to be a very 
intelligent consumer of insurance, particularly health insurance. 
Currently, the private sector provides some counterweight to this 
imbalance of expertise through the dominance of employer-provided group 
medical insurance.  In contrast to the individual insured, the employer has 
the resources, experience, and leverage to make better estimates and strike 
better bargains with private insurers.  But this field-leveling power of the 
employer remains less powerful than the accumulated expertise and 
resources of the insurance industry.   
More important, employers may not have the motivation to fully 
deploy their resources on behalf of insured workers.  Despite its 
responsibilities as a benefits provider, the employer’s zeal will be diluted 
by a desire to keep costs down.  It will be tempted to spend less for inferior 
coverage from a difficult insurer so long as not hard-pressed by the 
workforce.  Individual workers are unlikely to apply such pressure.  Unions 
are more likely to be effective advocates for employee group insureds, but 
unions have declined in membership to the point where only about 15 
percent of the workforce is organized.  Employer-provided insurance as a 
whole has declined in recent years as well.41   
For many employers, minimalist group insurance is their optimal 
economic strategy.  Prospective workers are looking primarily for a job 
rather than medical coverage (which is why the danger of adverse selection 
                                                                                                                 
41. See Jost, Health Insurance a Bad Idea?, supra note 4. 
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is overstated) and, as discussed above, have only limited expertise about 
medical insurance.  Consequently, workers and job applicants will not exert 
particularly powerful leverage forcing employers to achieve optimal 
medical coverage for their workforces.  We cannot be completely confident 
that employers will be faithful agents of employees concerning the 
purchase of medical insurance.   
 
B.  THE LEGAL FICTION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROL OF 
HEALTH 
 
The second legal fiction, which also becomes part of the legal friction 
between individualism and collective solidarity, is the increasing tendency 
to implicitly assign fault to persons experiencing adverse health events and 
medical costs.  More important, the typical consumer will not have much if 
any effective control over his or her medical care needs and costs.  But 
because of the John Wayne mythology of rugged individualism and 
personal responsibility, society (and analysts and policymakers who should 
know better) act as if the individual has some meaningful control over his 
or her health.  For example, people frequently refer to someone “beating” 
cancer or “battling” illness, as though one’s failure to stay healthy or 
recover were solely a function of one’s efforts and abilities.42  In reality, 
good or bad health, more than economic success or emotional happiness, 
                                                                                                                 
42. See SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978)(describing her struggles with 
breast cancer and noting social tendency to see illness and treatment as analogous to 
protagonist in conflict with adverse entity rather than fortuitous circumstances controlled by 
genetics or inexorable environmental factors).  See also DAVID RIEFF, SWIMMING IN A SEA OF 
DEATH (2008) (Sontag’s son chronicles her myriad medical problems and attempts to 
overcome them). 
One particular example of this tendency in popular culture sticks in my mind.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, sportscasters often referred to Jack Pardee, a former Los 
Angeles Rams coach and one-time star player (a linebacker for the Rams and the 
Washington Redskins) as “beating” black mole cancer, expressing some awe due to the 
rareness of recovery from the disease at that time.   
This, of course, is an empirically ridiculous way of putting it.  Pardee was a great 
player and a tough guy.  But he did not vanquish his cancer.  He recovered from it through 
good medical care and luck.  His recovery was not a testament to any moral, mental or 
physical superiority just as it would not indicate deficiency in these areas had he died from 
the cancer.  Depending on chance circumstances, the same type of virus might kill Arnold 
Schwarzenegger but leave Pee Wee Herman relatively unscathed.  Strength, athletic ability, 
intelligence, and determination have little or nothing to do with whether one gets sick or 
recovers.  But we continue to talk about illness in these misleading terms. 
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results far more from chance than from personal decisionmaking, conduct, 
discipline or effort.43 
For years, insurers have waged a semantic and psychological campaign 
against the notion of blameless fortuity in adverse events and at least 
suggested that many losses are not true accidents of chance but are to a 
significant degree the fault of insureds.  For example, automobile mishaps 
are no longer labeled “accidents” by most insurance personnel.  Instead, 
they are trained to speak of “collisions” and “crashes” that imply fault on at 
least someone’s part (usually the driver covered by another insurer).44  In 
health insurance, this more generally takes the form of the suggestion that 
while the insured does not knowingly become ill, the insured’s lifestyle and 
negligence may have created or contributed to the health problem that now 
requires medical care.45  This view, although possessed of some merit in 
the aggregate, is generally not a productive way to think about individual 
medical needs and insurance claims.   
In a large enough group of persons, their lifestyles will at least in some 
cases ultimately show significant impact on adverse health events and 
consequent medical care.  For example, a group of chain smokers will 
eventually have much higher rates of heart disease, lung cancer, 
emphysema, and related maladies associated with smoking while a similar 
group of nonsmokers will, absent other factors, have fewer such adverse 
health events and lower medical care costs.   
In the aggregate, it therefore makes considerable sense to promote the 
reduction of medical risk through encouraging better lifestyles among 
insurers.  Programs to promote exercise, healthy eating, nonsmoking, 
moderation in alcohol use, and avoidance of illegal drugs or unregulated 
                                                                                                                 
43. See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 562 (noting that ten percent of population “accounts 
for almost 70 percent of the health care costs, and the top 2 percent accounts for almost 40 
percent of the costs.”). 
44. See RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS 
GOVERNANCE Ch. 3 (2003).  For one example of the tremendous public relations resources 
deployed by the insurance industry, see Peter J. Howe, Firm He Hired to Buff Image is 
Suing Mogul; Cambridge PR Shop Says it’s Owed $2M, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2007 
(public relations firm eSapience Ltd alleges former AIG CEO and insurance executive 
Maurice “Hank” Greenberg owes $2 million for services purchased when he sought to 
burnish his image tarnished by then-New York Attorney General and later Governor Eliot 
Spitzer’s investigation of AIG; bills ranged as high as $978,000 for a month’s assistance in 
presenting Greenberg in “best light and to assure the presence and participation of key 
intellectual and public figures” at events involving Greenberg, according to complaint). 
45.  See Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 
supra note 22. 
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supplements all help group members as a whole, society, the medical 
profession, and reduce medical care usage and costs.   
Paradoxically, however, the current system of crazy-quilt private 
patchwork insurance does little to foster these efforts.  Most insurers fail to 
cover many potential efforts to enhance prevention of illness through better 
lifestyle.  Historically, private insurers have been slow to cover preventive 
medical care such as annual checkups.  This appears to result from a 
combination of short-sightedness, concern about overuse of this type of 
benefit, and the more calculatingly disturbing but perhaps correct business 
decision that paying for prevention in the instant policy period simply 
lowers some future insurer’s cost of covered care in subsequent policy 
periods.46   
But whatever the merits of preventive care and a health lifestyle, I find 
it disturbing that so much of modern health care and insurance rhetoric 
seems to uncritically accept the notion that much of medical need results 
from the insured patient’s own failings of discipline rather than the simply 
fortuity of genetics and luck.  Although a group as a whole will reflect the 
benefits of healthy lifestyle, individuals within the group may or may not 
enjoy the benefit.  For example, a non-smoker who wins marathons and has 
low blood pressure and cholesterol may nonetheless drop dead from a 
sudden heart attack.  Or he may be stricken with cancer.  Or rear-ended by 
a truck.  Or infected while making a blood donation.   
Conversely, the 300-pounder who stands 5’8” tall and smokes two 
packs a day may live to be 100.   When observers conclude that because 
each individual within a group demonstrates the whole group’s 
characteristics, they make what statisticians term the “ecological” fallacy.47  
For example, it would be erroneous to conclude that every union member 
                                                                                                                 
46. This is why also why Hyman is overly optimistic in positing medical insurers will 
engage in an optimal level of preventive care in the absence of government regulation.  See 
Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Failure?, supra note 4.  In 
addition, as Mariner notes, preventive care and wellness programs raise the prospect of 
deviating from the fortuity model of insurance and creating a situation that (like HSAs, 
HRAs and other consumer-driven proposals) tends to benefit the upper socioeconomic strata 
much more than their lower SES counterparts.  See Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal 
Responsibility in Health Reform, supra note 22. 
47. See Jerry Mashaw, The Economics and Politics the Understanding of Public Law, 
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 150 (1989) (“Behavior found to characterize a population, at the 
population level, has been fallaciously assumed to characterize the behavior of individuals 
in the population”); Gerald Kramer, The Ecological Fallacy Revisited:  Aggregate-versus-
Individual Findings on Economics, Elections, and Sociopolitical Voting, 77 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 92 (1983).  
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voting in a Democratic primary supported John Edwards, although it is true 
that he enjoyed (at least during the early stages of the 2008 campaign) 
considerable support from that group as a whole.  Non-statisticians 
intrinsically realize that this is incorrect but are often overly casual in 
stereotyping based on subconscious application of the fallacy (e.g., looking 
at a plumber with a lunch pail on his way to the polls and assuming he is a 
vote for Edwards).   
Much of the rhetoric about consumer/patient responsibility in health 
care comes dangerously close to embracing the ecological fallacy.  It 
suggests, at least implicitly, that people with health problems are at least 
partially responsible and that it is therefore unfair or unwise to pool them 
with people who are comparatively free of health problems or the need for 
expensive medical treatment.  This attitude is simply not rational as applied 
to the serendipitous nature of health problems and the need for medical 
care.   
Only in extreme cases (e.g., the self-destructive risk-taker, the 
spendthrift hypochondriac), can it legitimately be said that individual 
patients had a significant role in maladies that have afflicted them or the 
total amount and cost of treatment.  Much of adverse health and medical 
experience results from simple bad luck.  It is wrong to suggest, even 
indirectly, that this results from the patient’s failures and that the patient is 
therefore less deserving of adequate medical care and insurance coverage 
than those blessed with better medical fortune.48 
But the rhetoric in much of the health care and insurance debate, even 
if not strictly inaccurate, is slanted in favor of overstating the individual’s 
control over her health history and the relative desert of certain individuals.  
For example, use of a term such as “personal responsibility” is simply 
overdone and misleading for many health issues.49  A person stricken by 
                                                                                                                 
48. See Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard:  Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 12 (1999). 
49. But this terminology is so hard-wired into our discussions of medical issues that it 
pervades even scholarly treatments that do not embrace an unrealistic view of an 
individual’s ability to control his own health care options.  See, e.g., Mariner, Social 
Solidarity, supra note 22; Lois Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 445 (2005); Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in Health Care:  Spanning the Boundary 
Between Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 465 (2005); Lois Shepherd, Face To 
Face:  A Call for Radical Responsibility in Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 445 
(2003).  Reading the titles of these articles alone, one might first erroneously assume that 
they are part of the John Wayne ethos when they are in fact written from a communitarian 
social justice (Mariner, Shepherd) or professionalism (Heimer) perspective.  The rhetoric of 
market, rugged individualism, and aversion to government programs is so strong in the U.S. 
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cancer clearly is not at fault.  A person injured in an auto accident or 
workplace mishap may have been negligent but this hardly amounts to 
personally irresponsibility.  As the insurance industry well knows, 
everybody is negligent at times but not every instance of negligence results 
in damage to self or others.  Although behavior may contribute to problems 
with diabetes, heart or lung disease, much of medical outcome is a 
metaphorical roll of the hereditary and biological dice.  Personal 
responsibility rhetoric implicitly blames people more accurately described 
as victims and provides a subconscious salve permitting society to overlook 
the problem of an inadequate national approach to medical coverage. 
A term like “actuarial fairness,”50 although it may be technically 
accurate and useful in describing risk populations, is also rhetorically 
overloaded with the connotation that sick people have largely been their 
own worst enemies (or at least must lump their conditions).  Implicitly, 
providing coverage to those making higher demands on the medical system 
is “unfair” to those at lower risk or presenting fewer current demands.  This 
nomenclature makes it easier to avoid a sufficiently comprehensive 
solution because it implicitly suggests that any government efforts 
extending beyond a market-based solution is unfair to the bulk of society 
and unfairly subsidizes the medical needs of the undeserving. 
The net effect of this type of discourse is to reinforce the traditional 
American notions of rugged individualism and the optimal efficiency of 
markets, creating a climate where policymakers can implicitly take the 
position that doing more for those who are sicker, poorer, or less skilled in 
navigating the world carries too high a price tag, both economically (e.g., 
higher taxes, higher premiums, higher medical costs) and socially (e.g., 
enhancement of the “nanny state” in derogation of the preferred ethos of 
rugged individualism). 
In addition to being an unfair attack on the ill and the risky, the rhetoric 
of individualism and market veneration is amazingly unempathetic.  John 
Wayne was able to achieve his goals in large part because he was never 
seriously injured or ill, at least not prior to accomplishing his mission.51  
                                                                                                                          
that the immediate connotative reaction (mine, at least) to the term “personal responsibility” 
is to assume the speaker is advocating a “let the chips fall” position in which the individual 
stands alone, protected only by contract and individual fortitude.  
50. See Mariner, Social Solidarity, supra note 22 (using term throughout and also 
using term “personal responsibility” throughout). 
51. In the 1969 movie TRUE GRIT, for which he won an Oscar, Wayne was wounded 
while dispatching the villain but the seriousness of the wound, which ultimately did him in, 
did not manifest itself until after the shooting was over.  TRUE GRIT (Paramount Pictures 
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Today, some health insurance commentators would seemingly be unwilling 
to chalk up adverse health events to fortuitous chance and would instead 
wonder whether they had instead not brought this upon themselves through 
lifestyle factors (e.g., smoking, poor diet, insufficient sleep, poor 
hygiene).52  This implicit appeal to the John Wayne iconography of 
America is used as a selling point for certain insurance and financial 
products by appealing to the public through rhetoric about “consumer 
choice” or “freedom” or an “ownership society” when these initiatives will, 
for most people, be far less helpful than a government-administered single 
payer system.53 
 
                                                                                                                          
1969). Of course, defenders of rugged individualism might suggest this simply 
demonstrated will power (such as in the famous Jesse Ventura line (in the movie 
COMMANDO, which also starred a similarly macho-iconographic Arnold Schwarzenegger) “I 
ain’t got time to bleed” until the mission is completed).  COMMANDO (SLM Production 
Group 1985). While the laws of biology and physics (e.g., blood escapes rapidly when one 
is shot in a vital organ) may be suspended in Hollywood, they very much limit the ability of 
ill persons to surmount their maladies through exercises of personal responsibility. 
52. See, e.g., NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, MEDICAID REFORM A 
PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM  THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION (2005), 
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/0506medicaid.pdf (positing need for “incentives and penalties 
for individuals to take more responsibility for their health care”); Craig Thomas, 
Understanding Rural Health Care Needs and Challenges:  Why Access Matters to Rural 
Americans, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 255 (2006) (in addressing needed actions on health 
care, U.S. Senator Thomas argues that “most importantly, individuals must take personal 
responsibility for their health”); Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal 
Responsibility?  Health Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 535 (2005). But see Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, supra note 49 
(taking different perspective and placing responsibility on society to provide medical care 
and alleviate suffering for the ill); Heimer, supra note 49 (focusing primarily on 
responsibility of medical professionals to patients and society). 
53. See Deborah Stone, Health Law Symposium: The False Promise of Consumer 
Choice, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 475, 475 (2007) (“In these times, the new buzzwords for 
market reform are `consumer choice,’ `consumer direction,’ ‘consumer empowerment,’ and 
‘ownership.’  [T]he rhetorical emphasis on power and control for consumers disguises the 
real impact of market reforms, which is primarily to reduce the collective assistance and 
medical services that citizens receive.”). See also Monahan, Ownership Society, supra note 
17 (finding useful incentive structures in consumer-driven plans but also that consumers are 
not particularly adept purchasers of health care). 
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The Legal Fiction of the Reliable Responsibility of Individuals (and 
the Contradictory Legal Fiction that Individuals Are Louts Who Need 
Stern Market and Insurer Discipline) 
 
In addition to the rhetoric about personal responsibility concerning 
illness itself, there is also the suggestion in much of the debate that persons 
lacking adequate insurance when illness strikes are in this pickle largely 
through their own failure to pay the required social toll of insurance.  For 
example, we are frequently reminded that many who do not receive 
medical insurance through a job will go without insurance rather than pay 
premiums for an individual policy.  Some may even describe this as a 
rational decision but one that adversely affects the nation’s ability to 
provide medical insurance that is properly funded by those who will benefit 
from it.  For example, younger persons who are less statistically likely to 
have medical problems often fail to purchase insurance.  As a result, the 
private insurance system is deprived of their premium dollars and the 
insurance system as a whole is underfunded.  But when a twenty-eight-
year-old ruptures an appendix, he will generally be able to obtain treatment 
at an emergency room.   
The picture painted, with considerable justification, is that people like 
this are freeloading on the system.  In reaction, even those favoring 
continued substantial reliance on private medical insurance urge that such 
persons be required to purchase insurance and heavily penalized if they do 
not.  This is a major underpinning of the well-publicized Massachusetts 
plan and the health care proposals of Hillary Clinton and John Edwards.54 
This is not the place to discuss mandates at length but it should be 
noted that mandates tend to be far less effectual than commonly 
supposed.55  Consider auto insurance, where for decades every state has 
                                                                                                                 
54. For a summary of the Massachusetts plan, see Elizabeth A. Weeks, Failure to 
Connect:  The Massachusetts Plan for Individual Health Insurance, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1283 
(2007). 
55. See Hyman, Good, Bad & Ugly, supra note 14, at 1111 (expressing skepticism 
about efficacy of insurance purchase mandates); Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603 , 705 (2006)(noting difficulties with and practical limitations on 
suggested liability insurance purchase mandates); Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis:  
How The Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002) (mandates create collateral 
problems such as affordability for the poor and lower middle-class); John Jacobi, The Ends 
of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 388 (1997) (describing mandated purchase 
of health insurance as “politically problematic”); David A. Hyman, Professional 
Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal Triangle:  Will Lawyers or Insurers Call 
the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 370 (1997) (noting lack of success of movement to 
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had financial responsibility laws that require, as a condition for licensing a 
motor vehicle, that the owner purchase and maintain auto insurance.  The 
required minimum amounts of such insurance are shockingly low in many 
states and the premiums, although non-trivial, are hardly astronomical, at 
least for the low policy limits minimally required.  However, experience 
shows that a large portion of the driving public fails to maintain the 
required insurance.56   
There is little reason to think that medical insurance mandates will be 
significantly more effective.  The reason:  many people, especially at the 
economic margin, will shirk legal obligations that cost money if they can 
do so without significant penalty.  In response, proponents of mandated 
purchase of private insurance seek to use penalties to create sufficient 
incentive for citizens to purchase required insurance.  Although like auto 
insurance financial responsibility laws, this will work to a degree and 
improve upon an unfettered free market atmosphere, there is no reason to 
think that it will work better overall than auto insurance.   
Most likely, it will work less well.  At least for a few hours on a given 
Tuesday, anyone wanting a license plate will need to have at least some 
auto insurance in force.  By contrast, there is no similar mandatory event, at 
least not one occurring prior to when insurance is needed, which will apply 
to all potential policyholders.  The twenty-something Starbucks worker and 
the impoverished family of four can more easily bypass insurance 
mandates than can their driving counterparts.  Absent a police state-like 
increase in law enforcement infrastructure, they will be seriously 
scrutinized and “caught” in their failure to procure insurance only after they 
have suffered an adverse medical event.57 
                                                                                                                          
mandate malpractice insurance for lawyers); James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and 
Comprehensive Federal Health Care, A Call for “Cooperative Federalism” to Preserve the 
States’ Role in Formulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 422 (1994) 
(noting that mandates alone do not “provide benefits for the unemployed, indigent, and 
uninsurable”); Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer Mandate:  
Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. LOUIS L.J. 155 (1994).  But see Tom Baker, 
Containing the Promise of Insurance:  Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 371, 380 (2002)(finding potential significant utility in health insurance purchase 
mandates). 
56. See Rebecca Cathcart, California Taking Aim At Uninsured On the Roads, N. Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A22 (Twenty-five percent of California drivers uninsured despite 
longstanding requirement of insurance purchase as prerequisite for licensing car).   
57. See Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (noting studies showing reduced use of medical 
services by uninsured and failure of younger, healthier demographic groups to purchase 
medical insurance).   
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But we continue to think of mandated private insurance as 
comprehensive solution to the health insurance problem, just as we have 
viewed mandated auto insurance as an effective public policy tool.  This is 
unwise.  A sufficiently high number of persons will fail to purchase 
medical insurance and pay premiums into the system for funding expanded 
health care.  Whether this occurs because they are irresponsible shirkers 
and slackers or because they are simply too poor, unsophisticated, or 
unorganized to make the required purchase is beside the point – or at least 
beside my point.   
My point is that even the “progressives” or “reformers” in the area of 
medical insurance, driven by perceived political pragmatism if not 
thorough analysis, have erroneously viewed private insurance purchase 
mandates as a near-panacea in large part out of misplaced continued belief 
in the legal fiction of the effectiveness of individual personal responsibility.  
At a minimum, this legal fiction posits that if required to purchase 
insurance, individuals will do so promptly and responsibly in most all 
cases.  But if this estimate is correct, people would also purchase medical 
insurance even in the absence of mandates and would place such purchases 
ahead of other desired goods and services.  Historical and empirical 
evidence is quite to the contrary.   Instead, people either consciously or 
negligently fail to obtain insurance, even when they could at least in theory 
afford it.  A more realistic view of human behavior would embrace the 
more enforced community solidarity of a government administered single 
payer plan.58 
In addition, the legal fiction of individual rationality and omniscience 
also posits that when purchasing insurance, consumers will do so wisely 
and efficiently.  But, as discussed above, most laypersons lack the 
                                                                                                                 
58. See Stone, False Promise, supra note53, at 478: 
 
[W]hen people live at the margin, they are apt to choose the 
option with the lowest short-term costs over the one with the lowest 
long-term or total costs.  People living at the margin—and that margin 
may be well up into the middle class when families face chronic disease, 
disability, job loss, income decline, and all the other factors that make 
for economic squeeze – are simply not able to behave like the rational 
economic actors of consumer choice theory.  They cannot afford to take 
the long-term view.  They are forced to be “penny wise and pound 
foolish. 
 
See also id. at 480 (“perhaps the worst feature of the consumer choice 
approach” is that “it substitutes lay judgment for professional judgment.”). 
260 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
knowledge, experience, training, or sophistication to understand and 
differentiate insurance products and providers.  In contrast to the prevailing 
legal fiction, they are not good consumers of medical insurance.  Even 
when people dutifully follow mandates to buy medical insurance, they will 
frequently make suboptimal choices regarding necessary coverage and 
make errors in choosing among whatever options are presented to them by 
the private market.59  Consequently, a system premised on the wisdom and 
utility of consumer choice via John Wayne-style individualism and 
invisible hand market behavior is unlikely to achieve sufficiently 
comprehensive and adequate medical insurance or medical care for the 
population at large. 
  
C.    THE LEGAL FRICTION OF MARKET MYTHOLOGY AND RUGGED 
INDIVIDUALISM IN TENSION WITH BOTH ITSELF AND IN 
TENSION WITH  SOCIAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY 
SOLIDARITY    
 
As discussed above, the American ethos has been to erroneously 
assume too much understanding and discipline by the consumer of 
insurance and to view with distain the consumer who fails to make good 
insurance choices.  At the same time, empathy is not completely dead in 
American society.  We worship idealized concepts of rugged individualism 
and personal responsibility but are unwilling to adopt a completely 
Darwinian approach to the ill or injured.  Although there is a substantial 
amount of “blaming the victim,” for health problems, Americans do not 
completely turn a cold shoulder to the ill or injured.  The iconic image of 
Martin Luther King and the attendant social justice notion still competes 
for the hearts and minds of the public on issues of health care.  Similarly, 
although the market efficiency wing of Adam Smith’s own writings 
dominates much of the discourse, his thoughts on the importance of a 
                                                                                                                 
59. The Massachusetts plan and similar initiatives attempt to deal with this problem 
by placing some requirements on insurers as to the minimum content and features of health 
insurance policies sold.  Like mandated private coverage itself, this regulatory effort is 
better than nothing, but it will leave many consumers without optimal coverage for their 
needs.  However, to the extent that government-required minimum features of a medical 
insurance policy are effective, this is actually a powerful argument for simply traveling the 
extra mile to a government administered single payer system.  Logically, if regulators can 
design an effective basic medical insurance policy, they can also effectively design the 
contours of a fair single payer system. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The New 
Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229 
(2007).  
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strong, competent, self-regulating professional class also play a role in the 
health care debate. 
As the politicians continue to remind us during the 2008 election 
season, Americans are a compassionate people as well as a group that 
worships at the shrines of rugged individualism, personal responsibility and 
ambition.  As a consequence, despite some rhetorical and social looking 
askance at the obese, the slothful, smokers, drunkards, and druggies, 
society (even its insurance element) has been unwilling to completely 
exclude most such people from coverage they would otherwise receive as 
members of an insured risk pool.    
The inability of the body politic to adopt either the cold-hearted 
approach of letting the health or poor consumer choice chips fall where 
they may or the more emphatic communitarian approach of comprehensive 
universal health care leads to the legal friction or tension between 
allegiance to the norms of rugged individualism and personal responsibility 
and the recognition that, at least in the arena of human health, outcomes are 
often not within the control of the individual. 
The result is, much like American medical insurance itself, a 
patchwork of occasionally spotty coverage that for the most part provides 
coverage even for the Louie Andersons (overweight) and Humphrey 
Bogarts (smoker) of the world but does so in a manner that may impose 
additional costs or reduced coverage, particularly when that person is not 
part of a group insurance plan.   Increasingly, insurers in general have tried 
to restrict coverage accorded to insureds engaged in arguably wrongful or 
irresponsible activity and have tried to avoid providing medical insurance 
in such cases unless they can extract a sufficiently high premium.  For auto 
insurers, we see this new judgmentalism in the form of clauses that exclude 
coverage if a car accident arises out of the policyholder’s intoxicated 
driving or criminal act.  For health insurers, we see measures such as 
broader and longer bans on coverage for pre-existing conditions, 
differential premiums rates based on lifestyle factors.   
More important for purposes of the health care/medical insurance 
debate, the purported fault of patients provides insurers with an argument 
against single payer administration of universal coverage even if the 
argument is largely made sub silentio.  Because of public ambivalence 
about how far to take the personal responsibility track in derogation of 
compassion, this argument has not been completely successful alone but at 
the margin has helped the status quo resist efforts toward universal health 
insurance coverage. 
But this tension, like most, has strong elements of inconsistency, as 
does the so-called consumer driven health care movement.  On one hand, 
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the theology of market-and-individual driven health care posits that many 
people are just too darned undisciplined, lazy and self-destructive and that, 
as a result, the costs that they bring upon themselves should not be heavily 
subsidized nor should the health consequences of their foibles be borne by 
a unified national insurance system.   The consumer-driven, market-based 
model of medical insurance implicitly belittles individuals as undisciplined 
louts who fail to take adequate care of themselves, over-consume expensive 
medical care, and fail to exhibit apt discipline in lifestyle, insurance 
purchase, or resort to health care. 
But on the proverbial other hand, the consumer-driven movement 
argues that individuals are sufficiently all-knowing that they don’t need 
universal health care and single payer medical coverage and that they can 
make shrewd, disciplined insurance purchasing decisions.  In addition, the 
movement posits that people will be similarly shrewd, disciplined, price-
controlling consumers of medical services. 
The inconsistency is palpable.  The problem, of course, is that slothful 
slackers and the shrewd consumers are the same people, or at least 
comprise the same population pool.  Some subgroup of the populace may 
meet the implicit John Wayne/Adam Smith assumptions underlying the 
consumer-driven health movement (just as every neighborhood has a few 
nerds who never unwittingly violate even the most arcane neighborhood 
association rules regarding aesthetics).  But this subgroup is logically much 
smaller than posited by the movement – and too small to sustain movement 
health care.  People are not completely incompetent in health matters, but 
comparatively few have the education, training, time, discipline, and 
energy to manage their medical insurance portfolio in the manner posited 
by those favoring continued or increased market control over medical 
coverage.   
 
II.        THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE MARKET AND OF PRIVATE 
INSURER EFFICIENCY 
 
A seemingly stronger arrow in the quiver of the status quo is public 
concern that anything but a market-based, private sector model for medical 
insurance will be too inefficient and expensive.  The Adam Smith legacy of 
a belief in omniscient and omnipotent markets has created an unhelpful 
mythology positing that private sector health care and insurance is so 
dramatically and consistently more efficient than any government-run or 
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hybridized model that it should be tinkered with only under the most dire of 
circumstances and only to the most limited degree.60   
At the risk of picking more of a fight than I have already begun, much 
of David Hyman’s scholarship is in this vein, although he is also highly 
critical of the role of private insurer payers in the current patchwork system 
as well as critical of government single payer plans such as Medicare.61  
It’s clever, knowledgeable, insightful and well-written, with occasionally 
counterintuitive nuggets of some support for particular types of regulation 
or government efforts on behalf of patient rights.62  But regardless of 
whether one finds it persuasive, it seems undeniable that it all proceeds 
from a Smithian world view exceedingly enamored of markets and 
consumer choice.63  (The Smith who advocated for professionals’ financial 
                                                                                                                 
60. See Anna Bernasek, Health Care Problem? Check the American Psyche, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, at B3 (noting resistance to government public insurance system based 
on American norms). 
61. See e.g. Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S., 
supra note 16, at 959 (2005) (“markets dominated by third-party payment arrangements 
function relatively poorly…[p]ayers bear most of the costs of health care; patients enjoy 
most of the gains.  Payers therefore care about cost more than quality.”); David A. Hyman,  
Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong With a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
221 (2001); David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social 
Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen”, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531 (2001); David A. 
Hyman & Charles Silver, Just What the Patient Ordered:  The Case for Result-Based 
Compensation Arrangements, 29 J. L. MED & ETHICS 170 (2001); David A. Hyman, Drive-
Through Deliveries:  Is “Consumer Protection” Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N. C. L. 
REV. 5 (1999); David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA:  Past Imperfect/Future 
Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 29 (1998); David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability:  
Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 370 (1990) (“In a world 
where patients are relatively ignorant about their medical conditions, a for-profit provider 
has a clear incentive to cheat on quality and quantity. Because there are no equity 
shareholders, nonprofit hospitals may be safer for the relatively helpless patient.”).  See also 
David A. Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for the Perplexed, 26 
AM. J.L. & MED. 143, 152 (2000) (on the subject of “picking a fight”: relating that his 
scholarship was described at one conference as reflecting “the sort of views that caused the 
Irish potato famine.”).  Presumably, I have not gone this far in my differing. 
62. See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S., 
supra note 61; David A. Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, 46 PERSP. IN 
BIOLOGY. & MED. 55, 65 (2003) (finding that Medicare does care about quality – but 
suggesting that it achieves it less well than would private insurer or uninsured markets). 
63. For the best example of all these traits of Hyman scholarship, see DAVID A. 
HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006) (discussing fictitious memorandum in 
the manner of C.S. Lewis’ The Screwtape Letters (1942) revealing Medicare to be diabolic 
plot designed to drain Americans of virtues of thrift and truthfulness and lead them into 
seven deadly sins of avarice, gluttony, envy, sloth, lust anger and vanity); David A. Hyman, 
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success is largely missing in Hyman’s work but, like Smith, he holds 
professionals to an implicitly high standard of care and competence).  
Hyman is hardly alone, at least outside the academy, where the seemingly 
dominant view among policymakers is that any comprehensive program to 
effect full medical coverage must involve private insurers and that there 
should be no program that effectively eliminates private insurers in favor of 
government.64 
Notwithstanding its political dominance, the dominant market 
paradigm for configuring medical coverage appears substantially incorrect 
on a number of grounds.  First, despite the supposed marvels of the market 
in controlling costs, both health care costs and insurance premium rates are 
high and tending higher.  Market defenders typically ascribe this to the 
effects of government subsidization of group medical insurance, which is 
generally a fringe benefit that workers receive as untaxed compensation.  
The point has force but not nearly so much as its advocates claim.  Even 
without tax subsidy, private insurance premiums would likely be high 
because of market concentration, generally rising medical costs, strong 
demand for coverage, and insurer inability to effectively control costs to 
any significantly better degree than the government. 
Regardless of whether it is taxed when received by an employee, the 
employer’s share of group health insurance premiums costs money for the 
employer.  Although the cost can be deducted as a business expense, the 
corresponding reduction in tax liability is not, for most businesses, the 
same as avoiding the expenditure altogether.  Health insurance still costs 
                                                                                                                          
Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2003) (similar, shorter 
version of argument). 
64. See Hossain, supra note 1, at 1 (noting absence of even Democratic presidential 
support for government single-payer insurance or any plan that does not rely substantially 
on purchase of private medical insurance).  Further, Hyman, albeit sometimes feeling 
embattled among the ivory tower types, is not without at least partial support in the academy 
as well.  See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix 
It:  An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537 (2006) (advocating 
continued significant role for private insurance along the lines of Massachusetts plan, with 
purchase mandates but subsidies for payment). See also Jacobson, supra note 9, at 734-35 
(contending that four conceptual paradigms compete for dominance in health law: economic 
(market competitive); professional; rights-based (social justice) and institutional, and that 
“social justice model is on hold” which is a “euphemism for being dead in the water. 
Instead, the real struggle for doctrinal supremacy in health law is between the market and 
professional models.”).  A soundly administered government single payer system holds the 
more promise than the current or market models for achieving professional and institutional 
goals as well as social justice and may actually work to enhance meaningful consumer 
choice regarding medical services.   
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money, which presumably gives employers plenty of incentive to keep 
premiums down.  In spite of this, premiums consistently rise.  Although 
this is not necessarily the “fault” of the market for employer-insurer health 
care bargaining, it at least demonstrates the strong limitations on this 
market as a vehicle for controlling premium costs. 
Part of the problem is motivational disconnect between employers, who 
see medical insurance as an expensive fringe benefit on which to 
economize and workers who get to use the medical care and would like 
more, better care.  Another part of the problem is that even large employers 
may not have as much leverage with insurers as necessary to provide 
effective cost control in the face of insurer drive for profit while individuals 
are particularly ill-suited to the cost-policing enterprise.65  By contrast, the 
                                                                                                                 
65. See Robert Pear, Hard Sell Cited as Insurers Push Plans to Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2007, at A1; Sarah Lueck, Private Remedy: Insurers Fight to Defend Lucrative 
Medicare Business; As Democrats Push Cuts, Trade Group Targets Minority Lawmakers, 
WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007, at A1; Milt Freudenheim, A Benefit for Insurers: Medicare 
Drug Plan Feeds More Profitable Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at C1. See 
also James Bandler, et al., CEO Aims to Halt Stock-Based Pay at UnitedHealth; Move 
Comes Amid Scrutiny Of Options Timing, Gains; Suspensions in Vitesse Probe, WALL ST. J., 
April 19, 2006 at A1; George Anders, Health-Care Gold Mines: Middlemen Strike It Rich; 
Rewarding Career: As Patients, Doctors Feel Pinch, Insurer’s CEO Makes a Billion; 
UnitedHealth Directors Strive To Please ‘Brilliant’ Chief; New Questions on Options; 
Selling Trout for 40 Cents a Pound, WALL ST. J., April 18, 2006 at A1. Of course, providers 
also try to extract higher prices and maintain or improve their compensation.  See Reinhardt, 
Economist’s Model, supra note 3.  But see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Withdrawal Treatment: A 
Novel Plan Helps Hospital Wean Itself Off Pricey Tests; It Cajoles Big Insurer to Pay a 
Little More for Cheaper Therapies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2007, at A1 (example of cost-
saving methods originated and championed by provider. Hyman makes this point well in 
Mephistopheles and other writings).  See  e.g., Hyman, Patient Bill of Rights, supra note 61.  
A large part of my problem with Hyman’s analysis is his relative overemphasis on provider 
profit (particularly physician compensation) as compared to the problems of private insurer 
charges and profiteering, which in my view leave problems of provider compensation 
(particularly physician compensation) in the dust.   
Even more troublesome from my point of view is the differential human cost of 
provider avarice in contrast to insurer avarice.  Provider avarice may increase costs but 
should mean, at least in theory (and mostly in practice) that patients get more care and more 
than adequate care.  But see Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, supra note 63, at 
1183 (“Shoveling money out the door to purchase health care services is, of course, not the 
same thing as purchasing high-quality health care.”).  By contrast, insurer avarice is 
manifested in claim denial that may lead to severe injury or even death for a patient unable 
to obtain coverage; see Jane Zhang, Chronic Condition: Amid Fight for Life, A Victim of 
Lupus Fights for Insurance; Lost in U.S. Health-Care Maze, Her Coverage Was Ended As 
Her Illness Worsened; Skipping a $2,000 CT Scan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2006, at A1. But, of 
course, Hyman is hardly alone in pinning much of the blame for rising medical costs (in my 
view, more of the blame) on providers rather than insurers who fail to control them 
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federal government and individual states have bargaining clout exceeding 
that of even large companies.  Even a small state (e.g., Nevada) has more 
employees than even the largest multinational companies.  In addition, of 
course, insurance administered through a national government or 50 state 
administrations would be significantly more streamlined than insurance 
purchased through tens of thousands of companies (some large, some 
small) and administered by scores of health insurers. 
Just as employer-insurer bargaining has not been the anticipated cost 
control panacea regarding premiums, bargaining between insurers and 
medical providers has not controlled costs to the degree anticipated by 
defenders of private medical insurers.  It is not at all clear that insurers are 
particularly effective at controlling medical costs in a consistent and 
rational way.66  In spite of the central role of private insurers in the current 
medical care system, medical costs continue to rise, despite some 
occasional brief periods of relative stability.  By comparison, the health 
care systems that stop with the half-measures of the American status quo 
and move directly to the government single-payer system have significantly 
lower per capita medical costs.67 
The evidence on insurer cost control is mixed.  For example, insurers 
have been effective in negotiating provider discounts, at least this appears 
to be the case on the face of benefits explanation statements commonly sent 
by insurers to policyholders.  A typical one indicates that Doctor X charged 
$85 for an office visit but discounted it to $45 in order to receive insurer 
payment.  Even with my $20 deductible, Doctor X has, at least in theory, 
reduced his charges because of the presence of private insurance in this 
medical care transaction.68   
                                                                                                                          
(particularly the particularly avaricious) and for often establishing economic incentives that 
are at least as misguided as anything the government could dream up; see e.g.  Bruce C. 
Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 22.       
66. See  Rhonda L. Rundle, Critical Case:  How an Email Rant Jolted a Big HMO:  A 
22-Year-Old’s Tirade Made Trouble for Kaiser; Mr. Deal Got Fired, Famous, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 24, 2007, at A1 (whistleblower notes $1.5 billion annually in alleged waste expenditure 
by insurer on misconceived electronic records project);  John C. Goodman, Perverse 
Incentives in Health Care, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2007 at A13 (noting that Mayo Clinic may 
be cheaper than your local hospital). 
67. See supra note 18. 
68. Random walks through recent family medical bills reflect similarly deep 
discounts, at least on paper, for other services.  Fore example, one specialist lists a charge of  
$220 for a comprehensive new patient visit, but accepts $96.72 from my insurer, “adjusts” 
the charges to eliminate $93.28 (effectively eating this portion of the charge and in effect 
knocking the $220 charge to $130, leaving $30 as the patient’s portion.  For an ultrasound 
done separately for the examination, the list price is $175, for which the insurance company 
 
2008] ADAM, MARTIN AND JOHN 267 
 
Alternatively, Doctor Y may be unwilling to discount the retail price of 
an office building but has patients who prefer Dr. Y or doctors with a 
similar practice style and unwillingness to make deep discounts for 
insurers.  Dr. Y may simply bill the patient for whatever portion of the bill 
the insurer does not cover.  In effect, this subjects the patients of Dr. Y 
(e.g., me) to a 50 percent co-pay, a financial burden I am happy to bear for 
relatively lower cost medical needs of this magnitude.  I don’t shop for a 
cheaper doctor or one more willing to make the insurer’s proffered discount 
because I prefer Dr. Y, who on average spends triple the time with me 
during an office visit than my previous family physician and also is willing 
to be involved with any hospitalization of patients.   
                                                                                                                          
pays $68.54, the doctor absorbs $89.32 and I am billed $17.14.  The math looks about right, 
but I am not about to verify by taking the time to dig into the fine print of my group policy 
nor am I going to call a representative of the TPA that my employer’s plan has retained to 
process claims.  The final tally of $47.85 billed to me (there were some small lab charges as 
well) seems reasonable in relation to the $405 retail price listed on the doctor’s invoice and 
leaves me paying the traditional 20 percent co-pay.  So much for the power of patient 
consumerism.  Because I was seeing the doctor over a relatively acute medical issue (an 
infection), bypassing medical care was not an option and, knowing that all doctors of this 
specialty generally charge roughly the same rates, I was unlikely to price shop as well.  Nor 
would I be deterred by the 20 percent co-pay.  The deterrence was the time and 
inconvenience of seeing the doctor.  If I had not been previously told (based on a routine 
blood test) that I had an infection (accompanied by considerable symptoms of discomfort), I 
would gladly have skipped the trip to the doctor.  So much for moral hazard. 
 A less extreme example of discount billing with reduced monopoly money 
character of U.S. medical insurance was reflected in a recent family bill for oral surgery, 
specifically the extraction of four wisdom teeth from my older son’s mouth.  The dentist 
charged $1,465  ($285 for general anesthesia, and $295 per tooth.  Of this total, the insurer 
paid 1,052, I paid $313, and the dentist absorbed $100 in discount. 
Again tending to refute the picture of the world painted by market/consumer-
oriented commentators, I was really pretty indifferent to both the doctor’s suggested retail 
price and the degree to which the insurer extracted pricing concessions, even though this 
was not emergency surgery.  This was the dentist my son and I wanted to use based on the 
experience of his siblings (one with this dentist and another having a less successful wisdom 
teeth extraction with another well-regarded dentist in town).  I did not think $1,400 was a 
particularly high price to pay for all this dental work, which required not only the time and 
skill of the oral surgeon but also specific and general staff assistance, considerable fixed 
office overhead (e.g., special equipment), and variable costs such as general and local 
anesthesia, gauze, surgical thread, etc.  My $300 payment seemed more than reasonable, 
again paralleling the customary 20 percent co-pay, but I would hardly have blinked if the 
figure had been $400 or $500. 
See also Hyman & Silver, supra note 61, at 966 (largely positing substantial 
efficacy of private insurers in controlling prices but castigating them for not caring 
sufficiently about quality of care delivered).  See also id. at 981 (noting that medical 
malpractice insurance is “rarely risk rated”)(footnote omitted).   
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According to the market/consumer-oriented approach, I am not enough 
of a bargain hunter.  In this realm, I am behaving more according to the 
professionalism paradigm of medicine than the market competition 
paradigm.  I value more thorough professional treatment more than a 
reduced price tag.  Once again, my own experience suggests that much of 
the view of patient behavior posited by those promoting the consumer-
oriented approach does not accurately reflect actual patient behavior, at 
least for those with means or insurance. 
In addition, something about the deep discounts given by providers to 
insurers is uncomfortably reminiscent of the property tax statements we all 
also receive as homeowners.  A typical such statement gives an assessed 
value of the home that, even after the post-2005 housing downturn, is 
generally substantially lower than the actual current fair market value of the 
house.  Thus, a tax rate per $1,000 of value that would seem unduly 
confiscatory if the home were valued at current market prices becomes a 
sufferable tax burden when applied to an artificially low value carried on 
the assessor’s books.   
In similar fashion, the net cost of a medical service may be discounted 
only as a matter of cosmetics.  If provider discounts are a part of the game 
of insurer-provider interaction, the situation evolves to one in which the 
provider’s list price is intentionally inflated in the knowledge that the 
insurer will impose a discount.  In order to get his $45 payment from the 
medical insurer, Doctor X charges $90 for what would have otherwise been 
a $45 charge (or $65 if the patient’s co-pay is viewed as a sort of 
subsidizing middleman were eliminated from the equation).    
My own view is that $90 for a routine office visit to a family doctor is 
high enough to border on the excessive, despite the high overhead of 
running a doctor’s office, if the doctor is applying the business school rule 
of thumb that a doctor’s “encounter” with the patient should be no more 
than seven minutes.  Extrapolated, this results in an hourly rate of 
compensation for the doctor exceeding $700, a rate comparable with top 
partners in commercial law firms, which have high overhead resembling 
that of a doctor’s office.   
However, if the doctor is seeing each patient for 15 minutes on 
average, the doctor’s gross hourly rate is less than $400 per hour, a rate 
comparable to that of top business lawyers in many cities and a higher rate 
of pay than found in most occupations.  However, the net income to the 
doctor from this hour of work will be considerably less, perhaps even a 
comparative pittance, depending on the doctor’s overhead costs, which may 
be substantial, in some part because of expenditures required for dealing 
with private and government insurers.  Understandably, even the most 
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professional of physicians is tempted by the thought of shorter patient 
encounters and greater profits.  Spending 10 minutes per patient instead of 
15 minutes per patient results in a 50 percent increase in gross income (to 
$600/hour).  But if overhead costs are not too high, doctors can earn quite a 
good living and still give each patient on average 15 minutes of their 
professional attention. 
The case that per-service charges and compensation to medical 
providers are on the high side becomes stronger when one examines the 
rate of insurer payment for medical procedures, which can involve 
thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars for a 45-75 minute surgery.  
Much depends on the locality, the procedure, and the insurer.  Similarly, 
Medicare reimbursement rates vary widely by state.69  In spite of the higher 
overhead for surgery (as compared to an office providing patient 
examination), these compensation structures can make Wall Street lawyers 
look cheap.  But it may also be the case that the surgery reimbursement 
rates are modest in light of the time, skill, training, and overhead required 
for performing a procedure.  As previously discussed, one can in my city 
get wisdom teeth extracted from a highly regarded oral surgeon for a list 
price of less than $300 per tooth.  Less prestigious dentists in town may 
charge as little as $145 per tooth.70  This is not a lot to spend for an 
important, one-time medical-dental event designed to minimize or avoid 
future problems.71  
Hospital charges are, from my own experience, more problematic.  
Hospital charges of $2,000 per day are not uncommon, with much of the 
cost of medical care received while staying in a hospital separately billed at 
                                                                                                                 
69. See Hyman, Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, supra note 63, at 
1179-81. 
70. See supra note 68. As some point, too low a price for wisdom tooth extraction 
should presumably raise concerns about patient safety.  Unless the doctor charging $145 per 
tooth simply has an Albert Schweitzer-like preference for lower income, it is more likely 
that he has fewer or less experienced office staff, less modern equipment and facilities, and 
a business model that requires greater speed in performing the operation and releasing the 
patient.  All other things being equal, this has to increase the risk of adverse outcomes for 
the patient.  The dividing line between safe-but-no-frills extraction and unduly risky 
extraction is one best made by trained professionals and competent regulators untainted by 
undue financial incentives.  But at some point, cheaper medical care becomes less safe 
medical care.  For example, poorly done wisdom tooth extraction can damage nerves, gums, 
other teeth or result in undue bleeding and severe infection as well as a painful “dry socket.” 
71. But the medical cost-legal fee dichotomy breaks down somewhat.  For example, 
expensive lawyers are generally retained and paid by business entities that deduct the cost 
from their taxable income.  Individuals only have this luxury if medical expenses exceed 7.5 
percent of gross income in a given year.  
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a separate time.  In spite of the cost of physical overhead, nursing services, 
and liability insurance that a stay at the hospital somewhat different than 
grabbing a hotel room, this is a lot of money to spend for in essence 
parking a patient in a spot with access to medical facilities and nursing care 
personnel.  If private insurers can force doctors to take 50 percent 
discounts, one wonders why similar cost reduction has not been imposed 
on hospitals.   
Viewed broadly, it appears that private insurers standing in for 
individuals undoubtedly restrain medical care costs to a significant degree.  
But they are hardly great price-busters in this regard.  More important for 
purposes of the medical insurance debate, there appears to be no reason that 
a government entity policing medical charges could not perform the price 
control function as effectively as private insurers.  In practice, it appears 
that the Veteran’s Administration, Medicare, and Medicaid all do 
comparably well in this regard as compared to private insurers. 
If nothing else, a quilt of private insurance funding much of health care 
logically imposes greater expenditures than a government plan simply from 
the higher administrative costs associated with documenting services, 
claims, and payment involving so many insurers who have different forms, 
procedures, and protocols.  Typical doctor’s offices devote more than half 
their overhead simply to the administrative and paperwork burdens 
imposed by the current system.  In effect, we have a system that acts as 
something of a private full-employment measure by requiring the hiring of 
several persons who do not actually provide medical services in order to to 
support a single person or handful of persons actually offering medical 
services.  In the private health insurance world, bureaucracy and paperwork 
dominate to a degree that few government agencies can match.72  For 
                                                                                                                 
72. Again, to me, personal and shared experience is as telling as any statistical report.  
As one example, I have a friend with a spouse in need of mental health care.  Although her 
group insurance policy clearly covers these services, the claims administrator (which was 
retained by the managing general agent (which was retained by the self-insured employer’s 
group insurance plan) has repeatedly, erroneously refused treatment, incorrectly claiming 
that the spouse must be in an “acute” ready-to-jump-off-a-bridge mental state.  After many 
hours of phone calls and emails, my friend finally reached someone in the MGA office who 
confirmed that indeed there was coverage under the policy.  However, to effectuate 
treatment, she is again required to go through the same claims administrator that continues 
to claim non-coverage even though this issue has been decided favorably to the insured.  It 
is hard to imagine a government agency doing a poorer, more wasteful job of determining 
coverage and policing the receipt of medical benefits.  Cynics among us might wonder 
whether this is in fact part of a larger conspiracy (tacit or explicit) to delay treatment and 
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hospitals, the ratio or medical to administrative expenses is somewhat 
lower, but largely only because the cost of medical services at the hospital 
(e.g., surgery, intravenous feeding, intensive care) dwarfs the costs of the 
less intense medical care administered in a doctor’s office.  Further, if one 
considers the provision of a basic room and bed to be administrative 
overhead rather than medical services, the hospital ratio of overhead to 
medical costs would be high.  By contrast, government programs offer a 
consistency and streamlining superior to that of the current status quo 
affecting most insureds.   
Reduction of paperwork provides the opportunity to deploy the savings 
in administrative costs for most substantive expenditures such as more 
useful treatment or better compensation of medical professionals who 
                                                                                                                          
payment or to discourage insureds from using mental health services that they literally have 
paid for in advance through insurance premiums. 
Closer to home is my daughter’s experience with physical therapy after knee 
surgery.  Pursuant to a doctor’s prescription (actually several over time), she has been 
receiving therapy for some months.  Throughout this time, I have received scores of form 
letters informing me that my insurer cannot determine whether to pay its portion of the cost 
until it receives further information.  The insurer claims it does not have the prescription(s) 
on file while the provider claims it was sent weeks earlier.  Eventually, the provider and the 
insurer agree that these indeed are properly covered and documented services, although 
there has been for me some lost time from work making calls or writing letters.   
For example, as this was being written, I received in the mail a thick envelope 
from my insurance plan’s claims administrator containing 30 separate forms (plus an 
additional two forms arriving under separate cover in the same day’s mail) indicating that, 
after all the dust had settled , my insurer was covering the physical therapy.  I am course 
happy to be covered without dispute and to have my daughter receive needed post-operation 
physical therapy.  But was it even remotely necessary to kill so many trees and incur so 
much administrative expense in coming to that decision and communicating it to me?   
In effect, the bottom line is the same.  But due to these miscommunications and 
delays, approximately 70 of my daughter’s PT sessions have resulted in insurer-generated 
letters and “explanation” of benefits that needlessly kill trees, require postage, distract me, 
and require filing.  Meanwhile, the provider waits weeks or months for payment, which may 
explain part of why the cost for a simple physical therapy session is (at least by my 
reckoning) shockingly high (both in stated retail terms and after discount).   Of course, the 
delay and extra expense may be the provider’s fault.  But an efficient insurer would 
presumably find some way to avoid at least some of this seemingly needless expense. 
It is hard to imagine a government single-payer system creating more waste for in 
connection with a claim that in the final analysis is covered as part of routine insurer 
operations.  Nor does the private insurer/claims manager appear to be any better at 
communicating than much-maligned government bureaucracies.  For example, the typical 
letter of this type I have received in connection with my daughter’s physical therapy informs 
me that this is a “2nd Notice” (even when it is the first notice) and that I must “[p]lease 
respond in 30 days.”  A few lines later, I am told that “[n]o action is required of you at this 
time.” 
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might otherwise be unwilling to perform services for the payment rates 
promised by private insurers.  For example, an increasing number of 
physicians will not accept private insurance (or at least certain types of 
private insurance) but will accept Medicaid or Medicare patients.  In effect, 
this portion of the market of medical providers is refuting market-based 
defense of the status quo and demonstrating that for doctors there is 
nothing inherently superior about dealing with a private insurer as 
compared to a government insurer. 
Perhaps the biggest elephant in the room for advocates of increase 
market-based, privatized, or consumer-driven health care is the simple fact 
that the United States long ago stopped resembling anything close to a pure 
market-based model for the delivery of medical care.73  In spite of this 
“[t]axpayers . . . don’t get as much bang for their bucks because the 
government guarantees coverage for the elderly and the poor, groups that 
account for a disproportionately large amount of expenditures.”74 
Most obviously, we have Medicare and Medicaid and the VA and the 
Federal Employees Insurance Program as well as the de facto insurance of 
emergency room care that, for the uninsured, becomes subsidized or even 
“free” medical care, the costs of which are externalized on the medical 
community and society at large.  This coverage accounts for 40 percent or 
more of the medical coverage provided in the country (and perhaps even 
more of the total expenditures on health care).  Medicare is politically 
popular and will as only expand as the population ages.  Medicaid, like 
most programs designed for the needy, has a less powerful political base 
but seemingly also one that can withstand attack.  The VA enjoys similar 
                                                                                                                 
73. See Daniel Gross, National Health Care?  We’re Halfway There, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2006, §3, at 4 (stating that 38 percent of medical expenses in U.S. are publicly 
funded; “[t]he government spends money as if there were a national health insurance 
program.  In 2004, government spending on health care equaled 9.6 percent of the gross 
domestic product, compared with 6.9 percent in Canada, which has a single-payer universal 
health care program,” (quoting Harvard Medical School Professor David Himmelstein); 
considering all expenditures “government accounts for about two-thirds of health care 
spending” (quoting Princeton University economist Uwe Reinhardt)). Accord, Anna 
Bernasek, Health Care Problem?  Check the American Psyche, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006 
§3, at 1 (in U.S., government share of total medical care spending is 45 percent).  See also 
Bobinski, supra note 13 (“In 1987, the public and private share of health expenditures were 
the mirror image of the distribution found in Candada, with the private sector picking up 
70% of the costs of health care and the public sector paying for 30%.  The public share of 
health care expenditures [in the U.S.] grew to 40% in 2005 and remained stable in 
2006”)(footnotes omitted). 
74. See Gross, supra note 73 (“A rough rule holds that private insurance covers two-
thirds of the population and pays for only one-third of all health care”(quoting Reinhardt)). 
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support.  Although no one likes the use of emergency room visits as a 
substitute for regular health care (rather than true, acute emergencies or 
medical problems taking place at night or on weekends), political and 
social sentiment continues to weigh against giving Hospital ERs the 
prerogative to refuse services 
In addition, even the supposedly more private and market-oriented half 
of American health care is a far cry from ordinary retail selection, purchase 
and consumption.  Beginning with the use of health insurance coverage as a 
means of escaping the strictures of World War II’s wage and price controls, 
we have replaced individual fee-for-services purchase of medical care with 
not just an insurance-based system but one dominated by large group plans 
that are only “chosen” by policyholders at the margin.  As this system has 
evolved, it has become, as well described by Nan Hunter, into “employer 
corporate sovereignty in the formulation and administration of risk pools 
for group health insurance in the workplace.”75  Although this may be 
“private” (in that it is done by employers and non-government group 
insurers), it is not so much a market as a negotiated form of private 
legislation. 
Advocates of greater efficiency in health care pricing and delivery can 
muster a number of good arguments against a greater government role and 
against government subsidization.  But in addition to the problem of 
overlooking the humanitarian concern that adequate health care seems to 
many of us more a right than a consumer preference, the conservative side 
of the health insurance debate founders on empirical shoals.  Political 
sentiment will almost certainly prevent any retrenchment of the existing 
governmental presence in the medical coverage status quo.  Only a 
minority of voters seem to get enthused when political candidates rail 
against socialized medicine and only a few of even those that do have been 
willing to support any significant curtailment of the existing systems.  Most 
voters want to at least maintain the government presents that already exists.  
That sentiment will only grow stronger as more voters reach age 65 and the 
total medical costs of the Iraq War and Afghanistan intervention continue 
to roll on for years to come.   
Because of this political reality, conservatives will never again see an 
open market world regarding the purchase and delivery of medical services.  
Consequently, many of the proposed conservative remedies for current 
health care problems are simply not likely to be effective.  They cannot 
                                                                                                                 
75. See Nan  D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health 
Care,  97 GEO. LJ.  1 (2008). 
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supplant the current mixture of public and private with a tabula rasa that 
permits the purported full flowering of benefits they posit from a private 
market model.  Consequently, they are reduced to proposing incentives for 
more efficient behavior or isolated market-mimicking initiatives such as 
health savings accounts.   
As Tim Jost persuasively argues, HSAs appear largely a government 
subsidized benefit to the healthy and wealthy.76  This is hardly the return of 
the free, private market.  Rather, it looks instead like successful rent-
seeking by interest groups (the wealthy, banks, and insurers selling the 
high-deductible catastrophic plans that accompany HSAs).  Since the 
nation is not overrun with wealthy people in good health looking for tax 
shelters and humans are not the posited rational option maximers consumed 
with financial planning, the predicted boom in HSAs has been slow to 
materialize, suggesting that they are not the panacea painted by their 
advocates.77 
The second empirical shoal upon which the conservative ship founders 
is the experience of other industrialized nations.  As previously noted, 
Canada and Western Europe, after embarking on national government-run 
plans for universal coverage, have never retreated from that goal.  More 
important, as also previously noted, the per capita costs of medical care in 
those nations is dramatically lower than the U.S. and their citizenry appears 
to be at least as health as that of the U.S.78  Simply put, one must ask the 
                                                                                                                 
76.  See Jost, supra note 4. 
77. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health Savings Plans Start to Falter; Despite Employer 
Enthusiasm for Consumer-Directed Approach, Patients Express Dissatisfaction With How 
the Accounts Work, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at D1.      
78. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the 
Uninsured:  Lessons From International Experience With Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 419, 437-39 (2001) (noting higher costs of U.S. system as compared to those of other 
countries); Justin Lahart, Rethinking Health Are and the GDP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at 
C1 (noting dramatically higher costs per capita of U.S. System but U.S. measuring worse 
according to life expectancy, infant mortality, and other metrics);  But see Tyler Cowen, 
Abolishing the Middlemen Won’t Make Health Care a Free Lunch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2007, at C3 (contending that full amount of medical overhead costs in Europe and Canada is 
systemically understated in cost comparison studies because of failure to consider longer 
waiting times for some services in non-U.S. countries, which shifts in-kind overhead cost to 
consumer and also arguing that European systems are less responsive to paying for new 
treatments and drugs); Froma Harrop, Canada’s the Wrong Model for Universal Health 
Care, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2003592432_harrop28.html (referring to 
study by Fraser Institute, an organization that “promotes privatization” as finding Canadian 
system “wanting” in comparison to others but failing to provide concrete examples).    
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question:  If movement toward greater privatization, market competition, or 
personal choice is so wonderful, why have these other nations not moved in 
this direction?  And why has there failure to make any such movement not 
seemingly harmed health care in those countries relative to the more 
privatized, market-based, consumer-driven United States?    
 
III.  THE INEFFICACY OF INSURERS IN ACHIEVING FAIR 
COST CONSTRAINT 
 
Another aspect of Adam Smith’s legacy in the U.S. is a widely held 
belief that the private sector is always considerably more efficient than the 
public sector in accomplishing goals.79  Applied to medical coverage, this 
mythology posits that private sector insurers play a vital role in controlling 
health care costs that stems from the private sector’s greater talent in 
achieving efficiency.  A significant fear standing in the way of movement 
toward government as single payer is that health care costs, already rising 
well faster than inflation, will be even less effectively checked by 
government than it has been by the private sector. 
The mythology of Smithian invisible hand efficiency is so strong that 
its advocates conveniently overlook the degree to which much of the 
American economy has implicitly found that in many instances, 
                                                                                                                          
Both the Harrop and Cowen op-ed pieces reflect the type of rhetorical shortcut 
that often substitutes for analysis in the health care debate. Harrop quotes the Fraser Institute 
founder saying that “If people don’t have to dig into their own pockets when they use 
medical services” “you find yourself giving universal access to a physician for sniffles and 
company.’”  Cowen makes a more sophisticated but similar argument that “patients and 
doctors will try to get the most out of any system.  When they aren’t paying directly, 
patients will seek extra care and doctors will be happy to oblige.”) (also analogizing overuse 
of medical services as akin to shoplifting items in a retail store). 
This is the standard, overblown moral hazard analysis dumbed down to a homey 
phrase.  But does it really measure the inclination of more than a micro-majority of 
consumers?  Every person I know (including non-working adults and students) finds going 
to the doctor (even when quite sick) to be a great inconvenience that exacts a heavy price in 
time and energy even without a co-pay or deductible.  They only go to the doctor when they 
feel they have a real need.  For sniffles, they would rather have the additional time at work 
or to rest at home rather than parking themselves in a doctors’ office after breaking up their 
day to travel there.  On this issue, much of the resistance to comprehensive government-
administered insurance appears to come from those who hold a warped picture of the real 
world.  Although over-utilization by a fully insured population is a danger at the margin, it 
hardly represents normal patient behavior. 
79. Bernasek, supra note 60  (“[c]hanging the minds of so many millions of people 
isn’t done overnight.  But sooner or later, persuading people to do something that’s in their 
own economic interest ought to succeed.”). 
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government regulation in derogation of private markets has been necessary 
for sound and efficient economic and social policy.  Occasionally, even 
government operation of certain activities may be more efficient than 
regulated or unfettered market activity.  For example, we have largely 
forsaken the invisible hand in the cases of utility provision (gas, electricity, 
water), transportation (roads and mass transit), airports, cargo hauling, 
military procurement, and infrastructure generally.   
One can view the provision of adequate health care as an infrastructure 
problem.  Like many such problems, it is best solved by government 
intervention (and funding) to create the infrastructure platform, which in 
turn decreases administrative costs, provides consistency, and increases 
social productivity.  Efforts initially perhaps seen as in derogation of 
Smith’s invisible hand thus ultimately help create an environment in which 
markets and productivity can flourish beyond what would occur in the 
absence of adequate infrastructure.   
This portion of the health insurance problem also reflects another legal 
friction or inconsistency in attitudes.  On the one hand, the public wants to 
hold down health care cost increases.  But on the metaphorical other hand, 
the public appears unwilling to embrace many cost-containing measures.   
For example, health costs during the 1990s were relatively stable but this 
appears to have resulted in significant part from the limitations on care 
imposed by HMOs.  Many insureds chafed at these restrictions and their 
discontent fueled policy measures restricting HMO gatekeeping or 
mandating benefits.  Although the reining in of HMOs may not have been 
the sole or even prime cause, health care costs began to rise again 
significantly in the late 1990s and early 20th Century. 
Critics of a national medical insurance plan have at least something of 
a point:  if left to their own devices, consumers will take and take and take 
when it comes to medical care, at least if they are not paying sufficiently 
directly with their own money.  Consequently, they argue, under a 
government funded and administered system, individuals will lack 
adequate incentive to control themselves and will consistently opt for more 
treatment when less would suffice.  Hydraulically, this drives up the cost of 
health care (quite substantially in the aggregate) unless it is tamped down 
by a gatekeeper.   
Defenders of the current model argue that the private insurance 
industry does this better than government.  Although some of the “proof” 
for this assertion is essentially a second bare assertion that government is 
always more wasteful than the private sector, defenders to the status quo 
can point to government reaction to HMO controls as an example of the 
government’s greater sensitivity toward consumer sentiment.  Insurers 
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argue, at least implicitly, that his is bad because it gives government 
insufficient backbone to control health care costs, by rationing if necessary 
and that by contrast the insurance industry, fueled by the profit motive of 
Smith’s invisible hand, has the fortitude to hold the line on costs (or at least 
hold the line better than the government). 
This is not an unpersuasive or illogical argument.  However, it ignores 
two substantial problems.  First, advocates of holding the line on costs 
appear not to recognize that holding the line is not always a good thing.  
Sometimes, some things are worth a higher price in order to better provide 
the good or service in question.  Sometimes this is for utilitarian reasons:  
doing something right will increase productivity further down the line.  
Sometimes, this is for humanitarian reasons:  doing something right is 
worth simply to provide better, more humane treatment to patients. 
Government regulation banning “drive-by” deliveries of babies (so 
named because insurers would not pay for more than 48 hours of hospital 
care after a delivery, and hospitals tended to seek discharge within 48 hours 
even if individuals were willing to pay for longer stays) provides a good 
example.  In his previous writings, David Hyman has attacked these 
regulations with a sustained ferocity usually reserved for Red Sox fans 
talking about the Yankees.80  In his contribution to this Symposium, he 
again makes the argument that these regulations needlessly increased 
hospital stays and medical costs, resulting in a corresponding increase in 
medical insurance that encouraged shrinkage of coverage.81   
I have quite a different view, one formed in large part as a result of my 
wife’s experience with three baby deliveries, all by Caesarian section.  
Although Hyman would undoubtedly criticize this as argument by 
anecdote, I think the points made by reciting my own family experience 
make a useful point.  Further, although policymaking that is too driven by 
anecdote of course is dangerous, it is equally dangerous to lose sight of the 
application of policies by paying insufficient attention to personal 
experience and giving exclusive focus to aggregate date that may obscure 
or minimize the consequences of practices on the ground.  Josef Stalin was 
not addressing medical insurance when he infamously uttered that “a single 
death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.”  But he could just as well 
have been.  It may be a mistake to legislate on the basis of a single moving 
                                                                                                                 
80. See David A. Hyman, Commentary, What Lessons Should We Learn from Drive-
Through Deliveries? 107 PEDIATRICS 406 (2001); Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries, supra 
note 61. 
81. See Hyman, Government Failure?, supra note 4. 
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personal story.  But it can be just as mistaken to legislate (or refrain from 
legislation) based on aggregate data that glosses over the daily operation of 
medical care and insurance for real people. 
My story (or rather, my wife’s) is not tragic and moving in the manner 
of a patient’s needless death due to malpractice or lack of even achieving 
patient status because of lack of insurance, but it is instructive.  When our 
first child was born, there was a long, difficult delivery in which, after 20 
hours of labor, the medical professionals  concluded (about 12 hours too 
late for my taste, but that was the orientation of this practice) that Caesarian 
section was necessary for a safe birth.  Surgery successfully occurred in the 
wee hours of the morning and a healthy baby emerged.  Mom was 
exhausted, looking and feeling a bit like someone who had been in a 
marthon boxing match.   
Nonetheless, the hospital gave us the bum’s rush out after a two-day 
stay in the hospital.82  We were comparatively young, unsophisticated in 
these matters, and probably should have fought harder to stay in the 
hospital for two days (perhaps more) of much needed rest and care.  I even 
made an attempt at offering to pick up the extra care out of personal funds.  
The hospital was distinctly uninterested in working with us.  If the 
insurance would not pay for more than 48 hours of post-op care, it 
seemingly wanted us out, in spite of our middle class ability to pay.  So 
much for consumer-driven health care. 
Back home, the consequences of a rushed, abbreviated stay in the 
hospital were palpable.  The new mother, still physically exhausted from 
delivery, was now attempting to recover from the wounds of a C-section at 
home while caring for a newborn.  Although the dutiful husband did his 
semi-competent best to manage care for baby and mother, this was a far cry 
from the type of rest and care both would have received from the hospital.   
It took weeks for my wife to recover sufficiently to do anything of modest 
strenuousness.  Anecdotal or not, I remain convinced that she would have 
returned to her normal energy, health, productivity much sooner if she 
could have only had a few more days in the hospital.   
                                                                                                                 
82. Which means that we were accorded less coverage (and less maternal recovery 
time in the hospital) than even if we had been subject to a standard “drive-through delivery,” 
which Hyman defines as the practice of discharging women and newborns from the hospital 
less than forty-eight hours after a vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours after a Cesarean 
section.  See Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries, supra note 69, at 9.  Consequently, our 
family medical insurance situation would have been helped significantly with legislation 
that did not go as far as the Newborns and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996.  42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2003). 
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In addition, the newborn in question (our elder son) at age three weeks 
developed a viral infection, exhibited meningitis-like symptoms, and was 
hospitalized and given considerable medical care for days before 
recovering, which of necessity took mom and dad further away from work 
and productivity.  Although proving a link between my son’s severe 
problems at age three weeks and the shortened hospital stay is impossible, I 
can’t help but think that his mother’s bedraggled condition on discharge, 
which made for lactation and nursing problems, which in turn posed 
nutrition and immunity issues for the baby, might have played a role.  In 
any event, what resulted was a 4-5 week period in which two previously 
productive adults were largely out of commission in at least some part due 
to the supposedly cost-saving, efficient mechanism of kicking new mothers 
to the curb two days after a particularly rough delivery and C-section birth. 
When subsequent children arrived, C-section was also required.  By 
then, we were a little more sophisticated and assertive (and had broader 
insurance coverage and better medical care).  In addition to performing the 
operations much earlier without physically punishing the mother for hours, 
additional hospital recovery time was obtained.  Maternal recovery and 
new baby care proceeded far more smoothly and effectively.  Neither of the 
children had any post-partum health problems and both Mom and Dad got 
considerably more done during the ensuing five weeks after these 
deliveries than was the case with the first delivery. 
With this personal history, it is understandable that I was never a fan of 
drive-by deliveries and was thrilled to see government intervention to stop 
them.  Notwithstanding Hyman’s cogent (if perhaps overheated) arguments 
of net policy detriment, I remain a fan of this regulation.  Although it will 
not always result in greater family productivity and reduced overall 
medical costs, I am convinced that in many cases giving a new mother and 
baby a couple more days of hospital care (while the often hapless husband 
also has more time to get the home situation under control) will have that 
effect.  More important, it is simply a more humane way to treat new 
mothers and children.  American society regularly purports to value 
families.  Providing an additional increment of medical care – or at least 
removing the incentive for hospitals to rush patients home – is a small price 
to pay in the service of those values. 
A second problem with the conventional wisdom (that the private 
sector controls costs much better than the government) is that considerable 
evidence exists to suggest the sentiment is overblown or perhaps even 
erroneous.  At the least, it appears that private insurers do an inconsistent 
job of holding the line.  More important, it is to me unclear whether private 
insurers do any better job of cost containment than does the government.  
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Alternatively, if private insurers do too much better than the government in 
holding down the price of medical services, this may create incentives that 
undermine the availability and provision of sound medical care.   
As previously noted, private insurers have been able to extract from 
medical providers significant discounts from what the provider otherwise 
states as the “list price” for a medical or laboratory service.  This may 
simply mean that medical pricing has become like automobile shopping.  
The “sticker price” exists only as an outside anchor or measuring stick but 
no one really pays this list price (except the rare uninsured patient who 
actually has independent financial resources).  For purposes of argument, I 
will give credit to insurers for actually enforcing some type of real price 
constraint about medical providers.  At the very least, one certainly hears 
doctors consistently complain about the low payment rates provided by 
insurers.83   
The question then becomes:  does the private insurer do a better job of 
payment-for-services containment than comparable government programs.  
Here, the evidence seems mixed.  Insurers may be doing a pretty good job 
of keeping doctors from charging exorbitant amounts (even if they are also 
encouraging doctors to provide assembly-line care).  But Medicare and 
Medicaid also appear to be effective in tamping down costs-per-medical 
service.  And the VA, with its system of staff physicians on salary, may be 
the most efficient of all in controlling doctor-related costs.  Even where the 
insurer suppresses provider rates more than does a government payer, this 
hardly means the net benefit to patients and society is greater.  Excessive 
cost cutting may lead to unwanted collateral consequences.84 
                                                                                                                 
83. Doctors also differentiate among insurers.  Many refuse to see patients insured by 
carriers whose payment rates are simply too low.  One former internist of mine explained he 
rejected patients covered by the HMO then known as US Healthcare because it paid “coolie 
wages” for office visits.  Whatever the political incorrectness of the comment, it is a pretty 
good reflection of the way many doctors today do business.  They will work with some 
health insurers but not others based on the amounts paid for service, the administrative 
burden, and the overall difficulty of working with some providers.   Other physicians may 
take an “all comers” attitude, assuming that by seeing enough patients fast enough, they can 
make more money than if they simply avoid the stingiest, most difficult insurers altogether. 
84. The same, of course, can be true for excessive imposition of costs.  See Stephen 
Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Unintended Consequences, The Case of the Red-Cockaded 
Woodpecker, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 20, 2008 (Magazine) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/magazine/20wwln-freak-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.   
Dubner & Levitt, in an installment of their now well-known “Freakonomics” 
feature in the Times (see also STEPHEN DUBNER & STEVEN D. LEVITT, FREAKONOMICS:A 
ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (William Morrow 2005)), 
give the example of a deaf patient consulting an orthopedic surgeon and insisting on her 
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Clearly there is inherent tension (legal friction once again) between the 
goal of making provision of quality medical services economically 
attractive to prospective providers and holding back runaway medial costs.  
Hyman’s resolution of the tension is largely against medical providers and 
in favor of insurers and the posited cost-controlling force of more 
empowered consumers.  In addition to disagreeing with Hyman about the 
actual efficacy of consumer constraint, particularly where the consumer is 
too poor or uninsured to have much clout, I question whether excessive 
payment to providers, particularly doctors, is the culprit. 
Consider my eye doctor, who in addition to being very competent is 
also professional in the classic sense.  Although he is repeatedly identified 
as one of the best doctors in the area in local magazine’s “best of” features, 
he carries a comparatively low patient load, spends significant time with 
each patient, and has an uncrowded waiting room.  He accepts Medicare 
but not many private insurers, where he not only has found the 
reimbursement rate too low but also has found the private insurers’ 
paperwork and bureaucratic hassle to be too much for his staff.  He also 
expresses support for a comprehensive single-payer system along the lines 
of Medicare and suspects that a large portion of doctors, particularly 
younger doctors less reared on the traditional AMA stances against 
“socialized” medicine, agree with him.   
                                                                                                                          
right (per the Americans With Disabilities Act) to a sign language interpreter so that she 
could better understand the doctor’s diagnosis and recommendation.  In the Los Angeles 
metro area where this took place, a qualified interpreter generally charges $120/hour with a 
two-hour minimum, an amount required to be borne by the physician and which the 
patient’s private health insurer refused to cover.  Not surprisingly, the good doctor who 
initially accepted this needy patient and then was hit with unexpected interpreter charges 
made no money on this patient.  His solution and that of similarly situated doctors in the 
future will be to attempt to avoid taking such patients.  Id. 
The episode serves of course as a good example of the occasional incidence of 
negative unintended consequences from well-meaning legislation.  In addition, it serves to 
illustrate the degree to which too much of the modern health care burden has been placed on 
doctors relative to insurers.  Further, it provides additional support for a government single 
payer system.  Imposing translator costs on a single doctor, or even a medical group or 
hospital, has great potential for unfairness simply because of the fortuity of when a deaf 
prospective patient may approach a particularly provider seeking medical care.  Imposing 
mandatory coverage on a single private insurer is a better approach but still may result in 
lopsided distribution of the added costs of improving the access and experience of the deaf 
seeking medical care.  But if the coverage is provided by a national government single payer 
system, the added costs of translation are spread as broadly as possible and amortized 
among many beneficiaries of the medical-economic system.  This optimal risk spreading 
seems the fairest solution as well as one efficient in administrative terms and unlikely to 
deter any particular deaf patient from seeking and receiving desired care. 
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Regarding costs:  when he first began performing cataract surgery, he 
reports that the Medicare reimbursement rate was approximately $1,200 
and that of private insurers was about $1,100.  Notwithstanding the 
aggregate data about overall increase in medical costs, he has seen the rate 
of payment for cataract surgery go down (at least in Las Vegas) to a current 
rough range of $600 - $900, depending on the insurer.  Medicare pays 
about $750.  In a world where a visit from the plumber or electrician 
routinely results in minimum bills of $125 or more, this hardly seems like 
excessive compensation for the doctor.  Purchase of cataract surgery 
logically should cover not only the doctor’s actual time and skill in 
performing the procedure but must provide reasonable contribution to 
defraying his overhead and recoupment of investment in human capital 
such as medical school and additional training and education. 
Successful cataract surgery of course dramatically improves the 
patient’s vision and quality of life and probably improves their economic 
productivity as well (even though many cataract patients are older and 
retired).  Compared to other expenditures, particularly those for personal 
services,85 paying $750 to the doctor for the procedure does not seem like 
price gouging or an otherwise bad deal.  More important, if high quality 
physicians are reluctant to discount their prices below this amount, trouble 
can ensue.  Perhaps less competent doctors will be the ones performing the 
$600 cataract surgeries.  Or perhaps the doctor will make sure he takes on 
additional patients and schedules an additional procedure or two on surgery 
days, even if this results in more error due to haste or mistakes born of 
tiredness.   
                                                                                                                 
85. Economies of scale are easier to achieve with manufactured goods than with 
delivery of even relatively routine personal services.  For example, once the mold has been 
established, a manufacturer can crank out I-pods or televisions at a lower cost per additional 
unit than even the most rushed, robotic surgeon.  Personal services of necessity require 
investment of at least a minimum amount of time and present individual variants not found 
in manufacturing.  Every defective plumbing joint or electric socket is a bit different while 
mass-produced goods are not.  As a result, an I-pod that lasts for years can be sold for $300 
but the same amount of medical care quickly disappears into the mists of consumer 
memory.  As a result, people tend to see services as overprice relative to hard goods.  
Hence, the problem faced by family doctors, pediatricians, dermatologists, and other doctors 
whose primary work is seeing patients.  By contrast, surgeons and doctors performing 
diagnostic procedures are better compensated per minute of their time.  Surgical procedures 
are a bit of a hybrid in that something like successful cataract removal is a one-time event 
with long-lasting, positive consequences.  Prescription drugs have elements of both 
manufacturing (although research and development costs may be high and harder to recoup 
than found for consumer goods) and ongoing personal service because one needs in many 
cases to continue purchasing and using the pharmaceutical product for years on end. 
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Ultimately, these are empirical questions.  My point is that there is 
nothing to suggest that Medicare has resolved them less well than a more 
tight-fisted insurer.  Although government programs might be more 
vulnerable to inflationary pressures stemming from politics and public 
opinion, private insurers are similarly vulnerable to excessive deference to 
the profit motive.  If I were having cataract surgery (or most any other 
medical procedure), I would rather have the decisionmakers err on the side 
of pricing and policies that will make skill service and good treatment 
outcomes more likely.  This of course may make for higher per service 
costs under a government single-payer program.  But administrative cost 
savings may make up the difference and certainly appear to do so in 
Canada and Europe.  To the extent that they do not fully do so, this may 
simply be the price paid to medical providers by a wealthy nation for high 
quality health care that produces collateral economic and social benefits. 
In other areas of medical costs, it is similarly hard so see private 
insurers doing particularly better than government insurers regarding cost 
control.  Consider the matter of hospital costs.  Again, personal experience 
drives my thinking along with aggregate data.  In January 2006, I was 
stricken with a severe infection, high (105 degrees Fahrenheit) fever, 
substantial body aches and pain and a tennis-ball sized cyst on my liver.  
After this was detected in an MRI, I was instructed by my doctor to get into 
the nearest hospital for further care, which consisted primarily of 
intravenous antibiotics.  The IV antibiotics worked wonders.  Within 36 
hours, my fever had abated and I was considered out of danger, although 
still feeling weak, horrible, achy, etc.   The infectious disease specialist 
prescribed a six-week regime of continued IV drugs followed by weeks of 
orally taken antibiotics.  Eventually (but probably not fast enough), I began 
self-administering my IV antibiotics at home with “picc” line in my arm.   
The draining of the liver cyst presented more complex and 
confrontational issues.  At the hospital, it was quickly agreed that the cyst 
should be drained.  The staff radiologist felt it was too dangerous to do this 
without surgery, which the general surgeon was only too happy to perform, 
although this would have necessitated a long (6-8 week) recovery period 
from the invasive surgery alone.  On the good advice of doctor friends, we 
located another radiologist who reviewed the CT scan and X-ray film and 
concluded that the cyst could be safely drained with the less invasive 
insertion of a needle, preferably as an outpatient proceeding but possibly 
requiring post-op hospitalization depending on the results.  It took days of 
wrangling to get discharged from the first hospital.  Drainage at the second 
hospital (where the second radiologist had privileges) went well but the 
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condition of the withdrawn cyst material prompted the doctor to require 
hospitalization because of fears of internal bleeding.    
All this happened on the Friday before the 2006 Martin Luther King 
holiday weekend, which meant that getting physician follow-up was 
difficult.  Finally, by the ensuing Wednesday, I was discharged.  The 
situation was made more difficult because my former primary care 
physician did not visit patients in the hospital.  Instead, the overall 
supervision of my care fell to the “hospitalists” or general care internists 
that contracted with the hospital.  During both my hospital stays (10 days 
total), the hospitalists spent a total of about 15 minutes with me (or which 
they billed more than $750, a rate that most would agree is unconscionably 
high for doctors with this level of skill and comparatively little overhead as 
compared to “regular” doctors maintaining an office).  During those 15 
minutes, they (four different doctors for the hospitalist group were 
involved) misstated my record on several occasions.  Fortunately, I was 
conscious and could correct them.  They also were slow to discharge me, 
first for the drainage of the cyst and second for home IV care.   
During our cumulative 15 minutes together, they asked probing 
questions such as whether I raised goats in the back yard and whether that 
might be a source of the infection.  I successfully suppressed the urge to 
remind the doctor in question (a non-native graduated from a non-U.S. 
medical school) that we were in Las Vegas, not Waziristan.  Subsequently, 
I  switched to a primary care physician who would (a) visit me in the 
hospital to make sure my care was appropriate and (b) did not have an 
economic incentive with his hospital client to keep me in the hospital 
longer than necessary (a goal that Wayne, Smith and King would 
presumably support). 
Finally, some weeks after this experience, I received communication 
from the hospital and other care providers (although, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the hospitalists lagged, not billing for the services until 
more than a year later, without having submitted the bill to my insurer, 
even though I had provided them insurance information upon admission to 
the hospital).  My insurer (or rather the claims administrator that contracts 
with the State of Nevada’s self-insured plan) was reasonable.86   
                                                                                                                 
86. Our biggest imbroglio was that it did not want to pay for the second 
hospitalization because it had not been pre-cleared.  In response to the insurer’s original 
denial, I explained that the original treatment plan was to perform cyst drainage on an out-
patient basis and forgo hospitalization but that, reacting to what he saw during the 
procedure, the radiologist, a senior, well-respected doctor in town, required hospitalization 
as a precaution out of concern over possible post-drainage internal bleeding.  (I suspect he 
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When the final bills rolled in, they were substantial, although having 
survived, I was more than happy to pay my 20 percent co-pay and move on 
with life (which, in cliché-like fashion, I appreciated all the more after this 
series of misadventures in the medical system).  What continues to bug me, 
however, is that there seemed to be lots of fat in this system that could have 
been much better controlled by non-avaricious medical professionals and a 
more enlightened private insurer/claims management company.  
First, there is the absolute cost of hospitalization.  It averaged about 
$2,000 a day.  I realize there is a lot of overhead required for a hospital, but 
this seems just too much for ordinary, brand-x rooms and nursing care.  As 
in many cities, nursing staffs are stretched thin.  There were typically only 
four nurses on the floor and, judging from my regular sojourns around the 
floor, they had many patients in far worse shape than me.  They also spent 
a considerable amount of their time in record-keeping, even to the neglect 
of patients buzzing for assistance.  I was ambulatory within a day or so of 
the first admission, another sign that it might have been appropriate to have 
both hospital stays shortened.  (But it was a major boon to be able to walk 
to the juice cooler with my IV tower in tow because waiting for the nurses 
resembled waiting for Godot.) 
Two thousand dollars a day for basic hospitalization?  In most cities, 
one can get a suite at the Ritz for about a third of that amount.  And, 
presumably, one could purchase a considerable amount of private nursing 
care and rented medical equipment for the other half.  Part of the problem, 
of course, is that patients like me are not in much of a position to shop 
among hospitals, compare prices, and make price-conscious decisions.  
Residents of rural areas have even less opportunity for comparison 
shopping--another problem with the consumer-driven mythology.  Even for 
elective surgery, one finds relatively little difference in cost when shopping 
around (which I did some years before in connection with a hip 
replacement), assuming one can get a hospital or doctor’s business office to 
provide straight answers to questions about costs (reticence I suspect comes 
from difficulty in talking about their stated rates and discounted rates paid 
by insurers).  Under these circumstances, one might hope that insurers 
could drive a harder bargain with hospitals.  In addition, one must again ask 
the comparative question:  Are the rates paid by private insurers committed 
to quality care significantly less than those paid by government programs?  
                                                                                                                          
would not have kept me in the hospital as long as the hospitalists and the hospital, who had 
an economic interest in my continued stay, did).  So informed, my insurer agreed the 
hospitalization was apt. 
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If not, much of the efficiency-based argument for continuing to cling to a 
private insurance model losses its steam. 
If nothing else, private insurers (at least judging from my experience) 
have not done much to control adverse financial incentives of medical 
providers.  In fact, one might argue to the contrary.  Once the hospitals 
discovered that I had good insurance, they wanted to keep me as long as 
possible.  The hospitalist physicians, when they could be found at all, were 
distinctly unhelpful in trying to speed my release even after it became clear 
that further hospitalization was not required.  The hospitalists also wanted 
more and repetitive tests.  (I was CT-scanned twice in three days and had to 
figuratively stomp my feet in refusing to have a third before getting out of 
the first hospital after a five-day stay).  The hospitalists and a general 
surgeon practicing at the first hospital were only too eager to subject me to 
major abdominal surgery without even exploring the possibility that 
perhaps my liver cyst could be drained by needle after all.  In the end, I had 
a feeling akin to a tourist on a desert island with one vendor, who wanted to 
exploit this market advantage for all it was worth until the ship to shore 
arrived. 
My question:  why do insurers, who supposedly want to control 
runaway costs, not do more to forbid these adverse incentives (more on that 
below regarding problematic professionalism) or police them more 
aggressively?  In my experience, the only real check on price gouging 
through churning of services and an excessively extended stay was the 
professionalism of some of medical personnel involved87 and my own 
nagging (aided by my family), which avoided more expensive surgery and 
finally got me released from the two hospitals.   
Of course, this latter factor suggests that market cheerleaders are on to 
something in wanting to empower consumers.  They simply fail to 
appreciate the practical limitations on even educated consumers and seem 
to forget that the uninsured patient of modest means have almost no 
leverage over anything relating to medicine.  Perhaps most important, they 
                                                                                                                 
87. For example, the invasive radiologist, the infectious disease specialist, the hospital 
nursing staff, and the insurance administrator’s case manager were all supportive of an 
earlier discharge and transitioning to less expensive outpatient home care as soon as 
possible but were delayed by the slowness or mixed motives of the hospitalists.  In addition, 
my efforts to obtain better, safer, less expensive treatment were aided by doctor friends in 
the local medical community, even though they were not my treating physicians.  An 
impoverished, working class, uninsured, or less educated person would be less likely to 
know a helpful doctor through social connections. 
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fail to realize the practical limits on my degree of empowerment as a 
consumer, at least in this manner with some concrete potential for reducing 
medical costs,  is no less if I am covered under Medicare or a government 
single-payer program rather than a private insurer. 
During my time in hospital purgatory, there were other examples of the 
insurer being relatively lax in cost control.  Consider prescription drugs that 
I regularly take.  Once admitted to the hospital, I was forbidden to bring my 
regular “stash” of pharmaceuticals, which includes cholesterol, blood 
pressure, and anti-gout medicine.  Instead, the hospital insisted on 
administering these prescriptions to me from its stock – at a cost of about 
$20 per pill (as compared to the regular cost of about a dollar per dose).  I 
realize that there can be problems with patients self-medicating.  But this 
hardly seems to justify a system in which hospitals (who probably get the 
drugs for less than I would “on the outside”) are permitted to impose a 
2000 percent markup in price – willingly paid by the insurer that is 
supposed to be such a stringent guardian of costs. 
When I was finally liberated from the hospitals, I was visited by a 
wonderfully competent, straight-to-the-point home care nurse who 
instructed me in self-administration of the antibiotics and then peacefully 
left without looking for any other ways to run up costs (although she was 
helpfully available by phone for questions and her company replenished 
supplies as necessary).  Notwithstanding that this part of my treatment was 
sensibly streamlined, the costs for the IV equipment and drugs was 
significant, approximately $500 per week.  Although this is a lot less than 
the $2,000 per day at the hospital (plus itemized charges, including the IV 
drugs received at the hospital), it still seems high.  I realize that drug 
manufacturers need to recoup the cost of research and development as well 
as continuing overhead and distribution costs.  But I was receiving Zocyn, 
a common antibiotic that has been in use for years.  One might reasonably 
expect a truly efficient private medical and insurance system to be able to 
get the costs of such at-home drug care down to something like $200 per 
week.   
All in all, then, my medical experiences of early 2006 strongly 
suggested that the medical community and private insurance does a quite 
imperfect job in both treating patients and containing costs.  During the 
course of 10 days in two hospitals and three months of treatment (including 
visits to other specialists recommended in light of possible wear-and-tear 
on my liver and kidneys from all this), I was treated by a couple physicians 
I came to see as highly competent, with a fairly wide range of empathy and 
willingness to explain things to the patient.  Overall, my condition was 
treated appropriately and successfully, but not very efficiently.  However, 
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some of the medical professionals cut a less positive figure.  The hospitalist 
physicians were worse than worthless from my patient’s perspective.  
Ironically, this business model of medicine is touted in many quarters as a 
more efficient way to deliver services.  The primary family physician can 
remain in her suburban office park and see more patients more often while 
the hospitalist can efficiently attend to the needs of the hospitalized 
patients.  My experience suggests this theory is seriously flawed.88 
To the extent that the private insurer involved attempted to control 
costs, it was with fairly crude all-or-nothing measures rather than targeted 
attempts to prevent churning or inflated prices.  For example, my insurer 
initially balked at my second hospitalization before accepting that it was 
medically necessary.89  But it readily paid for $20 pills, multiple expensive 
tests, fairly expensive IV drugs, and hospital rooms at Helmsley Palace 
prices.  Could, Medicare and Medicaid really be worse in this regard, as 
Hyman argues?  If not, there is no reason to fear a national single payer 
system on efficiency grounds.  The question is not how government 
programs compare with perfection.  The question is how government 
programs compare to their private insurer counterparts.  
More to the point of this Symposium:  many aspects of medical 
treatment and coverage today are intrinsically removed from the consumer.  
In my case, I perhaps could have shopped better for a hospital with lower 
rates, a more daring or accomplished resident radiologist, or better 
hospitalist physicians.  But I was running a 105 degree fever at the time and 
my primary care physician was counseling immediate hospitalization and 
treatment of a rather large liver cyst.  Under those circumstances, 
comparison shopping and shrewd consumerism is unlikely.   
Of course, not all medical situations are acute or time-sensitive.  But 
even garden variety routine medical care is reasonably esoteric and has 
some temporal imperative that prevents consumer choice.  If a five-year old 
has a fever and joint aches, this is probably just the flu.  But what parent 
other than Joan Crawford90 will delay treatment while calling doctors for a 
                                                                                                                 
88. I have since switched to a primary physician who will visit hospitalized patients 
and serve as a check on the quality and expense of care provided by the hospitals and their 
associated vendors.  What continues to astound me is the popularity of a professional and 
business model so rife with conflicts of interest and incentives for more bureaucratic, 
expensive, lower quality care. 
89. See supra note 86. 
90. The parental shortcomings of Crawford, a popular actress in the 1940s and 1950s, 
were extensively chronicled in her daughter’s memoir.  See CHRISTINA CRAWFORD, MOMMIE 
DEAREST (William Morrow 1978).   
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price quote?  In addition, there are practical problems that likely limit 
aggressive consumer cherry picking.  What doctor will accept episodic 
patients who come to her for flu symptoms, go elsewhere for earache, and 
try a third doctor for annual checkups because of lower prices?  Even if 
doctors had no problem being commodified in this manner, there would 
likely be a rise in both the logistical costs of coordinating care and the 
substantive quality of care.  My experience in the hospital suggested that 
doctors seeing patients episodically are overly dependent on patient charts, 
which may be inaccurate or misread. 
For elective surgery, comparison shopping is equally or more difficult.  
Patients can get information, but it is not easy or cost free (all of this takes 
time, usually from working parents who lose productivity from this process 
as well as the need to nurse a sick family member or themselves back to 
health after medical care).  Costs will be roughly the same, since they are 
driven more by the status quo of government and employer corporate 
sovereignty more than any kind of market for services.  Even if HSAs and 
other consumer-driven initiatives catch on, this will remain the case.  In the 
real world, away from the drawing boards of the CATO institute and 
similar market-utopian think tanks, consumers are not in much of a position 
to improve health care or medical coverage. 
 
III.   PROBLEMATIC PROFESSIONALISM 
 
Veneration of the private sector (Smith) also supports the traditional 
prestige of physicians.  In a less well-know segment of the Wealth of 
Nations, Smith argued that professionals entrusted with important social 
functions, such as doctors (and lawyers, of course) should be well-
compensated so that they had adequate incentive to provide thorough and 
competent care.91  In addition, although Smith did not specifically make 
this point, professionals under economic pressure can too often behave in 
distinctly unprofessional or sub-professional ways.   The current system has 
managed to put such pressure on medical providers, particularly doctors, 
but at the same time has not provided universal care or adequate 
supervision of professional error. 
 Doctors are perhaps no longer placed on a pedestal or idolized or 
iconographic in the manner of the 1970s television series Marcus Welby.  
But they enjoy at least the ordinary prestige and deference accorded 
successful businesspersons (a legacy of Smith and Wayne) and in addition 
                                                                                                                 
91. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 111. 
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continued to be venerated for their assistance to patients in time of need.  
Other professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers) can 
only dream of enjoying the prestige and public good will held by doctors.   
As a result, the public is resistant to any medical coverage solution that 
even appears to reduce patient access to doctors of choice or to restrict the 
physician’s professional discretion. 
The problem with this aspect of modern medical insurance mythology 
is the public does not realize the degree to which doctor discretion and 
professionalism has already been severely compromised by the private 
sector and overall economic factors.  Although the worst excesses from the 
era of HMO hegemony (e.g., “drive-by” maternity delivery) have been 
curbed, private insurers still have a great deal to say about the manner in 
which most doctors practice medicine.   
In addition, even where an insurer is not directly choreographing the 
physician’s treatment of a patient, other incentives of the current structure 
give rise to a situation in which we now have what I term “problematic 
professionalism.”  Although most doctors continue to perform acceptably 
well under adverse circumstances, medical care remains sub-optimal in 
spite of its costs due to twisted incentive structures. 
Although the health care quilt is a mixture of public and private, for-
profit insurers and their agents (e.g., claims administrators) have a central 
role in determining the quantity and quality of care received.  Employers, 
particularly large employers, of course, have some leverage as purchasers 
of group insurance in that insurers will want to accommodate them for 
business reasons, particularly if the employer is willing to pay a sufficiently 
higher premium in return for desired coverage in a group policy.  
Employers thus play a key role to the extent they negotiate with insurers 
over the parameters of coverage.   
But insurers appear to be the real 800-hundred pound gorillas of this 
process in that they design the basic menu of standardized medical 
insurance options, shape the parameters of negotiation, and largely have the 
final say over the contours of coverage.92  To a large degree in the U.S. the 
private insurance industry sets the parameters of compensation, treatment 
with as much practical force as any government (although Medicare as the 
largest insurer is also important).  Although really large employers may 
                                                                                                                 
92. Once again, I differ with Hyman, who contends that Medicare is the “real” 800-
pound gorilla in the health care jungle.  See Hyman, supra note 63, at 1166 (“Medicare is 
the 800 pound gorilla of American health policy.”).  But see Hunter, , supra note 75 
(employers and insurers in tandem are figurative king of health care beast). 
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self-fund their insurance program by collecting funds that in theory will be 
adequate for the number of predicted claims, they also typically delegate 
policy and claims administration to an MGA or TPA that effectively 
operates as an insurer.  Employers also typically purchase stop-loss 
insurance from a private carrier as well in order to spread the risk assumed 
by self-funding.   
When the metaphorical dust settles, the insurance industry in effect 
operates as a private administrative agency regulating medical insurance 
coverage and delivery of medical services.  Doctors can avoid this 
governance by insurance only if they are willing to forgo accepting 
patients’ insurance or membership in an insurer HMO or network of 
preferred providers.  And once participating in a PPO or HMO, the doctor 
must do it the insurer’s way in order to remain in good standing and in 
order for services to the patient to be covered.  The law to some extent 
gives insurers a further leg up by exempting them from antitrust law 
(subject to some limitations) per the McCarran-Ferguson Act93 while 
doctors remain subject to antitrust law and are forbidden from concerted 
action in restraint of trade. 
Doctors are now more than ever acting as small (or in the case of some 
large practice groups medium) sized businessmen, placing greater emphasis 
on cost control, customer volume, marketing, and reduction of costs in 
delivering services.94  This can adversely affect the quality of care simply 
                                                                                                                 
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).  
94. For clarification:  I am not discussing medical practice law and reform, which is 
beyond the scope of this article and most likely asserts only a modest direct impact on 
overall health costs, notwithstanding claims of cost-escalating defensive medicine and 
undue transaction costs spend on frivolous claims.  See, e.g., Martha Raffaele, Study:  
Malpractice Crisis had Little Effect on Pa. Doctor Supply, INS. J., April 27, 2007, available 
at www.insurancejounral.com/news/east/2007/04/27/79016.htm; Jennifer Robison, The 
doctor is out – for good:  Some LV physicians can’t afford to stay in medicine, LAS VEGA 
REV. J., Mar. 25, 2007; Alicia Change, Study:  Four Out of 10 Medical Malpractice Cases 
are Groundless, INS. J., May 11, 2006, available at 
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/05/11/68248.htm;  Study Says Wrong-Site 
Surgery Is Very Rare and Preventable, INS. J., April 17, 2006, available at 
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/04/17/67367.htm.  See also Silver & 
Hyman, supra note 61; Atul Gawande, The Checklist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2007, 86 
(noting degree to which relatively simple intensive care protocols can effectively improve 
patient odds of survival but medical community slowness in adopting such protocols: “If a 
new drug were as effective at saving lives as Peter Pronovost’s checklist, there would be a 
nationwide  marketing campaign urging doctors to use it.”) (italics in original); Keith 
Mattheessen, Cutting Doctors’ Hours May Not Reduce Medical Errors, Studies Find, INS. J., 
Sept. 6, 2007, available at 
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/09/06/83233.htm; George J. Annas, The 
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because of the undue pressure to see many patients as fast as possible in a 
typical business day in order to obtain sufficient revenues to earn desired 
income.95   
                                                                                                                          
patient’s right to safety, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, 38 (Hospitals have been slow to adopt measures 
that would prevent medical errors that injure patients.”).  
However, the rancor occasioned by this issue and the degree it has driven a wedge 
between doctors, lawyers, and policymakers to the benefit of insurers undoubtedly helps to 
explain some of the dysfunctional policymaking in the area.  See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Nevada’s 
Med-Mal Changes Help Doctors, Hinder Lawsuits, INS. J., Feb. 9, 2007, available at 
www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2007/02/09/76860.htm; Tress Balda, Physician `I’m 
sorry’ bills continues to spread, Nine more states debate laws banning apology from use in 
litigation, NAT’L L.J., April 30, 2007; Joelle Babula, Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:  
Lawyers slam doctors with ad, LAS VEGAS REV. J., July 16, 2002.   
95.  See JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 97 (2007) (describing financial 
and insurance incentives pushing physicians in direction of spending inadequate time with 
patients learning of their symptoms and case history); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Economists’ 
Model, supra note 3; Peter Salgo, The Doctor Will See You for Exactly Seven Minutes, Peter 
Salgo, The Doctor Will See You for Exactly Seven Minutes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006. 
          According to Salgo, a professor at Columbia University’s College of Physicians 
and Surgeons, the new assembly line approach to seeing patients is closely linked to 
pressure from insurers, business consultants, and particularly HMOs, to which he attributes 
the formal requirements that doctors have no more than a seven-minute “encounter” with 
patients rather than a more flexible, open-ended interview that is likely to reveal more about 
the patient’s condition.   
 
This apparently kept shareholders happy.  But it reduced the 
doctor-patient relationship to a financial concept in a business school 
term paper.   
 
Doctors know you cannot provide compassion in seven-minute 
aliquots.  But we have felt powerless to change things.  The medical 
establishment has, many of us feel, simply rolled over and gone along to 
get along.  It has sacrificed patients’ best interests on the altar of 
financial return. 
 
See Salgo, supra.  Accord, Reinhardt, Economist’s Model, supra note 3, at 463 
(“group medical practices may tie the distribution of income to their members closely to 
each physician’s `productivity’ and then unabashedly define productivity in terms of neither 
clinical outcomes nor patients’ satisfaction, but strictly in terms of the gross revenue the 
physician brought into the clinic.”) (footnote omitted); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 2006, 82 (“As American turns its health-care system over to the 
market, pharmaceutical reps are wielding more and more influence – and the line between 
them and doctors is beginning to blur)(italics in original); Vanessa Fuhrmans, Doctors 
Assail UnitedHealth’s Threat of Fines:  Sanctions would be imposed on physicians sending 
patients to out-of-network labs for tests, WALL ST. J., April 10, 2007; Theresa Agovino, 
Doctors Suspect Insurers’ Rankings Measure Cost, Not Quality, INS. J., Feb. 9, 2007, 
available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/02/09/76830.htm; David 
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According to one widely taught business model, a physician who sees 
patients as part of her practice (as contrasted to a medical group providing 
only procedures) should spend no more than seven minutes with each 
patient.  As Jerome Groopman has powerfully demonstrated, truncated time 
with patients contributes significantly to diagnostic error, especially if the 
patient’s problems are atypical or complex.  Without taking sufficient time 
to learn about the patient’s malady, the doctor has an insufficient data base 
for applying her exercise of professional judgment, even if one assumes 
that some subset of seven minutes gives the doctor sufficient time to reflect 
adequately and reach a considered personal opinion.96   
                                                                                                                          
Armstrong, Critical Dose: Aspirin Dispute Is Fueled by Funds of Industrial Rivals; A Cheap 
Remedy for Clotting Used by Millions of Patients is Undermined by Research; Bayer’s 
Friends Fight Back WALL ST. J., April 24, 2006.  But see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurers Stop 
Paying For Care Linked to Errors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008; Vanessa Fuhrmans, An 
Insurer Tries A New Strategy:  Listen to Patients, WALL ST. J., April 11, 2006. 
However, to some extent, Salgo’s proposed realistic solution to the problem of 
assembly line medicine involves a reasonable dose of the consumer-driven, market 
competition efficiency championed by Hyman.  See id. (“solution to the problem” is “in the 
hands of our patients” who should “adopt a business mind-set when shopping for health 
care” and refuse to patronize brusque, patient-unfriendly physicians).   
The problem, of course, is that it is increasingly hard to find these types of Marcus 
Welby-style doctors with room to take on additional patients.  The seven-minute, assembly 
line doctor increasingly dominates the provider landscape and will continue to do so until 
the medical insurance and payment system provides better incentives for better quality care, 
including spending adequate time with patients. 
This sort of medical consumerism is perfectly consistent with my preferences as 
outlined in this article.  What separates Hyman and me to a large degree is that Hyman 
seems to me to convey the impression that insured patients are morally hazardous louts who 
over-consume medical care without acting as a check on cost or quality while I contend that 
natural patient desires for good care and experiences with the physician will allow some 
consumer policing of medicine – if the patients have the ability to pay.  Without it, patients 
either skip care altogether, go to the cheapest doctor or the one with the most lenient 
collection agency, or rely on inefficient emergency room care for what should be office 
visits.  See Bobinski, supra note 13, noting that Canadians on whole are much more likely to 
get concededly necessary medical care than Americans); Edit., Emergency Room Delays, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008 (attributing much of delay to demands placed by uninsured 
patients).  
96. See GROOPMAN, supra note 95, at 268.  The problem is hardly confined to private 
insurance providers.  See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Cancer Drug Representatives Spelled Out 
the Way to Profit, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2007; Dan Stockman, State service’s Medicaid bills 
squeeze doctors, FT. WAYNE JOUR.-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 2006 (describing doctor’s receipt of 
$260,000 bill from government because “his pool of Medicaid patients costs too much 
money”).  In the “haste makes waste” department, see also Shirley S. Wang, Institute Cites 
Medication Errors, Suggests Changes to Cut Injuries, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2006. 
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The cost-reduction programs for actual delivery of medical care and the 
higher office overhead (it takes more office staff to process required 
paperwork and haggle with insurers) prompted by insurers pushes against 
traditional professional excellent and tends to undermine the quality of 
medical care.  In a sense, the insurance industry and government programs 
like Medicare, Medicaid, and the VA are no different.  The question then 
becomes which type of entity will provide a better brand of coverage and 
medical care regulation when measured along the multiple dimensions of 
quality of care, amount of care, and cost. 
Assessment of the quality-of-care dimension strongly suggests that 
private insurers, driven by profit motive as well as legitimate cost concerns, 
has to a large degree made medicine less of a profession and more of an 
assembly-line style business.  The product dispensed is health care, but the 
mass produced health care of a medical Wal-Mart more than Marcus 
Welby.   
On one level, this may be a positive development for a large category 
of consumers with routine medical problems that require only basic 
solutions.  The Marcus Welby method (which included house calls) made 
for heart-warming (if occasionally corny) television but it wasn’t very 
efficient.  Some cost-benefit sharpening of service delivery under the 
traditional model is a positive development.  On another level, however, 
the assembly line commodification and economy of scale in much current 
medical practice is undesirable in that it weakens the accuracy and depth of 
diagnosis.  It can have particularly serious adverse consequences where 
medical problems are less typical or readily apparent and require greater 
professional involvement by the doctor. 
Even for not particularly esoteric patient problems, the quality of 
medical care in this brave new world of medicine-as-a-business seems 
suspect.  As recounted above in my simple brush with infection, IV 
antibiotics, and cyst drainage, the economic pressure placed on the medical 
care system by the current medical coverage system appears to produce 
suboptimal results, even if one credits the system with some significant 
restraint on costs.  In my relatively unremarkable case, the supposedly 
wonderful system of private sector medical care and insurance produced 
primary physicians who don’t go to hospitals or otherwise follow through 
with patient care and disengaged, ill-informed, hospitalists who provided 
no continuity of care but who appeared to be protecting the economic self-
interest of hospitals at the expense of the patient.  It also produced long 
waits and needlessly protracted hospitalization; excessive testing to 
“churn” my medical insurance portfolio to the benefit of hospitals and 
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providers; and exorbitant requests for compensation by doctors with limited 
diagnostic skill as well as inadequate motivation.97 
In general, much of modern medical care appears organized around the 
needs of insurers and medical providers rather than the patient.  In addition 
to long waits, there are the “banker’s hours” of many physicians and 
practices as well as poor response to patients unfortunate enough to be 
stricken on evenings and weekends.  Outside of the walls of a hospital, 
medical service providers appear fragmented and scattered almost as if 
intentionally attempting to test the patience of patients.  In few medical 
practices can the patient be seen by the doctor and take common required 
lab tests that are part of shared medical records.  The economics of the 
current system militate against it.  As a result, patients requiring relatively 
simple things such as blood work, urine samples, x-rays, a CT scan, an 
MRI, or more intrusive scoping, can almost never get this done under the 
same roof (and certainly not on the same day or even a reasonably 
compressed time frame. 
The net result is to require patients, most of who must miss work for 
medical care, to spent substantial hours crisscrossing metropolitan (or 
worse yet, larger rural) areas for hours or days on end in order to get a basic 
diagnosis, which then requires the patient to again relocate and queue in 
line for any procedures required to attack a medical problem.98  Add to this 
substantial repetitive paperwork and at least some jousting with medical 
insurers, all against a backdrop of legitimate quality concerns, and there is 
more than a little worth criticizing in the status quo.99   
                                                                                                                 
97.  See supra notes 84-88. 
98. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 61, at 959 (labeling situation “deplorable”).  See 
also REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE:  WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 20-33, 250-51 (1997).  
The inconvenience of obtaining care of course pales in comparison to the problems and lost 
productivity that occurs when people are uninsured or lack adequate coverage.  See 
generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 307 (2007) 
(collecting data regarding lost productivity and value resulting from illness, injury, and 
medical treatment). 
99. There also appears generally to be inadequate regulation of physicians.  It appears, 
for example, that a disturbingly large number of doctors relocate their practices to new 
states simply to stay a step ahead of regulators in their former state of licensing.  Some 
doctors are essentially on the lam from one state to another because of past problems in the 
prior state.  For years, state medical boards have embarrassed themselves by failing to stop 
this sort of opportunistic pulling up of stakes and failed to required adequate disclosure of a 
doctor’s past problems. In one relatively recent and notorious case, a doctor with a 
checkered past who had relocated to Colorado committed egregious malpractice and 
seriously injured a boy.  In outraged response, the state legislature enacted a law requiring 
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The economics of the current system appears to have undermined or 
even imperiled professionalism by encouraging an assembly-line like 
commodification of medicine and medical procedures.  For receipt of 
diagnostic testing, lab work, and corrective procedures, including surgery, 
the problems appear primarily to be the inefficiency of delay and questions 
of competence by the service providers (who may puncture an organ, 
amputate the wrong appendage, etc.).  For delivery of physician 
consultation, the effect is arguably more pernicious in that it robs 
diagnosticians of a precious tool – information – because primary care 
physicians, internists and other specialists often are unwilling or unable to 
listen effectively long enough due to the pressure of their business models 
and income goals.100 
Ironically, the financial pressure on doctors and their perceived need to 
ramp up the quantity of care delivered to make up for reduced insurer 
payments was arguably supported by the inventor of the invisible hand.  
Smith wanted professionals to be adequately paid and to have decent 
working conditions that would permit the professional to acquire necessary 
skill and breathing space for good judgment focused on the instant patient 
or client.  He saw this as a necessary price to pay to obtain adequate 
professional services.101  But misapplication of Smith’s primary faith in 
markets, coupled with the perhaps pathological ways in which the U.S. has 
deviated from a market model without replacing it with a comprehensive 
government model, has produced a status quo Smith would have abhorred:  
medical professionals who so scurry to earn what they consider an adequate 
income that they devote insufficient time to many patients, thereby 
truncating the information they receive, rushing to judgment that is often 
erroneous.  As a result, diagnostic error is much higher than it should be.  
The correct diagnosis may not come until the patient has endured 
considerable pain and inconvenience at substantial cost and, in some cases, 
may not come at all or only after the patient’s demise. 
                                                                                                                          
disclosure of such past events to prospective and current patients.  Good doctors should 
embrace this type of regulation because it would be both good marketing and diminish the 
business of problematic doctors.  It appears that only 17 percent of physicians ever are sued 
for malpractice and that a relatively small group of doctors create the bulk medical 
malpractice claims.  As the saying goes, five percent of the people create 90 percent of the 
problems  But if the regulatory system does not adequately intervene, these five percent can 
wreak havoc for years or even decades. 
100. See GROOPMAN, supra note 95, at 226-231.   
101. See SMITH, Wealth of Nations, supra note 6, at 111. 
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Alternatively, it would seem much better to operate a system that was 
not so dependent on squeezing doctor income that it produced adverse 
collateral impact.  One would expect a rational health care system to make 
it sufficiently attractive for a high quality treating physician to be 
sufficiently compensated for each interaction with a patient to spend 
adequate time with the patient.   
 
IV.   THE LIMITS OF CONSUMERISM AS A HEALTH CARE 
POLICY AND THE INEXORABLE CASE FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC MEDICAL INSURANCE 
 
By now, it is obvious that more of my sympathies lie with the social 
justice and professionalism paradigms more than market and consumer 
choice models.  Consequently, my sympathies lie more with Jost and 
Mariner, even though I am concerned that even their informative writings 
use what I have come to regard as the subtle but misleading nomenclature 
of personal responsibility and actuarial fairness.  Notwithstanding these 
quibbles, Jost’s piece persuasively highlights a major problem with HSAs 
and the larger consumer-driven movement.  Even if it works for many, the 
primary beneficiaries are the largely healthy and wealthy, who hardly need 
the tax subsidy/shelter provided by HSAs.  Beyond this, the consumer-
driven health movement works against the communitarian norm and makes 
a universally effective medical coverage program harder to obtain.  
Mariner, in addition, to also noting the limitations of the consumer-driven 
health care initiative, presents the important insight that even something as 
seemingly uncontroversial as “wellness” programs can contribute to the 
undesirable erosion of community solidarity and social justice in medical 
care and coverage. 
Hyman, although as usual raising many excellent points regarding the 
operation of government programs, remains too enamored of the market as 
a cure-all.  This is too unrealistically sanguine a view, even for a Smithite, 
in light of the muddled, path-dependent history of American health policy.  
Establishment of true market hegemony is both practically feasible and 
undesirable in light of the core necessity of medical care, even for the 
comparatively impoverished, unwise, and irresponsible.  Playing John 
Wayne to the more Martin Luther King-like postures of Jost and Mariner, 
Hyman also continues to give short shrift to the professionalism wing of 
Adam Smith’s writing in that Hyman, although deferring to medical 
expertise over consumer preference on some matters (e.g., drive-by 
deliveries), often paints a picture of medical providers as greedy 
opportunists who would have been at home in the Enron boardroom.  My 
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own view toward providers, particularly physicians, is more charitable, 
although Hyman’s warnings in this regard cannot be totally ignored.102 
Ultimately, however, Hyman fails to persuade because his proposed 
solution to health care issues favors an impractical return to the pre-World 
War II yesteryear of the allegedly pure market-based medical care that 
supposedly once existed, accompanied by a presumed shrewd consumer 
participation in the market which will, according to Hyman, lower medical 
costs and enable patients to receive affordable medical care most pertinent 
to their needs.  One might as readily believe that the tooth fairy will be 
coming to everyone’s neighborhood soon. 
First, it is too late to turn back the clock.  Better to look forward rather 
than back and move from oligarchic medical insurance to true universal 
government-funded care.103  Second, Hyman presumes an infallibly 
                                                                                                                 
102. Nor can it be ignored that much of Hyman’s scholarship urges increased quality-
enhancement efforts directed toward improving the performance of medical professionals.  
See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, supra note 61 at 958-59.  In this quest, he sees a more effective 
role for consumer than I think is realistic while I support more stringent government efforts 
in this regard that will not be diluted by the economic incentives of private medical insurers. 
103.  This increasingly seems to be the position of many commentators.  See, e.g., 
KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 237-43 (proposing that Medicare be expanded to cover entire 
population); Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, Let 1000 Flowers Wilt:  The Futility of 
State-Level Health Care Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1173 (2007); Maxwell J. Mehlman, 
“Medicover”: A Proposal for National Health Insurance, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (2007) 
(essentially suggesting expansion of Medicare, “[t]he most efficient administrative system 
for health insurance” based on October 2006 conference of health law experts); Artur Davis, 
The Health Care We Owe Each Other:  Universal Care as the 21st Century Social Compact, 
37 CUMB. L. REV. 425 (2006); John A. Nyman, The Efficiency of Equity, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 
461 (2006); David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, A National Health Program for 
the United States:  A Physician’s Proposal, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 102 (1989) (proposing 
comprehensive national health care system); Annette Fuentes, What’s wrong with 
nationalized health care?, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2007, available at 
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/09/what-wrong-wit.html (supporting single-payer 
system); Milt Freudenheim, Mayo Clinic Proposing A Universal Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2007, C4, col. 4 (“But Mayo, in a proposal hammered out over 18 months by a 
panel of more than 400 health policy experts, is not advocating a government-run single-
payer system.  Instead, it suggested that private insurance companies be required to offer 
standard plans with many options, like the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan available 
to government workers. Applicants for this insurance could not be turned down … Lower-
income people would get government help on a sliding scale.” Ironically, Mayo Clinic co-
founder Charles Mayo, then president of the AMA, had during the early 20th Century 
warned doctors to be wary of universal health insurance out of fear it would not only reduce 
physician incomes but undermine professional judgment and the doctor-patient relationship.  
See Cynthia Crossen, Before WWI Began, Universal Health Care Seemed a Sure Thing, 
WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007); Robert H. Frank, A Health Care Plan So Simple, Even Stephen 
Colbert Couldn’t Simplify It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, C3, col. 1 (noting that “American 
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shrewd, disciplined consumer that never was and never will be, at least 
where medical and insurance purchases are concerned.104  Third, as 
discussed above, Hyman’s perspective, however wonderful it may sound in 
theory, fails to square with the practical realities of consumer ignorance, 
bounded rationality, heuristic error, reduced choice, lack of time for 
investigation, and general lack of meaningful ability to comparison shop 
for medical insurance coverage.  In addition to the practical limitations on 
lay patients, the dominance of group medical plans alone dramatically 
distorts whatever chance might otherwise exist to tame medical costs and 
excessive use of services through empowered consumerism.   
Realistic assessment of the lay citizenry should appreciate that people 
are on average normally not sufficiently rational, informed, or disciplined 
to be able make the type of consistently intelligent medical treatment 
decisions upon which the consumer-driven model depends if it is to be 
anything other than a government-subsidized tax break for the rich.  
Perhaps more important, nearly half of medical care already is subject to 
government funding and substantial regulation.  A move toward a more 
market based, consumer-driven system would at best produce a hybrid that 
continues the inefficiencies of the status quo without much countervailing 
efficiency advantage and a redistributive trend toward the already well-off.  
All this leads me to the inexorable conclusion that the optimal practical 
means to serve both community solidarity and true consumer choice is to 
expand Medicare and make it the mandatory medical insurance coverage 
for all Americans.  This will, according to Hyman, bring cackles of delight 
in Hades as another American jumps on his posited road to hell paved with 
                                                                                                                          
costs are so high in part because the reliance on private insurance multiplies administrative 
expenses, currently about 31 percent of total outlays … Most health economists agree that 
government-financed reimbursement is the only practical way to control these expenses, 
many of them stemming from insurers’ efforts to identify and avoid unhealthy people.  
Canada’s single-payer health system, which covers everyone, spends less than 17 percent on 
administrative expenses . . .  A move to a single-payer plan would save more than enough to 
compensate insurance companies for lost profits.”); Bannister, November is Coming, supra 
note 1, at 27 (proposing a “[n]ew  nonprofit insurance company …  [that] would provide 
basic health coverage for all. The nonprofit company might be run by elected citizens that 
would use open hearings to design plans and set premiums. One important safeguard against 
fiscal irresponsibility would be to prohibit the nonprofit from issuing long-term debt.”) 
104. Hyman’s infallibly shrewd consumer must also be independently wealthy, retired, 
or otherwise have considerable time on his or her hands.  Even if consumers possessed the 
tools to function in the market Nirvana posited by Hyman and scholars of similar bent, they 
would need more time for researching, making, assessing, and recalibrating their medical 
and insurance purchases than one can realistically assume is possessed by normal working 
people. 
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good intentions105 by giving even more power to the Medicare juggernaut.  
I disagree, in part for reasons stemming from Hyman’s own critique of 
Medicare, which he describes as a “Ponzi” scheme dependent on the 
attraction of new participants (a/k/a “marks” in Hyman’s view) to finance 
the benefits of those who entered the Ponzi period at an earlier juncture.   
Hyman is correct to point out that Medicare in its current form is too 
dependent on the young and healthy subsidizing older persons more 
demanding of (and in need of) medical care.  As his devilish alter ego put 
it: 
As you [Mephistopheles] correctly perceived many 
years ago, allowing everyone into Medicare would 
immediately bankrupt the program because the cross-
subsidies that sustain Medicare are only achievable if there 
are sufficient marks outside the program to pay the 
necessary funds into the program.  Program beneficiaries 
understand this point perfectly well.  The demise of the 
[proposed 1993] Clinton plan was inevitable once it 
became clear that the plan would “take” from the elderly 
and “give” to the uninsured.  We are far better off delaying 
the day of reckoning by a few years and allowing the 
gluttony of Medicare beneficiaries and the passage of time 
to increase the number of unsustainable commitments . . 
.106 
 
This portion of Hyman’s critique resonates, but does so in favor of 
making the move toward expanded Medicare sooner rather than later.  To 
be sure, moving from a system designed to protect the elderly, and which 
as to some extent becomes afflicted with excessive interest group 
politics,107 to one covering a larger, more diverse population with differing 
                                                                                                                 
105. Although considerably less extreme, Hyman in a sense is an intellectual heir of 
Friedrich Hayek, a  libertarian who embraced individualism so strongly that he and his 
followers not only inveighed against the very real evils of communism and other forms of 
totalitarianism but also opposed even the sort of “soft socialism” that can provide the 
infrastructure necessary for civilized progress.  See, e.g., FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO 
SERFDOM (1944).  This also arguably makes Hyman heir to the considerably less intellectual 
John Wayne legacy. 
106. See Hyman, Mephistopheles, supra note 63, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 1185-86 
(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). 
107.  As Hyman correctly points out, the adverse reaction of so-called “greedy 
geezers” (my and the media’s term, not Hyman’s) to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage 
Act of 1988, which merely required Medicare beneficiaries to pay some of the cost of 
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incidence of medical needs will require some recalibration of benefits 
offered, prices paid, and funds collected (through tax, premiums, co-pays, 
and deductibles).  But the experience of other nations strongly suggests that 
this can be effectively done in a manner that will eventually result in 
overall improvement of care at lower cost. 
“[C]ritics of the single-payer plan have long railed against the specter 
of socialized medicine, suggesting that it means being treated by 
government functionaries” the “people who have experienced single-payer 
coverage firsthand seem unconcerned.”108  As Cornell economist Robert 
Frank relates:  “When one of my sons needed surgery for a broken arm 
during a sabbatical in Paris, for example, the medical system we 
encountered was just as professional as the American one and far less 
bureaucratic.”109  My own experience with my son’s attack of bronchitis in 
Germany was similar.  Seeing a doctor and filling the required prescription 
was faster, easier, and cheaper than had the same adverse medical event 
occurred in the United States – and my son was of course not even part of 
the German citizenry for whose benefit the plan was designed.110  At some 
                                                                                                                          
expanded coverage, and the political cowardice of Congress in repealing the act in the face 
of these tantrums, illustrates a problem with having government in the insurance business.  
See supra note 62.  But there is no iron law that Medicare must be under-funded or poorly 
administered.  More to the point:  the occasional electoral pathologies of Mediare seem to 
me no worse than the chronic problems besetting system using private insurance.  See, e.g., 
supra notes 4, 13, 18, supra (discussing high relative cost of U.S. medical care system); 
Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 KAN. L. REV. 
73, 152 (2005) (“[P]eople with health problems increasingly are forced to shoulder the load 
of their own medical costs.  The trend toward consumerism in health coverage shifts not 
simply costs, but also insurance risk, to individual insureds, and the results may be 
particularly dire for people in poor health.”); Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care:  
Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH, POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 93, 145 
(2006) (discussing problems associated with current system’s private adjudicative 
mechanisms for determination of necessity of care); George A. Nation III, Obscene 
Contracts:  The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 
KY. L.J. 101, 112 (2005) (noting degree to which current system warps pricing, resulting in 
posted retail price inflicted upon uninsured as contrasted to discounted price charged to 
insured patients). 
108. See Frank, supra note 103, at C3, col. 1. 
109. Id. at col. 5    “And [as Frank emphasizes for the slow to grasp] in France, which 
spends half as much on health care as the United States and has more doctors and hospital 
beds per capita, everyone is covered.”  Id. 
110. I realize that Germany has a system someone different than the arguably “purer” 
government single payer systems of France and Canada in that private insurance plays more 
of a role in Germany.  But for purposes of this comment, I do not believe it unfair to lump 
Germany with what I call “single-payer” countries (because of national government 
commitment to and administration of medical insurance), to whom they are far closer 
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point, all the ideology and theorizing in the world must yield to the hard 
empirical facts suggesting that medical care in Western Europe and Canada 
appears to be both cheaper and superior on the whole that that of the United 
States.111 
Rather than attempting to demonize (in Hyman’s case, quite literally) 
government insurance plans as spendthrift bureaucracies, we would be 
better off appreciating them as aspects of national infrastructure akin to 
roads, police and fire protection, and national defense.112  A comprehensive 
medical care program for all (which realistically can only be achieved 
through the government-run, single-payer approach), like these other 
                                                                                                                          
regarding health care policy.  See Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The Consumer-
Driven Persepctive, 14.2 CON. INS. L.J. 377 (2008); RICHARD KNOX, GERMANY’S HEALTH 
SYSTEM, ONE NATION, UNITED WITH HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (Faulkner and Gray 1993).  
Regarding non-U.S. health care systems, see generally ANTONIA MAIONI, PARTING AT THE 
CROSSROADS:  THE EMERGENCE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
(Princeton University Press 1998); ); CHRIS HAM (ED.), HEALTH CARE REFORM:  LEARNING 
FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Opem University Press 1997) (discussing UK, Sweden, 
Netherlands and Germany as well as U.S.); FRANCIS D. POWELL & ALBERT F. WESSEN 
(EDS.), HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION:  AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1993) 
(providing a general overview with particular focus on German, Candadian, Swedish and 
British systems).  But see William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law That Shapes the 
United States Health Care System:  Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the 
Established Paradigm, 15 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 151, 156 (2006) (concluding that the 
answer is “no”).  
111. See supra notes 4, 13, 18, supra; Jacobi, supra note 4 , at 535-36; Manfred Huber 
& Eva Orosz, Health Expenditures Trends in OECD Countries, 1990-2001, 25 HEALTH 
CARE FIN. REV. 1 (2003).  
112.  Of course, the current American government treatment of these infrastructure 
issues is not particularly encouraging.  See Free Hiatt, She Brakes for Ideology, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 23, 2008, A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/20/AR2008012002275.html (“[T]raffic congestion already is 
costing the U.S. economy as much as $200 billion a year.”). 
My primary point, however, is that there is no doubt that inadequate infrastructure 
imposes costs on society.  We do not enjoy net savings simply because we spend less (and 
do less) regarding roads, bridges, policemen, fireman, soldiers – or health insurance.   
Further, many of the current government’s failures concerning the transportation 
infrastructure stem not from institutional incompetence but from ideology-based resistance 
that recently has trumped sound policy analysis.  See Hiatt, supra ([According to the Bush 
Administration, the “main reason you are sitting in traffic . . . is not that the purchasing 
power of Highway Trust Fund revenue has been dwindling for the past decade, not that 
population and freight traffic have been soaring with no government response – but that you 
are not being asked to pay enough to use the road you are on.”)  Hiatt also notes that the 
Bush Administration rejected a bipartisan federal commission‘s “comprehensive, balanced 
plan for the next 50 years, calling for maintenance and construction, road and rail, public 
and private roads.”  Id.  (emphasis in original). 
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infrastructure programs, provides a platform for greater national 
productivity113 as well as social justice and a chance for medical 
professionals to practice their craft under a set of incentives more 
supportive of quality care.114  Only some small increment of faux 
individualism is lost.115 
American attitudes toward health care and medical insurance continue 
to be unduly dominated by accidents of history and the mythological power 
of the nation’s archetypes.  The rugged individualism embodied in John 
Wayne, and the market efficiency associated with Adam Smith are today’s 
dominant archetypes.  Although each embodies characteristics that are 
desirable in general (who can, as a general proposition, be against 
individualism, personal responsibility, ambition, free markets and greater 
                                                                                                                 
113. See, e.g., Jennifer Robison, Staffs May Shrink:  Plurality of companies say they’ll 
thin ranks as costs for health insurance rise, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 21, 2008, available at 
http://www.lvrj.com/business/13942712.html.  For example, employers freed of the burden 
of being the nation’s front line source of medical coverage would also be freed of the need 
to make personnel and payment decisions based on consideration of the cost of group 
medical care.   
114. See Furrow, supra note 14, at 417 (“[T]he moral argument of social solidarity 
with our fellows, so eloquently put by Timothy Jost in his comparative work on European 
systems, pulls in tandem with the conservative argument that more health care is better for 
the economy.”) (citing TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?:  THE THREATS FACING OUR 
PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE (Oxford University Press 
2003)). 
115. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith made a similar defense of public works 
spending as a useful investment to assist the market economy in reaching its full potential.  
See SMITH, supra note 6, at 473-85.  Thus, there was an “infrastructure” Smith as well as a 
professionalism Smith and a market Smith.  Although the pro-market, “invisible hand” 
Smith is most prominent in his writing, the American adaptation of Smith has tended to 
completely ignore Smith’s support of professionalism and infrastructure.  
 Some see this and the overwhelming American aversion to self-consciously 
adopting a government single-payer system as a product of interest group conspiracy.  See, 
e.g., MICHAEL TOWNES WATSON, AMERICA’S TUNNEL VISION:  HOW INSURANCE COMPANIES’ 
PROPAGANDA IS CORRUPTING MEDICINE & LAW 276 (Horatio Press 2006).  Although the 
lobbying and public relations campaigns of insurers, drug companies, medical providers, 
and other interest groups have undoubtedly all contributed to fostering the “market-uber-
alles” ethos of the U.S., my own view is that it is largely the organic product of the 
historical evolution of American self-identity.   
America celebrates markets, personal wealth, and rugged individualism like no 
other country in the world.  By contrast, Canadian culture gives proportionately greater 
celebration to collective national enterprise, such as the building of the Trans-Canadian 
railroad.  In Canada, the thousands of workers get credit.  In the U.S., the CEO of the 
railroad company would likely be the hero of the story.  This difference in national psyche 
goes a long way toward explaining the different national systems of medical care and 
insurance. 
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economic wealth?), slavish, blind, and inflexible devotion to these 
idealized concepts has produced an unwillingness to face basic operational 
and empirical facts about the optimal means for maximizing access to 
health care and medical coverage for the citizenry.116 
Without doubt, a government-administered public insurance plan is the 
optimal route.  Whatever theoretical uncertainty may exist in thought 
experiments or political debate is belied by the empirical evidence.  
Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Scandinavia and Germany all spent 
about half as much per capita on health care as the U.S. and have healthier, 
longer-lived populations.  Of these countries, only Germany has anything 
looking in any way similar to the public-private partnerships urged by the 
most liberal of American politicians.  The others are all government-run 
single payer systems of medical insurance.  England actually runs the 
medical side as well as the insurance side and has what might accurately be 
termed socialized medicine in which the doctors work for the government.  
Most important, Medicare has operated successfully as a single-payer form 
of public insurance for 40 years.  Its imperfections can be improved upon 
and its reach extended. 
                                                                                                                 
116. See Stone, supra note 53, at 486-87.  Deborah Stone’s assessment of the excesses 
of this ethos is even more condemning: 
 
The consumer choice approach to social policy represents a 
cynical turn in American public philosophy. . . . More often than not, 
“consumer choice” and “consumer direction” are glittery wrappings in 
which employers, insurers, and politicians package benefit reductions, 
program contractions, and budget cuts.  
 
Giving people a budget that is too small for their needs does 
not give them the experience of freedom.  Instead, they experience 
every decision not as free choice but as a terrible trade-off. 
    * * * 
Consumer choice theory is thus an ideology.  It is a way of 
seeing the world, and particularly a way of interpreting social justice.  It 
is a philosophy that minimizes communal obligations to citizens, 
maximizes individually responsibility for one’s own well-being, and 
tolerates great inequalities in well-being as morally acceptable.  It 
replaces a social commitment to meeting needs with commitment to 
meeting budgets.  It uses the rhetoric of “freedom” and “autonomy” to 
justify the abdication of social responsibility and the failure to provide 
appropriate and compassionate care. 
 
See Stone, False Promise, supra note 53, at 486-87.  See also Stone, Beyond Moral 
Hazard, supra note 48. 
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The actual operation of health care and insurance in the real world 
demonstrates that the single payer system and close equivalents are simply 
more efficacious than the American status quo and so-called “consumer-
driven” alternatives.  It no longer makes sense to shy away from this 
approach simply because of the aura associated with Wayne and the market 
side of Smith’s persona.  After too long a period of the dominance of these 
images, the time has come to reassert the professionalism side of Smith 
and, more important, the social justice and community solidarity values 
embodied in Martin Luther King’s legacy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To be sure, a government can administer a medical coverage system 
badly.  But it is equally true that a government-run system can be efficient, 
probably at least as efficient as the current insurer-dominated, employer-
dominated system.  Greater progress will be made when policymakers 
focus on the factors that make for effective government operation of 
insurance coverage and free themselves from the tyranny of legal fictions 
and mythology about the infallibility of markets, personal fault, consumer 
omniscience, medical provider behavior, and private insurer efficacy. 
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HEALTH INSURANCE: MARKET 
FAILURE OR  GOVERNMENT FAILURE?  
 
David A. Hyman1 
 
“A society that does things that are inefficient or 
perverse in their effects ought to be told so.”2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Health insurance is once again on the policy agenda, and it is déjà vu 
all over again.  There are the same troubling statistics -- 47 million 
Americans are uninsured, and 20 million Americans are “under-insured” 
(whatever that means).3  There are the same anecdotes about the tragic 
consequences of being uninsured.  There are reports by government 
agencies, think tanks, and do-gooder organizations.  There are the same 
policy entrepreneurs, pushing old wine in new (and not so new) bottles.  
There are the same appeals to social solidarity, self-interest, or both.  The 
interest groups are back in force as well -- each seeking to protect and 
advance their own interests, while asserting their deep and abiding concern 
for the broader public interest.4  Reform proposals are being pushed by all 
the usual suspects, including local, state and federal legislators, and all of 
the presidential candidates.   
The reform proposals vary in their specificity, but all (either implicitly 
or explicitly) identify the source of the problem as “market failure” – and 
promise new regulations and more taxes to “fix” the problem.  This article 
follows a different approach, and makes the case that “government failure” 
should occupy center-stage in understanding how things came to look the 
way they do.  Rather than market failure, it is our inefficient and perverse 
                                                                                                                 
1. Richard & Marie Corman Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University 
of Illinois.  
2. GEORGE STIGLER, Are Economists Good People?, in MEMOIRS OF AN 
UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 6 (University of Chicago Press 2003) (1988).     
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2006 (2007).  The claim that someone is underinsured is rhetorically 
appealing, but essentially meaningless, absent some shared understanding of “adequate” 
coverage.  Efforts to define “adequate” coverage typically result in the determination that 
everyone should have “gold-plated” coverage.  That is exactly what everyone would have if 
cost were no object.  It isn’t.   
4. Strictly speaking, they never left.   
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regulation of health insurance that should be the focus of our ire, and of 
regulatory reform.    
Part II briefly outlines the existing market and regulatory framework 
for health insurance.  Part III explains the sources of government failure in 
the market.  Part IV outlines some possible approaches to addressing the 
problem of government failure.  Part V concludes. 
   
II. ESSENTIALS OF REGULATING THE HEALTH INSURANCE 
MARKET 
 
Approximately 61 percent of the non-elderly population (totaling 260 
million people) receives health coverage through an employer.5  5 percent 
purchase individual coverage.6  16 percent receives government-sponsored 
coverage, and 18 percent are uninsured.7   
Why do so many Americans obtain health insurance through their 
employer – particularly when only 2% of the population had employment-
based coverage in 1930?8  In an earlier article, I explained that this outcome 
was a historical accident, fueled by federal labor and tax policy:  
 
The first dramatic increase in employment-based 
coverage came during World War II.  Wage and price 
controls were instituted by the Office of Price 
Administration in an attempt to deal with inflation.  
Employer contributions to insurance and pension funds 
were not counted as wages, and were accordingly excluded 
from the wage controls.  The freezing of cash wages forced 
employers to compete for scarce labor by enhancing their 
fringe benefit packages.  Health insurance offered a 
straightforward way for employers to sweeten their 
compensation package in a manner that would be quite 
appealing to potential employees.  
                                                                                                                 
5. KAISER FAMILY FOUND, The Uninsured: A Primer, Key Facts about Americans 
without Health Insurance, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-03.pdf 
6. Id. 
7. Id.  To be sure, how many uninsured there are depends greatly on how long one 
must be without insurance to qualify.  If one focuses on the hard-core uninsured (those 
without coverage for a two year period), the number of uninsured is far smaller.   
8. Robert B. Helms, The Tax Treatment of Health Insurance: Early History and 
Evidence, 1940-1970, in EMPOWERING HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS THROUGH TAX REFORM 1, 
8 (Grace-Marie Arnett ed., 1999).   
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The second impetus for employment-based coverage 
was the federal tax code.  In 1943, the Internal Revenue 
Service issued a ruling indicating that the amounts paid by 
employers for insurance for employees did not constitute 
income to employees, even though employers could deduct 
these amounts as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses.  Ten years later, the IRS withdrew this ruling, 
but Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code in 1954 
to expressly exclude employment-based coverage from 
taxable income.  In effect, this asymmetric tax treatment 
allows employers to purchase health insurance for their 
employees using employees’ before-tax income, rather 
than forcing employees to purchase it themselves with 
after-tax income.  The amount of the subsidy is a function 
of the marginal tax rate for any given taxpayer, but its size 
is larger for higher-income taxpayers because of the 
progressivity of federal taxation.  In the aggregate, this 
subsidy is worth more than $100 billion in foregone tax 
revenue per year, and is the second largest tax expenditure, 
after home mortgage interest.  The result is a substantial 
financial incentive for employees to obtain coverage 
through their employer if at all possible.   
 
Labor unions were another factor in the rise of 
employment-based coverage. During the late 1940s and 
1950s, unions aggressively bargained for richer benefit 
packages, with health insurance at the top of their list.  In 
industries in which unions were strong (e.g., 
manufacturing and public-sector employment), the result 
was that many subscribers obtained first-dollar insurance 
coverage and medical care at no out-of-pocket cost to 
themselves whatsoever.  Employers with non-unionized 
workforces also offered rich benefits to discourage their 
employees from unionizing.9 
 
                                                                                                                 
9. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers For Employment-Based Health 
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS  23, 25-26 (2001-2002) (footnotes 
omitted).  
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The linkage between employment and health insurance has significant 
distributional consequences.  Large and mid-size employers are more likely 
to offer coverage, and more likely to offer a choice of coverage than small 
employers.10  Employment-based coverage is much less likely to be offered 
to those who work in certain industries (e.g., agriculture, retail, and food 
service), and those working less than full-time.11   
The link between employment and health insurance also has substantial 
regulatory consequences.  Pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states 
have primary regulatory authority over insurance sold to state residents.12  
However, federal preemption of state regulation (with or without direct 
federal regulation) is always possible, as long as Congress expressly 
indicates its intention to affect the “business of insurance.”13  Thus, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act broadly preempts state 
regulation of employment based health insurance -- except to the extent the 
employer provides coverage by purchasing a state-regulated health 
insurance contract.14  Conversely, employment-based health insurance is 
not subject to state regulation if the employer self-funds the coverage it 
provides to its employees.15  Of those who obtain health insurance through 
their employer, 45 percent are funded by the employer purchasing a health 
insurance contract, and 55 percent are self-insured by the employer.16   
In practical terms, this framework means that the 71 million Americans 
who obtain coverage individually or through an employer’s insured plan 
are subject to both state and federal regulation, while the 87 million 
Americans who obtain coverage through an employer’s self-funded plan 
are subject only to federal regulation.17  
How have the federal and state governments exercised this regulatory 
authority?  At the federal level, there has been relatively limited direct 
regulation of health insurance.  When ERISA was enacted in 1974, it 
focused on pension plans, and imposed no substantive regulations on 
                                                                                                                 
10. Employer Health Benefits: 2007 Annual Survey, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & 
HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR. 4-5, 58 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Annual Benefits Survey], 
available at http://kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf. 
11. Id. at 34. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000). 
14. Such coverage is called an “a “fully insured plan.”  See 2007 Annual Benefits 
Survey, supra note 10, at 146.  
15. Such coverage is called a self-funded plan.  Id.   
16. Id. at 147. 
17. See id. at 1.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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employment-based health insurance.18  Over the intervening 34 years, there 
have been a few new substantive regulations, including requirements 
prohibiting “drive-through deliveries,”19 requiring parity in coverage of 
mental health treatment,20 and imposing limits on the use of preexisting 
condition exclusions.21  Because ERISA preempts state law, but does not 
impose much in the way of substantive regulation, this framework means 
that self-funded employers have operated in a virtual regulatory vacuum.  
Self-funded employers are more likely to operate in multiple states, so this 
regulatory vacuum has meant such employers can implement uniform 
coverage arrangements without worrying about state-by-state regulatory 
variation.  Stated differently, the current framework provides self-funded 
employers with virtually complete freedom to design and implement 
whatever health care coverage they desire – including spending as little or 
as much as they want.22   
At the state level, there has been a massive amount of regulation 
affecting every aspect of the relationship between insurers, providers, and 
patients.  As Figure 1 demonstrates, there are three distinct relationships 
that can be regulated: the relationship between the insurer and the 
physician/provider (Type I regulation); the relationship between the 
physician/provider and the patient (Type II regulation), and the relationship 
between the patient and the insurer (Type III regulation).23 
                                                                                                                 
18. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 9, at 29. 
19. Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §300gg-4 
(2000). 
20. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §1185a (2000 and Supp. 111 2004) 
and 42 U.S.C. §300gg-5 (2000 and Supp. 111 2004).   
21. See 26 U.S.C. §9801 (2000 and Supp. 111 2004); 29 U.S.C. §1181 (2000 and 
Supp. 111 2004); 42 U.S.C. §300gg (2000). 
22. See Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential 
Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203 (2007); Retail Industry Leaders 
Assn. v. Fiedler, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).    
23. There are also regulatory strategies that do not fit neatly into this model, such as 
solvency regulation and premium taxes.  All states employ such strategies, and impose 
premium taxes as high as 3%. JEFF LEMIEUX, AHIP CTR FOR POLICY & RES., PERSPECTIVE: 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/Administrative_Costs_030705.pdf.  Because of ERISA 
preemption, self-funded employers are not subject to such taxes.   
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Examples of Type I regulation include “any willing provider” 
legislation, restrictions on compensation mechanisms, and prohibitions on 
“gag clauses.”  Type II regulation includes mandated disclosure of 
qualifications, results, and incentives to limit care.  Type III regulation 
includes mandated coverage of certain benefits, such as alcohol treatment, 
and post-partum stays, and provisions affecting the circumstances and price 
at which insurance may be offered (including guaranteed issue and 
community rating).   
States have adopted numerous Type I and Type III regulations, but 
relatively few Type II regulations.24  The number of Type I and Type III 
regulations also appears to have grown dramatically over time.25  The most 
common Type I regulations are any willing provider/freedom of choice 
legislation covering chiropractors (46 states), psychologists (44 states) and 
optometrists (43 states).26  The most common Type III regulations are 
mandated coverage of newborns (50 states), alcoholism treatment (45 
states) diabetic supplies (47 states), breast reconstruction after mastectomy 
(48 states), and mammograms (50 states).27   
Proponents of mandates sometimes suggest that they decrease costs.  
By and large, this argument is pure sophistry.  Proponents are focusing on 
the fact that those receiving the mandated services suddenly face lower out-
of-pocket costs, but this result is a mathematical consequence of spreading 
                                                                                                                 
24. See Victoria Craig Bunce et al., Health Insurance Mandates in the States 2006, 
COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE  (2006) [hereinafter CAHI], available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/MandatePub2006.pdf.  
25. Compare U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-96-161, HEALTH 
INSURANCE REGULATION VARYING STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE  9 
(1996) (“On average, states have enacted laws mandating about 18 specific benefits), and  
CAHI, supra note 24,  (identifying more than 1800 mandates, or 36 per state).   
26. CAHI, supra note 24. 
27. Id.  
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the costs for those receiving the mandated treatment across a larger 
population.  This result is obviously not the same thing as lower costs 
overall.  
To the extent private insurance is not already providing the mandated 
coverage, the mandate will increase costs – with the magnitude of the 
increase affected by a number of factors, including the elasticity of demand 
for the mandated services.28   Estimates of these costs vary widely.29   
  
III. JUDGING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
What is there to be said for (and against) this regulatory framework?  
There is broad agreement that some regulation of health insurance is 
appropriate – but once one moves beyond the core issues of solvency and 
externalities, there is considerable disagreement on what should be 
regulated and how to do so.  In part, the disagreement is attributable to the 
use of different analytical frameworks.  Those using a neo-classical 
economic framework are likely to focus on the problems of adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and the fact that health insurance contracts are 
                                                                                                                 
28. In theory, a mandate could lower overall costs if broader ex ante use of the 
mandated treatment resulted in lower costs ex post.  For example, if better screening for and 
treatment of hypertension lowered hospitalization rates for heart attacks, mandated coverage 
might result in lower costs.  But, if ex ante investment resulted in lower costs ex post, it is 
unclear why rational insurers would fail to make such investments, unless they did not 
expect to internalize the costs of the heart attacks – and voluntary contracts offer a way for 
insurers and insureds to handle such “churn.”  The fact that insurance is purchased through 
intermediaries (usually employer human resources departments) also suggests that this 
problem is more theoretical than real.   
29. CAHI, supra note 24 (“Based on our analysis presented in this paper, mandated 
benefits currently increase the cost of basic health coverage from a little less than 20% to 
more than 50%, depending on the state.”); Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, 
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Mandated Benefit Laws, 77 MILBANK Q. 425, 
444-445 (1999) (estimating cost of mandates ranging from 4% - 13%).  See also Assessing 
the Impact of Mandated Health Insurance Benefits on Cost and Coverage, RUTGERS CENTER 
FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/Downloads/7120.pdf. 
[I]t is clear that there is not a consistent and compelling body of 
evidence to support the notion that mandates have had a major impact 
on health insurance premiums, employer decisions to offer health 
insurance, and coverage. While several earlier studies showed greater 
impacts of mandates on cost and coverage, more recent studies using 
improved methods found only small impacts or, in some cases, no 
statistical associations of mandates with cost or coverage. 
Id. 
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complex and incomplete.30  This lens is likely to lead to regulations 
addressing opportunistic behavior by both the insurer and the insured.   
Those using a behavioral economic framework are likely focus on the 
fact that human beings have better things to do with their time than read 
insurance contracts -- and even if they read them, they are likely to 
discount or ignore inefficient coverage terms.31  This lens is likely to lead 
to the willingness to mandate coverage of terms that individuals would 
supposedly want (and be willing to pay for) if they were perfectly 
rational.32  Those using this framework typically assume that regulators can 
identify inefficient and efficient coverage terms, and only impose the latter 
– although they generally offer no evidence to support this assumption.33   
Those using a redistributionist framework are likely to focus on their 
desire to transfer resources from the more fortunate (healthy and wealthy) 
to the less fortunate (sick and poor).34  This lens is likely to lead to 
coverage mandates that individuals would not be willing to pay for if they 
were perfectly rational – which is, after all, the definition of redistribution.   
                                                                                                                 
30. See generally David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with A 
Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S.CAL L. REV. 221 (1999-2000). 
31. See Id at 234. 
 Life is short, and reading the fine print in one's insurance 
contract is not high on most peoples' list of favorite weekend activities -
- particularly when they do not perceive that their efforts will have any 
effect on the terms of the contract. Even if one is prepared to read the 
insurance contract, it does not follow that one will pay attention to the 
specific terms which, after the fact, turn out to be important. Against 
this backdrop, ‘bounded rationality’ constrains the operation of market 
forces which would normally ensure the optimal mix of quality and 
price. 
Id. 
32. Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: 
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(1999-2000). 
33. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IMPROVING HEALTH 
CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 31-32 (2004) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/24694.pdf: 
For mandates to improve the efficiency of the health insurance 
market, state and federal legislators must be able to identify services the 
insurance market is not currently covering for which consumers are 
willing to pay the marginal costs. This task is challenging under the best 
of circumstances – and benefits are not mandated under the best of 
circumstances. 
Id. 
34. Hyman, supra note 30, at 247. 
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All three of these frameworks share an underlying assumption that 
regulation is driven by the public interest.  A fourth framework (public 
choice) emphasizes that regulation often reflects rent-seeking behavior by 
special interests, and accordingly counsels for great skepticism regarding 
the merits of most such initiatives.   
It would be nice to report that the entirety of the regulatory framework 
described above fits neatly into one of these four analytical approaches.  As 
always, reality is messier than theory – particularly when one tries to apply 
oversimplified theories of regulation to the real-world oversight of a 
massive industry by more than a hundred potential regulators.35  Indeed, it 
would be somewhat surprising if the regulatory framework for health 
insurance reflected a single animating theory, since regulation of the health 
care sector in general reflects the impact of multiple inconsistent normative 
frameworks.36   
Thus, individual mandates can result from any one of these regulatory 
frameworks, or the combination of more than one of these frameworks.  
Despite this heterogenity, in-depth examination of individual mandates 
reveals an important commonality: provider lobbying figures in most of 
them – often aided by a small group of affected patients and/or relatives of 
patients.37  These groups offer legislators pre-packaged salient anecdotes to 
support reforms that “fortuitously” result in insulating these providers from 
the operation of market forces (Type I regulations), and more and better 
coverage of the services these providers wish to deliver (Type III 
regulations).  The costs of these “reforms” are widely shared (and generally 
off-budget), but the benefits are highly concentrated – precisely the 
circumstances under which collective action problems can be overcome.38 
                                                                                                                 
35. 50 state insurance commissioners plus 50 state legislatures plus Congress equals 
more than 100 potential regulators.   
36. Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 354-356 (2006) (noting a plethora of competing organizing 
principles in the regulation of health care).   
37. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN & LAURA A. TOLLEN, TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY HEALTH 
SYSTEM: THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROMISE OF PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE 238 (2004) 
(“Often these mandates are legislative responses to the demands of narrow interest provider 
and consumer constituencies, such as disease specific advocacy groups or nurses 
associations, for instance.”); DOJ/FTC, supra note 33, at 24 (“providers of the mandated 
benefit are usually the most vigorous proponents of such legislation, making it more likely 
that the mandated benefit constitutes ‘provider protection’ and not ‘consumer protection.’ 
”). 
38. ENTHOVEN ET. AL., supra note 37 at 238. 
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Although these reforms are styled as “consumer protection,” they are, more 
often than not, “provider protection.”39 
If legislators were Platonic guardians, the problem would take care of 
itself.  They aren’t, and it won’t. Legislators have neither the information 
nor the inclination to identify only cost-justified/efficient reforms. Indeed, 
saliency bias dramatically increases the probability that health insurance 
regulation will come to grief, disserving the interests of those the 
legislators purportedly intended to protect.40   
The problem is easy to state but hard to solve:  
 
Legislators tend to identify “necessary reforms” on the 
basis of bad anecdotes and popular appeal. . . Legislators 
also tend to discount the trade-offs and costs which result 
from their reforms.  In a voluntary insurance market, cost-
increasing consumer protections will predictably price 
some people out of the market-and it is hardly self-evident 
where the cost/quality/access equilibrium should be set, let 
alone whether there should be a single standard for all 
                                                                                                                 
39. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in 
Regulating Managed Care, 16 HEALTH AFF. 26, 30 (1997) (“one should be sure that what is 
being proposed is consumer protection and not provider protection masquerading as 
consumer protection.”); Peter T. Kilborn, Bills Regulating Managed Care Benefit Doctors, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at Al (“The quip going around is that this is physician 
protection, not consumer protection.”) 
40. See Hyman, supra note 30, at 248: 
Coverage and delivery issues that are salient to consumers 
will be handled without much difficulty through normal market 
mechanisms so long as consumers are actually willing to pay for the 
desired services. However, in order for an issue to attract legislative 
attention, it must be salient to consumers as well.  If the issue is not 
salient to consumers, it will have little or no appeal to legislators, who 
must allocate their scarce political capital to bills that will be perceived 
by their constituents as beneficial. The result is that legislative 
initiatives promoting cost-justified contract terms will generally 
duplicate contract terms already prevalent in the coverage market. To 
the extent the legislation does not duplicate existing contract terms, it is 
exceedingly likely that the proposed contract terms will have already 
been rejected as non-cost-effective, either by the market as a whole, or, 
in a well-differentiated market, by some of the market participants and 
their customers. Such contract terms are embraced by the legislature for 
their symbolic value or as a political pay-off, and not because they 
provide a cost-justified benefit to consumers. 
Id.  
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coverage. The drafting of consumer protections is also 
readily hijacked by entrenched providers, who have their 
own interests at heart. Finally, the emotional implications 
of these issues ensure that legislators will be reluctant to 
embrace the necessary trade-offs.41 
 
Those wishing a concrete example of how this dynamic plays out in the 
real world should consider the fuss over “drive-through deliveries” – the 
practice of discharging women and newborns from the hospital less than 
forty-eight hours after a vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours after a 
Cesarean section.42 The issue was ideal from a legislative perspective: 
vulnerable mothers and babies exploited by faceless health plans, grieving 
witnesses complaining of specifically identifiable (and immensely 
sympathetic) victims, suited villains with MBAs, and CPAs overriding the 
decisions of selfless physicians in white coats, and a largely off-budget 
solution. In relatively short order, an overwhelming majority of the states 
and the federal government mandated more extensive coverage.  
Prohibiting drive-through deliveries was politically popular, but there is 
little or no evidence that extended post-partum stays provide any benefit - 
let alone a benefit worth the substantial associated cost.43  Worse still, the 
mandate crowded out alternative arrangements that actually benefitted and 
were preferred by new mothers.  With successes like this, who needs 
failure?   
That said, why should anyone care about this particular dysfunctional 
corner of the regulatory state?  Isn’t setting minimum standards what we 
rely on legislators and regulators to do – even if they opt for overly rich 
benefit packages some of the time?  Unfortunately, such “minimum 
standards” can have substantial adverse consequences – with those 
consequences compounded by the regulatory monopoly that each state has 
pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.   
 
These adverse consequences include: 
                                                                                                                 
41. Id. at 236. 
42. David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is Consumer Protection Just What 
the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C.L. REV. 5, 24 (1999) [hereinafter Hyman, Just What the 
Doctor Ordered].  See also David A. Hyman, Commentary, What Lessons Should We Learn 
From Drive-Through Deliveries?,  107 PEDIATRICS 406 (2001). 
43. Hyman, Just What the Doctor Ordered, supra note 42, at 9. 
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1. Forcing individuals who can’t afford more expensive 
coverage to do without insurance entirely – thus increasing the 
number of people who are uninsured;  
2. Forcing those who can afford more expensive coverage 
to purchase it, even though they have better uses for the 
money;44  
3. Constraining competition on the financing and delivery 
of health care services;  
4. Taking money from the poor and working class, and 
giving to the upper middle class, who provide (and 
disproportionately receive) the mandated services.45   
 
The basic problem is that health insurance is a bundled product sold 
into a diverse market, to people with varying intensity of preferences for 
coverage with different cost-quality-access trade-offs.  Mandates are based 
on the assumption that there is one right answer to these trade-offs – but the 
reality is that all Americans do not want (and some can’t afford) coverage 
which incorporates all the bells and whistles.  For many consumers, 
regulation actually overrides their preferences, instead of protecting them, 
and does so at their expense.  Stated differently, “people may die or suffer 
adverse outcomes if their insurance does not cover ‘everything,’ but they 
will also die or suffer adverse outcomes if they are unable to afford health 
insurance. . . setting an inefficiently high level of health care quality as the 
mandatory minimum ignores both the short-term consequences for price 
and access and the long-term consequences of increased price and 
decreased access on quality.”46    
                                                                                                                 
44. Cf. David Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: 
Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-
Off, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 978 (1998). 
Clients who can afford the best do not necessarily want to pay for 
it. They may happily purchase limited legal services and put the money 
they save in the bank, the stock market, or whatever else strikes their 
fancy. A person wealthy enough to own a Rolls Royce can drive a 
Plymouth and keep the change-at least as long as the Rolls Royce 
dealers have not put the Plymouth dealers out of business.  
Id. 
45. See generally Barak D. Richman, Insurance Expansions: Do They Hurt Those 
They Are Designed to Help? 26 HEALTH AFF. 1345 (2007).  
46. Hearings on Health Services, Regulatory Costs, and the Uninsured Before the 
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (2004) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement 
of David A. Hyman), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-
safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpUi.pdf. 
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It is clear that the cost of health insurance is a major factor in why so 
many people are uninsured.47  Given that reality, it is far from clear why we 
should accept a regulatory framework that offers people the choice between 
“nothing but the best and nothing.”48 
 
IV. TREATING THE PROBLEM: A DOSE OF TAX REFORM AND 
REGULATORY FEDERALISM 
 
If one wanted to improve on the status quo, there are two obvious 
targets: the tax treatment of health insurance, and the elimination of state-
specific monopolies on insurance regulation created by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act and ERISA.  Each of these targets is addressed in turn.   
 
A. TAX SUBSIDY 
 
As noted previously, individuals who obtain health insurance through 
their place of employment receive a sizeable tax subsidy.  In its current 
form, the tax subsidy is the source of considerable horizontal and vertical 
inequity and allocative inefficiency.49   
                                                                                                                 
47. David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly, 55 KANSAS L. REV. 1103, 1113, n. 49 (2007);  William M. Sage, David A. Hyman & 
Warren Greenberg, Why Competition Law Matters to Health Care, 22 HEALTH AFF. 31, 35 
(Mar./Apr. 2003) (“When costs are high, people who cannot afford something find 
substitutes or do without. The higher the cost of health insurance, the more people are 
uninsured. The higher the cost of pharmaceuticals, the more people skip doses or do not fill 
their prescriptions.”).  See also Posting of David Cutler to Blog for Our Future, available at 
http://www.ourfuture.org/blog-entry/adviser-describes-obama-health-plan (June 1, 2007, 
4:07 EST). 
Let's face it, the major reason that 45 million Americans don't have 
health care and many others are going without needed medical care is 
not that they don't want it, it's that they can't afford it. . . No matter how 
much we tell Americans they should, or even have to, buy health 
insurance, the fact is that people will not get coverage unless it is 
affordable. 
Id. 
48. Hearings, supra note 47 (testimony of David A. Hyman) (“We should not place 
the poor and less fortunate in the position of choosing between ‘nothing but the best and 
nothing’ when it comes to health care coverage – but excessive regulation will do exactly 
that.”). 
49. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American 
Health Care, 69 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 42 (2007); Hyman & Hall, supra note 9. 
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There is no shortage of proposals on the best way to fix the problem.50  
We should pick one and give it a try.  My personal preference is to repeal 
I.R.C. §106, and see if we can make health care less expensive by making 
it more expensive.51  That said, “leveling up” is likely to prove more 
politically feasible than “leveling down,” and if that is the grease for fixing 
the some or all of the existing tax inequities, so be it – allocative 
inefficiencies notwithstanding.  Fixing the tax subsidy may also help 
increase portability of coverage, by uncoupling it from a specific employer.   
 
B. REGULATORY FEDERALISM 
 
The framework for regulating health insurance is a mess.  Identical 
coverage (from the perspective of covered employees) is regulated quite 
differently, depending on whether the plan is self-funded or insured.  There 
are also state-specific regulatory monopolies, with little effective constraint 
other than employers and individual citizens exiting from the market 
entirely (by relocating) or virtually (by self-funding their coverage or no 
longer offering insurance if they are employers, or becoming uninsured if 
they are individuals).52  The unsavory combination of regulatory monopoly, 
                                                                                                                 
50. Reform options include:  
[R]epealing the exclusion outright; continuing to exclude it from 
income, but capping its value and allowing it to erode over time; 
converting the exclusion to a tax credit; leaving the existing exclusion 
alone, but adding tax credits as a subsidy for the poor; making the 
exclusion more universal. . . excluding all out-of-pocket spending on 
health care; and, so on.  
David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing The 
Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 LAW CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 
274 (2007). 
51. I.R.C. § 106 (1986) (“Gross income does not include contributions by the 
employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through insurance or otherwise) to 
his employees for personal injuries or sickness.”). 
52. See Hyman, supra note 30, at 230, n. 23: 
 [A]ny significant regulatory mismatch provides an incentive 
to employee benefit plans to become self-funded, in order to avoid the 
costs associated with state-level regulation. Thus, the efforts of the 
states to regulate in this area have effectively backfired, since they have 
become increasingly aggressive at regulating a vanishing market-and 
their efforts increase the rate at which the market vanishes. 
Id.  But see Christina H. Park, Prevalence of Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits:  
National and State Variation, 57 MED CARE RES. REV. 340, 343 (2000) (finding no 
association between number of state mandates and percentage of employers who are self-
funded).   
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off-budget costs, and the politics of mandating is also likely to result in 
mandate creep.   
How should we address this unhealthy dynamic?  A number of 
approaches have been floated, including direct federal 
regulation/chartering, deregulation, association health plans, exclusive state 
regulation, and cross-border sales of health insurance.53  I suggest an 
alternative strategy that blends certain of these elements, while exploiting 
the benefits of jurisdictional competition.54  The goal is to identify the 
“Delaware” of health insurance regulation. 
There are different ways of creating jurisdictional competition in health 
insurance regulation.55  The most comprehensive approach requires 
amendment of both McCarran-Ferguson and ERISA.  Under this approach, 
insurance companies would pick the state they wished each of their 
insurance products to be regulated by (“home jurisdiction”).  ERISA 
preemption would be constrained, and ERISA plans would be required to 
designate a home jurisdiction as well.56  Individual states could only 
prohibit the sale of insurance policies to their state’s residents if the insurer 
had not designated a home jurisdiction.  Premium taxes could only be 
collected by the home jurisdiction, but they would have to be shared 50:50 
with the jurisdiction where the insured resides.   
The result of this approach is the creation of a national market for 
health insurance coverage.  States should compete for the premium taxes 
associated with the sale of insurance subject to their regulation – and the 
inclusion of ERISA plans ensures that a sizeable amount of new money is 
at stake.  States would have to take a hard look at the aggregate cost of the 
mandates and premium taxes they impose, knowing that the wrong decision 
would result in the loss of a sizeable amount of revenue.  States would also 
be constrained from adopting too lax a regulatory framework by the 
knowledge that their own residents will be subject to the same regime.  The 
sharing of premium taxes allows states to maintain their traditional 
                                                                                                                 
53. See generally Amy Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? 
An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361 (2007). 
54. See New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”). 
55. For a different model, see HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT, H.R. 4460, 110th  Cong. 
(2007). 
56. Although this will make ERISA plans subject to state-level regulation, only one 
state will get to regulate them.  Thus, the problem of inconsistent state regulatory regimes, 
which ERISA was designed to address, is not a problem.   
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consumer protection efforts to ensure that health insurers do not misbehave.  
Finally, the elimination of the ERISA regulatory vacuum will eliminate the 
pressure for Congress to directly regulate in this area.   
If states do not want to wait for federal legislation, they can implement 
a similar regulatory result by entering into regional compacts.  Each state 
can agree to allow the sale of any health insurance product that was 
acceptable to the other states, and share the associated premium taxes and 
enforcement responsibility.  Paradoxically, the states whose residents 
would benefit the most from jurisdictional competition are the least likely 
to participate in such regional compacts.  Yet, all it takes is two states to 
agree to begin the process of jurisdictional competition – and the results 
will tell us a lot about how much individuals and employers actually value 
state-level regulation of health insurance.   
To be sure, broader markets for health insurance, whether structured on 
a national or regional basis, will make life more difficult for states that 
wish to regulate inefficiently or hide the costs associated with the use of 
regulation to redistribute resources.  It is not obvious why more 
transparency on the consequences of health insurance regulation should 
count as a problem.  Stated more bluntly, these effects are a “feature, not a 
bug.”  If states want to regulate inefficiently, they are certainly entitled to 
do so – but they should bear the costs of their inefficiency.  Similarly, 
states that want to engage in redistribution have no valid objection if 
jurisdictional competition forces them to squarely confront the costs of 
their largesse – particularly if, as if often the case, the redistribution results 
from rent-seeking.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
One could come up with a system for regulating health insurance that is 
more perverse than the one we have, but it would take both effort and 
creativity.  As Bill Simon, former Treasury Secretary once observed, our 
tax system should look like it was “designed on purpose based on a clear 
and consistent set of principles. . . .”57  The same should apply to our 
regulation of health insurance and health insurers. Tax reform and 
regulatory federalism offer a strategy for rationalizing the system, by 
harnessing the self interest of all involved, and forcing legislators to face 
the costs of their decisions.  
                                                                                                                 
57. WILLIAM E. SIMON, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/blueprints/forward.pdf.   
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Regardless of the manner in which health insurance is regulated, 
private insurers will never behave like public insurers.  If legislators 
actually want public insurance, they should enact it.  If they can’t do that, 
but they still think the mandated services are important, they should pay the 
market clearing price to have them delivered.58  Of course, a world in 
which legislators/regulators have to “pay the piper” is a world in which 
legislators/regulators are suddenly much more cautious about imposing 
such burdens.59   
Playing legislative/regulatory whack-a-mole with individual coverage 
terms and individual insurers may be making providers, lobbyists and 
lawyers rich, but it isn’t doing any favors for the consumers that are its 
intended beneficiaries.  It is time to change the incentives for everyone 
involved.   
Finally, although this article focuses on the regulation of health 
insurance, we should not ignore the similar pathologies that prevail in the 
regulation of health care delivery.  That, however, is the subject for another 
day, another article, and another journal.   
 
                                                                                                                 
58. States could either pay insurers to include the desired services in their insurance 
plans, or they can pay providers for delivering them.  Regardless of which approach is 
employed, state legislators would suddenly have to internalize the costs of the regulations 
they impose.   
59. Hyman, supra note 30, at 249 (“Because the government provides coverage for a 
minority of those who are insured, the majority of the costs of ‘reforms’ considered by 
legislators are off-budget.  Predictably enough, the result is more and costlier consumer 
protection than would be the case if the costs were on-budget.”).   
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HEALTH INSURANCE RISK 
POOLING AND SOCIAL SOLIDARITY:  
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVID HYMAN 
 
Amy B. Monahan* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, Americans have valued social solidarity with respect to 
health care.  That is, Americans have more or less supported the idea that 
health risks are appropriate to be shared within a community.1  There is a 
tension, of course.  Social solidarity with respect to health care means that 
the relatively healthy individuals will pay higher prices for health insurance 
in order to subsidize the health insurance of the relatively less healthy.  
Americans have generally supported this cross-subsidization.  However, 
given ever-rising health insurance prices, there is now significant interest in 
lessening the extent to which health care risks are shared in our society.2  
As several contributors to this symposium have pointed out, instead of 
pooling our collective health risks we are creating ways in which 
individuals with low health risks can opt out of the risk pool or otherwise 
receive preferential treatment.3  This comment seeks to respond primarily 
to the regulatory federalism proposal put forward by Professor David 
Hyman, which I argue will unnecessarily harm certain risk-pooling 
functions of health insurance and therefore undermine social solidarity.  I 
will begin first with a brief look at what risks are and are not currently 
pooled, before examining options for expanding health insurance risk 
pooling.  I will then turn to Professor Hyman’s proposal, analyzing 
regulatory federalism in light of its effect on risk pooling and social 
solidarity. 
                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Law. 
1. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 
312 (1997). 
2. See generally Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free 
Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361.   
3. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The Consumer-
Driven Perspective, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 377 (2008); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity 
and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 199 ( 2008) (describing 
the singling out of certain conditions for wellness programs, where the functional result is to 
“charge higher rates to individuals based on their personal health risks”). 
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Before beginning, a brief note regarding terminology.  A theme of this 
symposium is “social solidarity” with respect to health care.  Social 
solidarity, generally speaking, refers to the connections between 
individuals within a society.4  “Risk pooling” on the other hand, is an 
economic term that refers to individuals joining together, through an 
insurance contract, to pool their collective risks.5  I use the terms “social 
solidarity” and “risk pooling” interchangeably in this comment because 
social solidarity with respect to health risk is expressed through the degree 
of risk pooling present in health insurance arrangements.6  As we increase 
the degree of risk pooling in health insurance arrangements we are 
increasing social solidarity with respect to medical risks.   
 
I. WHAT RISKS ARE CURRENTLY POOLED? 
 
The extent to which health risks are pooled varies based on the type of 
health insurance purchased.  The first distinction is between (1) large group 
coverage and (2) individual and small group coverage.  Large group 
coverage, offered by an employer, provides a high level of risk sharing.7  In 
such plans, all eligible employees typically pay identical premiums, 
regardless of age or health status.8  With respect to covered benefits, risks 
are both pooled and cross-subsidized.9  Of course, the extent of the risk 
pooling and cross-subsidization varies based on the size of the group.  The 
larger the group, the more heterogeneous it is likely to be in terms of risk, 
                                                                                                                 
4. See A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (John Scott and Gordon Marshall eds., 3d ed. 
2005), available at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e2165. 
5. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 1-2 (1986).   
6. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1122 (Michael J. Garland & Merwyn R. 
Greenlick eds., 3d ed. 2004) (“the insurance compact expresses an underlying solidarity 
among insurance pool subscribers”). 
7. See ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
8. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
prohibits an employer from varying premiums based on health status.  See 29 U.S.C. §1182 
(1996).   
9. Generally, “risk pooling” refers to individuals within the same risk classification 
sharing the risk of unexpected losses.  This is what takes place when health insurance 
premiums vary with health status.  “Cross-subsidization” refers to the sharing of risk 
between individuals with different risk classification.  For example, when young and old 
workers pay the same health insurance premium, the risk is cross-subsidized, with the young 
workers subsidizing the coverage of the older workers.  See ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 95 
(describing cross-subsidization).   
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providing a greater amount of risk pooling and cross-subsidization.10  
However, even in a large group plan with significant risk pooling and 
cross-subsidization, an important limitation results from the fact that only 
risks associated with the medical benefits covered by the plan are pooled 
and cross-subsidized.   
Individuals and small groups are susceptible to two related risk-pooling 
problems.  The individual market is particularly susceptible to adverse 
selection.11    Adverse selection has been defined as “the annoying 
tendency of people to do what’s best for themselves.”12 In the individual 
health insurance context, it occurs when a healthy individual forgoes 
coverage.13  If an individual is healthy and does not believe that she will 
incur medical costs in excess of health insurance premiums and related out-
of-pocket costs, she is unlikely to enroll in health insurance.14  Conversely, 
if she has reason to believe that her medical expenses will exceed her 
health insurance premiums and the related out-of-pocket payments, she is 
likely to enroll in health insurance.  As a result, individuals who purchase 
health insurance generally have greater-than-average risk.15  Premiums for 
individual health insurance therefore reflect the greater-than-average risk 
level of purchasers. Small groups are at a disadvantage in risk-pooling 
because they lack a diversified pool of purchasers.16  Small groups, while 
endogenous, do not have size sufficient to reflect community-wide risk 
                                                                                                                 
10. Employer groups also have the advantage that they are formed for non-insurance 
purposes.  See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health 
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 32 (2001).   
11. Id. (stating that adverse selection is “particularly acute among the newly 
unemployed who were previously insured.”). 
12. David Mark Tuomala, Panelist, Society of Actuaries, Consumerism and Consumer 
Choice-Implications for Health Plans, Dallas Spring Meeting 3 (May 30, 2001), in REC. 
SOC’Y ACTUARIES, Spring 2001, at 3. 
13. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Market-Based Reform:  What to Regulate 
and by Whom, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 109, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/14/1/105. 
14. Id.  (explaining that “those who expect not to use their coverage are more likely to 
drop it.”).  See also Hyman & Hall, supra note 10, at 32 (stating that “adverse selection 
discourages the purchase of insurance by some people who would otherwise have chosen to 
purchase coverage.”). 
15. This is particularly true under community rating.  See Hyman & Hall, supra note 
10, at 32 (noting that “adverse selection is increased by laws, such as community rating, that 
require insurers to disregard certain risk factors.”). 
16. Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform, 19 
AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 39-40 (1993). 
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levels and therefore are susceptible to poor experience rating and resulting 
high premiums.17 
Both the individual and small group markets are further affected by the 
different types of state regulation.  Some states have community rating 
laws, which require insurers to charge each covered individual the same 
premium, regardless of their health status.18  Other states allow insurers to 
adjust premiums based on risk, but constrain the amount of the adjustment 
using so-called rate bands.19  Often, states that have community rating 
requirements also have guaranteed issue laws, requiring insurance 
companies to offer insurance to every individual who applies for 
coverage.20  Other states neither constrain the ability of insurers to adjust 
premiums based on risk nor require insurers to issue coverage to each 
applicant.21  While differing state regulation affects the degree to which 
risk is shared, in all states there appears to be a substantial degree of risk 
sharing among a state’s privately insured population with respect to those 
benefits covered by the policy of insurance.22   
 
II. WHAT RISKS ARE NOT SHARED?   
 
Health insurance protects against two primary types of risks: macro-
level risk and micro-level risk.  Macro-level risk is the risk associated with 
                                                                                                                 
17. See Enthoven & Singer, supra note 13 at 109 (noting that small employers are 
“too small to spread risks” and “achieve economies of scale in administration…”). 
18. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §3231 (McKinney 2008). 
19. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §379.936 (West 2008). 
20. See § 3231, supra note 18. 
21. See Kaiser Fam. Found., Small Group Health Insurance Market Rate Restrictions, 
2007, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=351&cat=7 (last visited Mar. 3, 
2008). 
22. See Bradley Herring & Mark V. Pauly, The Effect of State Community Rating 
Regulations on Premiums and Coverage in the Individual Health Insurance Market, 20 
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper 12504, August 2006) (finding significant risk 
pooling even in states without risk rating limitations or guaranteed issue requirements, and 
noting the “apparent degree of pooling.”).  See also Enthoven & Singer, supra note 13 at 
109 (stating that “the excess burden of cost from adverse selection in the individual market 
must be allocated to someone.”).   
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medical expenses generally.23  Micro-level risk is the risk associated with 
incurring losses associated with particular medical treatments or services.24   
Individuals with health insurance pool their macro-level risk, while 
those who lack health insurance of any kind retain the risk of loss 
associated with medical expenses.  The only way to increase macro-level 
risk sharing is to increase the number of individuals with health insurance 
coverage. 
While individuals with health insurance pool their macro-level risks, 
the particular scope of their insurance contracts determines which micro-
level risks are pooled.  For example, if an individual’s health insurance 
policy does not cover cancer treatments, risk of loss associated with cancer 
treatments is retained at the individual level and not pooled.  By enacting 
mandated benefit laws, federal and state governments regulate micro-level 
risk pooling by requiring coverage for certain benefits in all contracts of 
health insurance.25  The risk of loss associated with any service or 
treatment not covered by a standard contract nor mandated by the state or 
federal government is retained at the individual level.  In order to increase 
micro-level risk pooling, the scope of health insurance coverage would 
need to be broadened.  The section below will briefly examine popular 
reform proposals, each of which focuses on increasing macro-level risk 
pooling. 
 
III.   WHAT CAN BE DONE TO BROADEN RISK POOLING? 
 
As stated above, the only way to increase macro-level risk pooling is to 
increase the number of individuals with health insurance.  Nearly 18% of 
the non-elderly population in the United States lacks health insurance.26  
Unfortunately, while we have many statistics on the uninsured population, 
relatively little is known about the factors that determine whether an 
                                                                                                                 
23. See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ WITH MELISSA COX, CAN WE 
SAY NO? THE CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE 95 (2005) (stating that health 
insurance efficiency is principally intended to protect against the “risk” of large and 
burdensome financial losses). 
24. See Monahan, supra note 2, at 1365. 
25. See id. at 1364-74 (describing state and federal regulation of the substance of 
health insurance contracts, as well as the related policy rationales). 
26. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: 
Analysis of the March 2007 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 310 at 4 
(Washington, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10a-20071.pdf. 
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individual purchases private health insurance.27  We know that many cite 
prohibitive cost when explaining why they declined employer-offered 
coverage.28  However, there is also significant evidence that demand for 
health insurance is not very price elastic.29  In other words, in order to make 
significant improvement in rates of coverage, cost would have to decrease 
substantially.30  Related to cost is also the issue of individual demand for 
health insurance.  For example, young adults are significantly more likely 
to be uninsured than older adults, suggesting that demand may vary based 
on perceived risk.31   
There is disagreement with respect to the most effective (and desirable) 
way to increase the number of individuals who are covered by health 
insurance.  The primary reform proposals involve (1) changing the tax 
treatment of health insurance premiums, (2) requiring all individuals to 
purchase health insurance coverage, (3) requiring all employers to offer 
health insurance coverage to their workers, or (4) decreasing micro-level 
risk pooling in order to decrease costs.32 
 
                                                                                                                 
27. M. Kate Bundorf et al., Health Risk, Income, and the Purchase of Private Health 
Insurance 1(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11677, 2005) (“[S]urprisingly 
little is known about the factors that determine whether an individual obtains health 
insurance in private markets.”). 
28. See, e.g., Paul Fronstin, Employment-Based Health Benefits: Access and 
Coverage, 1988-2005, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, NO. 303 at 8 (Washington, Employee Benefit 
Research Institute, Mar. 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973833. 
29. See, e.g., Michael Chernew et al., The Demand for Health Insurance Coverage by 
Low-Income Workers: Can Reduced Premiums Achieve Full Coverage?, 32 HEALTH 
SERVICES RES. 453, 464 (1997) (“Although the overwhelming majority of individuals 
participate in their employer’s plan, there appears to be a subset who do not, even at prices 
heavily distorted by the employer.  For this group of workers, it is unlikely that a further 
subsidy would alter participation dramatically.”).  See also Jonathan Gruber & Ebonya 
Washington, Subsidies to Employee Health Insurance Premiums and the Health Insurance 
Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 9567, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9567. 
30. See generally Chernew, et al. supra note 29. 
31. See Fronstin, supra note 26, at 15.   
32. See, e.g., Friedman infra note 35 (arguing why tax preferences should be 
eliminated altogether); see also infra note 47 (proposing why all individuals should be 
required to purchase health insurance or be penalized); see also infra note 56 (mandating 
that employers offer health insurance to their employees); see also infra Part III.3 and supra 
Monahan note 2 (describing current legislative efforts to reduce the impact of state 
mandated benefit laws, the primary vehicle for enforcing micro-level risk pooling).  
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1. Tax Reform Options 
Arguments in favor of tax reform are based both on fairness and 
affordability grounds.  Currently, only self-employed individuals and those 
who receive coverage through their employer may pay health insurance 
premiums on a pre-tax basis.33  This historical accident puts those who are 
not self-employed or who are not offered health insurance by their 
employer at a significant disadvantage when it comes to purchasing health 
insurance.  These individuals must not only purchase insurance on the less-
favorable individual market, but the price is not subsidized by the federal 
government.34  Reformers propose remedying this disparity in different 
ways.  Some propose that the tax preference should be eliminated entirely; 
there would be no preference for employer-provided insurance but the 
federal government would cease subsidizing the purchase of private health 
insurance for anyone.35  Others argue that all individuals should be 
permitted to purchase health insurance on a pre-tax basis, thereby retaining 
the current tax preference for health insurance but making it universally 
available.36  Concerned that even a universal ability to pay health insurance 
premiums on a pre-tax basis will not significantly increase insurance 
coverage levels, others argue in favor of various versions of a tax credit for 
the purchase of health insurance.37  
These proposals have markedly differing effects on their ability to 
increase levels of health insurance coverage and therefore to increase risk 
pooling.  Eliminating the tax preference for insurance, while providing 
equitable treatment to all individuals, would not immediately decrease the 
cost of insurance.  Rather, it would increase the cost of insurance for most 
                                                                                                                 
33. See I.R.C. §§106, 125, and 162(l)(1)(b). 
34. See generally Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society 
Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006) (explaining the effective federal subsidy 
available for employer-provided coverage). 
35. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, How To Cure Health Care, 142 PUB. INT. 3 (2001), 
available at http://www.thepublicinterest.com/archives/2001winter/article1.html. 
36. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the 
Tax Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1229, 1258 
(1995) (“Congress should extend § 106’s exclusion to all taxpayers regardless of the source 
through which they obtain coverage”). 
37. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Making Health Care More Affordable 
(Sept. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902.html. (proposing that giving 
small business owners refundable tax credits for contributions they make to their 
employees’ health savings accounts would reduce the rising cost of health care and promote 
affordable coverage options). 
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individuals in the short run.  Nonetheless, proponents argue that it might 
very well increase coverage rates.  Economists argue that, absent the 
current economic distortions associated with employer-provided health 
insurance, individuals would elect to purchase less comprehensive 
insurance coverage.38  With the price no longer subsidized by the federal 
government they would chose plans with higher deductibles and cost 
sharing levels, less comprehensive coverage, or both.39  When individuals 
bear a greater portion of their medical expenses they will tend to spend 
less.  And as individuals curb their medical expenditures the costs of both 
medical care and health insurance will fall.40  As insurance prices fall, more 
individuals will be able to afford coverage.  If the model works according 
to theory, this proposal could broaden macro-level risk pooling.41 
The proposal to make the tax preference universally available would 
potentially lower the cost of health insurance for those who are not self-
employed or do not have access to employer-provided coverage.  However, 
the value of the deduction from gross income varies based on the 
individual’s marginal tax rate.  For those in the highest marginal tax 
bracket, the discount would be significant.42  For those without federal 
income tax liability, the exclusion would have no effect on health insurance 
affordability.43  Of course, those without access to employer-provided 
health insurance are more likely to be lower-income individuals.44  So, 
while broadening the current tax preference for health insurance would 
eliminate the current disparate treatment for individuals who are not self-
employed or who lack access to employer-provided coverage, it seems 
unlikely to greatly increase the number of insured individuals.   
                                                                                                                 
38. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 7. 
39. See id. at 2 (arguing that people will be more conservative in how much they 
spend for health coverage once they have to pay for it out-of-pocket). 
40. David Hyman sums this up neatly by explaining that we should “make health care 
less expensive by making it more expensive.”  David A. Hyman, Health Insurance: Market 
Failure or Government Failure?, 14 CONN. INS. L. J. (forthcoming 2008). 
41. Of course, the evidence regarding the price-elasticity of the demand for health 
insurance suggests that the magnitude of the effect on coverage rates would not be great.  
See Chernew et al., supra note 29 at 453, 466. 
42. An individual in the top marginal tax bracket would get a “discount” of 35% on 
the cost of health insurance by virtue of being able to deduct or exclude health insurance 
premiums from otherwise taxable income. 
43. In 2002, 30% of all individuals who filed federal income tax returns had no 
federal income tax liability.  Michael Parisi & Scott Hollenseck, Individual Income Tax 
Returns, 2002, 24 STAT. INCOME 8, 24 (2004). 
44. See Fronstin, supra note 26, at 10, 13-14. 
2008] A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVID HYMAN 333 
 
The final tax reform option is to provide some form of tax credits to 
help subsidize the purchase of health insurance.  Tax credits have the 
advantage of reducing an individual’s tax liability dollar-for-dollar and 
therefore not varying with the individual’s marginal tax bracket.  However, 
non-refundable tax credits would not create a purchase incentive for 
individuals without federal income tax liability.45  Because low income 
individuals are more likely to be uninsured than higher income individuals, 
many proponents argue that credit refundability is essential to the success 
of a tax credit proposal.46  A refundable tax credit program appears to hold 
the most promise for effectively increasing health insurance coverage rates, 
but is also the most expensive tax reform option.   
 
2. Purchase Mandates 
Leaving aside the potential for tax reform, another popular reform 
option is to require all individuals to purchase health insurance and to 
impose a monetary penalty on those who do not.47  This appears to be a 
promising method to address what we consider to be sub-optimal demand 
for health insurance.48  This reform is particularly appealing if it will cause 
low-risk individuals—who might otherwise rationally decide to forgo 
health insurance—to opt-in to the risk pool.   
Individual health insurance purchase mandates would improve the 
economic incentives for individuals to purchase health insurance.  Under 
most proposals to mandate health insurance purchase, a non-complying 
individual would face a significant monetary penalty.49  Therefore, when an 
individual contemplates whether to purchase health insurance, he or she 
will take into account the cost associated with non-compliance with the 
mandate.  The result should be that a greater number of low-risk 
individuals will purchase health insurance because of the additional cost 
                                                                                                                 
45. This would likely exclude 30% of the population.  See supra text accompanying 
note 30. 
46. See Jonathan Gruber & Larry Levitt, Tax Subsidies For Health Insurance: Costs 
and Benefits, 19 HEALTH AFF. 72, 78-79 (2000). 
47. See generally KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, STATES 
MOVING TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE REFORM (2008), (available at 
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/kcmu_statehealthreform.cfm) [hereinafter KAISER 
COMMISSION]. 
48. When I use the term “sub-optimal” in this context I am referring to sub-optimal 
from a societal perspective.  It may be possible that a given individual’s decision to forgo 
health insurance is rational. 
49. See KAISER COMMISSION, supra note 47, at 3. 
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imposed on forgoing such coverage.50  By increasing the number of low-
risk individuals who are insured, the overall risk level of the insured 
population should decline and premiums may decrease as a result.  By 
creating a strong incentive to opt-in to the risk pool, health insurance 
purchase mandates would significantly strengthen social solidarity.51     
 
3. Offer Mandates 
Another reform option, sometimes proposed in tandem with the 
individual mandate discussed above, is to require employers to offer health 
insurance to their workers.52  This proposal is premised on taking 
advantage of both the preferential tax treatment granted to employer-
provided health care coverage, as well as its group purchasing model.53   
I will refrain from an in-depth discussion of offer mandates, primarily 
because such mandates implicate the preemption provisions of ERISA, a 
meaningful discussion of which is beyond the scope of this comment.54  
However, the important question to be answered is whether offer mandates 
would meaningfully increase coverage rates.  While many workers 
currently are either not offered coverage by their employer or are not 
                                                                                                                 
50. See Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential 
Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1230-31 (2007) (discussing this 
possibility in the context of Massachusetts’s health care reform legislation).  Due to the 
likelihood of increased employee demand, these mandates may also encourage more 
employers to offer health insurance.  See id. But see David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts 
Health Plan: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1111-12 (2007) 
(analogizing health insurance to automobile insurance mandates, which have led to less-
than-universal coverage). 
51. However, this is not a perfect solution if the maximization of risk sharing is our 
objective.  Even if every state or the federal government were to require the purchase of 
health insurance, risk pools would remain stratified.  Under our current system, state 
regulation of insurance results in state-level risk pools.  See Christina H. Park, Prevalence of 
Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits: National and State Variation, 57 MED. CARE RES. & 
REV. 340, 342 (2000).  Those pools are further stratified by self-insuring employers who 
have their own risk pools.  Id. at 340, 342.  However, creating the broadest possible risk 
pooling would require (1) moving the regulation or insurance to the federal level, (2) 
preventing employers from self-insuring their plans, and (3) requiring community rating and 
guaranteeing issue for all who apply.  Given political realities, it may be too difficult to 
obtain such nationwide risk pooling. 
52. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.151F, § 2 (Supp. 2007). 
53. Normative arguments are also made in support of offer mandates, arguing that 
employers have a responsibility to make health care coverage available to their workers.   
54. See generally Monahan, supra note 50 for a discussion of ERISA preemption in 
the context of offer mandates. 
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eligible for such coverage—suggesting that significant improvement could 
be made by requiring employers to make such coverage available—30% of 
workers who are offered coverage decline it.55  Because of the problem of 
non-universal enrollment in offered health insurance, offer mandates are 
often proposed in conjunction with purchase mandates.56 
 
4. Decreasing Micro-Level Risk Pooling 
As we strive to find ways to increase health insurance coverage rates, 
and therefore macro-level risk pooling, there is increasing discomfort with 
mandated benefit laws, the primary vehicle for enforcing micro-level risk 
pooling.57  The tension is this: as we increase micro-level risk pooling by 
requiring more treatments or services to be covered by health insurance 
contracts, we potentially raise prices and therefore decrease coverage rates.  
The two appear to have an inverse relationship.  As a result, there is 
significant interest in eliminating or decreasing mandated benefit laws.58 
But, as will be explored further below, blaming mandated benefit laws 
for decreasing coverage rates oversimplifies the relationship.  We cannot 
have effective macro-level risk pooling without having effective micro-
level risk pooling.  If we strip away all of our micro-level risk pooling, 
such that a health insurance contract protects only against the risk of loss 
associated with broken toes, we have not gained much social solidarity, 
even if we have universal coverage.  I realize, of course, that we are not 
anywhere close to stripping health insurance down to broken toe coverage, 
but the point remains the same.  It matters what gets covered by health 
insurance contracts.  The problems associated with decreasing micro-level 
risk pooling are discussed in more detail below. 
 
IV.    AN EXAMINATION OF REGULATORY FEDERALISM 
 
Professor Hyman critiques our current system of regulating the 
substance of health insurance contracts on many fronts.  He makes an 
economic argument that our current regulatory system decreases welfare by 
providing consumers with the choice between “nothing but the best and 
                                                                                                                 
55. See Fronstin, supra note 28, at 1. 
56. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. Ch.111M, § 2 ( West. Supp. 2007). 
57. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 2, at 1401-13 (describing current legislative efforts 
to reduce the impact of or eliminated state mandated benefit laws). 
58. See id. 
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nothing.”59  He critiques mandated benefit laws as resulting from rent-
seeking, rather than sound health policy,60 and also makes a normative, 
libertarian argument regarding freedom to contract.61   
In lieu of our current system of regulation, Professor Hyman advocates 
regulatory federalism with respect to health insurance.  As he explains, 
“The goal is to identify the “Delaware” of health insurance regulation.”62  
Under this system of regulatory federalism, health insurance purchasers 
could elect to buy insurance in any state, allowing such purchasers to elect 
the regulatory regime that will apply to their health insurance coverage.63  
For example, an individual who lives in Massachusetts but does not value 
Massachusetts’ mandated coverage for infertility treatment would be free to 
purchase coverage from Wyoming, where such coverage can be excluded 
from a health insurance contract.   
On first glance, regulatory federalism does appear to fix many of the 
problems Professor Hyman has identified.  Regulatory federalism would 
almost certainly be an effective counter to rent-seeking behavior.  As 
Professor Hyman points out, a competitive regulatory environment would 
not allow states the luxury of special interest legislation.64  If a state’s 
mandated benefit laws were not valued by the population, they would 
simply buy insurance elsewhere.  States, not wanting to lose premium tax 
revenue, would likely be hesitant to grant economic rents to special interest 
groups.  If rent-seeking is a primary concern, this appears to be a very 
effective solution. 
The case for welfare maximization is somewhat less compelling.  
According to standard economic theory, consumers with free market 
choices will be able to satisfy their preferences and therefore maximize 
their welfare.65  But let us examine why regulatory federalism would 
                                                                                                                 
59. Hyman, note 40, at 10 (internal citation omitted). 
60. Id. at 5, 10.  See also David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer 
Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5, 92 (1999).   
61. Hyman, supra note 40, at 10. 
62. Id. at 11. 
63. Id. at 11-12.  Professor Hyman also proposes scaling back ERISA preemption by 
requiring even self-insured plans to elect a home jurisdiction for purposes of health plan 
regulation. Id.  Further, he makes the novel proposal that states need not wait for federal 
legislation to allow inter-state purchasing.  Rather, two or more states could voluntarily join 
together to allow their residents to purchase health insurance from any of the other 
participating states.  Id. at 11. 
64. Id. at 7. 
65. See Cecil E. Bohanon, A Comment on “Economic Inefficiency: A Failure of 
Economists,” 21 J. ECON. EDUC. 427, 427-29 (1990). 
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increase some individuals’ welfare.  The benefit from regulatory federalism 
comes from purchasers being able to forgo coverage for certain treatments 
or services.   This, in turn, will decrease the premium associated with the 
policy, leaving the purchaser with more money to spend on other desired 
items, thereby increasing the individual’s welfare.  The individuals with the 
most to gain under such a system are those with low health risks.  For 
individuals with relatively high health risks, their welfare is arguably 
decreased.  Granted, they should, in a functioning market, be able to 
maximize their welfare by freely entering into a contract that maximizes 
their preferences.  However, adverse selection in health insurance 
purchasing creates market failure,66 and allowing interstate purchase of 
health insurance will result in greater adverse selection problems.  First, 
note that state mandated benefit laws rely on market restriction in order to 
function.67  You cannot compulsorily share risk if individuals are free to 
opt-out of the mandate.  Obviously, given the ability to opt-out, those who 
do not anticipate utilizing the benefit at issue will forgo such coverage.  But 
now individuals who do not opt-out of the benefit will be signaling to the 
insurer that they expect to utilize the benefit, and the premium increase 
associated with the benefit will correspond to that expected utilization.  
Essentially, regulatory federalism would prevent community-wide risk 
spreading for the benefits at issue and instead spread risk only among the 
population expected to utilize the benefit.  And this assumes that such 
coverage will continue to be available in an unrestricted market.  Adverse 
selection may be such a problem that insurance coverage for “optional” 
benefits simply disappears.  The fact that states will be competing for 
premium tax dollars makes this outcome even more likely, since state 
legislatures will likely move quickly to remove any mandates that are 
causing decreased enrollment in health insurance contracts governed by 
their state.68 
Regulatory federalism appears to satisfy libertarian ideals by providing 
freedom to contract, but only with respect to benefits unaffected by adverse 
selection.  The market failure caused by adverse selection affects not only 
welfare maximization, but also the freedom to contract.69  It is not simply 
that individuals will now be able to choose the contract terms they desire.  
                                                                                                                 
66. Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance 
Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 103 (2002).  
67. Monahan, supra note 2, at 1410.    
68. Id. at 1411-12 (discussing the impact that interstate sale of health insurance would 
likely have on the state legislative process). 
69. Monahan, supra note 2, at 1385-86. 
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Because of adverse selection, the choice of contract terms with respect to 
health insurance is likely to be limited even in a free market.  So low risk 
individuals will have the freedom to elect their contract terms (with lesser 
coverage terms), while certain high risk individuals will be unable to elect 
the broad coverage they may desire – falling short of the freedom to 
contract ideal. 
 We might be able to look past the negative effects of regulatory 
federalism on high-risk individuals if the end result is a significant increase 
in macro-level risk pooling by increasing the number of Americans who are 
insured.  However, estimates suggest that allowing the interstate sale of 
health insurance, as Professor Hyman’s proposal would permit, would not 
result in an increase in health insurance coverage.  The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) recently prepared an estimate for proposed federal 
legislation allowing for interstate sale of health insurance.70  The CBO cost 
estimate states simply that interstate sale of health insurance “would reduce 
the price of individual health insurance coverage for people expected to 
have relatively low health care costs, while increasing the price of coverage 
for those expected to have relatively high health care costs” resulting in an 
increase in the number of relatively healthy individuals, and a decrease in 
the number of individuals expected to have relatively high cost, who buy 
individual coverage” with little net effect on coverage rates.71  This 
conclusion is consistent with the analysis above regarding the likely 
outcome of regulatory federalism.  
Professor Hyman’s concerns about our current system of regulation are 
real, and should be addressed.  But adopting regulatory federalism 
fundamentally undermines micro-level risk pooling, an important 
contributor to social solidarity.72 Micro-level risk pooling, after all, 
determines which medical risks will be shared.  As a result, I am not ready 
to give up on the risk-pooling function of mandated benefit laws.  Instead, 
we need to work to (1) identify permissible justifications for such laws73 
and (2) identify the proper procedure for drafting and adopting such laws.74  
If we can do a better job of regulating the substance of health insurance 
                                                                                                                 
70. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE REPORT ON H.R. 2355: HEALTH CARE 
CHOICE ACT OF 2005 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6639/hr2355.pdf. 
71. Id. at 7. 
72. Monahan, supra note 2, at 1385, 1387. 
73. See Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U. COLO. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
74. Legislatures seem ill-suited to the task.  See generally Hyman, supra note 60. 
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contracts we would move toward a health care system that effectively pools 
risk, strengthens social solidarity, and yet eliminates unnecessary costs.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The issues touched on in this Comment are not, by any means, easy.  
We want all Americans to have access to quality health care, which means 
we want all Americans to have health insurance coverage.  We seem to be 
in agreement that, to one degree or another, we believe that health risks are 
appropriate to be shared.  At the macro-level, the goal is easy.  As we 
increase coverage, we increase risk-sharing and therefore social solidarity.  
But as we strive to increase macro-level risk sharing, we must be on guard 
against stripping away the micro-level coverage provisions.  To decrease 
the cost of coverage we might be tempted to exclude more and more 
services from health insurance contracts.  Even if such efforts do increase 
health insurance coverage, they will reduce social solidarity by eliminating 
the sharing of risk associated with the treatments at issue.  As previously 
stated, we cannot have effective macro-level risk pooling without effective 
micro-level risk pooling.  Professor Hyman has pointed out many of the 
problems with our current system of regulating micro-level risk pooling, to 
which we must respond not be giving up entirely, but by working to define 
both appropriate justifications and processes for regulating the substance of 
health insurance contracts.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
340 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE HEALTH INSURANCE DEBATE IN 
CANADA: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
 
Mary Anne Bobinski1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This Essay begins with an intentionally ambiguous title.  Are 
comparisons to Canada relevant and useful for policy-makers in the United 
States and, if so, what lessons can we learn?  Part II of this Essay highlights 
some of the risks and benefits of cross-border comparisons between the 
United States and Canada.  In Part III, I analyze some of the key data points 
often cited in comparing the two health care systems. Part IV explores the 
current Canadian debate about private health insurance. Finally, in Part V, I 
focus on the lessons from Canada for the health insurance debate in the 
United States.  
 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF COMPARISONS 
 
Are comparisons to Canada relevant? Do they offer any value to policy 
makers or to the American public?  The frequency of these comparisons 
might suggest that the answer is obvious. Yet there are substantial reasons 
to pause and consider when and how comparisons to Canada are truly 
relevant for the United States.2 
                                                                                                                 
1 Dean and Professor of Law, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. This 
Essay is based on a presentation originally given in January 2007 at the AALS Conference 
in Washington, D.C. The Essay was substantially revised, updated and submitted for 
publication in February 2008. The Essay’s consideration of cross-border health law is paired 
with separate piece on the relevance of U.S. health law and policy for Canada. See Judicial 
Responses to Government Restrictions on Health Care Markets in the US and Canada, 
presented at the Visions National Health Law Conference in Banff, Alberta (November 10, 
2007). The author wishes to thank commentators at the AALS Section on Insurance 
program in January 2007 for their questions and suggestions as well as Betsy Segal (UBC 
Law ’07) and Brenda Osmond (UBC Law class ’09) for research assistance.  
2 For a general discussion of the benefits and risks of comparative health policy 
analyses, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Comparative and International Health Law, 14 
HEALTH MATRIX 141 (2004).  See also American College of Physicians, Achieving a High-
Performance Health Care System with Universal Access: What the United States Can Learn 
from Other Countries, 148 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 55, 62-63 (2008) (noting difficulties of 
using comparative data but arguing that “the United States has much to learn by closely 
examining how other countries’ health care systems tried to solve the problems that underlie 
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For many in the U.S., Canada is a cold country to the north, perhaps 
best known for maple syrup, ice hockey, natural beauty, and polite 
citizenry.  Canada’s proximity to the U.S. and the substantial economic ties 
between the two countries tend to promote the comparison industry.  
Canada seems familiar enough to create a natural quasi-empirical research 
study for U.S. policy makers interested in trying to predict the impact of 
changes in health care policy in the U.S.  Advocates on both sides of the 
debate seem to believe that we can determine, for example, whether or not 
a single payer system would address the ills of the U.S. health care system 
by looking to the Canadian experience.  
There are of course substantial differences between the two countries. 
Canada has roughly a tenth the population of the United States even though 
it is slightly larger in size.3 Despite Canada’s vast geography, ninety 
percent of Canadians live within a few hours’ drive of the U.S. border4 and 
a significant portion of Canada’s economy is based on exports to the U.S.5  
Canada has nonetheless retained its distinctive character, readily seen in 
areas ranging from the coexistence of English and French traditions and 
languages to a political and social climate generally viewed as significantly 
more “liberal” and less dominated by social conservatives than the United 
States. An illustrative list of the differences between the two countries 
would probably include Canada’s failure to support the war in Iraq, the 
relatively swift legalization of same sex marriage, and Canada’s pride in 
adopting a largely government-funded health care system.6   
Over and above these significant differences in history, politics, and 
culture, so much of the debate about Canada seems to reveal more about 
the U.S. than it does about Canada itself.  The U.S.-Canadian border – 
frequently referred to as “the longest undefended border in the world”7 – 
may not provide a clear window into an alternate reality so much as it 
                                                                                                                          
the United States’ low-ranking performance ….”); Editor’s Note, Comparative Health 
Policy, 26 J. H. POLITICS POL’Y & L. 675. 
3 The Central Intelligence Agency, “Canada,” in The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html (updated 
regularly with new data). 
4 Id. (“Geography-note . . ..approximately 90% of the population is concentrated 
within 160 km of the US border”). 
5 Id. (Economy-overview section) 
6 For a recent view on Canada’s slight shift to the center or right, see Clifford 
Krauss, Conservative Win in Canada Could Help Repair Ties to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2006, at A4.  
7 See, e.g., Susan Catto, Tighter Border Security Slows Canadian Traffic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, sec. 5, at 3 (noting new post-9/11 security measures).  
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serves as a fun house mirror: reflecting back American concerns in 
exaggerated form rather than revealing relevant data about the impact of 
different systems of organizing and delivering health care.8 Is it accurate, 
relevant or useful to characterize the Canadian system as “socialized 
medicine” with health care providers fleeing to better paid jobs in the U.S. 
and Canadian citizens waiting in dangerously long lines for emergency or 
specialized care while government bureaucrats decide who will receive 
what types of care?9  Is it any more accurate, relevant or useful to describe 
the Canadian system as a nirvana in which society has accepted 
responsibility for providing basic health care for all and has developed an 
efficient, effective, and stable system of delivering on that commitment?10  
The very terms of the debate – “socialized medicine” and “government 
bureaucrats” -- reveal more about the signposts of American political 
discourse than they do about the reality of the system they seek to 
describe.11  
Filmmaker Michael Moore’s indictment of the U.S. health care system, 
Sicko¸ provides a useful illustration of this problem.12  The movie attempts 
to puncture the myths about Canada’s health care system through vignettes 
involving U.S. citizens seeking to qualify for coverage under the public 
system in Canada and Canadians who have received prompt care for their 
health conditions in Canada.  The film thus includes an undoubtedly a 
humorous debunking of the negative stereotypes about the Canadian health 
care system often heard in political debates. Yet the Canadian reaction to 
the movie is somewhat complex. Canadians view their health care system 
as a source of national pride and identity and many Canadians undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                 
8 For a slightly different use of the mirror image, see KAREN DAVIS, ET AL., 
MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: AN INTERNATIONAL UPDATE ON THE COMPARATIVE 
PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 1 (2007) (“Like the queen in the ‘Snow 
White’fairy tale, Americans often look only at their own reflection in the mirror – failing to 
include international experience in assessments of the health care system.”), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/1027_Davis_mirror_mirror_international_upda
te_final.pdf?section=4039. 
9 The answer is “no,” of course. Among other things, medicine is Canada is not 
socialized: Canada has a single-payer system but most health care is provided by non-
governmental institutions and private physicians.  See William Lahey, Medicare and the 
Law: Contours of an Evolving Relationship, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 1, 13 
(Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield, and Colleen Flood, eds., 3d ed. 2007).   
10 The answer here is “no” as well. See text accompanying notes 70-71.  
11 For similar observations, see Peter S. Hussey, Review, Health Systems in 
Transition: Canada, 297 JAMA 647 (2007).  
12 See Michael Moore, Sicko, http://www.michaelmoore.com/sicko/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2008).   
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enjoyed the humorous comparisons between the two systems. But, at the 
same time, the movie’s rosy glow created more than a few moments of 
discomfort for Canadian audiences given broad concerns about the 
sustainability of the current system and an intense debate about how to 
address lengthy waiting times for certain procedures.13   
Given the risks of cross-border comparisons, this Essay therefore takes 
a skeptical, limited view of the relevance of the Canadian experience for 
the insurance debate in the United States.  The next section of this Essay 
provides a basic outline of the Canadian system and then analyzes some 
recent data comparing Canada to the U.S. using data on health care 
expenditures, access and outcomes.      
 
III. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
A. THE CANADA HEALTH ACT 
 
The Canada Health Act established a publicly-funded health care 
system that, confusingly enough for American readers, is called 
“Medicare.”14  Much as occurred with the Medicaid system in the United 
States, the federal government in Canada used the lure of federal funding 
subsidies to induce provincial participation on a national health care 
program. Unlike the Medicaid system established in the U.S., the Canadian 
Medicare system is not viewed as a program designed to remedy the gap 
poverty creates in what is viewed as the presumptively efficient operation 
of the market for health insurance. The Canadian program as created by 
federal legislation and implemented in the various provinces instead largely 
                                                                                                                 
13 See, e.g., Jeffrey Simpson, Sicko Lets Us Wallow In Our Health-Care Smugness, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), July 11, 2007, at A17.  See also Tracy Hampton, 7-Country 
Survey of Patients: US Adults Most Unhappy with Health Care, 298 JAMA  2730 (2007) 
(while adults in the US are the most unhappy with their health care system, with 34% 
agreeing that the system needs to be rebuilt completely and 48% more citing the need for 
fundamental changes, many Canadians are worried as well. Twelve percent of Canadians 
think their system needs to be rebuilt and another 60 percent think that fundamental changes 
are needed).  
14 The Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6. The Canada Health Act is available 
online at http://www.canlii.org.  Although the Act is refreshingly brief and clear, 
particularly compared to health care legislation in the United States, the federal legislation 
and related provincial Acts have nonetheless spawned considerable litigation and academic 
commentary.   For a general overview of the fundamentals of Canadian health care law, 
including the Medicare system, see Lahey, supra note 9, at 1-67.  
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supplants the private market for health insurance coverage for an important 
set of core health care services.  
The Canadian Medicare system is characterized by five fundamental 
principles: accessibility, universality, portability, comprehensiveness, and 
public administration.15  Under the portability requirement, provinces must 
provide insurance coverage for lawful residents and are prohibited from 
imposing any waiting or eligibility period greater than three months.16  
Provinces are also required to pay for the costs of health care incurred by 
residents who are temporarily away from their home province.17 The 
Medicare program’s universality requirement establishes that provinces 
must provide insured persons access to services covered under the plan on 
the same terms and conditions.18 The accessibility of the system is 
maintained through provisions requiring the payment of providers from 
public funds that are coupled with provisions prohibiting extra billing or 
user charges.19    Comprehensiveness is created through the coverage of all 
medically necessary hospital services and medically required physician 
services.20  The Act requires provinces to administer and operate their plans 
                                                                                                                 
15 Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 7.  See also Lahey, supra note  9, at 34-
45 (discussing the criteria). 
16 Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 11 (“(1) In order to satisfy the criterion 
respecting portability, the health care insurance plan of a province (a) must not impose any 
minimum period of residence in the province, or waiting period, in excess of three months 
before residents of the province are eligible for or entitled to insured health services”). 
Under section 2, “’resident’” means, in relation to a province, a person lawfully entitled to 
be or to remain in Canada who makes his home and is ordinarily present in the province, but 
does not include a tourist, a transient or a visitor to the province.” Id at §2. 
17 Id. at §11(1)(b). 
18 Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 10  (“In order to satisfy the criterion 
respecting universality, the health care insurance plan of a province must entitle one 
hundred per cent of the insured persons of the province to the insured health services 
provided for by the plan on uniform terms and conditions.”) Section 2 defines “insured 
persons” as “in relation to a province, a resident of the province” but excludes members of 
the Canadian Forces, members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.), 
penitentiary inmates, and provincial residents who have not yet completed their residency 
requirements.  Id. at § 2. 
19 Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 12 (“In order to satisfy the criterion 
respecting accessibility, the health care insurance plan of a province (a) must provide for 
insured health services on uniform terms and conditions and on a basis that does not impede 
or preclude, either directly or indirectly whether by charges made to insured persons or 
otherwise, reasonable access to those services by insured persons”). Section 12 also 
establishes the requirements and general standards for the compensation of physicians, other 
practitioners, and hospitals. Id. 
20 Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 9 (“In order to satisfy the criterion 
respecting comprehensiveness, the health care insurance plan of a province must insure all 
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through public entities on a non-profit basis, although health care can be 
provided through physicians who are not government employees.21  
The principles of the Canadian system enjoy broad public support even 
though the system is saddled with some internal conflicts.22 Universality 
and portability imply uniformity but Canada’s complex political landscape 
has tolerated deviations in independent-minded Quebec.23 The system was 
more comprehensive at the outset than it is today, given developments that 
have moved care out of hospitals and away from physicians and toward 
pharmaceuticals, home care, and other services not included within the core 
Medicare mandate.24  Provinces have addressed at least some of these 
challenges to comprehensiveness through programs layered on top of the 
core health services mandate; however the terms of provincial plans vary, 
leading to a lack of uniformity across Canada for some important types of 
health care.25  Covered residents have access to the system without regard 
to their economic circumstances and need not fear the potentially crushing 
burden of deductibles and co-payments. But truly wealthy Canadians can 
“buy out” of the current system by seeking care in the United States and 
average Canadians may experience significant delays in accessing some 
services. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
insured health services provided by hospitals, medical practitioners or dentists, and where 
the law of the province so permits, similar or additional services rendered by other health 
care practitioners”). Section 2 provides that “’insured health services’” means hospital 
services, physician services and surgical-dental services provided to insured persons” while 
excluding services provided under other federal legislation or provincial workers 
compensation regimes).  “Medically necessary” and “medically required” are not defined 
within the Act or in provincial legislation.  The implications of this gap are explored in, 
JUST MEDICARE: WHAT’S IN, WHAT’S OUT, HOW WE DECIDE (Colleen M. Flood, ed. 2006).  
21 Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 8. 
22 See Lahey, supra note 9, at 66-67; and BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF 
HEALTH CARE IN CANADA: FINAL REPORT (2002) [The Romanow Report], 
http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/english/pdf/romanow/pdfs/HCC_Final_Report.pdf.  
23 See Lahey, supra note 9, at  47  (noting Quebec’s refusal “to reimburse other 
provinces (except Ontario) at the rates of the other province for services provided to Quebec 
residents”). 
24 Id. at 21-23. Drug therapies are covered under the Canada Health Act when 
administered in a hospital.  Provinces have gone beyond the Act’s requirements by 
establishing publicly funded pharmaceutical assistance programs, though there is 
considerable variation in coverage and patient costs.  Id.  
25 Id.  
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B.  HEALTH EXPENDITURES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  
 
Health care expenditures take a central position in many debates about 
health care.   Rising health expenditures have been taking a larger and 
larger share of gross domestic product (GDP) in both Canada and the 
United States.  In 2006, per capita health care expenditures in Canada rose 
to $3,678 or 10% of the GDP.26  In Canada, public sources generally pay 
for about 70% of health expenditures with the private sector picking up the 
remaining 30%.27  Super-inflationary increases in health care expenditures 
mean that health care occupies a larger and larger share of provincial 
expenditures. Private insurance and private payment cover goods and 
services not within the core Medicare mandate. 
Health care expenditures in the United States increased to $6,714 per 
capita or 15.3% of the GDP in 2006.28  In the mid-1960s, before the 
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid, the public and private share of 
health expenditures were the mirror image of the distribution found in 
Canada, with the private sector picking up 70% of the costs of health care 
and the public sector paying for 30%.29  The public share of health 
expenditures reached 40% by 1978 and stood at 45.8% in 2006.30  Increases 
in health care spending have had a disproportionate impact on state and 
local government budgets. 31  
Both Canada and the United States spend more per capita and as a 
percentage of GDP than many other developed countries. The median rate 
of health care spending per capita for the thirty Organisation for Economic 
                                                                                                                 
26 OECD Health Data 2008 - Frequently Requested Data [hereinafter “OECD 
Health Data 2008”] (MS Excel document; 2006 expenditures measured in “U.S.$, 
purchasing power parity”), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html.  See 
also Canadian Institute for Health Information, Health Care in Canada 2007 9-10 (2007),  
http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/products/hcic2007_e.pdf 
27 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26.  See also National Health Expenditure 
Trends, 1975-2007 9-10 (2007), 
http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/products/NHET_1975_2007_e.pdf.  
28 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26.    
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Aaron Catlin, et al., National Health Spending In 2006: A Year of Change for 
Prescription Drugs, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 14, 21 (2008) (Exhibit 5). The state and local share 
of public health care expenditures has been close to 13% since 1990 but this relative 
stability masks the fact that state and local spending on Medicaid has tripled during this 
same time period while federal expenditures have grown 2.5 times and total expenditures 
have only doubled. Id.  
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in 2006 was $2,898 (US) 
or 8.9% of GDP.32 The U.S. led the OECD countries in per capita costs and 
percentage of GDP (at $6,714 and 15.3%) while Canada ranked fifth in 
spending and eighth in percentage of GDP (at $3,678 and 10%).33 The 
excellent comparative data on health care spending is relative rather than 
normative: we can compare how much countries spend but we have no 
definitive measure of how much would be the correct amount.34 
Commentators therefore turn to other types of data that more readily permit 
evaluation of the results of health care spending.  Two major areas of 
comparison involve access and health care outcomes.  
 
C. ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
Access to health care can be measured in different ways. Levels of 
health insurance coverage are clearly important, as health care costs can 
rapidly outstrip the ability of people to pay directly for their own health 
care.  Yet, as increases in the percentage of GDP allocated to health care 
have vividly demonstrated, every society must manage trade-offs between 
spending on health care and spending on other goods and services.  
Restrictions on health care spending are managed through some form of 
rationing conducted at some level of the system.35 The method of rationing 
                                                                                                                 
32 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). See also 
Gerard F. Anderson, Bianca K. Frogner, and Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Spending in OECD 
Countries in 2004: An Update, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1481, 1483 (2007) [hereinafter 
Anderson, Frogner & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004] (Exhibit 1) and Gerard F. 
Anderson, Bianca K. Frogner, Roger A. Johns, and Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care 
Spending And Use Of Information Technology In OECD Countries, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
819, 820 (2006). 
33 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). See also 
Anderson, Frogner & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1483 (Exhibit 1).  
34 See generally, William D. Savedoff, What Should A Country Spend on Health 
Care?, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 962 (2007) (noting issue and analyzing different approaches). 
35 “Rationing” is a somewhat vague term used in different ways in different 
contexts. See, e.g., Roy G. Spece, Jr., A Fundamental Constitutional Right of the Monied to 
“Buy Out of” Universal Health Care Program Restrictions Versus the Moral Claim of 
Everyone Else to Decent Health Care: An Unremitting Paradox of Health Care Reform?, 3 
J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 14-15 (2007).  The admittedly expansive definition of 
rationing used in this Essay is meant to cover everything from restrictions on the supply of 
health care providers or type of care, to bedside rationing and waiting lists for services, to 
rationing based on access to health insurance or wealth.  In the global sense, “rationing” 
simply refers to the process of aligning limited health care resources or funding with the 
not-so-limited health care needs of the population. 
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directly affects access to care because it defines who has access to what and 
when.     
Canada clearly wins compared to the United States whenever access is 
measured by the percentage of the population with health insurance. 
Canada provides health insurance coverage for nearly all of its legal 
residents. In the United States, more than 45 million people – representing 
more than 15% of the population – are uninsured with many millions more 
underinsured from the risk of catastrophic health care costs.  In total, “[a]n 
estimated one-third of U.S. adults are either uninsured during the year or 
underinsured.”36 
Accessibility can also be compared using the method and impact of 
rationing employed within a society.  Some types of health care are 
rationed through waiting lists in Canada as well as in other countries 
offering universal coverage.37 In the United States, most types of care are 
not rationed through waiting lists.38 Instead, certain portions of the 
population are left uninsured or underinsured and therefore are denied care 
altogether or face delays and the risk of substandard care.39  In the 
aggregate, the result is that Canadians fare better than Americans: 
“[c]ompared with Canadians, US residents are one third less likely to have 
a regular medical doctor, one fourth more likely to have unmet health care 
needs, and more than twice as likely to forego needed medicines.”40  
However the U.S. results were not uniform: insured Americans reported 
slightly better access to care and receipt of services than Canadians.41 
Uninsured Americans generally fared much worse than Canadians.42 
Accessibility is related to the supply of physicians (or other health care 
professionals), hospital beds, and specialized medical equipment. 
                                                                                                                 
36 Cathy Schoen, et al., Toward Higher-Performance Health Systems: Adults’ Health 
Care Experiences in Seven Countries, 2007, HEALTH AFFAIRS   w717, 718 (2007).  
37 Kristen Boyle, A Permanent Vacation: Evaluating Medical Tourism’s Place in the 
United States Healthcare System, HEALTH LAW, June 2008, at 42. 
38 One notable exception – at least for the moment -- involves the transplantation of 
scarce organs. Organs are allocated from a waiting list rather than through the market.  See 
Troyen Brennan, Markets in Health Care: The Case of Renal Transplantation, 25 J. L. MED. 
& ETHICS 249 (2007).    
39 See, e.g., Sharon Wilcox, et al., Measuring and Reducing Waiting Times: A Cross-
National Comparison of Strategies, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1078, 1078-79 (2007).  
40 Karen E. Lasser et al., Access to Care, Health Status, and Health Disparities in 
the United States and Canada: Results of a Cross-National Population-Based Survey, 96 
AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1300, 1303 (2006).   
41  Id. at 1303, 1304. 
42 Id.  
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Interestingly, despite record setting expenditures on health care, the United 
States does not lead the world in various measures of health care supply.43  
Both Canada and the U.S. have fewer physicians per 1,000 persons than the 
OECD median.44   Canada appears to use its physicians more efficiently 
than the U.S. and is at the median of OECD countries with 5.9 physician 
consultations per capita compared to 4 in the United States.45  Canada does 
have fewer practicing nurses per 1,000 population (8.8) than the U.S. 
(10.5); in this area the U.S. is above the OECD median (9.8).46   Similarly, 
Canada has more acute care beds per 1,000 population than the United 
States though both are below the OECD median.47 
Canada maintains universal coverage for physician and hospital 
services, which explains why Canadians in general have better access to 
health care than Americans.  But Canada rations access to certain types of 
care through waiting lists and those waiting lists have become a major legal 
and political issue. Studies repeatedly find that Canadians wait longer for 
certain elective procedures than Americans.48  A recent survey found that: 
                                                                                                                 
43 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). See also 
Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2).  
This counterintuitive result is related in part to the fact that the price for health care is higher 
in the U.S.: 
Although these are crude measures, the low resource levels and 
low utilization rates coupled with the high level of health care spending 
in the United States suggest that U.S. prices for health resources are 
higher than in other OECD countries. The high level of spending on 
U.S. health care may reflect that the system more quickly adopts 
expensive new technology and pays much higher prices for the real 
resources used in health care. 
Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1484. 
44 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). There were 2.4 
practicing physicians per 1,000 population in the U.S. and 2.1 in Canada in 2006 compared 
to the OECD median of 2.94. See also Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 
2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2).   
45 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2005 data). See also 
Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2).   
46 OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (2006 data on practicing nurses, density 
per 1,000). But see Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, 
at 1485 (Exhibit 2) (reporting more nurses per capita for Canada in 2004).   
47  OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (2.7 acute care beds per 1,000 population 
for the U.S. and 2.8 for Canada in 2005; the OECD average was 3.9). See also Anderson, 
Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2) (similar). 
48 See, e.g., Cathy Schoen et al., supra, note 36, at 720 (“German and US adults 
reported the most rapid access and Canadian and British adults, the longest waits”); and 
Cathy Schoen, et al., U.S. Health System Performance: A National Scorecard, 26 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS w457, w458 (2006).   
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Although more US respondents had unmet health care 
needs than did Canadians (13.2% and 10.7%, 
respectively), their reasons for having such needs differed. 
Seven percent of US respondents (and less than 1% of 
Canadians) had unmet needs because of financial barriers, 
whereas 3.5% of Canadians had unmet needs because of 
waiting times (vs. less than 1% of US residents).49   
 
In another recent survey, 11% of Canadians and 16% of Americans 
reported having had elective surgery in the past two years.50 Only thirty-
two percent of the Canadian respondents received their elective surgery in 
less than a month compared to 62% of respondents from the U.S.; 14% of 
the Canadians waited more than six months, compared to only 4% of the 
Americans.51 
In some areas, Canada and the U.S. both fare badly compared to some 
other developed countries. Survey respondents in both countries reported 
difficulties in securing same day physician appointments and were more 
likely than respondents from other countries “to report long waits (six days 
or more) to see a doctor when sick.”52 Respondents from both countries 
were also more likely to have sought care, sometimes inappropriately, from 
an emergency room.53 Canadians were the most likely to have waited two 
or more hours in the emergency room (at 46%).54 Americans had the fourth 
highest percentage of persons waiting two hours or more (at 31%).55 
In summary, Canadians generally have better access to health care than 
Americans as a whole though insured Americans report slightly better 
results in some areas.  Both Canada and the U.S. are confronting some 
challenges regarding the supply of health care providers and hospital beds. 
More Canadians than Americans report delays in receiving some types of 
care.   
Access to care is important but not necessarily for its own sake so 
much as because health care is related to positive health care outcomes. We 
                                                                                                                 
49 Lasser, supra note 40, at 1303.  
50 Schoen et al., supra note 36, at w721 (Exhibit 2). 
51 Id.  
52 Schoen, et al., supra note 36, at w724. Thirty percent of Canadian respondents 
reported waiting six or more days compared to 20% of US respondents. Id. at w725 (Exhibit 
4). 
53 Id. at w724-w725 (including Exhibit 4). 
54 Schoen, et al, supra note 36, at w725 (Exhibit 4). 
55 Id. 
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care whether people have access to physicians, hospitals, and emergency 
rooms because access to care bears at least some relationship to the length 
and quality of people’s lives.56  As will be seen in the next section, the U.S. 
does not fare particularly well on measures of health care outcomes 
compared to Canada or many other countries.  
 
D. HEALTH CARE OUTCOMES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
There are many measures of health care outcomes. Efforts to “rate” the 
success of health care systems using multiple criteria and indicators are 
increasingly common.  Researchers associated with the Commonwealth 
Fund have developed an analysis that uses data on the “Quality of Care,” 
“Access,” “Efficiency,” “Equity,” and “Healthy Lives.”57 Unfortunately, 
[t]he U.S. ranks last overall across the five dimensions of a high 
performance health system” when compared to Australia, Canada, 
Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.58  Yet Canada received 
the next worst results, coming in 5th out of the 6 countries studied.59  Using 
                                                                                                                 
56 It is important, however, not to overstate the role of health care.  There are 
significant variations in morbidity and mortality that appear largely unrelated to access to 
health care. For a summary of factors influencing health, see Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, supra note 26, at 45 (noting that relevance of socio-economic status, social 
environment and support networks, employment/working conditions, physical 
environments, personal health practices, healthy child development, biology and genetic 
endowment, and gender). 
57 DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 4. Each of these five categories is in turn broken 
into subparts and measured using multiple benchmarks.  “Quality of care” provides a 
somewhat complicated example of this process. “Quality of care” is “defined . . . as care that 
is effective or ‘right,’ safe, coordinated and patient-centered.” Id. at 6. Each of these sub-
categories is measured using specific indicators. “Right care measures” include indicators 
such as the percentage of women in certain age groups who have had a Pap test within the 
past two years and the percentage of diabetics receiving certain identified services. Id. “Safe 
care” indicators are measures of errors in the health care system, such as being given the 
wrong medication. Id. at 9. “Coordinated care” measures whether patients have a regular 
doctor and whether the system collects and coordinates information about care. Id. at 11. 
“Patient-centeredness” is defined as “care delivered with the patient’s needs and preferences 
in mind.’” Id. at 12.  The benchmark criteria include communication, continuity and 
feedback, and the level of engagement and concern with patient preferences. Id. at 12.   
Quality of care is the most complex category of measures but the scores for “Access,” 
“Efficiency,” “Equity,” and “Healthy Lives” are determined using a similar process. 
58 DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 4.   
59 Id. at viii (Figure ES-1. Overall Ranking). 
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these global measures, the Canadian system produces better results that the 
U.S. system, but both could benefit from improvement.  
These global measures of system quality have the virtue of combining 
a wide range of comparative data about health care systems. Yet as victims 
of the U.S. News and World Report ranking system for law schools can 
attest, ranking systems appear to offer numerical precision while 
sometimes obscuring the important value choices inherent in picking some 
indicators over others or weighing some results over others.60  It might 
therefore be helpful to “drill down” into the results for some specific 
outcome indicators in the United States and Canada.61  
Two frequently cited indicators are infant mortality and length of life. 
As is now well known, the United States does not fare particularly well on 
these measures as compared to Canada and many other countries.   In 2005, 
the U.S. had a relatively high rate of infant mortality (7.0) compared to 
Canada (5.4); neither country was a particular success story compared to 
others around the world.62  
Life span can be measured in several ways.63 One increasingly popular 
method focuses on the rate of preventable death and healthy life 
expectancy.64  The rate of preventable death or “amenable mortality” 
“refer[s] to deaths from certain causes that should not occur in the presence 
of timely and effective health care.”65 Examples include deaths from 
“conditions such as bacterial infections, treatable cancers, diabetes, 
cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease, and complications of common 
                                                                                                                 
60 See, e.g., Law School Admissions Council, Ranking Law Schools, 
http://www.lsac.org/Choosing/deans-speak-out-rankings.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).  
61 The selection of indicators also represents a value choice. In this case, I have 
chosen indicators based on the broad popularity of these measures in comparative health 
studies. 
62 DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 21 (Figure 8). For the current comparative data 
see Central Intelligence Agency, Rank Order—Infant Mortality, in The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html. 
63 Canada and the U.S. can be compared on average life expectancy as well as 
healthy life expectancy at age 60.   In 2008, Canada was ranked 8th in the world for life 
expectancy at birth (81.16 years) compared to the United States, which was ranked 46th (at 
78.14 years).  CIA, Rank Order – Life Expectancy at Birth, in The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html 
(website updated regularly with most recent data). Canada also bests the U.S. in average 
healthy lives expectancy at age 60 (18 years in Canada compared to 17 in the U.S.). DAVIS, 
ET AL, supra note at 8, at 21 (citing 2003 WHO data). 
64 DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 21. 
65 Ellen Nolte & C. Martin McKee, Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an 
Earlier Analysis, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 58, 59 (2008). 
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surgical procedures.”66 The United States has a higher rate of amenable 
mortality than Canada (96.41 compared to 68.15) and has not been 
reducing the rate of amenable mortality as quickly as many other 
countries.67 Thus, “by 2002-03, the United States had among the highest 
amenable mortality rates of countries studied, for both males and 
females.”68 
This data on health status and outcomes reinforces the conclusion that 
the Canadian health care system produces better access to better care with 
better outcomes and at lower cost that the United States. At the same time, 
it is clear that both Canada and the United States fare poorly compared to 
other OECD countries on many of these measures.  Further, while the 
United States struggles to broaden access to care within a system that 
favors a private health insurance market, Canada’s public health care 
system is confronting challenges related to costs, comprehensiveness, and 
waiting times. Comparisons between the two countries invariably focus on 
the balance of public and private sector responsibility for health care. The 
next section of this Essay will explore the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
recent foray into the debate. 
 
IV. THE CANADIAN INSURANCE DEBATE 
 
A.  THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DEBATE IN CANADA 
 
Despite the title of this section, it is important to recognize the limited 
nature of the debate about the roles of the public and private sectors in 
Canada. As noted above, the Canadian Medicare program is a source of 
national pride and identity. There is thus no real interest among Canadians 
or their politicians in changing the fundamental character of the health care 
system away from a publicly supported, universal and comprehensive 
system of care.   In addition, there is little interest in affirmatively 
developing anything that might be called a “two-tier” system of health care: 
one in which a public health care system is coupled with a vigorous private 
market for health care services. “Two-tier” is a symbolic touchstone – 
                                                                                                                 
66 Id. (researchers also included ½ the deaths from ischemic heart disease (IHD) 
based on evidence that half the deaths in this category are preventable). 
67 Id. at 62 (Exhibit 2).  
68 Id. at 63. Improving U.S. scores to the average of eighteen studied OECD 
countries would prevent 75,000 deaths of persons under age 75 per year. Id. For a similar 
analysis, see DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 21 (Canada is 3rd and U.S. is 6th in ranking of 
six countries based on mortality amenable to health care). 
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playing much the same role as the phrase “socialized medicine” does in the 
United States – and the phrase generally means “bad” in any policy debate. 
Indeed, one Canadian critique of the U.S. is that it has created a two-tiered 
system in which the public programs have suffered from the emphasis on 
the private market with the result that health care is allocated based on 
ability to pay rather than need.   
Of course it could well be argued that Canada already has a two-tiered 
system, at least in some respects.  The private sector pays for thirty percent 
of health care costs in Canada, in part because the Medicare program does 
not include within its core mandate increasingly important types of health 
care such as out-of-hospital pharmaceuticals and home health care.69 In 
addition, the wealthiest Canadians are capable of paying for care directly 
from a limited number of private clinics in Canada or at health care 
facilities in the U.S. or elsewhere. But it is important to recognize that these 
examples typically inspire calls to expand or to improve the Medicare 
program rather than creating a sense of comfort with the notion of 
privatized care. 
The Canadian health care system is under enormous pressure due to 
increasing costs, insufficiencies in the supply of health care providers, 
expanding waiting lists, and the anticipated impact of an aging population.  
Commissions and academics have issued numerous reports on the future of 
the health care system. By and large, these reports reaffirm the centrality of 
the public’s role in funding and administering the delivery of health care in 
Canada. Two particularly prominent recent reports, the Romanow Report70 
and the Kirby Report,71 both concluded that Canada’s emphasis on public 
responsibility for health care should be maintained. For all of these reasons, 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Chaoulli v. Québec 
(Attorney General) generated considerable controversy.72   
  
B. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAOULLI CASE AND (JUST A BIT OF) 
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
                                                                                                                 
69 Martha Livingston, Update on Health Care in Canada:  What’s Right, What’s 
Wrong, What’s Left, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 267, 271, 279 (1998). See also supra note 24.  
70 See The Romanow Report , supra note 22. 
71 THE HEALTH OF CANADIANS – THE FEDERAL ROLE, VOLUME SIX: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM (Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science 
and Technology) (2002) [hereinafter The Kirby Report] (known as the Kirby Report after 
Senator Kirby), http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/soci-e/rep-
e/repoct02vol6-e.htm/. 
72 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.).  
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The Chaoulli case was initiated by a patient, George Zeliotis, and a 
physician, Jacques Chaoulli.73 Mr. Zeliotis had become a critic of waiting 
lists after experiencing delays while receiving treatment for various 
medical conditions.74 Dr. Chaoulli had previously unsuccessfully sought 
provincial recognition of his home-delivered medical services as well as a 
license to open a private hospital.75  The plaintiffs sought a declaration that 
two specific provisions of Québec law violated the both Quebec Charter76 
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.77  The challenged 
provisions prohibited the sale of private health insurance for health care 
covered under the provincial Medicare plan.78  These prohibitions appeared 
to be designed to support the public health system by preventing the 
development of privately funded care.  
                                                                                                                 
73  Id. at  807. 
74 Id. at 792. 
75 Id. at 792-93. 
76 Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 (Can.) [hereinafter the 
“Quebec Charter”], http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-12/20071213/whole.html . 
77 The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 (Can.) [hereinafter the “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” or the 
“Canadian Charter”], http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html. 
78 The first contested provision prohibited private coverage of “insured services” – 
that is, those covered under the provincial medical plan:  
15.  No person shall make or renew a contract of insurance or 
make a payment under a contract of insurance under which an insured 
service is furnished or under which all or part of the cost of such a 
service is paid to a resident or a deemed resident of Québec or to 
another person on his behalf. 
Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29. See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 911 (Can.) (Appendix) The second contested provision was similar but 
focused on hospitalization services covered under the provincial plan:   
11. (1) No one shall make or renew, or make a payment under a 
contract under which  
(a) a resident is to be provided with or to be reimbursed 
for the cost of any hospital service that is one of the insured 
services; 
 (b) payment is conditional upon the hospitalization of a 
resident; or  
 (c) payment is dependent upon the length of time the 
resident is a patient in a facility maintained by an institution 
contemplated in section 2.  
(2)   This section does not apply . . . [during the waiting period for 
provincial coverage]. 
Hospital Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-28. See Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. 791, 911-12 
(Appendix). 
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The Quebec Charter is a provincial document that, while not strictly 
speaking a constitution, does give courts the ability to review and to strike 
down inconsistent provincial legislation. Section 1 of the Quebec Charter 
provides that “Every human being has a right to life, and to personal 
security, inviolability and freedom.”79 The Quebec Charter also includes a 
type of “savings clause,” under which legislation that appears to violate §1 
can nonetheless be justified and preserved. Section 9.1 of the Quebec 
Charter provides: “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a 
person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order 
and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec. . . . In this respect, the 
scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed 
by law.”80 The Supreme Court of Canada had previously found that §9.1 
was similar to §1 of the Canadian Charter, discussed below, and that the 
government could be required to demonstrate that “the restrictive law is 
neither irrational nor arbitrary and that the means chosen are proportionate 
to the end to be served.”81 
The Canadian Charter establishes the broader power of the courts to 
overturn any federal or provincial legislation inconsistent with its 
provisions.82 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter provides that “Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.”83 There are two parts to the §7 analysis: determining whether there 
has been a deprivation of a protected right and then determining whether 
the deprivation is nonetheless consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice. As would be expected, there is a substantial body of case law and 
commentary interpreting the provisions of §7 and other aspects of the 
Canadian Charter.84 
In addition, §1 of the Canadian Charter allows courts to uphold 
legislation depriving individuals of their §7 rights in certain circumstances.  
                                                                                                                 
79 Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, § 1 (Can.), 
http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-12/20071213/whole.html. 
80  Id. at art. 9.1; Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 821 (Deschamps, J.) 
81 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 821-23 (Deschamps, J.) (citing Ford v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.)) Justice Deschamps therefore noted that the Oakes test 
developed under §1 of the Canadian Charter would be applied to determine whether the 
legislation could be justified under §9.1 of the Quebec Charter. See notes 86-87, infra. 
82  The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 (Can.),  http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html. 
83 Id. at §7.  
84 See generally PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (5th ed. 2007) (two 
volumes).  
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Section 1 provides: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.”85  Canadian courts use the “Oakes test” to 
carry out the §1 analysis critical to determining whether or not to strike 
down legislation that deprives someone of his or her §7 rights.86  Under this 
test: 
 
First, the court must determine whether the objective 
of the legislation is pressing and substantial.  Next, it must 
determine whether the means chosen to attain this 
legislative end are reasonable and demonstrably justifiable 
in a free and democratic society.  For this second part of 
the analysis, three tests must be met:  (1) the existence of a 
rational connection between the measure and the aim of 
the legislation; (2) minimal impairment of the protected 
right by the measure; and (3) proportionality between the 
effect of the measure and its objective . . . .87 
 
The tests of rationality, minimal impairment, and proportionality have also 
been applied to determine whether restrictive legislation can be justified 
under §9.1 of the Quebec Charter.88 
The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in bringing their Canadian Charter and 
Quebec Charter claims in the lower courts. The trial court dismissed the 
motion for a declaratory judgment under the Canadian Charter without 
specifically considering the Quebec Charter.89 The trial court found that the 
provincial legislation did infringe the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person under §7 of the Canadian Charter but held that the deprivation 
did not violate the principles of fundamental justice. It did not need to 
reach the §1 analysis but nonetheless indicated that it would have upheld 
the legislation as justified under §1.  The plaintiffs’ appeal was thereafter 
                                                                                                                 
85 The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11, §1 (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html. 
86 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 823 (Can.) 
(Deschamps, J.). The test was developed in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.)).  
87 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 823 (Can.) 
(Deschamps, J.)(citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.)). 
88 See Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 822-23  (Deschamps, J.) (citing Ford v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.)).  
89 Id. at 807-08. 
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dismissed by the Court of Appeal, with each of the panel judges writing a 
separate opinion.90 Again, none of the judges drew specific attention to the 
Quebec Charter. 
Given the treatment of the plaintiffs’ claims in the courts below, and 
the iconic status of Canada’s public health system, it was somewhat of a 
surprise when the Supreme Court of Canada struck down Quebec’s ban on 
private health insurance in a 4:3 decision.  The justices split 3:3 on the 
question of whether the legislation violated §7 of the Canadian Charter and 
whether it could be justified under §1.91  The deciding vote and narrow 
basis of the decision were therefore crafted by Justice Deschamps, who 
found that the Quebec legislation violated §1 of the Quebec Charter and 
that it could not be justified under §9.1 of that document.92 She did not 
reach the claims under the Canadian Charter.   
The opinions of the justices are detailed and comprehensive; the entire 
decision is nearly 100 pages long.93  A number of important Canadian 
commentaries already have been published on the decision and its 
implications.94  For our purposes, we need only focus on two aspects of the 
debate between the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. First, we will 
analyze the court’s treatment of whether the ban on private health insurance 
intruded into a right protected by the Quebec Charter or the Canadian 
                                                                                                                 
90  Id. at 809.  
91 Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major wrote an opinion, joined by Justice 
Bastarache, finding that  
“[w]e concur in the conclusion of our colleague Deschamps J. that 
the prohibition against contracting for private health insurance violates 
s. 1 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. 
C-12, and is not justifiable under s. 9.1.  On the argument that the anti-
insurance provision also violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (“Charter”), we conclude that the provision 
impermissibly limits the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
protected by s. 7 of the Charter and has not been shown to be justified 
as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter. 
See Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 843 (Can.) (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring)). 
Justices Binnie and LeBel, joined by Justice Fish, were unwilling to find a violation of the 
Quebec Charter or the Canadian Charter. Id. at 860-911 (Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting).   
92 Id. at 805-42 (Deschamps, J.).    
93 The narrow opinion by Justice Deschamps will be referred to herein as the 
“majority” decision; the opinion by the Chief Justice and Justice Major is the concurring 
opinion and the opinion by Justices Binnie and LeBel is the dissenting opinion. 
94 See, e.g., ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA, 257-77 (Colleen M. Flood et al., eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter ACCESS TO CARE]; Symposium on Chaoulli, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 249 (2006) 
[hereinafter Symposium on Chaoulli].  
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Charter. Second, we will explore the court’s analysis of whether the ban on 
private health insurance was rationally related to the continued existence of 
the public health care system itself.  The implications of these aspects of 
Chaoulli decision for United States will then be explored in the final Part of 
this Essay.  
 
C. DID THE PROHIBITION ON PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 
DEPRIVE THE PLAINTIFFS OF A PROTECTED RIGHT? 
 
It is not necessarily easy to draw a line from a provincial ban on private 
health insurance to the freedoms protected under the Quebec Charter or the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  On its face, the legislation in 
Quebec merely restricted the sale of insurance for services that were 
already covered under a public health insurance scheme.  The plaintiffs 
were not prevented from using their own funds to purchase health care 
privately, either in Canada or in another country. The restrictions imposed 
appeared to affect economic rights of the sort not protected in either of the 
two Charters. The plaintiffs nonetheless argued that the legislation violated 
their rights to life, liberty, and personal inviolability under the Quebec 
Charter and their rights to life, liberty, and security of the person under the 
Canadian Charter.95   Despite the somewhat indirect nature of the claims, 
the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously supported the 
view that a prohibition on private insurance could, at least under some 
circumstances, violate the protected rights of Canadian citizens.  The 
analysis of this issue is inherently interesting, of course, and may have 
some implications for the United States. 
Justice Deschamps in her majority opinion limited her analysis to the 
provisions of the Quebec Charter, which provides protections for the “right 
to life, and to personal security, inviolability and freedom.”96  She found 
that the ban on private health insurance prevented Quebeckers from buying 
private insurance and that this in turn prevented them from receiving care 
in the private sector, thereby implicitly finding that insurance is necessary 
to fund private health care.97  The ban on private health insurance therefore 
forced the plaintiffs to rely solely on the public system to meet their health 
care needs.98 Medical evidence indicating that some people would die 
                                                                                                                 
95 Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at 807.  
96 Id. at 815.   
97 Id. at 818-21. 
98 Id.  
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while on a waiting list due to delays was sufficient to implicate the right to 
life.99   Medical testimony that waiting for surgery could cause injuries to 
become irreparable while also causing people to endure pain, limited 
mobility, and mental suffering was sufficient to show an infringement of 
personal inviolability.100  The ban in private health insurance coverage thus 
forced Quebeckers into a public system where rationing, in the form of 
waiting lists for certain forms of treatment, infringed protected rights to life 
and to personal inviolability.101 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major (with Justice Bastarache 
concurring) agreed with Justice Deschamps’ analysis of the Quebec 
Charter. The concurring justices applied a similar analysis and reached the 
same conclusion under §7 of the Canadian Charter, using much of the same 
evidence in the trial record.  According to Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Justice Major: 
 
Not every difficulty rises to the level of adverse 
impact on security of the person under s. 7.  The impact, 
whether psychological or physical, must be serious.  
However, because patients may be denied timely health 
care for a condition that is clinically significant to their 
current and future health, s. 7 protection of security of the 
person is engaged.  Access to a waiting list is not access to 
health care.   As we noted above, there is unchallenged 
evidence that in some serious cases, patients die as a result 
of waiting lists for public health care. 102 
 
The appellants have established that many Quebec 
residents face delays in treatment that adversely affect 
their security of the person and that they would not sustain 
but for the prohibition on medical insurance. It is common 
ground that the effect of the prohibition on insurance is to 
                                                                                                                 
99 Id. at 819-20 (citing evidence from a cardiovascular surgeon that persons with 
cardiovascular disease are “’always sitting on a bomb’ and can die at any moment. In such 
cases it is inevitable that some patients will die if they have to wait for an operation.”) 
100 Id. at 820 (citing evidence from an orthopedic surgeon that “the usual waiting time 
of one year for patients who require orthopaedic surgery increases the risk that their injuries 
will become irreparable. . . [and that] many patients on non-urgent waiting lists for 
orthopaedic surgery are in pain and cannot walk or enjoy any real quality of life.”). 
101 Id. at 818. 
102 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 850 (Can.) 
(McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). 
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allow only the very rich, who do not need insurance, to 
secure private health care in order to avoid the delays in 
the public system.  Given the ban on insurance, most 
Quebeckers have no choice but the accept delays in the 
medical system and their adverse physical and 
psychological consequences.103 
 
The concurring justices concluded that “prohibiting health insurance 
that would permit ordinary Canadians to access health care, in 
circumstances where the government is failing to deliver health care in a 
reasonable manner, thereby increasing the risk of complications and death, 
interferes with life and security of the person as protected by s. 7 of the 
Charter.”104 
The dissenting justices, led by Justices Binnie and LeBel, were more 
resistant to the conclusion that a ban on private health insurance implicated 
protected rights.  They began their analysis with a discussion of claims that 
did not involve protected rights. They emphasized that the Charter does not 
protect any “right to contract” grounded in the “liberty” found in §7.105 The 
dissent noted that Dr. Chaoulli did not have a protected liberty interest in 
providing health care outside of the public health care system106 and 
rejected as well the notion that individuals have a “constitutional right ‘to 
spend money.’”107 The dissenting justices did, however, “accept the trial 
judge’s finding that the current state of the Quebec health system, linked to 
the prohibition against health insurance for insured services, is capable, at 
least in the cases of some individuals on some occasions, of putting at risk 
their life or security of the person.”108 Further, “if the public system fails to 
deliver life-saving care and an individual is simultaneously prevented from 
seeking insurance to cover the cost of that care in a private facility, then the 
individual is potentially caught in a situation that may signal a deprivation 
                                                                                                                 
103 Id. at 845-46.  
104 Id. at 850 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). 
105 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 879-80 (Can.) 
(Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting) (“We do not agree with the appellants, however, that the 
Quebec Health Plan puts the ‘liberty’ of Quebeckers at risk.  The argument that ‘liberty’ 
includes freedom of contract (in this case to contract for private medical insurance) is novel 
in Canada, where economic rights are not included in the Canadian Charter and discredited 
in the United States.”). 
106 Id. at 880. 
107 Id. at 880-81. 
108 Id. at 875. 
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of his or her security of the person”109 if the intrusion into physical or 
mental security is sufficiently serious.110 
It appears that the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada were 
willing to recognize that private health insurance is the sina qua non of 
access to health care in a private market place.  Without access to private 
health insurance, citizens were forced into a public system that admittedly 
rationed care by using waiting lists for certain types of treatments.  The 
justices unanimously found that a restriction on the private market for 
health insurance could, in these circumstances, cause the deprivation of the 
right to life and security of the person.   In the next section, we will explore 
the court’s analysis of whether the needs of the public health care system 
justified the infringement of protected individual rights.  
 
D. ARE BANS ON PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE RATIONALLY 
RELATED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A PUBLIC HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM?  
  
In Chaoulli, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada all agreed that 
the maintenance of the publicly funded health care system was a legitimate 
and likely even a “pressing and substantial” governmental objective.111 The 
key question then became whether the ban on private health insurance 
                                                                                                                 
109 Id. at 880-81. 
110 Id. at 881-82. 
111 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-40 (Can.) (setting out the proper 
analysis for claims under §1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Justice 
Deschamps applied this test in applying the justificatory provisions of §9.1 of the Quebec 
Charter, finding that: “the purpose of the prohibition is to preserve the integrity of the public 
health care system. From this perspective, the objective appears . . . . [and is later 
confirmed] to be pressing and substantial.”  Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 825-26 
(Deschamps, J.).  The Chief Justice and Justice Major accepted that “the government 
undeniably has an interest in protecting the public health regime” as part of their §1 analysis 
under the Canadian Charter. Id. at 859 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). The 
dissenting justices also considered the purpose of the prohibition on private health insurance 
coverage in their §1 analysis. The dissent found that: 
Quebec’s legislative objective is to provide high quality health 
care, at a reasonable cost, for as many people as possible in a manner 
that is consistent with principles of efficiency, equity and fiscal 
responsibility. Quebec . . . subscribes to the policy objectives of the 
Canada Health Act . . . . The legislative task is to strike a balance 
among competing interests. . . . The appellants do not challenge the 
constitutional validity of the objectives set out in the Canada Health 
Act. 
 Id. at 896-97 (Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting). 
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coverage was sufficiently related to the goal of preserving the public health 
care system. The justices diverged sharply on the question of whether the 
provincial ban on private health insurance was justified under §9.1 of the 
Quebec Charter, the “principles of fundamental justice” portion of §7 of the 
Canadian Charter, or the justificatory provisions of §1 of the Canadian 
Charter. Although these three provisions use different language and, at 
least in part, different analytical frameworks,112 the justices’ three opinions 
in the end depended on whether or not the prohibition of private health 
insurance was sufficiently related to and necessary for the maintenance of a 
strong public health care system.  
The four justices who ultimately invalidated Quebec’s ban in private 
health insurance relied on four key arguments. First, they noted that the 
Canada Health Act does not prohibit the development of a private health 
insurance or private care.113  The provinces themselves vary, with only a 
few banning the sale of private health insurance for covered services.114  
The lack of uniform legislative response to the prospect of a private market 
undercut the argument that a ban on private insurance or private care was 
necessary to maintain the system. 
Second, the majority found no direct and conclusive evidence in the 
record that the development of a market for private health insurance market 
and the potential expansion of a private health care system would actually 
undermine the public health care system. The government presented 
witnesses who testified that (a) “the emergence of the private sector would 
lead to a reduction in popular support . . . for the public plan”;115 (b) “the 
most influential people would no longer have any incentive to bring 
pressure for improvements to the [public plan] because they would obtain 
better coverage privately116; (c) “there would be a reduction in human 
resources in the public plan because many physicians and health care 
professionals would leave the plan out of a motive for profit”117; and (d)  
                                                                                                                 
112 See supra, text accompanying notes 80-83, 91-92.  
113 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 844 (Can.) 
(McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring).  
114 As noted by Justice Deschamps, “The approach to the role of the private sector 
taken by the other nine provinces of Canada is by no means uniform.  In addition to Quebec, 
six other provinces have adopted measures to discourage people from turning to the private 
sector.  The other three, in practice, give their residents free access to the private sector.” 
Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 at 831 (Deschamps, J.). See also id. at 831-32 (summarizing 
relevant provincial legislation in each jurisdiction). 
115 Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 828 (Deschamps, J.). 
116 Id.  
117 Id.  
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the development of a private health care market would “lead to a decline in 
the professionalism and ethics of physicians.”118  Justice Deschamps 
characterized this evidence as being based on “logic or common sense” that 
was subject to dispute; she emphasized the absence of research studies or 
empirical evidence.119   
The government also contended that the private market would 
negatively impact the public plan by (a) increasing overall health 
expenditures120; (b) allowing private insurers to “reject the most acute 
patients, leaving the most serious cases to be covered by the public 
plan”121; and (c) encouraging physicians “to lengthen waiting times in the 
public sector in order to direct patients to the private sector.”122  Justice 
Deschamps once again discounted these claims, noting among other things 
that the cost increases would be born by private individuals, that the public 
system would not be worse off if left with seriously ill patients for whom 
they already provided care, and that conflicts of interest could be and were 
being managed in other ways.123 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major conducted a similar 
analysis and reached a similar result in their concurring opinion, though 
using the framework of “arbitrariness” under §7’s analysis of the principles 
of fundamental justice.124 After summarizing the government’s evidence 
about the relationship between the ban on private health insurance coverage 
and the need to maintain the public health care system, these justices found 
that “[t]o this point, we are confronted with competing but unproven 
‘common sense’ arguments, amounting to little more than assertions of 
belief.  We are in the realm of theory.  But as discussed above, a 
theoretically defensible limitation may be arbitrary if in fact the limit lacks 
a connection to the goal.”125 For the Chaoulli’s majority and concurring 
justices the next best place to look for evidence of a connection between 
the ban and the public system was in the experience of other countries.  
                                                                                                                 
118 Id. at 829. 
119 Id.  
120 Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 829 (Deschamps, J.). 
121 Id. at 830. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
124  Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 853 (Can.) 
(McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). (“interference with life, liberty and security of 
the person is impermissibly arbitrary if the interference lacks a real connection on the facts 
to the purpose the interference is said to serve”). 
125 Id. at 854 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). . 
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Justice Deschamps and Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major 
reviewed the experiences of other OECD countries.126 The absolute 
prohibition of private insurance for health care delivered by physicians who 
are not participating in the public system is unique to some provinces in 
Canada.127  The majority and concurring opinions noted that many OECD 
countries with strong public health systems permit private health insurance 
and have developed a strong private market for health care.  For these 
justices, the evidence thus tilted toward the conclusion that the ban on 
private health insurance was not sufficiently related to the goal of 
preserving the public health care system. Thus Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Justice Major’s concurring opinion notes: “This brings us to the evidence 
called by the appellants at trial on the experience of other developed 
countries with public health care systems which permit access to private 
health care.  The experience of these countries suggests that there is no real 
connection in fact between prohibition of health insurance and the goal of a 
quality public health system.”128 
Fourth and finally, the majority and concurring opinions rejected 
claims that the courts should defer to legislative judgment in this sensitive 
and important public policy debate. The courts were not required to defer to 
the legislative branch. Justice Deschamps noted:  
 
The instant case is a good example of a case in which 
the courts have all the necessary tools to evaluate the 
government’s measure. Ample evidence was presented. 
The government had plenty of time to act. Numerous 
commissions have been established. . . . Governments 
have promised on numerous occasions to find a solution to 
the problem of waiting lists. . . [I]t seems that governments 
have lost sight of the urgency of taking concrete action. 
The courts are therefore the last line of defence for 
citizens.129  
 
Similarly, the Chief Justice and Justice Major rejected the call for 
judicial deference: “The fact that the matter is complex, contentious or 
                                                                                                                 
126 See, e.g., id. at 833-36 (Deschamps, J.) and 855-58 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, 
J., concurring). 
127 Id. at 833-34 (Deschamps, J.). 
128 Id.  at 854 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). 
129 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 853, 840 (Can.) 
(Deschamps, J.).  
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laden with social values does not mean that the courts can abdicate the 
responsibility vested in them by our Constitution to review legislation for 
Charter compliance when citizens challenge it.”130  For Chief Justice 
McLachlin and Justice Major, the court’s review was narrow in scope: 
“[t]he Charter does not confer a freestanding constitutional right to health 
care.  However, where the government puts in place a scheme to provide 
health care, that scheme must comply with the Charter.”131 
This Essay’s discussion of Chaoulli has not focused on the intricacies 
of Canadian constitutional law, the details of the legal analyses employed 
by the justices, or on the strengths and weaknesses of their use of 
precedent. Given the limited discussion of these important issues, the 
majority and concurring opinions seem straightforward, logical, and even 
compelling. Yet it is important to recognize that the Chaoulli decision 
included a very strong dissent and that there are many critics of the 
majority and concurring opinions.132  
One important critique focuses on the standards for determining 
whether §7 rights have been infringed. The dissent was sharply critical of 
the “test” for when restrictions on the private market will implicate the 
rights protected by §7 of the Canadian Charter.  The Chief Justice and 
Justice Major had noted in their concurring opinion that “[b]y imposing 
exclusivity and then failing to provide public health care of a reasonable 
standard within a reasonable time, the government creates circumstances 
that trigger the application of s.7.”133 The dissent argued that this appeared 
to be a legal rule but that it was at best a policy formula with no settled 
answer: 
 
What, then, are constitutionally required “reasonable 
health services”?  What is treatment “within a reasonable 
time”?  What are the benchmarks?  How short a waiting 
list is short enough?  How many MRIs does the 
Constitution require?  The majority does not tell us.  The 
majority lays down no manageable constitutional 
standard.  The public cannot know, nor can judges or 
governments know, how much health care is “reasonable” 
                                                                                                                 
130 Id. at 844 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). 
131 Id. at 843 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). 
132 See, e.g., ACCESS TO CARE, supra note 94; Symposium on Chaoulli, supra note 94. 
132 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 853, 861-62 (Can.) 
(Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting). 
133 Id. at 843-44 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). 
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enough to satisfy [the Canadian Charter]. . . It is to be 
hoped that we will know it when we see it.134 
  
These concerns are amplified by the dissent’s view that rationing is 
inevitable in any health care system, whether public, private or mixed, and 
that there is no meaningful consensus about appropriate waiting times.135  
For these reasons, and others, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court of 
Canada should have deferred to the legislative choice to bolster the public 
health system by restricting access to the private market.136  
In addition, many have argued that the majority and concurring 
opinions’ review of the evidence presented at trial and available in previous 
studies is somewhat selective. Thus, while citing the data in the Romanow 
and Kirby Reports, the majority and  concurring opinions fail to note that 
these reports and virtually all others in Canada have confirmed the need to 
prevent the emergence of a private health care market that could create a 
“two-tier” system of medicine in Canada.137  Justices Binnie and LeBel 
noted that “[t]he Quebec government views the prohibition against private 
insurance as essential to preventing the current single-tier system from 
disintegrating into a de facto two-tier system. The trial judge found, and the 
evidence demonstrated, that there is good reason for this fear.”138  Justices 
Binnie and LeBel argued vehemently that the trial judge had sufficient 
evidence – more than common sense conjecture – to find that the ban on 
private health insurance protected the integrity of the public health 
system.139  
 
E. THE AFTERMATH 
 
The Chaoulli case was ultimately decided on a narrow basis, under the 
Quebec Charter, rather than under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.140 It nonetheless created considerable controversy and 
widespread concern that the decision would upset the foundations of the 
                                                                                                                 
134 Id. at 861-62 (Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting). 
135 Id. at 883-85. 
136 Id. at 860-61. 
137 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 853, 893-94 (Can.) 
(Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting). 
138 Id. at 863. 
139 Id. at 885-86. 
140 See supra, text accompanying notes 91-93.  
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Canadian health care system.141 Four years later, little has changed across 
Canada.  
Quebec adopted legislation in December 2006.142 Under Bill 33, the 
province established centralized public waiting lists for various procedures 
and expressed a commitment to reducing waiting times.143 The legislation 
also authorized the creation of private hospitals; one type of private 
hospital could contract to provide services for the public system and 
another would be purely private, staffed by physicians who have “opted 
out” of the public system. These private facilities would be limited to 
providing certain types of services in order to reduce the waiting time for 
access to those services. 
No other province has significantly altered its approach to private 
health care. Alberta’s then-premier initially praised the Chaoulli decision 
and vowed to loosen constraints on the private health care system. After 
much fanfare and anticipation, Alberta abandoned these “Third Way” 
proposals when the public proved unenthusiastic about the reforms.144 
Chaoulli’s more lasting legacy appears to be in focusing political and 
public attention on waiting lists and the reduction of wait times.145  
Chaoulli helped to accelerate federal and provincial efforts to reduce 
waiting times for a number of important procedures, such as hip 
replacements or cataract surgery.146     Private health care continues to be 
controversial and subject to significant legal constraints.147 
                                                                                                                 
141 See, e.g., Lawrie McFarlane, Supreme Court slaps for-sale sign on medicare, 173 
CMAJ 269 (2005). See generally ACCESS TO CARE, supra note 94; Symposium on Chaoulli, 
supra note 94. 
142 An Act to Amend the Act respecting health services and other social services and 
other legislative provisions, Bill 33 (2006, Chapter 43), Quebec National Assembly, 37th 
Legislature, 2nd Session (December 2006), 
http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=5&file=
2006C43A.PDF.  
143 See, e.g., John Geddes, Waiting for a Revolution, MACLEANS, Dec. 30, 2007, 
http://www.macleans.ca/science/health/article.jsp?content=20071219_74840_74840 (“Last 
year, Premier Jean Charest's government satisfied the court's requirements by promising to 
provide joint replacements and cataract surgery within six months of a doctor determining a 
patient needs the surgery. If government-funded hospitals can't do the job, the government 
will pay to have it done at a private clinic. As well, the Charest government moved to let 
Quebecers pay privately for a limited range of services, but predicted few would, since the 
public system was about to get considerably faster”). 
144 See Wayne Kondro, Take the Highway, 179 CMAJ 25 (2008).  
145 Geddes, supra note 143.   
146 Id.  
147 See, e.g., Petti Fong, Private B.C. Clinic Reopens to Public, THE TORONTO STAR, 
April 10, 2007, at A11.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE U.S. 
  
I argue in this Essay that it is important to take a limited, skeptical view 
of cross-border health policy arguments.  Canada is significantly different 
from the U.S. in many respects, including in its commitment to health care 
as a public good and its concerns about market-based allocations of health 
insurance or health care.  We need to be cautious when looking to Canada 
to ensure that we are not merely gazing at a reflection of our own hopes or 
anxieties.  With this cautionary reminder, this Essay’s analysis has 
suggested several important observations about the health insurance debate 
in the United States. 
 
Lesson 1: Look East or West rather than North or South 
 
The data on cost, access, and health care outcomes suggests that both 
Canada and the United States should look to other countries for ideas about 
the organization and delivery of health care. While Canadians enjoy better 
health care at lower costs and with better outcomes than citizens of the 
United States, the health care systems of both countries suffer in 
comparison to other OECD countries.148   In Chaoulli, the majority and 
concurring justices avoided citing the United States experience, relying 
instead the role of private health care of other OECD countries in Europe, 
Japan, and Australia.149  Justice Deschamps, Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Justice Major therefore undoubtedly sought to avoid both the ideological 
baggage and poor results of the United States’ system.   Advocates for 
health care reform in the U.S. might well follow this example and focus 
attention on other OECD countries.  
    
Lesson 2: Courts Sometimes Resist Ideological Constraints 
 
Canada and the U.S. are commonly distinguished by fundamentally 
different views about whether health care is an ordinary market commodity 
or a special social good.  Peter P. Budetti has characterized the debate as 
between “market justice” and “social justice.”150 In the U.S., where the 
market justice “runs deeply,” “[i]ndividual resources and choices determine 
                                                                                                                 
148 See supra, text accompanying notes 26-68. 
149 See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 833-36 (Can.) 
(Deschamps, J.); id. at 854 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). 
150 Peter P. Budetti, Market Justice and US Health Care, 299 JAMA 92 (2008). 
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the distribution of health care, with little sense of collective obligation or a 
role for government.”151  In Canada, the social justice view dominates: the 
view that “goods and services [are allocated] according to the individual’s 
needs... stems from principles of shared responsibility and concern for the 
communal well-being with government as the vehicle for ensuring social 
equity.”152   Courts sometimes act as a counterweight to these ideological 
commitments. 
The Chaoulli decision is an example of this phenomenon.  Quebec 
sought to justify its restriction on private health insurance as necessary to 
preserve the social justice basis of the public health care system.  The 
government argued that private insurance would at minimum result in some 
individuals having better access to care than others based on their ability to 
pay and that it might, in addition, erode the social justice underpinnings of 
the public system.153  A majority of the justices rejected this argument, 
finding that the government prohibition unreasonably risked the lives and 
health of individual Quebeckers.154 The justices expressed concerns that the 
prohibition on private coverage was based on ideology rather than 
evidence.155  In the end, the Supreme Court of Canada therefore actually 
supported the expansion of the private market for health insurance in 
Canada despite the social justice ideology prevalent in that country. 
The recent en banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach provides a 
parallel example from the United States.156  In Abigail Alliance, plaintiffs 
challenged an FDA policy which prohibited manufacturers from selling 
certain experimental drugs to terminally ill patients.157 The plaintiffs’ 
claims mirrored those asserted in Chaoulli:  they argued that the federal 
rule had the effect of denying them access to potentially life-saving or life-
extending treatment and therefore violated their fundamental right to self-
preservation. As in Chaoulli, the market prohibition was justified, in part, 
                                                                                                                 
151 Id. at 92.  
152 Id. Burdetti contends that “Social justice in health care requires universal coverage 
and ensured access to care, whether through social insurance, private insurance, or some 
combination.” Id.  
153 See supra, note 120-22.  
154 See supra, text accompanying notes 111-31.  
155 See supra, text accompanying notes 119 & 125.  Justice Deschamps noted that the 
courts were the last line of the defense for individuals when the government failed to act.  
See supra, text accompanying note 129.  
156 Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 
S. Ct. 1069. 
157 Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697. 
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by the needs of the public:  it was feared that giving terminally ill persons 
access to experimental therapies outside of clinical trials would 
compromise the integrity of the clinical trial system.158  A panel decision 
favoring the plaintiffs was withdrawn and replaced by an en banc decision 
rejecting the claim that the market restriction implicated any fundamental 
right.159 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.160 In the end, 
the U.S. courts favored restricting the private market for experimental 
therapies, at least in part to preserve the public good.  
 
Lesson 3:  Ideological Commitments Nonetheless Substantially 
Constrain Health Care Reform 
 
Canadians and Americans share a deep ideological commitment to the 
fundamental premises of their health care systems even as those premises 
are under considerable pressure.  Canadians are deeply attached to the 
vision of health care as a public good allocated based on need rather than 
wealth, even as health care expenditures place increasing pressure on 
governmental budgets. Moreover, limits to the benefits provided under the 
Canadian Medicare program mean that 30% of health expenditures are paid 
by individuals or private health insurance.161  Yet the specter of private 
health care is considered to be a threat rather than either a present reality or 
as a viable option for addressing the growing constraints on the public 
health care system. 
In some ways, Americans are even more constrained by ideological 
commitments.  American rejection of “socialized medicine” or to 
government-run health care appears to ignore the realities of the health care 
market place in the U.S., in which 40% of the direct expenditures are made 
by governmental entities and even the employment-based “private” health 
                                                                                                                 
158 See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson and Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved 
Drugs, 297 JAMA 205 (2007) (noting possible impact on clinical trials).  Chaoulli and 
Abigail Alliance are not precisely analogous because Abigail Alliance involved a much 
greater uncertainty about whether permitting a patient to access the private market would 
actually protect that patient’s health or life.  That is, it seemed probable that giving patients 
access to certain medical treatments in a private market would preserve and extend life but it 
is not nearly as clear that giving terminally ill patients access to unapproved drug therapies 
would actually preserve life.  
159 Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 711. 
160 Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 128 S. Ct. 1069. 
161 See supra, text accompanying note 27.  
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insurance market is subsidized by substantial federal tax breaks.162  Policy 
debates in the U.S. are characterized by significant ideological -- and 
political -- commitments to preserving both the private health insurance 
market and the image of U.S. health care as primarily a private system with 
narrow public responsibility and involvement. President Bush’s veto of the 
expansion of the Children’s Health Insurance Program in 2008 was directly 
linked to the threat than the public program would draw enrollment away 
from the private health insurance market.163   
Health care reform efforts in both the United States and Canada 
therefore must meet ideological litmus tests, perhaps because both systems 
are close to a transformative “tipping point.” In both countries, significant 
reforms seem unlikely, despite relatively poor performance and high levels 
of public concern.164 It sometimes seems that the primary purpose of policy 
comparisons between Canada and the U.S. is to assure citizens that no 
matter how concerned they are about their own health care system, they can 
at least be grateful that they do not have the other country’s system. Thus 
Canadians react just as negatively to the specter of a two-tiered health care 
system as Americans do to the threat of Canada’s erroneously-labeled 
system of “socialized medicine.” There is no fork in the road when it 
comes to health care reform because one path is blocked by ideological 
constraints. Even within the single permissible path, health care reform 
proposals are evaluated in part by whether they will create a side route 
away from the ideological commitments of each system. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
162 See supra, text accompanying notes 30; Paul Fronstein and Dallas Salisbury, 
Health Insurance and Taxes: Can Changing the Tax Treatment of Health Insurance Fix Our 
Health Care System?, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 309, Sept. 2007, 1-25, 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-20074.pdf; Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health 
Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2007 Current 
Population Survey, 2007 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 310, Oct. 2007, 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_ IB_10-20073.pdf.  
163 Robert Pear, Veto Stands on Measure to Expand Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
24, 2008, at A18. 
164 For a discussion of public concerns about health care in the U.S., Canada, and 
other countries, see Cathy Schoen, et al., Higher-Performance, supra note 36, at  w717, 
w721 (Exhibit 2).  Seventy-two percent of Canadians surveyed and 82% of Americans 
surveyed thought their health systems needed fundamental changes or to be rebuilt 
completely. Id. Twenty-six percent of Canadians and 16% of Americans thought their health 
care systems worked well with only minor changes needed. 
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Lesson 4:  The Cross-Border Trade in Health Law is Underdeveloped 
 
The high level of cross-border policy debate between Canada and the 
United States can sometimes obscure the relative lack of interest in cross-
border health law.  In some senses this should not be surprising: law is after 
all a peculiarly national and local phenomenon. Legislation applies only 
within the legislature’s jurisdictional boundaries.   Courts rely on 
precedents, most often from their own jurisdictions, and have only a limited 
authority to consider the legislation and judicial decisions of other 
countries.  U.S. courts rarely cite the precedents of other jurisdictions as a 
basis for their own decisions and face considerable controversy when they 
do so.165  
Yet this Essay has suggested some areas in which health law academics 
and perhaps even health care advocates might profitably consider 
additional consultation and collaboration.  The Chaoulli decision includes 
two areas of possible mutual interest:  (a) a substantive exploration of 
when, if ever, restrictions on a private market can be considered to intrude 
on individual liberty; and (b) a process-oriented analysis of the role of 
courts in addressing the problems of a health care system in the face of 
legislative inaction.  
Scholars thus might reasonably consider the close parallels between the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Chaoulli and the D.C. Court of 
Appeals decision in Abigail Alliance.  The courts in these two cases 
struggled to define when and how restrictions on the creation of a private 
market impermissibly infringed individual life and liberty.  It is at least 
interesting that the Supreme Court of Canada was more willing to accept 
such a claim than the D.C. Court of Appeals.  There may well be aspects of 
the arguments or opinions in Chaoulli that might be used in presenting 
future claims in the U.S. The “self-preservation” argument made in Abigail 
Alliance might be more compelling, for example, in cases where the 
restriction on the market creates more definite harm for the individual and 
                                                                                                                 
165  See, e.g., Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AMER. U. 
L. REV.  553 (2007) (noting controversy in the U.S. Supreme Court regarding use of foreign 
precedent).  Canadian courts are more comfortable with the use of foreign precedent, in part 
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where the collective interest market restrictions is based on ideology rather 
than demonstrated necessity.166  Similarly, Canadian scholars and 
advocates might consider whether the Chaoulli decision means that the 
Canadian courts will be more receptive to other types of challenges to 
market restrictions, such as those governing experimental therapies or 
organ transplantation. The Chaoulli case also provides an interesting case 
study in the ability of courts to analyze and digest health policy and health 
policy research as well as in the role of courts in fostering health care 
reform.   
Despite these linkages, as of November 2008, no reported decisions in 
Canada have cited the Abigail Alliance litigation and only one U.S. court 
has referred to the Chaoulli case.167 Thirty-eight articles in U.S. journals 
found in the Westlaw JLR database referred to Chaoulli while no articles in 
the Canada-JLR database referred to Abigail Alliance.168  The cross-border 
trade in health law theories and arguments may therefore have considerable 
room to grow in the years ahead.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
166 For an influential discussion of the self-defense argument, see Eugene Volokh, 
Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007). 
167 Westlaw search performed in the “allcases” (U.S.) and “can-allcases” (Canada) 
databases (search performed November 30, 2008). 
168 Westlaw search performed November 30, 2008.  For one particularly insightful 
comparative analysis, see, e.g., Roy G. Spece, Jr., A Fundamental Constitutional Right of 
the Monied to “Buy Out of” Universal Health Care Program Restrictions Versus the Moral 
Claim of Everyone Else to Decent Health Care: An Unremitting Paradox of Health Care 
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IS HEALTH INSURANCE A BAD IDEA? 
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost1 
 
Unique among the developed nations of the world, the United States 
depends on private insurance to insure a majority of its residents.2  Private 
insurance exists virtually everywhere in the world, but in most countries it 
merely supplements or complements a comprehensive public insurance 
program that covers all, or virtually all, of the population.3  There are 
complicated historical, political, and cultural reasons why we depend on 
private insurance for health coverage in the United States.4  It seems very 
unlikely, however, that we will abandon private health insurance as our 
primary form of health coverage in the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear, that private insurance coverage in the 
United States is on the decline.  Employment-based insurance coverage 
probably peaked sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and has been 
falling ever since, with a brief uptick in the late 1990s.  Coverage has 
dropped from 73 percent of the population under 65 in 1999 to 66.5 percent 
in 2006.5  Even though public insurance coverage has been growing as 
private insurance coverage shrinks, the number of uninsured continues to 
rise, to 43.6 to 44.8 million, nearly 17% of the under-65 population in 
2005-2006.6 
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Although most view the number of uninsured as a problem, a small, but 
very influential minority of American policy advocates consider 
“overinsurance” to be our most serious policy problem.7  The strength of 
this movement,   known euphemistically as the consumer-driven health 
care (CDHC) movement, is demonstrated by the fact that these advocates 
succeeded in the waning moments of the 109th Congress, in expanding 
federal tax subsidies for health savings accounts (HSAs), their policy 
alternative to conventional health insurance.8 
Since the early 1970s, a number of conservative and libertarian 
advocacy groups have kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism of our current 
private health insurance system.9  They claim that this system is the product 
of bad public policy, in particular of the employment-related health 
insurance tax subsidy.10  This subsidy, they charge, has resulted in 
employers offering and employees accepting far more insurance than 
would be purchased without the tax subsidy.11  
This excessive insurance, they claim, results in excess consumption 
and higher prices of health care.  The tax subsidy decreases the price to 
consumers and thus increases the demand for health insurance, which in 
turn decreases the price to consumers and increases the demand for health 
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care.12  Insured health care consumers buy far more health care products 
and services than they would if they had to pay for health care out of their 
own pockets.  This is the phenomenon of moral hazard that insurance 
teachers talk about every day.  Consumers also pay higher prices than they 
would pay without insurance because they have no incentive to shop 
around for lower price providers.13  The tax subsidy is, therefore, one of the 
most important reasons why health care costs so much in the United 
States14  While the moral hazard claims of CDHC advocates seem to be 
solidly based in neoclassical economic theory, they also are supported by 
the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, which found that insureds with 
higher deductible plans do in fact consume less health care.15 
But there is more to their claims.  CDHC advocates also argue that 
consumers who are not paying for health care out of their own pockets are 
less concerned about quality than they might be if they were paying for 
services themselves.16  At least, consumers have less reason to seek out 
comparative information regarding providers, which could support 
shopping based on quality as well as cost.17   Fully insured individuals also 
have less incentive to take care of themselves, to engage in healthy 
behaviors and seek preventive or early primary care, and thus are more 
likely to become ill and need health care18 (a claim, by the way, that the 
Rand study found no evidence to support).19 
The ultimate solution to the problem of excess insurance–simply 
outlawing health insurance–is not embraced by even the most fervent 
market advocates.   They understand the problem of catastrophic costs – of 
the highly skewed nature of health care costs that accounts for health 
insurance in the first place.20  Few people can afford to pay out of pocket 
for a heart transplant or for the services required to respond to the major 
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traumatic injuries caused by a car accident.21  Many of those afflicted with 
expensive chronic diseases would soon find themselves unable to afford 
further health care without health insurance. Bankruptcy solves the 
problems of some of those faced with enormous expenses and no 
insurance, but it only deals with already incurred costs and does not assure 
continuing access to care.22  Bankruptcy, moreover, only shifts the costs of 
care to providers, who themselves may be financially unable to absorb the 
loss. 
Acknowledging the problems that would attend the elimination of 
health insurance, CDHC advocates rather call for limiting insurance to truly 
catastrophic expenses through the imposition of high deductibles.23  Most, 
but not all, CDHC advocates also call for the creation of health savings 
accounts (HSAs) to be coupled with high-deductible health insurance plans 
(HDHPs).24  They call for tax subsidies to cover contributions to the HSAs 
(whether contributions come from employers or employees) as well as the 
income from those plans and payments for high-deductible health plans.25  
Advocates contend that HSAs will introduce point-of-purchase competition 
into health care and save the cost of claims processing, thus reducing health 
care costs.26  At the same time, they believe that HSAs will assure that 
consumers have funds available to purchase health care, thus assuring 
access, and will encourage consumers to shop for better quality products 
and services, thus improving quality.  They even argue that moving to 
CDHC will expand insurance coverage, as catastrophic policies will be 
more affordable, both because they offer thinner coverage and because 
consumers will consume more cost consciously, bringing down insurance 
costs.27 
Over the past half decade the CDHC movement has been 
extraordinarily successful in public policy advocacy.  Although tax 
subsidies for medical savings accounts were first introduced by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, they were subject to 
                                                                                                                 
21. According to recent estimates, heart transplants cost from $50,000 to $287,000, 
averaging $148,000, while liver transplants cost from $66,000 to $367,000, averaging 
$235,000.  Transplant, CHFPATIENTS.COM, http://www.chfpatients.com/tx/transplant.htm. 
22. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor Patient: In Search of Non-Debt Based 
Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 456-57, 462 (2003-2004). 
23. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 231-32. 
24. Id., CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 66-68. 
25. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 67; Cogan, Hubbard, & Kessler, supra note 
10, at 35-38. 
26. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 249-250. 
27. Id. at 250. 
2008] IS HEALTH INSURANCE A BAD IDEA? 381 
 
many restrictions and never really caught on.28  The Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), however, greatly expanded tax 
subsidies for health care accounts, which it rechristened health savings 
accounts, or HSAs.29   
The MMA offers a tax exclusion to employers and a deduction to 
employees for funds contributed by an employer or employee to an HSA.  
The HSA must, however, be coupled with a HDHP, which must, in 2007, 
have a deductible of at least $1100 a year for a single individual or $2200 a 
year for family coverage.30  The catastrophic policies that accompany an 
HSA must also have caps on out of pocket expenditures, which cannot 
exceed $5500 for an individual and $11,000 for a family in 2007.31  The tax 
subsidies for contributions to the HSA for 2007 only extend to 
contributions up to, for 2007, $2850 for individual coverage and $5650 for 
family coverage.32 Under the MMA, tax-deductible contributions were also 
limited to the amount of the deductible, but this limit was removed by 
Congress in legislation late in 2006.33  
Money contributed to an HSA can be spent for “qualified medical 
expenses,” without being subject to income tax, but withdrawals are subject 
to both income tax and to a 10% excise tax if it is spent for other 
purposes.34  “Qualified medical expenses” are broadly defined to include 
many things not covered by traditional health insurance, such as 
nonprescription drugs.  HSA expenditures are controlled only by very 
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infrequent audits by IRS auditors who have no health care expertise35.  It is 
likely, therefore, that HSA expenditures will be limited only by the 
imagination, on the one hand, and good faith, on the other, of their owners.   
If HSA funds are not spent for health care, they can be withdrawn for 
any purpose once the account holder dies, becomes disabled, or reaches the 
age of 65.36  HSA funds may continue to be withdrawn after age 65 for 
qualified medical expenses, including Medicare premiums, free from 
taxation.37  If they are used for other purposes after age 65, withdrawals are 
taxed as income, but no penalties attach.  
The HSA has been joined by another new health savings device, the 
health reimbursement account or HRA.  The HRA was created not by a 
statute but rather by the IRS.  In 2002, the IRS determined that existing 
legislation authorized the offer of tax subsidies for employer contributions 
to health savings vehicles fully funded by employers.38  The HRA is 
attractive to employers because the accounts can be held as notional 
accounts and need not be fully funded and because the funds in them also 
need not go with the employee if he or she leaves employment. 
HSAs and HRAs have grown quite quickly over the past two years, 
although the number enrolled in these plans, like everything else about 
them, is contested.  The Employee Benefits Research Institute estimates 
that about 1.3 million Americans are enrolled in a consumer-driven plan, 
though another 8.5 million Americans have a plan with a deductible high 
enough that they could set up an HSA.39  The Center for Health Systems 
change estimates that about 1.43 million Americans have an employment-
based HSA and 1.3 million have an HRA.40  AHIP, the health insurance 
trade association, claims that 4.5 million Americans are in HSA-compatible 
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plans.41  CDHC advocates claim that the number of Americans in 
consumer-driven plans will grow to 15-30 million over the next 5 to 10 
years,42 but CDHC growth, rapid in the first two years, seems to have 
leveled off, at least in the employment-related market.43 
There has been a great deal of speculation as to how CDHC will affect 
health care in general and the health insurance market in particular.44   
Advocates believe, of course, that it will bring down costs while improving 
quality and access. Skeptics have worried that CDHC will lead to favorable 
selection, as healthy individuals and families choose consumer driven 
plans, leaving those with costly medical problems in comprehensive plans, 
which will become ever more costly as they cover a smaller and more 
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expensive population, the familiar insurance death spiral.45. Skeptics also 
wonder whether consumers have the information, or perhaps even the 
ability, to make wise consumer choices in health care.46  The Rand HIE, for 
example, found that although insureds with higher deductibles did consume 
less health care, they cut back on high value health care to the same extent 
they cut back on low value health care.47 
Empirical evidence as to how CDHC is working out remains sketchy.   
It seems to be working out very well for banks.  HSAs are the kind of low 
interest savings accounts that used to be the bread and butter of banks but 
that have been hard to market in recent years because they are bad financial 
investments.  The HSA market is worth billions to banks, not just because 
banks pay low interest on these deposits, but also because they collect fees 
for establishing the accounts and for transactions.48  HSAs are also seem to 
be working out quite well for insurance companies that specialize in these 
accounts, several of which have bought or partnered with banks, and some 
of which are managing the accounts themselves.49   Finally, HSAs are 
working out very well for wealthy individuals looking for a retirement tax 
shelter.  Individuals in high tax brackets who have the choice of doing so 
are well advised to buy a eligible high deductible policy, cover any medical 
expenses from the deductible, and invest the legal maximum in the HSA, 
leaving it there for retirement to accumulate tax-free returns.  This strategy 
could allow, by one scenario, a tax-free accumulation of $1.5 million by 
retirement over a 40 year period.50   
It is less clear how CDHC  is working out for employers, who purchase 
much of the private health insurance in the U.S., and for providers.  High 
deductible policies are obviously somewhat less expensive than 
comprehensive policies, but if employers make a significant contribution to 
their employees’ HSAs, they do not necessarily pay less overall.51  Some 
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providers welcome the possibility of being able to bill consumers directly 
rather than to deal with insurers, but in fact most consumer-driven policies 
are structured so that the provider bills the insurer in any event, and the 
insurer then collects from the HSA.52  This assures consumers access to the 
insurer’s bargaining power, but means that there is little savings in 
transaction costs.  To the extent that providers bill consumers directly, they 
will experience savings in transactions costs and probably be able to charge 
higher prices, but they also have more risk exposure if consumers are 
unable to pay the bill. 
The most important question, however, is how does consumer-driven 
health care affect consumers?   First, there is some evidence of favorable 
selection toward consumer-driven plans, which seem to be chosen by those 
in better health, but the effect is not clear.53  Because high deductible and 
high coinsurance plans have become quite common in recent years, even 
before the MMA, CDHC plans might be quite attractive to people with 
high medical costs because the law at least requires a cap on out-of-pocket 
limits. There is more evidence that CDHC plans are chosen by wealthier 
and better educated subscribers, which is not surprising.54  
There is also some evidence that CDHC reduces health care spending 
and use, and that participants in CDHC plans use more preventive care 
(which can under the law be excluded from deductibles) and comply better 
with prescribed treatment regimes.55  Evidence on cost-savings, however, is 
still weak and confounded by the possibility of favorable selection, while 
evidence of quality improvement is far from conclusive. Some studies, for 
example, find that CDHC members are more likely to delay or forego 
needed medical care or the use of necessary medications.56 
The most troubling emerging evidence is that CDHC is further eroding 
the modest level of health care solidarity that private health insurance has 
brought about in this country.  The public health insurance systems of all 
other developed countries are based, in the end, on the idea of solidarity–
the belief that we are all at risk of disease and injury, that we all need to be 
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healthy to be productive members of society, and we ought all to contribute 
to the cost of health care to the extent of our ability to the cost of providing 
health care for all.57  Employment-based health insurance has sustained a 
weak version of solidarity in the United States.  Within employment 
settings, most employees have more or less equal access to health 
insurance, subsidized by the taxpayer, and with costs arguably borne 
somewhat disproportionately by higher income employees.58 
If employers move toward high deductible policies, however, an ever 
greater proportion of the cost of health care is going to be passed directly 
on to employees, particularly sick employees.  Recent research shows that 
the majority of employees in high deductible plans are not offered a choice 
by their employer; they are simply given the high-deductible plan.59    
Thirty percent of employees with CDHC’s moreover, receive no employer 
contribution to an HSA, and over half receive less than $1000 per year.60  
Lower income employees, moreover, often contribute little or nothing 
themselves to an HSA.  27% of individuals in CDHC plans with incomes 
of less than $50,000 a year contribute nothing to their HSA according to 
the EBRI survey.61  Of those who have had HSAs for a year or more, 23 
percent rolled over nothing at the end of the year, 26%, $500 or less.62  
Overall 14% had nothing in their accounts at the time of the survey, 16% 
more $200 or less.63  44% of those who did not open an account said that 
they did not do so because they did not have money to put into the account, 
19% said that the tax benefits were not attractive enough to justify it.64 
Of course, high deductible accounts mean high exposure for those with 
high health care costs, and overwhelming evidence has emerged in recent 
years that consumers with high deductible accounts who lack health 
savings accounts forego necessary health care.  Adults with health 
problems who have deductibles above $500 (and particularly those with 
incomes below $35,000 a year) are much more likely than those with lower 
deductibles to not fill a prescription, not get needed specialist care, to skip a 
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recommended test or follow-up visit, or report having a medical problem 
for which they have not sought medical care.65  Patients with high 
deductibles are also much more likely to have medical bill or medical debt 
problems.66  Nearly half of “underinsured” adults identified by a recent 
survey were contacted by a collection agency in the year prior to the survey 
regarding medical bills, while more than one-third said that they had to 
change their lives dramatically to pay for medical bills.67  
To put it bluntly, whatever else CDHC may accomplish, it seems to be 
bringing us tax subsidized retirement savings for the rich, high deductible 
health plans and financial misery for the poor.  If one believes that health 
insurance is a bad idea, that health insurance must be seriously curtailed to 
bring about consumer choice and efficient markets, this cost in solidarity 
may be acceptable.   
If one believes, however, that insurance is ultimately about solidarity, 
not efficiency, these issues are troubling.  Health insurance obviously 
contributes to solidarity between the sick and the healthy, but can also build 
solidarity between the poor and the wealthy.  Health insurance is also about 
security–knowing that when you need health care you will be able to get it, 
and to get it without missing a rent payment or a car payment.  Efficiency 
is a good thing, of course, and the efficient distribution of health care 
should be encouraged.  But the evidence that CDHC is bringing us 
efficiency is at best equivocal.  The evidence that it is bringing about the 
breakdown of solidarity and threatening security is stronger.  Health 
insurance is, in fact, a good idea, and we must look for ways to achieve 
efficiency while preserving what little risk sharing still exists in this 
country–perhaps even building on it.  But how we can achieve this is 
beyond the scope of this essay.68 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
65. See Karen Davis, Michelle M. Doty and Alice Ho, How High Is Too High?  
Implications of High-Deductible Health Plans, Commonwealth Fund Pub. No. 816, 2005, at 
9, available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/816_Davis_how_high_is_too_high_impl_HD
HPs.pdf?section=4039.  
66. Id. at 11. 
67. Cathy Schoen, et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults are 
Underinsured?  HEALTH AFFAIRS, at w5-296, June 14, 2005, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.289. 
68. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 189-204 (exploring this topic 
further). 
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ASSIGNMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
RIGHTS FOR LATENT INJURY AND DAMAGE CLAIMS  
John T. Waldron, III 
Andrew R. Stanton* 
 
The efficiency of the American business community depends in part on 
the ability to transfer assets and stock with minimal limitations.  Through 
mergers, asset sales, stock sales, corporate dissolutions, and other 
transactions, American businesses generally enjoy the freedom to change 
their structure to adapt to the constantly-evolving business environment.   
In these transactions, there is often a link between the assets being 
transferred and the liabilities that are associated with those assets.  For 
instance, under the state statutes governing corporate transactions, the 
surviving company in a merger typically is the successor to both the assets 
and liabilities of the merging companies.  Similarly, corporate dissolutions 
often result in the transfer of the dissolving corporation’s assets and 
liabilities to its shareholders.  In other transactions, the link between assets 
and their related liabilities has been broken.  For example, under many 
states’ laws, assets generally may be sold free and clear of any liabilities 
associated with those assets, depending on the circumstances.   
To ensure that transactions that could divorce assets from their related 
liabilities do not adversely affect third parties or the general public, 
legislatures and courts have developed a number of protections designed to 
allow society to obtain the economic benefits derived from such corporate 
transactions without incurring undesired consequences.  For instance, 
through the laws governing fraudulent conveyances and successor liability, 
legislatures and courts have established safeguards that, when applicable 
and under certain circumstances, serve to prevent tort defendants from 
transferring their assets in a manner that would deprive tort claimants of a 
proper source for recovery. 
This link between assets and liabilities is a two-way street.  Just as 
courts have articulated rules to ensure that, in appropriate circumstances, 
the seller’s liabilities follow the assets being transferred, courts also have 
devised principles for determining whether certain assets, such as insurance 
assets, follow the liabilities being transferred to a buyer. 
For example, courts across the country have adjudicated a recurrent 
dispute between insurers and policyholders regarding the effect of “anti-
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assignment” conditions1 in insurance policies where the policyholder has 
attempted to transfer its insurance rights to a third party as part of a 
corporate or other transaction.  This issue has been particularly difficult to 
resolve in the context of claims for insurance coverage for latent bodily 
injury and property damage, such as environmental, asbestos and other 
delayed-manifestation claims where the bodily injury or property damage 
already took place (or began to take place) prior to the transfer of insurance 
rights at issue but was not discovered until years after the transfer.   
In such disputes, insurers often contend that anti-assignment conditions 
preclude the policyholder from transferring its insurance rights to a third 
party without the insurers’ consent, even where the transaction provides 
that the third party will assume the liabilities to which the insurance assets 
related (hereinafter, the “Insurer Position”).  In response, the entity to 
which the insurance rights have been assigned (the “Successor Insured”) 
typically asserts that anti-assignment conditions cannot be used by insurers 
to avoid providing coverage for occurrences that already took place prior to 
the transfer, because the occurrences gave the assigning policyholder 
“choses in action” under the policies that were freely transferable, with or 
without the insurers’ consent (hereinafter, the “Successor Insured 
Position”).2   
Courts have resolved this dispute in different ways.  A number of 
courts have adopted the Successor Insured Position that, while an insurer 
cannot be required to insure a third party for new occurrences that relate 
solely to the third party’s conduct after the transfer in question, a 
policyholder is free to assign or otherwise transfer its insurance rights 
                                                                                                                 
* Mr. Waldron is a partner and Mr. Stanton is an associate in the Pittsburgh office 
of K&L Gates LLP, Henry W. Oliver Building, 535 Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
(412/355-6500), a law firm that regularly represents policyholders in insurance coverage 
disputes, including policyholders in environmental, asbestos, and other toxic-tort-related 
insurance disputes.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of any clients of the law firm. 
1. These anti-assignment conditions often purport to provide that the insurance 
policy, or interests thereunder, may not be assigned without the insurer’s consent.  See, e.g., 
I MILLER’S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED, at 421.4 (2006) (“Assignment of 
interest under this policy shall not bind the [insurer] until its consent is endorsed hereon.”). 
2. The use of the terms “Successor Insured” and “Successor Insured Position” is a 
simplification and is not intended to suggest that all insureds will or should have the same 
position in a dispute over the transfer of insurance rights in a corporate transaction.  
Ultimately, resolution of such issues will turn on the unique circumstances and facts of each 
case and hence the discussion in this Article is necessarily general.  The specific language of 
the transactional documents and the insurance policies should be consulted as such language 
may affect the transfer of insurance rights. 
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relating to occurrences that began prior to the transfer without having to 
obtain the insurer’s consent.  On the other hand, other courts, including 
most notably the California Supreme Court in Henkel Corp. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co.,3 have adopted the Insurer Position and held that an 
anti-assignment condition precluded the policyholder from transferring its 
insurance rights without the insurer’s consent, including its liability 
insurance rights for bodily injury that had already happened prior to, but 
was not discovered until after, the transfer in question.  As a result, the 
insurers in Henkel and these other cases were able to avoid paying 
substantial amounts in coverage to the Successor Insured to which the 
policyholder had attempted to assign coverage.  Based on Henkel and 
similar decisions, insurers are now more aggressively relying on anti-
assignment conditions in their policies as a basis for denying coverage 
where the entity seeking coverage is a successor to the policyholder, 
whether by way of merger, stock sale, dissolution, or asset sale.4   
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, this insurer effort arguably 
threatens to undermine the efficiency of corporate transactions while 
benefiting the insurers alone.  On this view, insurers are seeking enormous 
windfalls through the virtual elimination of their coverage obligations 
pursuant to historical policies, for which they collected substantial 
premiums, by way of a corporate transaction or other subsequent 
circumstances having nothing to do with the scope of the risk insured under 
the policies.  According to these Successor Insureds, courts should reject 
the Henkel decision and remain committed to the position that anti-
assignment conditions do not preclude the transfer of liability insurance 
rights for losses that took place prior to the transfer in question.  As 
discussed in more detail below, this position provides that, whether the 
corporate transaction resulting in the transfer of rights to coverage was a 
merger, stock sale, dissolution, or asset sale, the insurer’s consent is not 
required to transfer such insurance rights even where the injury or damage 
                                                                                                                 
3. 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003). 
4. The emergence of these issues, especially in light of the Henkel decision, has been 
the subject of significant analysis by commentators.  See, e.g., Seth A. Tucker and Ann-
Kelley Kemper, You Have the Liabilities, But Do You Have The Coverage? Coverage 
Rights for IBNR Liabilities Under Occurrence-Based Liability Policies Issued to a 
Corporate Predecessor, 16 Coverage 3 (May/June 2006); Gregory J. May, Successors’ 
Rights to Insurance Coverage for Predecessors’ Preacquisition Activities:  Recent 
Developments, 40 Tort & Ins. L.J. 911 (2004-2005); Tom Baker, John Buchanan, and 
Marianna Horton, Meet Your New Insured: Successors' Rights to Insurance Assets in 
Corporate Transactions, 4 Coverage 1 (2004). 
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at issue did not manifest until years after the transaction.5  In recent 
months, there have been a number of developments in the decisional law 
addressing this tension between the Successor Insured Position and Insurer 
Position on the transferability of rights to insurance coverage.6 
 
I. AN INSURER’S CONSENT IS GENERALLY NOT NEEDED 
FOR A POLICYHOLDER’S INSURANCE RIGHTS TO 
TRANSFER BY MERGER 
A policyholder’s insurance assets (along with its liabilities) generally 
transfer to the surviving corporation in a merger, even where the insurer 
has not consented to the transfer, notwithstanding any anti-assignment 
conditions in the insurer’s policy.   
All fifty states have adopted some form of merger statute.7  Merger 
statutes generally provide that the surviving corporation, upon the effective 
date of the merger:  (i) assumes all of the rights, privileges, powers, and 
immunities of the non-surviving corporation (provided they are not 
inconsistent with the articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation 
and that if the merger is with a foreign corporation they are not inconsistent 
with any limitation in the domestic jurisdiction), and (ii) is subject to and 
assumes the prior duties and liabilities of the non-surviving corporation.8 
For instance, Section 259(a) of the General Corporation Law of the 
State of Delaware (“DGCL”) provides that when a merger becomes 
effective, the separate existence of the non-surviving corporation ceases 
and the surviving corporation possesses “all the rights, privileges, powers 
and franchises as well of a public as of a private nature” and is “subject to 
all the restrictions, disabilities and duties” of each of the merged 
corporations.  As Section 259(a) further states: 
 
                                                                                                                 
5. This article focuses on the question of an insured’s continuing right to its 
historical insurance coverage, notwithstanding changes in corporate structures and other 
transactions; it does not address the competing interests of multiple potential insureds with 
respect to the same policies, which can present different considerations (such as, for 
example, policyholders that intended to retain their insurance rights and not transfer them in 
the corporate transaction at issue).  This article also does not focus in detail on the related 
issue of whether and under what circumstances historical liabilities and related rights to 
insurance coverage may be transferred to a Successor Insured by “operation of law.” 
6. See infra section (IV)(C)(5) for a discussion of some of these recent 
developments.  
7. See Jonathan R. Macey, Macey on Corporation Law § 9.01[B] (2003).   
8. Id. 
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The rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of said 
[merging] corporations, and all property, real, personal and 
mixed, and all debts due to any of said constituent corporations on 
whatever account, as well for stock subscriptions as all other 
things in action or belonging to each of such corporations shall be 
vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger 
or consolidation; and all property, rights, privileges, powers and 
franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as 
effectually the property of the surviving or resulting corporation 
as they were of the several and respective constituent 
corporations . . . .9 
 
Consistent with Section 259(a), courts have held that a merger results 
in the transfer of the non-surviving corporation’s rights and obligations 
under its insurance policies to the surviving corporation by operation of 
law.10  Further, such a transfer does not violate any non-assignment 
provision in such policies.11 
                                                                                                                 
9. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 259 (a)(2002) (emphasis added); Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 
319 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Del. 1970) (“[Section] 259 provides that when a merger becomes 
effective all assets of the merged corporation, including causes of action which might exist 
on its behalf, pass by operation of law to the surviving company.”); cf. Texaco Refining & 
Mktg., Inc. v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 824 F. Supp. 500, 507 (D. Del. 1993) (“A 
statutory merger . . . results in a combination of the two corporations with the surviving 
corporation attaining the property, rights, and privileges of the absorbed corporation, as well 
as retaining its own property, rights, and privileges.”).   
10. Brunswick Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 750, 752-753 
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (“under [Delaware, Maryland and Pennsylvania] corporation law, the 
surviving corporation in a merger is vested with all rights and benefits under a liability 
insurance policy formerly due the merged corporation.”); see also Knoll Pharm. Co. v. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying Illinois law, “once a 
merger is established, the successor corporation takes on the obligations and liabilities under 
the insurance policies”); Texaco A/S, v. Commercial Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 2722, 1995 WL 
628997, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1995) (holding under New York law that surviving 
corporations of mergers were named insureds under liability policies issued to merged 
entities since “the risk contemplated by the insurers is not substantially altered by requiring 
them to provide coverage for the pre-acquisition activities of the merged corporation”), 
vacated on other grounds, 160 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998); Aetna Life & Cas. v. United Pac. 
Reliance Ins. Co., 580 P.2d 230 (Utah 1978) (“logical conclusion is that the surviving 
corporation . . . simply stands in the same position as that occupied by the merged 
corporation . . . prior to the merger”); Paxton & Vierling Steel Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 
497 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Neb. 1980) (holding that it is “logical, reasonable and, most 
importantly, fair” that insurance rights transfer from merging corporation to surviving 
corporation by operation of law); Chatham Corp. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 334 N.Y.S.2d 959 
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (observing that the non-surviving corporation’s insurance policy 
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II. AN INSURER’S CONSENT TYPICALLY WOULD NOT BE 
NEEDED FOR A POLICYHOLDER’S INSURANCE RIGHTS 
TO TRANSFER IN A STOCK SALE 
The conveyance of all of a corporation’s stock generally transfers 
ownership of the corporate entity as a whole, with the corporation generally 
retaining all of its assets unless certain assets are expressly excluded from 
the transaction.12  Hence, because the sale of a policyholder’s stock alone 
ordinarily does not involve an “assignment” of insurance policies, an 
insurer’s consent typically would not be required. 
When a policyholder’s stock is sold, insurers sometimes contend that 
their consent is required for that policyholder to be able to keep its own 
insurance rights.  In response, Successor Insureds may challenge this 
assertion on public policy grounds, contending that, if the insurers’ position 
were taken seriously, public companies, whose stock is bought and sold 
every day, would unwittingly forfeit their insurance rights each time a 
share of stock were sold.  Indeed, the insurers’ position has been rejected 
by several courts for that reason. 
For example, the court in Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Automobile Ins. Co. held 
that a company whose stock is being sold need not obtain the consent of its 
insurers to retain its insurance rights.13   In Knoll, all of the stock of the 
named insured was sold to a third party.14  The named insured later was 
                                                                                                                          
“automatically vested in plaintiff as the surviving corporation by virtue of the provisions 
of . . . the Business Corporation Law”).   
11. See, e.g., Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287, 
292-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Thus, it is our conclusion that the no-assignment clause should not 
be applied ritualistically and mechanically to forfeit coverage in these circumstances”); 
Knoll Pharm., 167 F. Supp.2d at 1011 n.7 (finding no increased risk associated with the 
statutory merger since the insurers were only liable on those claims against the surviving 
corporation that arose out of the covered acts of the insured corporation and refusing to 
enforce no-assignment clause); Texaco, 1995 WL 628997, at *6 (successors by merger 
entitled to access coverage issued to merged entities “notwithstanding the no-assignment 
clause, because the transfer of substantially all the assets of the corporation results in the 
transfer of liability as well, irrespective of any agreement otherwise”); Paxton, 497 F. Supp. 
at 581 (“It seems well recognized that a provision limiting assignment in an insurance policy 
simply does not apply to a transfer occurring by operation of law.”). 
12. See, e.g., Terrific Promotions, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1243, 
1248 (N.D. Ill. 1996); SCA Disposal Servs. of New England, Inc. v. Central Nat’l Ins. Co., 
No. 900393C, 1994 WL 879687, at *4 (Mass. Super. Apr. 12, 1994) (holding that the 
company whose stock was purchased retained its insurance rights).   
13. Knoll Pharm., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
14. Id. at 1006. 
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merged with the plaintiff,15 and the plaintiff asserted that it was therefore 
the successor to the named insured’s insurance rights.16  While the insurers 
did not dispute that the plaintiff succeeded to whatever insurance rights the 
named insured had at the time of the merger, the insurers claimed that the 
named insured had no insurance rights after the earlier sale of its stock.17  
In this regard, the insurers argued that the named insured’s insurance rights 
did not transfer with the insured in the stock sale because the insurers’ 
consent was not obtained.18  Rejecting the insurers’ arguments, the court 
held that the stock sale did not involve any change in the insured’s rights or 
obligations under the insurance policies.19   
In an effort to distinguish Knoll and similar decisions, insurers 
frequently cite to other cases that they assert stand for the proposition that 
their consent is needed for a policyholder to retain its insurance rights when 
its stock is being sold.  However, Successor Insureds may dispute whether 
such cases support the insurers’ position.  For instance, in SCA Disposal 
Services of New England, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Company of 
Omaha,20 the purchaser of an insured’s stock argued that it could access the 
insured’s insurance, notwithstanding anti-assignment conditions, because 
the purchase of the insured’s stock was akin to a merger.  The court 
rejected the purchaser’s right to access the insured’s insurance because, in a 
stock sale, the company whose stock is being sold retains all of its assets 
and liabilities: 
 
[T]he transfer of [the insured] to [the purchaser’s predecessor] 
was accomplished through stock purchase, not by statutory 
merger. . . .  [The insured] retained its separate corporate identity 
after the purchase.  When acquisition is accomplished by stock 
purchase, all legal attributes of the acquired entity continue.21 
                                                                                                                 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1007. 
17. Id. at 1010. 
18. Id.  The insurers also argued that the insurance rights did not transfer with the 
insured because the language of the purchase agreement expressly excluded insurance rights 
from the transfer.  However, the court held that the exclusion was referring to the parent’s 
insurance contracts, not the insured’s.  Id. at 1009. 
19. Id. at 1007-08.   
20. SCA Disposal Servs. of New England, No. 900393C, 1994 WL 879687, at *4 
(Mass. Super. Apr. 12, 1994). 
21. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).   
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The SCA court did not indicate that the insurers’ consent was needed 
for the insured to retain its insurance rights through the stock sale (and 
indeed the court went on to find coverage for the insured for its 
environmental liabilities under a policy not containing a pollution 
exclusion).22 
Similarly, in Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co.,23 the court held that a subsidiary whose stock was sold lost 
coverage because it had been covered under its parent’s policy as a 
“subsidiary.”  After the parent sold the stock of the subsidiary, the latter 
ceased to be a subsidiary and, therefore, was no longer covered under the 
parent’s policy for post-sale losses.  Critically, the court did not hold that 
the subsidiary lost coverage because it failed to obtain the insurer’s 
consent.  As the Court of Appeal clarified on appeal:  “At the time of the 
stock transfer from [the parent] to [the third party], [the former subsidiary] 
lost its status as a subsidiary and therefore no longer fell within the ambit 
of the [defendant’s] policy.”24 
In addition, other cases often cited by insurers do not hold that an anti-
assignment condition in an insurance policy requires that the insurer’s 
consent be obtained for the insured to retain its insurance rights when its 
stock is sold: 
 
Bunzl Pulp & Paper Sale, Inc. v. Golder25 – No party in the case 
asserted that the sale of the stock of the insured in any way 
affected the insured’s own insurance rights.  The company 
that bought the insured’s stock did assert that it could access 
its new subsidiary’s insurance policies, but the court rejected 
                                                                                                                 
22. Id. at *10-11. 
23. Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334 (D.D.C. 
1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
24. Indep. Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 948.  The decision in Home Ins. Co. v. 
Service Am. Corp., 662 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Ill. 1987), similarly does not support the 
contention that an insurer’s consent is needed for a policyholder to retain its insurance rights 
when its stock is being sold.  Like Independent Petrochemical, the Home case involved a 
company that was insured as a “subsidiary” under its parent’s policy, but then the company 
was sold to a third party, thus causing the company to lose its status as a covered 
“subsidiary.”  Id. at 967. 
25. Bunzl Pulp & Paper Sale, Inc. v. Golder, No. Civ. A., No. Civ. A. 90-4303, 1995 
WL 89026 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1995). 
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this claim because the policy “did not insure the 
shareholders of [the insured].”26 
 
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. CAE-Link Corp.27 – This decision 
did not hold that an insurer’s consent is required for an 
insured to retain its insurance rights when its stock is sold.28  
Nor did this decision involve a sale or assignment of 
insurance rights or policies, or even anti-assignment 
conditions.29  Rather, the Lawyers Title decision involved a 
form of insurance entirely different from general liability 
insurance – title insurance – with unique policy language not 
found in standard-form liability policies.30  Specifically, the 
title insurance in Lawyers Title provided coverage for the 
“insured,” which was defined to mean the named insured 
and “those who succeed to the interest [in the real estate at 
issue] of [the named insured] by operation of law as 
distinguished from purchase including, but not limited to, 
heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, personal 
representatives, next of kin, or corporate or fiduciary 
successors.”31  Because the defendant acquired the real estate 
at issue through a “purchase,” the court held that it did not 
qualify as an insured under this definition.32   
 
In re Asian Yard Partners33 – This decision did not involve 
insurance policies or language similar to the typical 
standard-form “Assignment” conditions.34  The partnership 
agreement at issue included a “No Transfer” provision that 
stated:  “No Partner may sell, assign, transfer, give, 
                                                                                                                 
26. Id. at *3. 
27. Lawyers Title Ins. v. CAE-Link Corp., 878 F. Supp. 767 (D. Md. 1994). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 768. 
31. Id.   
32. Id. at 771. 
33. In re Asian Yard Partners, Nos. 95-333-PJW, 95-334-PJW, 1995 WL 1781675 
(Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 18, 1995). 
34. Id. 
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hypothecate or otherwise encumber . . . directly or indirectly, 
or by operation of law or otherwise, any interest in the 
Partnership . . . .”35  The sole asset of one of the partners, 
AOC, was its 1% general partnership interest.  One of the 
limited partners, AYP, owned 100% of the stock of AOC.36  
When AYP sought bankruptcy court approval of the sale of 
all of AOC’s stock, the court concluded that this sale would 
constitute an indirect sale of AOC’s 1% general partnership 
interest in the partnership, and thus that the sale violated the 
“No Transfer” provision.37   
 
Accordingly, Successor Insureds may argue that, because the sale of a 
policyholder’s stock does not involve the assignment of any insurance 
rights (let alone insurance policies), an insurer’s consent is typically not 
required under normal circumstances for the policyholder to retain its 
insurance rights through the sale. 
 
III. AN INSURER’S CONSENT GENERALLY WOULD NOT BE 
NEEDED TO TRANSFER INSURANCE ASSETS AS PART OF 
A POLICYHOLDER’S DISSOLUTION 
When a corporate policyholder is dissolved and its assets transferred to 
a third party (typically its shareholder(s)), insurers frequently contend that 
this transfer of insurance assets requires their consent under the 
“Assignment” conditions in their policies.38  Successor Insureds will 
ordinarily be able to refute the insurers’ position, relying on two principal 
grounds.39 
First, in cases involving the transfer of insurance rights in the context 
of a corporate dissolution, courts have held that an anti-assignment 
condition does not apply to the transfer of insurance assets relating to pre-
transfer losses, even where those losses are ongoing, but not discovered 
until after the transfer.40  For instance, in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
                                                                                                                 
35. Id. at *5.   
36. Id. at *1. 
37. Id. at *6-7.   
38. See, Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 
1974).   
39. Id. 
40. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). 
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Casualty & Surety Co., the policyholder had engaged in operations that 
were causing undiscovered environmental property damage.41  In 1979, the 
policyholder was dissolved, and its remaining assets were transferred to a 
liquidating trust.42  In the mid-1980’s, the environmental property damage 
was discovered, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
demanded that the liquidating trust clean up the site of the operations.43  
When the trust sought coverage under the policyholder’s policies, one of 
the insurers contended that an anti-assignment condition had precluded the 
transfer of the policyholder’s insurance assets to the trust.44  Rejecting the 
insurer’s position, the Utah Supreme Court held that all of the 
policyholder’s insurance assets had transferred to the liquidating trust, 
despite the anti-assignment condition.45   
One of the cases relied on by the Sharon court -- National American 
Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. -- held that assignment of an 
insurance policy and coverage for post-assignment losses of the assignee 
are not precluded by an anti-assignment condition in the policy, where the 
assignment of the insurance policy did not increase the risk of the insurer.46  
In Jamison, the policyholder purchased a fire insurance policy from the 
insurer.47  Soon after the issuance of the policy, one of the defendants 
purchased all of the stock of the policyholder.48  Several months after this 
stock purchase, the policyholder was dissolved, and all of its assets were 
distributed to its sole shareholder, including the fire policy.49  After the 
dissolution and assignment, a fire caused damage to the insured premises, 
and the shareholder sought coverage under the policy.  Rejecting the anti-
assignment condition as a basis for denying coverage, the court held that 
such conditions do not apply to the assignment of policies providing 
coverage for post-assignment losses if “the assignment involves no increase 
in risk to the insurer.”50  Finding that the dissolution of the policyholder 
and assignment of the insurance policy resulted in no such increase in the 
risk to the insurer, the court concluded that the anti-assignment condition 
                                                                                                                 
41. Id. at 130. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 139 n.15. 
45. Id. (citing cases finding anti-assignment conditions inapplicable). 
46. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1974).   
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1128.   
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did not apply.51  To hold otherwise, according to the court, would “place 
form over substance and would conflict with the oft-expressed doctrine that 
forfeitures of insurance policies are not favored in the law and are to be 
avoided whenever possible.”52   
Second, certain dissolutions arguably constitute de facto mergers for 
which an insurer’s consent is not required in order to transfer insurance 
assets.  Courts addressing dissolutions have concluded that, where a 
company purchases all of the stock of another company and then 
subsequently dissolves its new subsidiary, transferring all of the 
subsidiary’s assets and liabilities to it, a de facto merger may have 
occurred.53  For example, in Arnold Graphics Industries, Inc. v. 
Independent Agent Center, Inc., the court held that there had been a de 
facto merger between a parent and its subsidiary where, some time after 
purchasing all of the subsidiary’s stock, the assets and liabilities of the 
subsidiary were transferred to the parent and the subsidiary dissolved.54   
The court came to this conclusion even though the subsidiary had 
conducted business as a distinct legal entity for about a year between the 
parent’s purchase of its stock and the transfer of the subsidiary’s assets to 
the parent, stating that “there is no requirement that all of the events that 
are necessary to a finding of de facto merger occur at the same time.”55  As 
discussed above in Section I, Successor Insureds may assert that the 
transfer of insurance rights through a merger (“de facto” or otherwise) does 
not require the consent of insurers.   
Notwithstanding these two arguments advanced by Successor Insureds, 
in an effort to avoid providing coverage to the sole shareholder parent of a 
policyholder that has been dissolved, insurers may repeat their contention 
that insurance must pass “by operation of law” for the anti-assignment 
condition of their policies to not apply and that a transfer of assets through 
                                                                                                                 
51. Jamison, 501 F.2d at 1128. 
52. Id.; see also Paxton & Vierling Steel Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 573, 
580 (D. Neb. 1980) (noting that, with respect to whether an anti-assignment condition 
applies, the difference between a transfer of assets upon corporate dissolution and a transfer 
based on a merger is not material, as the inquiry in both cases is focused on whether the 
insurer’s risk has been materially increased). 
53. Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. Indep. Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
54. Id. 
55. Id.; see also Hoche Prods. v. Jayark Films Corp., 256 F. Supp. 291, 295-96 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding de facto merger where (1) company purchased all of the stock of 
third party, (2) third party then assigned all of its assets to the company, and (3) third party 
later dissolved).   
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a dissolution is not a transfer “by operation of law.”  However, Successor 
Insureds may attempt to refute this insurer position on two grounds.  First, 
as discussed below, insurance rights for pre-transfer liabilities arguably do 
not have to transfer by operation of law to survive an anti-assignment 
condition.56  Second, assuming arguendo that this standard were 
controlling, the cases regularly cited by insurers arguably do not support 
their contention that such a transfer in connection with a corporate 
dissolution is not “by operation of law.” 
To support their position that their consent is needed for the transfer of 
insurance rights in the context of a corporate dissolution, insurers have 
cited to the decision in Snellman v. A.B. Dick Co.57  However, Successor 
Insureds may contend that the Snellman decision supports their position 
that a successor may recover under a contract, such as an insurance policy, 
for the damages suffered, but not discovered, by its predecessor prior to the 
transfer of the predecessor’s rights.  In Snellman, the plaintiff’s subsidiary 
entered into an agency agreement with the defendant.58  Unbeknownst to 
the plaintiff or his subsidiary, the defendant began to engage in activities 
that allegedly constituted breaches of the agreement.59  The subsidiary was 
later dissolved.60  Subsequently, the plaintiff discovered the defendant’s 
activities and sued for breach of the agency agreement between the 
dissolved subsidiary and the defendant.61  The defendant asserted that the 
agency agreement had terminated at the time of the subsidiary’s dissolution 
in light of a broadly-drafted anti-assignment condition in the agreement.62  
Because the agreement was an executory contract and the court believed 
that the plaintiff’s subsidiary should not be permitted to assign its ongoing 
duties under the agency agreement to a third party with whom the 
defendant had not agreed to contract, the court held that the anti-
assignment condition precluded the contract from continuing to be in effect 
after the dissolution.63  However, to the extent that the plaintiff’s breach-of-
contract claim was based on the defendant’s conduct before the subsidiary 
was dissolved, the court, relying on Illinois’ statute regarding corporate 
                                                                                                                 
56. See infra Section IV.A. 
57. No. 81C3048, 1987 WL 8619, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1987). 
58. Id. at *2.  
59. Id. at *10 (citing plaintiff’s allegations of breaches of agency agreement that may 
have occurred prior to dissolution of plaintiff’s subsidiary).   
60. Id. at *1.   
61. Id. at *2. 
62. Id. at *3. 
63. Snellman, 1987 WL 8619 at *9.   
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dissolution, held that the plaintiff retained the subsidiary’s cause of action 
despite the dissolution.64  Thus, even though the subsidiary was not aware 
at the time of its dissolution that the defendant had already breached their 
agreement, the subsidiary’s causes in action for this undiscovered breach 
were transferred to the plaintiff at the time of its dissolution under Illinois 
law, and this transfer was unaffected by the anti-assignment condition 
included in the agreement. 
In addition to Snellman, insurers frequently rely on Butera v. 
Attorneys’ Title Guar. Fund, Inc., for the proposition that the transfer of 
insurance rights to the sole shareholder of a policyholder upon the 
policyholder’s dissolution is not a transfer by “operation of law.”65  
However, Successor Insureds may argue that Butera is inapposite for four 
principal reasons.  First, the Butera case did not involve an anti-assignment 
condition, but rather the interpretation of a definition of “insured” that is 
unique to title insurance policies.66 Second, the definition of “insured” at 
issue in Butera specifically provided that transfers “by operation of law” 
did not include transfers by “purchase.”67  Therefore, even if it were 
relevant whether a transfer was “by operation of law” as that phrase is used 
in its ordinary legal meaning, the Butera case involved a definition of “by 
operation of law” that was unique to the particular policy language at issue 
and thus arguably provides no guidance regarding the ordinary legal 
meaning of that phrase.  Third, Butera did not involve transfers of assets 
upon dissolution.  Fourth, the court indicated that a transfer of property to 
an insured’s sole shareholders as a result of the insured’s dissolution would 
constitute a transfer “by operation of law.”68  Instead, the court held that a 
separate purchase of the property by a third party from the insured was a 
“purchase” and therefore not a transfer “by operation of law” under the 
policy.69 
                                                                                                                 
64. Id. at *10.   
65. Butera v. Attorneys’ Title Guar. Fund, Inc., 747 N.E.2d, 949, 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001). 
66. Id. at 951, 952. 
67. Id. at 951. 
68. Id. at 952-53 (discussing favorably the decision in Historic Smithville 
Development Co. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 445 A.2d 1174 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1981), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds 464 A.2d 1177 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1983), in 
which the court held that “if a corporation, in dissolution or otherwise, transfers all of its 
assets to some other entity or to an individual, the transferee is a ‘successor’ in every sense 
of the word”). 
69. Id. at 954. 
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Finally, insurers often cite to the decision in Bunzl Pulp & Paper Sale, 
Inc. v. Golder, for the proposition that dissolutions do not transfer 
insurance policies containing anti-assignment clauses because dissolutions 
are not transfers by “operation of law.”70  In Bunzl, the insured transferred 
title to real estate to its parentand then was dissolved.71  The decision does 
not explain what happened to the insured’s other assets, including its 
insurance rights, at dissolution.  The parent asserted that it could access the 
insured’s liability policy either (i) because it owned all of the stock of the 
insured when the insured dissolved, or (ii) because the insured had 
transferred real estate to the parent.72  The court rejected both of these 
arguments.  First, the insurance policy did not insure the shareholders of 
the insured and therefore the parent was not insured under the policy by 
virtue of its ownership of the insured’s stock.73  Second, the mere 
acquisition by deed from the insured of title to real estate did not also give 
the parent the insured’s insurance rights relating to that property.74  These 
holdings typically are irrelevant to cases involving the question of whether 
the sole shareholder parent of a policyholder succeeds to that 
policyholder’s insurance rights upon the policyholder’s dissolution, 
because, unlike the transfer of real estate by deed in Bunzl which was 
limited to real estate and did not seek to transfer insurance assets, the 
dissolutions of corporate policyholders typically include the transfer of all 
assets, including insurance assets and liabilities to the sole shareholder 
parent.   
In sum, Successor Insureds have a number of arguments to distinguish 
the Insurers’ cases and to support the Successor Insureds’ Position that 
insurance assets may be transferred to them in the context of the 
policyholder’s dissolution, notwithstanding anti-assignment conditions 
contained in the policies at issue. 
 
IV. TRANSFERRING INSURANCE ASSETS AS PART OF AN 
ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
Bolstered by the Henkel decision, insurers are now asserting more 
aggressively that the anti-assignment conditions in their policies preclude 
the transfer of historical insurance rights without their consent.  
                                                                                                                 
70. No. Civ. A. 90-4303, 1995 WL 89026, at *2, 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1995). 
71. Id. at *2. 
72. Id. at *2,3. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at *3.   
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Specifically, even though a purchaser may have intended to obtain all of 
the assets, including insurance rights, of a seller, insurers contend that their 
anti-assignment conditions operate to block the transfer of insurance rights 
and to defeat the purchaser’s and seller’s intent.  This conclusion, and the 
Henkel decision upon which it rests, is currently the subject of substantial 
coverage litigation. 
 
a. CASES ADDRESSING WHETHER THE TRANSFER OF INSURANCE 
RIGHTS FOR COVERAGE FOR PRE-TRANSFER EVENTS 
REQUIRES AN INSURER’S CONSENT 
A number of courts addressing the issue have held that anti-assignment 
conditions do not preclude a transferee from obtaining coverage under the 
transferor’s policies for the liabilities arising out of pre-transfer events.  
These courts have reasoned that, because the event causing the liability 
already took place prior to the transfer, the transfer of the insurance rights 
relating to this liability does not materially increase the risk to the insurer.75 
For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that rights to 
insurance may be assigned without the insurers’ consent where the loss has 
taken place prior to the assignment.76  In Lain, the beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy assigned the policy benefits after the death of the insured 
to a funeral home to cover the insured’s funeral expenses.77   The insurer 
denied coverage, arguing that it had not given consent to the assignment.  
Rejecting the insurer’s reliance on the anti-assignment condition, the court 
held that such conditions do not preclude an assignment of insurance 
benefits where the assignment takes place after the loss has occurred: 
 
The general rule, supported by a great wealth of 
authority, is that general stipulations in policies, 
prohibiting assignment thereof except with the insurer’s 
                                                                                                                 
75. See, e.g., Elat, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 654 A.2d 503, 505-06 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1995) (rejecting the insurer’s reliance on an anti-assignment condition where 
the assignment took place after the property damage at issue had occurred, stating:  “[T]he 
purpose behind a no-assignment clause in a casualty or liability policy . . . is to protect the 
insurer from insuring a different risk than intended.  Assignment of the right to collect or to 
enforce the right to proceed under a casualty or liability policy does not alter, in any 
meaningful way, the obligations the insurer accepted under the policy.  The assignment only 
changes the identity of the entity enforcing the insurer’s obligation to insure the same 
risk.”). 
76. Lain v. Metro.Life Ins. Co., 58 N.E.2d 587, 588 (Ill. 1945). 
77. Id. at 588. 
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consent, or upon giving some notice, or like conditions, 
have universally been held to apply only to assignments 
before loss, and, accordingly, not to prevent an assignment 
after loss, of the claim or interest of the insured in the 
insurance money then due in respect to the loss.78 
Similarly, courts applying New York law have found that rights to 
insurance may be assigned without the insurer’s consent where the event 
from which the liability arose took place prior to the assignment.79   
In addition, courts in other jurisdictions that have considered the issue 
agree that insurance benefits may be transferred without the insurer’s 
consent despite the presence of an anti-assignment condition, where the 
injury or damage in question took place prior to the transfer.80   
                                                                                                                 
78. Id. (emphasis added). 
79. Bronx Entm’t v. St. Paul’s Mercury Ins. Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (following Holt, and stating that, even though the policy at issue contained an anti-
assignment condition, the assignee of insurance rights could maintain an action against the 
insurer for the named insured’s pre-assignment business interruption damages); Employers 
Ins. of Wausau v. Duplan Corp., No. 94 Civ. 3143(CSH), 1999 WL 777976, at *32 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1999) (confirming that an entity that is not a named insured may invoke 
rights under an insurance policy “when the party seeking coverage (1) is the surviving 
corporation in a merger with the insured; (2) is legally regarded as the corporate successor 
of the insured through purchase or transfer of the insured’s assets; or (3) has been assigned 
the insured’s rights in the policy”) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Holt v. Fid. Phoenix Fire Ins. 
Co., 76 N.Y.S. 2d 398, 399-400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (noting that, once a fire occurred, 
the named insured had an accrued claim under its fire insurance policy that it could have 
assigned to a third party); see also Texaco A/S, S.A. v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, 
N.J., No. 90 Civ. 2722 (JFK), 1995 WL 628997, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1995) (“[T]he 
rationale for respecting the no-assignment clause does not apply when liability arises from 
pre-sale activity – no-assignment clauses are designed to protect insurers from unforeseen 
increases in risk.  When the loss occurs before the transfer, any increase in risk due to the 
successor’s characteristics is irrelevant.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)), vacated on 
other grounds, 160 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998). 
80. See, e.g., Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1128, 1130 
(8th Cir. 1974) (holding that transfer of all assets to sole shareholder upon dissolution of 
corporation effectively transferred insurance coverage for pre-dissolution losses); Ocean 
Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441, 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1939) 
(rejecting insurer’s reliance on anti-assignment condition and holding that assignment of 
“[a]ll other property rights and assets of whatsoever nature and description” transferred to 
succeeding corporation the right to insurance coverage for injuries occurring before the date 
of conveyance); B.S.B. Diversified Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (“The purpose of a no-assignment clause in an insurance contract is to 
protect the insurer from increased liability.  After the events giving rise to the insurer’s 
liability have occurred, the insurer’s risk cannot be increased by a change in the insured’s 
identity.”); Int’l Rediscount Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 669, 
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b. CASES ADDRESSING WHETHER THE TRANSFER OF INSURANCE 
RIGHTS REQUIRES THE CONSENT OF THE INSURER WHERE THE 
INJURY OR DAMAGE WAS NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL AFTER 
THE TRANSFER 
 
A number of courts, including cases decided under New York and 
Illinois law, have held that anti-assignment conditions do not preclude the 
transfer of liability insurance rights relating to bodily injuries that took 
place prior to, but were not discovered until after, the transfer.   
For example, in Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. 
Co.,81 the policyholder’s product was injected into the claimant in 1950, 
and allegedly, as a result of atomic decay, unknowingly caused continuous 
bodily injury to the claimant until 1971, when the claimant was 
diagnosed.82  The policyholder was insured under policies issued by the 
defendant-insurer that were in effect from 1952 to 1960.83  As a result of a 
corporate reorganization in 1963, the policyholder’s assets were transferred 
to the plaintiff.84  When the claimant filed suit against the plaintiff in 1973, 
                                                                                                                          
672-73 (D. Del. 1977) (agreeing with the “numerous other courts over the years” that have 
held that anti-assignment conditions do not apply to the transfer of insurance rights 
providing coverage for pre-transfer losses, stating that “it would be a mere act of caprice or 
bad faith for [the insurer] to take advantage of the stipulation that the transfers were subject 
to its consent”); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 485 P.2d 837, 839 (Ariz. App. 
1971) (“[T]his [anti-assignment] rule is based upon the right of the insurer to choose its 
insured so as to know its risks.  Therefore, it is not applicable when an assignment is made 
by an insured after the liability-causing event has occurred.” (citing several cases)); P.R. 
Mallory & Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 54C01-0005-CP-00156, 2004 WL 1737489, at *8 
(Ind. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2004) (noting that the loss at issue took place before the transfer of 
insurance rights); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Iowa 2001) 
(holding that anti-assignment condition was inapplicable to transfer of chose in action for 
coverage for loss occurring prior to transfer, and noting that, “even if the [anti-assignment] 
provision had specifically prohibited post-loss assignments, it would most likely be in 
contravention of public policy and the general purpose of indemnity contracts”); 
Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., No. 9900467B, 2005 WL 3489658, at 
*2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2005) (recognizing that the general rule is that anti-assignment 
clauses do not prevent the transfer of insurance rights for pre-transfer losses); Egger v. Gulf 
Ins. Co., 903 A.2d 1219 (Pa. 2006) (assignment of rights to coverage as part of litigation 
settlement valid where loss pre-dated assignment); 3 COUCH ON INS. 3d, § 35:7 (1997) 
(noting that “the great majority of courts adhere to the rule that general stipulations in 
policies prohibiting assignments thereof except with the consent of the insurer apply only to 
assignments before loss, and do not prevent an assignment after loss”). 
81. No. 76 Civ. 809, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16759 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1977). 
82. Id. at *1-2.   
83. Id. at *2. 
84. Id. at *8.   
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the plaintiff sought coverage under the policies issued by the defendant to 
the policyholder.85  Rejecting the insurer’s reliance on its anti-assignment 
condition, the court, applying New York law, held that the policyholder 
had an accrued claim at the time of the asset transfer in 1963 for the bodily 
injuries that took place prior to that time, even though no claim was 
asserted against the policyholder until ten years after the asset transfer: 
 
Such [anti-assignment] clauses do not apply to an assignment 
of an insurance claim after the loss has occurred.  This is so even 
if the insurance contract reads to the contrary, because the 
assignment of an accrued insurance claim is the same as assigning 
a chose in action, and contractual limitations on such assignments 
are contrary to the public policy of New York. 
In this instance, any claim of [the policyholder] against [the 
defendant-insurer] accrued between 1952 and 1960, and the 
transfer of [the policyholder]’s assets ultimately to [the plaintiff] 
in 1963 occurred after any insurance claim against [the defendant-
insurer] had arisen.86 
Thus, even though the insurer did not breach its policy obligations by 
failing to defend until the claimant filed suit in 1973, the insurance claim 
was deemed to have accrued when the bodily injury itself took place from 
1952 through 1960, prior to the transfer of insurance assets in 1963.87  
Accordingly, the anti-assignment condition could not apply.88 
                                                                                                                 
85. Id. at *1-2. 
86. Id. at *7-8 (citations omitted).   
87. Id. at *8-9.   
88. Id.; see also Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1105, 
1105-07 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (anti-assignment condition did not preclude plaintiff, which 
acquired the policyholder’s contract rights through foreclosure, from recovering under the 
policyholder’s indemnity policy where the losses took place prior to, but were not 
discovered until after, the transfer of insurance rights); Snellman v. A.B. Dick Co., No. 
81C3048, 1987 WL 8619 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1987) (a successor may recover under a 
contract for the damages suffered, but not discovered, by its predecessor prior to the transfer 
of the predecessor’s rights under the contract to the successor); see generally Am. Nat’l Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Harold Abrams, P.C., No. 99 C 5807, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2577 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 19, 2002) (contrasting occurrence-based policies with claims-made policies, and noting 
that coverage attaches under occurrence-based policies when the occurrence causing the 
bodily injury or property damage takes place, not when the claim is made:  “‘In the 
“occurrence” policy, the peril insured is the “occurrence” itself.  Once the occurrence takes 
place, coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for some time thereafter.  
 
408 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
Beyond New York and Illinois, a number of courts in other 
jurisdictions have also held that anti-assignment conditions do not bar the 
transfer of liability insurance rights relating to losses that took place prior 
to, but were not discovered until after, the transfer.  For example, in 
Gopher Oil Co. v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co.,89 the policyholder 
engaged in activities in the 1950s and 1960s that resulted in undetected 
environmental property damage during the insurers’ policy periods.90  In 
1973, the policyholder assigned all of its assets to the plaintiff.91  Eighteen 
years later, the property damage manifested, and the plaintiff was sued.92  
The insurer refused to provide coverage based on an anti-assignment 
condition in its policies.93  Rejecting the insurer’s reliance on the anti-
assignment conditions, the court held that it would follow the “great 
majority of courts” that had concluded that anti-assignment conditions do 
not bar the transfer of insurance rights for liability coverage for events that 
took place prior to the transfer: 
 
The purpose of a non-assignment clause is to protect the 
insurer from an increase to the risk it has agreed to insure.  But 
when events giving rise to an insurer’s liability have already 
occurred, the insurer’s risk is not increased by a change in the 
insured’s identity.94 
 
Thus, because there could not be a material increase in risk to the 
insurer with respect to tortious conduct that had already taken place, the 
court ruled that the anti-assignment condition did not apply to this transfer 
of liability insurance rights for property damage that was ongoing, but not 
yet discovered, at the time of the transfer.95 
Similarly, in Total Waste Management Corp. v. Commercial Union 
Insurance Co.,96 the policyholder was insured under a general liability 
                                                                                                                          
[Whereas] in the “claims made” policy, it is the making of the claim which is the event and 
peril being insured . . . .’”) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bauman, No. 90 C 0340, 
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18668, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1992)). 
89. 588 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. App. 1999). 
90. Id. at 761-62.   
91. Id. at 761, 763.   
92. Id. at 761.   
93. Id. At 761-762. 
94. Id. at 763.   
95. Gopher Oil, 588 N.W.2d at 763. 
96. 857 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.H. 1994). 
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policy issued by the defendant with a policy period ending in 1984.97  In 
1988, the policyholder sold certain assets to the plaintiff.98  A third party 
subsequently sued the plaintiff for property damage that had occurred, but 
had not been discovered, prior to the asset sale.99  The insurer denied the 
plaintiff’s claim that it had succeeded to the policyholder’s liability 
coverage rights.100  The court ruled against the insurer, holding that the 
anti-assignment condition did not preclude the plaintiff’s right to liability 
coverage for property damage that had been caused by the policyholder and 
that had taken place during the insurer’s policy period: 
 
Some of the damage or loss caused by [the policyholder] to 
[the third party]’s property allegedly occurred during the term of 
[the insurer]’s policy and prior to [the policyholder]’s transfer of 
assets.  [The insurer]’s risk is therefore no greater than when the 
policy “covers only the risk it evaluated when it wrote the 
policy.”  If [the plaintiff] is found to be the corporate successor to 
[the policyholder], [the insurer]’s liability on the insurance 
contract to [the policyholder] would be limited to the terms and 
date of the policy.101 
In the context of asbestos-related bankruptcy plans, several courts have 
confirmed that insurance rights of a debtor-policyholder may be transferred 
to a trust to fund the payment not only of pending asbestos claims, but also 
of future asbestos claims not yet asserted, despite the objections of the 
debtor’s insurers based on the anti-assignment conditions in their 
policies.102   
                                                                                                                 
97. Id. at 154. 
98. Id. at 143 n.2. 
99. Id. at 142. 
100. Id. at 145. 
101. Id. at 153 (quoting N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d at 
1358); see also Wolkerstorfer Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Co., No. C0-93-12712, slip op. at 8-
11 (Minn. 10th Dist. May 19, 1994) (holding that transfer of assets from a partnership to a 
corporation transferred rights to liability coverage for environmental property damage that 
had taken place prior to the transfer but which was not discovered until years after the 
transfer); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 139 n.15 (Utah 
1997) (holding that an insurer’s consent was not needed to transfer insurance rights covering 
liability for ongoing, but undiscovered, property damage from the policyholder to a 
liquidating trust as part of the policyholder’s dissolution). 
102. See In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (“‘[B]ecause an 
insured’s right to proceeds vests at the time of the loss giving rise to the insured’s liability, 
restrictions on an insured’s right to assign its proceeds are generally rendered void.’” 
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c. POTENTIAL INSURER RESPONSES 
 
Insurers often proffer a series of arguments to support their position 
that insurance rights may not be transferred in the face of an anti-
assignment provision without their consent, including the following 
arguments.  Specifically, insurers frequently argue: 
 
1. That a policyholder has not suffered a “loss” under the 
policy until the insurer has breached its duty to defend or 
indemnify, and therefore that no “loss” could have taken 
place prior to the execution of the asset purchase 
agreement where the bodily injury or property damage 
was not discovered until after that time; 
2. That insurance rights can only be transferred “by 
operation of law”; 
3. That various cases should be read to support the 
conclusion that the anti-assignment conditions apply to 
the transfer of historical insurance assets; 
4. That the decisions in Henkel and related cases represent 
the better reasoned view. 
 
As discussed below, Successor Insureds may raise various hurdles in 
an attempt to defeat these insurer arguments. 
 
1. The Successor Insured Position:  Insurance Rights for 
Pre-Transfer Injuries or Damage May Be Transferred 
Regardless of Whether or Not the Insurer Has 
Breached Its Duties by the Time of the Transfer 
 
As discussed above, a number of courts have held that an anti-
assignment condition does not ordinarily preclude the transfer of insurance 
                                                                                                                          
(quoting Cont. Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1995))); 
see also In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., No. 03-10495(JKF), Transcript of Bench Opinion at 
145-46 (D. Del., July 31, 2003) (confirming bankruptcy plan that assigned insurance 
proceeds to trust over the objections of debtor’s insurers based on anti-assignment 
conditions, stating that “[a]ssignment of a right to receive proceeds does not change any risk 
that was insured against.”) (vacated on other grounds, 391 F.3d 190, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2004)) 
(declining to reach merits of insurers’ argument that assignment of proceeds violated anti-
assignment conditions in policies). 
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rights providing liability coverage for injuries or damage that was ongoing, 
but undiscovered, at the time of the transfer.  Insurers often try to avoid that 
conclusion by asserting that, for such injuries or damage, the relevant loss 
did not occur until after the execution of the asset purchase agreement.  The 
insurers base this contention on the theory that a policyholder does not 
suffer a “loss” until an insurer has failed to defend or indemnify it.  To 
illustrate, in cases involving asbestos, environmental, and other latent 
bodily injury and property damage claims that were not filed until after an 
asset sale took place, the insurers may argue that they did not fail to defend 
or indemnify the policyholder before the asset sale, and hence that no 
policyholder incurred a “loss” until after the asset purchase agreement was 
executed.  Thus, the argument goes, there were no insurance rights or 
choices in action to transfer to the purchaser at the time of the asset sale. 
The decisions discussed above cast doubt on this pro-insurer argument.  
In each of those cases, the underlying injury or damage had not yet been 
discovered at the time of transfer of the insurance asset, and no suit had 
been filed against the party seeking insurance coverage.  Accordingly, no 
claim had been made for the insurer to deny before the transfer.  Under the 
pro-insurer argument, no “loss” – i.e., rejection of the request for a defense 
or indemnity – had occurred before the applicable transfer; nonetheless, the 
courts concluded in each case that the anti-assignment condition was 
inapplicable. 
The decisional law discussed above thus appears to undercut the pro-
insurer position that “loss” for purposes of analyzing the applicability of an 
anti-assignment condition relates to when the insurer decides to deny a 
claim for coverage.  Rather, the view of these courts is that the relevant 
“loss” occurs not when the insurer denies coverage, but rather when the 
event giving rise to the liability takes place, e.g., when the bodily injury or 
property damage occurs. 
Notwithstanding such cases, Henkel and its related cases, discussed 
below, provide support for the insurers’ position.  In an effort to build 
further support, insurers may take relatively novel positions on the 
interpretation of decisional law to bolster their position that liability 
insurance rights cannot be transferred until the insurer has failed to defend 
or indemnify the insured.  However, Successor Insureds may contend that 
the cases that insurers typically rely upon do not provide the necessary 
foundation for that position: 
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Bronx Entertainment v. St. Paul’s Mercury Ins. Co.103 – In this 
decision, the named insured assigned its insurance claim for 
business interruption damages to the plaintiff.  Even though 
the policy at issue contained an anti-assignment condition, 
the court held that the plaintiff could maintain an action 
against the insurer for these pre-assignment business 
interruption damages.104  The court held that the plaintiff 
could not recover for its own business interruption losses 
suffered after the assignment at issue, absent the insurer’s 
consent.105 
 
Service Adjustment Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London106 – 
Consistent with the majority rule discussed above, this 
decision, which involves a fire loss under a fire insurance 
policy, stands for the simple proposition that “[a]n insured’s 
claim under a policy may be assigned after the loss.”107  The 
decision does not address situations in which the loss took 
place prior to the transfer, but was not discovered until after 
the transfer.   
 
Loyola Univ. Med. Center v. Med Care HMO108 – In this 
decision, the court held that an anti-assignment condition did 
not apply to the transfer of medical insurance benefits where 
the injury had taken place before the transfer, even though 
the medical costs for which the insurance policy would 
provide reimbursement had not yet been incurred.109  Even 
though the medical insurance policy would have no 
obligation to indemnify the policyholder until it incurred 
medical costs, the court found that the relevant “loss” was 
                                                                                                                 
103. 265 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
104. Id. at 363 (“Of course Plaintiff may maintain an action for [transferor’s] losses 
that accrued as of the date of the assignment.”)  
105. Id. 
106. 562 N.E.2d 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
107. Id. at 1049. 
108. 535 N.E.2d 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
109. Id. at 1129. 
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the incidence of injury and not the payment of medical costs.  
Accordingly, because the loss occurred before the 
assignment, the assignment was not precluded by the anti-
assignment condition.110   
 
In sum, as discussed above, a number of courts have held that an anti-
assignment condition does not apply to the transfer of liability insurance 
rights for coverage for injuries or damage taking place prior to the transfer, 
even where such injuries or damage have not been discovered prior to the 
transfer.  The insurers’ contention that an assignor does not have any 
insurance choices in action to transfer until it has been the victim of a 
breach by the insurer of its duty to defend or indemnify is not consistent 
with this decisional law. 
 
2. The Successor Insured Position:  To Survive 
Application of an Anti-Assignment Condition, a 
Transfer of Insurance Rights Is Not Required to Occur 
“by Operation of Law 
Insurers often contend that, where a policy contains an anti-assignment 
condition and the insurer’s consent has not been obtained, coverage rights 
can only be transferred if, among other requirements, that transfer occurs 
“by operation of law.”  Under this approach, insurers contend that neither 
an asset purchase, a stock purchase, nor an assignment in connection with a 
corporate dissolution constitutes a transfer “by operation of law.”  As a 
result, such insurers argue, the transferee in question cannot be the 
successor to the transferor’s insurance rights at issue. 
This particular pro-insurer position has substantial weaknesses.  
Among other things, no requirement that the transfer of insurance rights 
must be accomplished “by operation of law” can be gleaned from much of 
the decisional law.111  Successor Insureds may argue that no basis exists to 
                                                                                                                 
110. Id.(“What [the policyholder] assigned was her present conditional right to the 
insurance proceeds.  A valid assignment of a conditional right is enforceable in equity.” 
(citations omitted)). 
111. By way of example, although the courts in each of the following cases held that 
insurance rights had effectively transferred, not one of the cases involved a transfer by 
operation of law:  Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1105, 1105-07 
(N.D. Ill. 1987); Snellman v. A.B. Dick Co., No. 81C3048, 1987 WL 8619 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
24, 1987); Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., No. 76 CIV 809, 
1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16759 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1977); Gopher Oil Co. v. American 
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impose such a requirement and that so doing would run afoul of the case 
law supporting their position. 
 
3. The Successor Insured Position:  Cases Relied Upon 
by Insurers Do Not Support the Insurers’ Position 
In addition to Henkel, insurers often assert that a number of cases hold 
that anti-assignment conditions preclude the transfer of insurance rights in 
corporate transactions other than mergers.  However, Successor Insureds 
may argue that these decisions do not support the insurers’ position: 
 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Duplan Corp.112 – Apparently 
contradicting the insurers’ suggestion that coverage can 
transfer only through a merger, this decision expressly 
confirms that an entity that is not a named insured may still 
invoke rights under an insurance policy not only as a result 
of a merger, but also when the entity “is legally regarded as 
the corporate successor of the insured through purchase or 
transfer of the insured’s assets; or . . . has been assigned the 
insured’s rights in the policy.”113  The party seeking 
coverage in Wausau was denied coverage because it had not 
purchased the named insured’s assets, obtained an 
assignment from the named insured, or merged with the 
insured.114   
 
Home Ins. Co. v. Service Am. Corp.115 – In this decision, the 
defendant was initially a subsidiary of the named insured, 
and thus initially was covered under a policy that insured the 
named insured and its “subsidiaries.”116  When the defendant 
was sold to a third party, it ceased to be a subsidiary of the 
                                                                                                                          
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Minn. App. 1999); Wolkerstorfer Co. v. 
Bituminous Cas. Co., No. C0-93-12712, slip op. at 8-11 (Minn. 10th Dist. May 19, 1994); 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 139 (Utah 1997); see 
also supra Sections III, IV. 
112. No. 94 Civ. 3143(CSH), 1999 WL 777976 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999). 
113. Id. at *32.   
114. Id. 
115. 662 F.Supp. 964 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
116. Id. at 965.  
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named insured, and thus ceased to be insured under the 
policy for any losses that arose after the sale.117  
Consequently, when the defendant suffered a fire loss after 
the sale, the court found no coverage for the defendant’s fire 
loss.118   
 
Butera v. Attorneys’ Title Guar. Fund, Inc.119 – This decision 
involves an entirely different form of insurance from 
standard-form liability policies – title insurance – that has 
unique policy language not found in standard-form liability 
insurance policies.120  Specifically, the title insurance at issue 
in Butera provided coverage for the “insured,” defined to 
mean “the [named] insured [and] . . . those who succeed to 
the interest [in the real property at issue] of such insured by 
operation of law as distinguished from purchase including, 
but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, 
personal representatives, next of kin, or corporate or 
fiduciary successors.”121  Because the plaintiffs acquired the 
real property at issue through a “purchase,” the court held 
that they did not qualify as insureds under this definition.122  
As the court noted, “Title insurance is an unusual type of 
insurance.  It is not a recurring policy:  there is a single 
premium, and the policy remains outstanding forever to 
protect the property owner.”123  In short, because of the 
substantial differences in the type of policy at issue, the 
policy language, and the risks covered by the policy, Butera 
may not be applicable more generally to cases in which 
liability insurance rights are being transferred. 
 
                                                                                                                 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 968. 
119. 747 N.E.2d 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
120. Id. at 950. 
121. Id. at 951.   
122. Id. at 954. 
123. Id.    
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Holt v. Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.124 – In this decision, the 
court agreed that, once a fire occurred, the named insured 
had an accrued claim under its fire insurance policy that it 
could have assigned to a third party.125  Other than 
recognizing that insurance rights may be assigned without 
the insurer’s consent where the loss has taken place prior to 
the assignment, this decision stands for the relatively 
commonplace proposition that an assignee of a business 
interruption rider to a fire policy may not recover for its own 
business interruption losses that were incurred after the 
assignment, absent the insurer’s consent.126 
 
Bronx Entertainment v. St. Paul’s Mercury Ins. Co.127 –Similar 
to the facts in Holt, this decision involved a claim by the 
named insured under a business interruption policy.128  
Shortly after suffering property damage, the named insured 
assigned its insurance claim to the plaintiff.129  Even though 
the policy contained an anti-assignment condition, the court 
confirmed that the plaintiff could maintain an action for 
these pre-assignment damages against the insurer.130  As in 
Holt, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover for its 
own business interruption losses suffered after the 
assignment at issue, absent the insurer’s consent.131 
 
Carle Place Plaza Corp. v. Excelsior Ins. Co.132 – Similar to the 
decision in Holt, this decision also stands for the proposition 
that an assignee may not recover under a fire insurance 
                                                                                                                 
124. 76 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948). 
125. Id. at 399.   
126. Id. at 399-400. 
127. 265 F.Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
128. Id. at 361. 
129. Id. at 360. 
130. Id. at 363.   
131. Id. 
132. 534 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
2008] ASSIGNMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE RIGHTS 417 
 
policy for a fire loss that takes place after the assignment, 
absent consent of the insurer.133 
 
EM Indus. Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co.134 – This decision 
cites favorably the decision in Ocean Accident & Guar. 
Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,135 which held that 
insurance benefits may be transferred without the insurer’s 
consent despite the presence of an anti-assignment condition 
in the policy where the injury or damage has taken place 
prior to the transfer.136  The court in EM Indus. stated that 
the plaintiff’s insurer had “failed to establish its alternative 
contentions that [another insurer] is obligated to the plaintiff 
and therefore to it under an assignment theory (see, Ocean 
Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 
441, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658 [and cases cited therein]) or 
under a successor-enterprise liability theory, since there was 
no merger of companies as a result of the [purchase 
agreement] (see, Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 
N.Y.2d 239).”137  In other words, insurance rights could have 
transferred either by merger or by a non-merger transaction, 
as in Ocean Accident.138 
 
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Snyder Moving & Storage, Inc.139 – 
The court in Snyder noted that the seller in an asset sale may 
be permitted to sell its rights to insurance benefits despite an 
anti-assignment condition:  “‘This [non-assignment] rule is 
based upon the right of the insurer to choose its insured so as 
to know its risks.  Therefore, it is not applicable when an 
assignment is made by an insured after the liability-causing 
event has occurred. . . .  In such a case the general rule is that 
                                                                                                                 
133. Id. at 398. 
134. 529 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
135. 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658 (1939). 
136. Id. at 444-45. 
137. EM Indus., 529 N.Y.S.2d at 123.   
138. Id. 
139. 52 Fed. Appx. 899 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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the assignment is not of the policy itself, but of a claim 
under, or a right of action on, the policy.’”140   
 
Federal Ins. Co. v. Purex Indus., Inc.141 – In this decision, the 
court denied an insurer’s motion for summary judgment 
based on an anti-assignment condition because the insurer 
had failed to carry its burden of showing that the condition 
applied.  The court did not have occasion to rule whether 
insurance assets could be transferred only in a merger.142 
 
Red Arrow Prods. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau143 – In this 
decision, the court rejected the asset purchaser’s claim to 
coverage under the seller’s policies because the parties 
agreed that the insurance rights were not part of the assets 
conveyed in the asset purchase agreement.144  Unable to 
argue that there had been an express transfer of the seller’s 
insurance rights, the buyer relied entirely on the Northern 
Insurance line of cases to assert that, because it had 
CERCLA liability for the actions of the seller, it should be 
entitled to access the seller’s insurance by operation of 
law.145  The court rejected the reasoning of the Northern 
Insurance line of cases because “[t]he [public] policies 
driving the product-line successor liability rule, however, are 
clearly not at play here [in a case involving CERCLA 
liability].”146 
 
                                                                                                                 
140. Id. at 903-04 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Valley Nat. Bank of Ariz., 485 
P.2d 837, 839 (1971)).  Having said that, the court went on to deny that the plaintiff had 
acquired the insurance benefits of the seller on the grounds that the asset purchase 
agreement identified the specific assets that were being transferred, and insurance was not 
among them.  Id.   
141. 972 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1997). 
142. Id. at 899-90. 
143. 607 N.W.2d 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). 
144. Id. at 299. 
145. Id. at  299-300. 
146. Id. at 302-03.   
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Muslin v. Frelinghuysen Livestock Managers, Inc.147 – In this 
decision, a racehorse mortality policy contained an anti-
assignment condition and, in addition, expressly provided 
that transfer of any interest in the horse at issue would result 
in the voiding of the policy.  The policyholder orally 
transferred the horse to third parties.  As a result, the court 
held that the policy was void as of the time of the transfer.  
Consequently, when the horse died after the transfer, the 
new owners of the horse could not recover under the 
mortality policy.148  Because Muslin involves a type of 
policy and policy language not at issue in standard-form 
liability insurance policies, the decision may be viewed by 
courts as irrelevant in cases involving the assignment of 
liability insurance rights.  At best, Muslin stands for the 
proposition that, where an insurance policy containing an 
anti-assignment condition was assigned without the insurer’s 
consent, the policy does not provide coverage to the assignee 
for losses incurred after the assignment. 
 
In sum, Successor Insureds have a number of arguments that they may 
rely on to attempt to distinguish the cases often cited by insurers seeking to 
establish the broad applicability of anti-assignment provisions. 
 
4. Henkel and Cases Involving Retroactive Liability 
a. The Henkel Decision 
While the decisional law discussed above may not provide a strong 
foundation of support to insurers seeking broad enforcement of anti-
assignment provisions, the Henkel decision does support the insurers’ usual 
position that anti-assignment conditions bar the transfer of coverage rights 
without their consent.  However, the Henkel decision may be vulnerable to 
several counter-arguments that Successor Insureds may raise. 
 
                                                                                                                 
147. 777 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1985).   
148. Id. at 1232.   
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i. The Successor Insured Position:  The 
Henkel Decision Would Lead to 
Absurd and Unfair Consequences 
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, the Henkel decision should 
not be followed because requiring insurer consent to transfer insurance 
proceeds for undiscovered losses that took place prior to the transfer would 
lead to unreasonable consequences.  On this view, an insurer has no 
incentive whatsoever to consent to a request by the policyholder to assign 
insurance proceeds.  Indeed, an insurer arguably has an incentive to not 
consent, in the hope that the policyholder would go forward with the asset 
sale anyway, thereby giving the insurer an argument that it is free of any 
coverage obligation for pre-assignment losses.   
The policyholder seemingly is then left with a Hobson’s choice – 
abandon the asset sale and its attendant benefits or, under Henkel, cause the 
insurance rights that it had already paid premiums to obtain to vanish, 
giving the insurer a windfall and likely making the asset sale much less 
attractive to the buyer, who then may be risking the assumption of 
liabilities without insurance to pay for them.  Under the Successor Insured 
view, either result is against public policy.   
First, two entities that have decided that it is in each of their respective 
economic interests to enter into an asset sale should not be dissuaded from 
doing so because insurers, who have already been paid premiums to cover a 
certain risk, can escape that risk by refusing to consent to the assignment.  
Putting this kind of power in the hands of insurance companies to deter 
legal and beneficial commerce benefits no one except those insurance 
companies. 
Second, from a Successor Insured’s perspective, insurers would receive 
an undeserved windfall as a result of the Henkel approach in those cases 
where the contracting parties went ahead with the asset sale.  In contrast, 
the Successor Insured Position avoids such windfalls by permitting the 
transfer of coverage for pre-transfer losses on the rationale that such a 
transfer does not increase the risk that the insurers agreed to accept and for 
which they were paid substantial premiums. 
Third, Successor Insureds may argue that the Henkel decision is at odds 
with the well-settled principle of insurance law that ambiguous policy 
language should not be construed to forfeit coverage.149 
                                                                                                                 
149. See, e.g., A.D. Desmond Co. v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 585 N.E.2d 1120, 
1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“Insurance forfeitures are not favored as insurance serves 
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Fourth, according to Successor Insureds, the Henkel decision runs afoul 
of the general rule that anti-assignment conditions are to be construed 
narrowly, against the party seeking to prohibit the assignment.150  
Therefore, the Successor Insured’s Position goes, because typical anti-
assignment conditions do not unambiguously apply to transfers of 
insurance rights relating to losses that took place prior to the transfer, the 
Henkel court should have construed the anti-assignment condition at issue 
there against the insurer and in a manner that preserved, rather than 
forfeited, coverage. 
In sum, the Successor Insured Position posits that the Henkel decision, 
if followed, would result in unfair and economically detrimental 
consequences.  Under this Position, because courts are to avoid interpreting 
insurance policy or other contractual provisions in a manner that leads to 
absurd consequences, courts should not construe the anti-assignment 
conditions to bar the transfer of liability insurance rights where the losses 
already took place, or began to take place, prior to the transfer.151  
  
ii. The Successor Insured Position:  The 
Henkel Decision Incorrectly Found an 
Increased Risk to the Insurer 
In addition to leading to unfair consequences, Successor Insureds may 
claim that the Henkel court’s analysis is flawed because it incorrectly 
concluded that the transfer of insurance rights relating to losses that had 
already taken place would subject the insurer to an increased risk.  The 
                                                                                                                          
important purposes in contemporary society, and courts should be quick to find facts which 
support coverage.”); Brynildsen v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 327, 329 (N.J. Super. 
Law Div. 1971) (“This court is in accord with the general principle of the law of insurance 
that forfeitures are not looked upon with favor, and is disposed to avoid forfeiture if by 
reasonable interpretation it can do so.”). 
150. See, e.g., Elzinga & Volkers, Inc. v. LSSC Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (N.D. 
Ind. 1993) (“[B]ecause the [anti-assignment] clause is a restriction on alienation, it must be 
strictly construed against the party urging the restriction.”); First Bank & Trust v. Novak, 
747 P.2d 850, 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (“A restriction against assignment is a restraint on 
alienation, and as such it is strictly construed against the party urging the restriction”). 
151. Cross Armored Carrier Corp. v. Valentine, 268 N.Y.S.2d 792, 797-98 (N.Y. Supr. 
Ct. 1966) (“Resort to a literal construction may not be had where the result would be to 
thwart the obvious and clearly expressed purpose which the parties intended to accomplish 
or where such a construction would lead to an obvious absurdity or place one party at the 
mercy of another.” (citations omitted)); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 726 N.E.2d 
126, 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] strained, forced, unnatural, or unreasonable construction, 
or one which would lead to an absurd result must be adopted.”) 
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principal basis for the court’s conclusion was that, where the assignor still 
exists or can be revived, the insurer may be required to “face[] the 
dilemma” whether to provide coverage to the assignor, the assignee, or 
both if a dispute arises over the existence and scope of the assignment.152  
Successor Insureds may argue that, contrary to the court’s suggestion, such 
a circumstance would not subject the insurer to any risk that is any different 
from the risks that the insurers agreed to accept. 
First, insurers are faced with the potential for invalid coverage claims 
every day.  Whether it is a request for coverage by a company that 
previously assigned away its insurance rights or a request for coverage by 
an insured whose claim falls within an exclusion, the business of insurers is 
to apply their policies to the facts and pay those claims that are valid.  The 
fact that an insurer must distinguish valid claims from invalid claims does 
not constitute an increase in the insured risk, but rather is a part of that 
insurer’s normal business operations. 
Second, the law and applicable rules provide procedural vehicles 
through which the insurers may resolve any uncertainties regarding 
whether coverage exists for a claim.  If an insurer cannot determine 
whether a claim is covered or excluded, or whether the entity requesting 
coverage is insured or not, the insurer may reserve its rights and commence 
a declaratory judgment action that will clarify its obligations.  
Alternatively, where more than one entity claims a right to the same set of 
insurance proceeds, the insurer may commence an interpleader action 
and/or pay the proceeds into an account with the court, with the proceeds to 
be paid to the entity that succeeds in demonstrating that it is entitled to 
them.153  These procedural mechanisms ensure that the insurer will not be 
required to pay any more money than it is obligated to pay under its 
insurance policy. 
Third, depending on the circumstances, the insurers may be obligated 
to provide coverage to both entities seeking coverage.  Insurers routinely 
provide coverage, for instance, to multiple members of the same corporate 
family.  Each claim for coverage by competing claimants must be 
evaluated on its own merits. 
                                                                                                                 
152. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 75-76 (Cal. 2003).   
153. See, e.g., Krauss v. Central Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. 1943) 
(explaining that in a dispute between a policyholder and an entity that alleged that the 
policyholder had assigned its interest in insurance proceeds to the entity, the insurer 
deposited the insurance proceeds with the court, to be distributed to whichever claimant 
succeeded in demonstrating its entitlement).   
2008] ASSIGNMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE RIGHTS 423 
 
Thus, under the Successor Insured view, the fact that an assignor and 
an assignee may both claim an entitlement to insurance proceeds does not 
necessarily “increase the risk” to the insurer.  An insurer may pay the party 
that it believes possesses a valid claim, or a court may determine which 
party has the valid claim.  What the insurer should not be permitted to do, 
according to Successor Insureds, is refuse to pay either claim because of 
the possible occurrence of the other.  This is particularly true when the lack 
of increased risk to the insurer is weighed against the consequences to an 
asset purchaser of finding that, contrary to its reasonable expectations, it 
did not obtain any insurance rights after all.  In sum, Successor Insureds 
may strongly contest the court’s finding in Henkel that assignment of rights 
to insurance proceeds increases the risk to the insurer.   
 
iii. The Successor Insured Position:  The 
Henkel Decision Incorrectly Requires 
a Breach by the Insurer Before an 
Interest in the Policy May Be 
Assigned  
  
The Henkel decision also is based on the premise that the insurer must 
have breached the policy before the policyholder has a right that may be 
assigned.  Without significant analysis, the Henkel court concluded that the 
assignor there did not have an assignable chose in action for breach of the 
insurance policy at the time of the assignment because the underlying 
asbestos claimants had not yet asserted any claims; consequently, no claim 
had been made yet to the insurer and no chose in action for breach of 
contract existed that could be assigned.154   
Successor Insureds will argue that the Henkel court’s holding that the 
insurer must first breach the policy before the policyholder has accrued any 
assignable rights under the policy is contrary to the rulings of the numerous 
courts discussed above that have held that the policyholder possesses a 
chose in action at the time that the underlying claimant suffers bodily 
injury (or property damage).155  Those cases did not require a breach of the 
                                                                                                                 
154. Henkel, 62 P.3d at 75.   
155. See supra Parts IV.A-IV.C.1.  While these courts have found that the claim or 
chose in action has arisen at the time that the loss takes place and therefore may be 
transferred in a corporate transaction, the claim will typically not be considered to have 
accrued for purposes of the statute of limitations, because different considerations and 
public policies are implicated in the analysis of whether the statute of limitations has expired 
in a given case.  Analysis of statute of limitations issues are outside the scope of this article. 
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policy by the insurer – only that the loss in the underlying case occurred 
prior to the transfer. 
Further, even assuming arguendo that the policyholder does not 
possess an accrued insurance claim at the time of the assignment, it 
arguably does possess a conditional right under the policies.  Such 
conditional rights have been found by certain courts to be assignable.156 
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, just as anti-assignment 
conditions do not apply to accrued insurance claims relating to losses that 
took place prior to the assignment, such conditions do not bar the 
assignment of conditional rights to insurance coverage.  As an example in 
support of this position, in Loyola University Medical Center v. Med Care 
HMO,157 an insured possessed an insurance contract with a health 
maintenance organization (HMO) that entitled her to reimbursement for 
payments made for medical treatment covered under the contract.158  Prior 
to receiving treatment or paying any medical expenses for a medical 
condition that the insured sustained, the insured assigned her rights to 
proceeds under the medical insurance contract to the hospital that would be 
providing her treatment.159  After providing treatment, the hospital sought 
payment from the HMO.  However, the HMO denied coverage on the 
grounds that the insured’s assignment of the insurance proceeds violated an 
anti-assignment clause.  Specifically, the HMO argued that the medical 
insurance contract provided indemnity for the cost of medical services and, 
since the insured had not received any medical services at the time of the 
assignment, the insured had no chose in action to assign to the hospital.160  
Rejecting this argument, the court held that the anti-assignment clause did 
not preclude the transfer of the insured’s conditional right to insurance 
proceeds: 
 
                                                                                                                 
156. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 320 (“The fact that a right . . . 
is conditional on the performance of a return promise or is otherwise conditional does not 
prevent its assignment before the condition occurs.”); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Allied 
Freightways, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 823, 824-25 (Mass. 1950) (following the “great weight of 
authority” recognizing the validity of a present assignment of anticipated benefits under a 
contract that are conditioned on an event that may or may not happen in the future); 
Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d 268, 271 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1991) (confirming that 
injured victim could assign his conditional right to settlement proceeds even though his tort 
claim had not settled and may have never settled). 
157. 535 N.E.2d 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
158. Id. at 1129. 
159. Id. at 1126-27.   
160. Id. at 1128-29 & n.2.  
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What [the insured] assigned was her present conditional right 
to the insurance proceeds.  A valid assignment of a conditional 
right is enforceable in equity.  Hence, the assignment attaches to 
each installment of money “to become due” under an existing 
contract as it becomes due and payable to the assignor.161 
Accordingly, Successor Insureds will argue that, once a claimant has 
suffered injury or damage, the policyholder has an accrued liability 
insurance claim under its policies in effect during the time of the injury or 
damage, or, at a minimum, the policyholder has a conditional right to 
proceeds under those policies.  Either way, under the Successor Insured 
Position, the claim or right is assignable and such an assignment would not 
violate an anti-assignment condition.   
Moreoever, for the reasons discussed above, Successor Insureds may 
contend that the Henkel decision is erroneous, and hence courts should 
follow the cases holding that anti-assignment conditions do not apply to the 
transfer of liability insurance rights relating to losses that took place prior 
to the transfer, including losses that are not discovered until after the 
transfer. 
 
b. Cases Involving Retroactive Liability 
 
Insurers also typically rely heavily on two cases, (1) Quemetco Inc. v. 
Pacific Auto. Ins. Co.;162 and (2) Century Indem. Co. v. Aero-Motive Co.,163 
involving an asset purchaser’s ability to access the seller’s insurance 
policies for environmental liability imposed retroactively by statutes passed 
subsequent to the date of the asset purchase.164  In each of these cases, 
according to the insurers’ perspective, the asset seller allegedly could not 
have had a right to insurance proceeds at the time of the asset sale because 
there was no basis for liability at that time.165  It was not until years after 
each respective transaction, however, that statutes were passed. These 
                                                                                                                 
161. Id. at 1129 (citations omitted); see also Robert S. Pinzur, Ltd. v. Hartford, 511 
N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (confirming that a policyholder may assign its 
present conditional right to proceeds that had not yet accrued, though ultimately finding no 
assignment because the assignor received no consideration), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 126 
(Ill. 1987). 
162. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
163. 318 F.Supp.2d 530 (W.D. Mich. 2003). 
164. Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628; Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 532. 
165. See Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629-30; Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
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statutes retroactively imposed environmental liability on the asset seller 
(and the asset purchasers) such that a right to insurance proceeds could 
exist; even though the asset seller had no right to insurance proceeds at the 
time of the transaction and no right to insurance proceeds could have been 
conveyed to the asset purchaser.  The courts, agreeing with this position, 
held that no insurance proceeds transferred to the asset purchasers.166 
For instance, in Quemetco, the buyer contended that it had acquired the 
seller’s insurance choses in action in the asset purchase agreement.  The 
court cited with approval the decisions in Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp.v. Sw. 
Bell Tel. Co.,167 and Greco v. Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,168 in which the 
courts held that anti-assignment conditions did not preclude the transfer of 
insurance proceeds for losses that took place prior to the transfer.169  
However, because of the retroactive nature of CERCLA, the court held that 
no loss or damage existed at the time of the sale, and thus no insurance 
proceeds could have been purchased by the asset buyer.170 
Similarly, in Aero-Motive, in 1972, the named insured sold assets, 
including a manufacturing plant, to the defendant, and expressly assigned 
two insurance policies to the defendant.171  In the early 1990s, the 
defendant discovered contamination at the site where the plant was located, 
and was then required to take remedial action by the Michigan Department 
of Environmental Quality.172  Like the court in Quemetco, the court in 
Aero-Motive confirmed that “an anti-assignment clause will not be 
enforced where a loss occurs before the assignment, because in that 
situation the assignment of the claim under the policy is viewed no 
differently than any other assignment of an accrued cause of action.”173  
Moreover, the court noted that the “majority rule” was that “an insurer’s 
responsibility under a liability policy accrues at the time the complainant 
suffers damage rather than at the time of the negligent act.”174  
Nevertheless, because there was no damage upon which liability could be 
imposed until decades after the asset sale, the court concluded that there 
was no right to insurance proceeds at the time of the sale, and thus the asset 
                                                                                                                 
166. See Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39. 
167. 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1939). 
168. 12 Cal. Rptr. 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). 
169. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 100 F.2d at 447; Greco, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 806. 
170. Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.   
171. Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 532-33. 
172. Id. at 533. 
173. Id. at 539 (citations omitted).   
174. Id. at 540.   
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purchaser did not acquire any rights to coverage for the environmental 
liability at issue. 
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, the decisions in Quemetco 
and Aero-Motive are flawed because, while these courts correctly 
acknowledged and agreed with the cases that anti-assignment conditions 
generally do not bar the transfer of coverage for pre-transfer losses, these 
courts failed to properly apply this conclusion.  While the courts were 
focused on the passage of statutes after the transfers in question that sought 
to impose retroactive liability, the courts ignored the fact that the common 
law typically provides a basis, such as under the laws of trespass and 
nuisance, for imposing liability for environmental property damage.  Thus, 
as subsequent courts have found, Successor Insureds may assert that the 
courts were arguably mistaken in concluding that there was no right to 
insurance proceeds at the time of the transfers in question.175  In addition, 
where a policyholder’s conduct has caused bodily injury or property 
damage, the policyholder arguably possesses, at a minimum, a conditional 
right under its insurance policies, and hence, even though this right may be 
conditioned on the subsequent imposition of liability for such conduct, the 
policyholder’s conditional right is transferable.176   
 
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Several recent court decisions have addressed the rights of a successor 
to access insurance coverage for pre-transfer losses.   
 
A. PILKINGTON AND GLIDDEN 
 
The Ohio Supreme Court recently issued two decisions holding that, 
where a successor assumed liabilities under a contract, the rights to 
coverage did not automatically transfer to the successor by operation of 
                                                                                                                 
175. See, e.g., Gopher Oil Co. v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 756, 
764 (Minn. App. 1999) (refusing to follow Quemetco because, while the loss at issue in 
Quemetco under California law arguably did not occur until Congress enacted CERCLA in 
1980, the loss at issue in Gopher Oil clearly occurred under Minnesota law at the time of the 
contamination).   
176. See supra Section IV.A. 
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law:  The Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.177 and Pilkington N. 
Am., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.178   
In order to address whether the insurance rights could be transferred, 
the Pilkington Court first examined the corporate history, which the Court 
set forth as follows:  prior to 1986, various insurance companies issued 
occurrence policies (the “LOF policies”) to Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass 
Company (“LOF Glass Co.”).179  In 1986, Pilkington purchased LOF Glass 
Co.’s glass-manufacturing business in a two-part transaction.  First, in 
February 1986, LOF Glass Co. placed the assets and liabilities of its glass-
manufacturing division into a new wholly-owned subsidiary, LOF Glass, 
Inc., pursuant to a Transfer and Assumption Agreement.180  Second, in 
March 1986, LOF Glass Co. entered into a Share Exchange Agreement 
with Pilkington Brothers P.L.C. and one of its subsidiaries, Pilkington 
Holdings, Inc., pursuant to which the Pilkington entities acquired all of the 
stock of the newly-formed LOF Glass, Inc.181  In July 2000, LOF Glass, 
Inc. was renamed Pilkington North America.182  As a result of the 
transactions, Pilkington obtained both the glass business and the 
environmental liabilities arising from the business, including liabilities 
arising from conduct by LOF Glass Co.183  Pilkington sought coverage for 
defense and indemnification for those liabilities under the LOF policies.184 
The court was presented with the question whether, despite the 
presence of anti-assignment conditions in the policies, Pilkington had the 
right to defense and indemnification under the LOF policies for the 
environmental liabilities it had assumed.185   The Ohio Supreme Court 
certified three questions of state law from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.186  The three questions 
                                                                                                                 
177. 861 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 2006). 
178. 681 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2006).  The issue of a successor’s rights to coverage also 
has been recently addressed in the courts of Indiana, and is pending before the Indiana 
Supreme Court in the case of Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. et al. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 870 
N.E.2d 529, 541 (Ind. Ct.App. 2007) (holding that "a chose in action arises under an 
occurrence-based insurance policy at the time of the covered loss.... The lack of a 
specifically defined amount of recovery is not fatal to the determination that a chose in 
action exists."), opinion vacated and transfer granted, 878 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Dec. 20, 2007). 
179. Pilkington, 861 N.E.2d at 124. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 123. 
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addressed by the court were:  (i) Whether Pilkington’s demand for defense 
and indemnification constituted a “chose in action”; (ii) whether anti-
assignment conditions in the policies barred Pilkington’s acquisition of 
such a chose in action; and (iii) whether rights to coverage for pre-transfer 
occurrences automatically followed liabilities by operation of law when the 
liabilities had been assumed by contract.187 
The court, rejecting the reasoning of the Henkel court that a chose in 
action arises when a sum certain is due and payable, held that “a chose in 
action arises under an occurrence-based insurance policy at the time of the 
covered loss.  The distinction created in Henkel does not align with the 
obligations recognized in Ohio that the insured’s right to recover arises 
automatically at the time of loss.”188  The court further ruled in favor of the 
Successor Insured Position that “[w]e see no reason to deviate from the 
standard rule on this issue, and thus we hold that the chose in action as to 
the duty to indemnify is unaffected by the anti-assignment provision when 
the covered loss has already occurred.”189 
Finally, the court rejected Pilkington’s argument that, because it had 
assumed liabilities by contract, it should be able to access the insurance 
rights by operation of law.  Rather, the court recognized that insureds may 
intend to transfer liabilities while retaining the insurance assets that may 
respond to those liabilities, and reasoned that “[t]he parties specifically 
contract to control liability.  Allowing indemnity to follow liability as a 
matter of law interferes with that control.”190  Accordingly, the court held 
that “when a covered occurrence under an insurance policy occurs before 
liability is transferred to a successor corporation, coverage does not arise 
by operation of law when the liability was assumed by contract.”191 
Relying on the reasoning set forth in the Pilkington decision, the Ohio 
Supreme Court in Glidden reversed the pro-successor holding of the Ohio 
Court of Appeals that rights to coverage followed liabilities by operation of 
law.192  Specifically, the Ohio Court of Appeals had held that Glidden’s 
rights to coverage arose by operation of law, following certain historical 
liabilities that had been transferred to it.  In so holding, the Court of 
Appeals had rejected the reasoning in Henkel that permitting the transfer of 
                                                                                                                 
187. Id. 
188. Id.  
189. The court did not reach a definitive holding regarding the transferability of the 
insurers’ duty to defend under the policies. Id. at 134. 
190. Id. at 131. 
191. Id. 
192. Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 861 N.E.2d 109, 115 (Ohio 2006). 
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insurance rights by operation of law would undercut the freedom of parties 
to contract as they please.  Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Ohio 
Supreme Court reiterated the reasoning set forth in Pilkington and held that 
rights to insurance coverage do not follow the transfer of liabilities by 
operation of law.193 
 
B. ELLIOTT 
 
In another recent Ohio decision, Elliott Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,194 
the district court for the Northern District of Ohio framed the question 
before it as follows:  “[T]he specific issue in this case [is] whether coverage 
can pass by operation of law where liability was assumed by contract.”195   
Specifically, the facts in Elliott were described by the court as follows:  
In 1957, the original Elliott Company and Carrier Corporation (“Carrier”) 
merged and Elliott Company was dissolved and operated thereafter as a 
division of Carrier (“Elliott Division”).196  For the next six years, the 
defendant insurer issued policies that insured Carrier and “The Elliott 
Company, A Division of Carrier Corporation.”197  In 1979, United 
Technologies Corporation (“UTC”) acquired Carrier, and the Elliott 
Division continued to operate as a division of Carrier.198    
In 1981, UTC incorporated Elliott Turbomachinery Company, Inc. 
(“Elliott Turbo”), and UTC, Carrier, and Elliott Turbo entered into an 
“Agreement and Plan of Reorganization and Corporate Separation” 
(“Separation Agreement”).199  Under the Separation Agreement, the parties 
agreed to transfer all of the assets and liabilities of the Elliott Division to 
Elliott Turbo.200  In the Elliott action, Elliott Turbo contends that, pursuant 
to the Separation Agreement, it also had transferred to it the insurance 
                                                                                                                 
193. Id. Based on the specific facts presented, the court further rejected Glidden’s 
arguments that rights to coverage were expressly transferred by the terms of the corporate 
transactional documents at issue, that the insurers were collaterally estopped from raising 
certain defenses to coverage, and that the insurers’ “corporate history” defense was barred 
by waiver and/or equitable estoppel.  Id. at 115-116. 
194. Elliot Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 483 (N.D. Ohio 2006), rev’d 
in part on reconsideration, 239 F.R.D. 479 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2006).  See supra note 134. 
195. Id. at 495. 
196. Id. at 486. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
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rights under the 1957-63 Carrier policies.201  However, the exhibit to the 
Separation Agreement that is identified therein as listing the specific assets 
transferred to Elliott Turbo has been lost and, as a result, the insurer argues 
that Elliott Turbo cannot establish that the insurance rights were transferred 
to it by contract.202 
When plaintiff Elliott Co. sought coverage under the Carrier policies 
for asbestos claims arising from the pre-transfer alleged conduct of the 
Elliott Division and Elliott Turbo, the insurer argued that, among other 
things, the anti-assignment conditions in its policies barred the assignment 
of coverage for such claims.203  Disagreeing with the insurer’s position, the 
court noted that the “vast majority of courts, including courts in Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York and Delaware, hold that no-
assignment clauses do not prevent the voluntary assignment of coverage 
rights under occurrence-based policies for claims related to preassignment 
occurrences.”204  Following such courts and rejecting the conflicting view 
espoused in Henkel, the court concluded that “no-assignment clauses do not 
preclude the assignment of coverage for preassignment occurrences.”205 
Having found that the insurers’ anti-assignment conditions did not 
apply, the court then addressed whether the parties intended in the relevant 
transactional agreements to transfer to plaintiff the rights to the coverage at 
issue.  The court initially found that the parties did not intend to transfer 
rights under the Carrier policies to plaintiff under the 1981 Separation 
Agreement.206  In addition, the court held that the rights under the Carrier 
policies were not transferred to plaintiff by “operation of law” where the 
liabilities at issue had been transferred to plaintiff by contract.207  In so 
holding, the court stated that, “[i]f sophisticated parties to a corporate 
transaction do not intend for the entity acquiring liability to also succeed to 
coverage, there is no reason for the courts to rewrite their contracts.”208 
                                                                                                                 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 491. 
203. Id. at 486-87. 
204. Id. at 490. 
205. Id. at 491   
206. Id. at 492.  The court subsequently granted Elliott’s motion for reconsideration 
and held that whether rights to coverage under the Carrier policies were transferred under 
the 1981 Separation Agreement is an issue of disputed fact. Elliot Co. v. Liberty Mutual 
Co., 239 F.R.D. 4791, 481 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2006). 
207. Elliot, 434 F.Supp. 2d at 496 (“When a successor entity acquires liability by 
contract, it is not entitled to coverage for that liability unless coverage was also acquired by 
contract.”). 
208. Id. at 498.   
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C. HOLLOWAY 
 
The Oregon Supreme Court adopted a different approach to the issue in 
Holloway v. Republic Indem. Co. of America.209  In Holloway, the insured 
sought coverage under a “Worker’s Compensation and Employers’ 
Liability Policy” for an injury claim brought by one of the insured’s 
employees.210  After the insurer denied coverage, the insured and claimant 
reached a settlement that stipulated to the entry of a judgment against the 
insured and to a covenant not to execute on that judgment against the 
insured for more than a fraction of the judgment.211  Under the settlement 
agreement and notwithstanding an anti-assignment condition in the policy, 
the insured also assigned her rights against the insurer for indemnity 
payments or any breach of the insurance contract to the claimant.212  The 
claimant then sought to recover from the insurer on the grounds that the 
anti-assignment condition was ambiguous and should be construed to not 
apply to losses that took place prior to the assignment.213 
Rejecting the validity of the assignment, the Oregon Supreme Court 
held that the anti-assignment condition in the policy did not distinguish 
between pre- and post-transfer losses:  “Nothing in the [anti-assignment] 
clause suggests a limitation to pre-loss rights or duties or provides an 
exception for post-loss rights or duties.  Reading such an exception into the 
policy would not be reasonable and would ‘insert what has been 
omitted.’”214  Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the 
anti-assignment clause in the employers’ liability policy at issue was 
unambiguous and precluded the insured’s assignment of rights.215 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After successfully defeating their coverage obligations in Henkel, 
insurers have been more aggressively raising the anti-assignment condition 
to attack policyholders’ claims for insurance coverage for latent bodily 
                                                                                                                 
209. 147 P.3d 329 (Or. 2006). 
210. Id. at 332. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 330. 
214. Id. at 334 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 42.230). 
215. Id. at 335 (“[T]he anti-assignment clause in question is not ambiguous … we 
conclude that that clause prohibited the assignment of rights from the insured to Holloway 
because the insured had not obtained [the insurer’s] written consent.”). 
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injury and property damage, such as environmental, asbestos and other 
delayed-manifestation claims.  To counter these arguments by insurers, 
Successor Insureds may rely on decisional law holding that anti-assignment 
conditions do not preclude the transfer of insurance rights relating to bodily 
injury or property damage that took place prior to the transfer.  These cases 
may successfully undermine insurers’ arguments, concluding that a 
policyholder may transfer to a third party its liability insurance rights 
without its insurers’ consent, whether the corporate transaction in which the 
insurance rights were transferred was a merger, stock sale, dissolution, or 
asset sale, even where the injury or damage at issue did not manifest until 
years after the transaction. 
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THE “RACE CARD” AND REFORMING 
AMERICAN HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
Dayna Bowen Matthew 
 
A person’s race defines little that is biologically distinctive.  However, 
as a social construct,1 race is a powerful determinant.  For example, race 
stubbornly continues to serve as a determinant of health care status, access, 
outcomes and medical well-being in America.  For the one-third of 
Americans who self-identify as racial or ethnic minorities,2  their race 
accurately predicts that they are more likely to be un-insured3 no matter 
what their income level or socio-economic status is,4 and completely 
independent of the level of education they may attain.5  Hispanics are the 
most likely group of Americans to be uninsured; 33% of Latinos (“non-
white Hispanics”) in this country were uninsured in 2001.6  African-
Americans followed closely (19% uninsured) and 18% of Asians were 
uninsured while only 14% of white Americans lacked health insurance 
during the same period, 7 although the United States Census Bureau 
estimates that whites represent over 66% of the American population.8  The 
simple fact is not only that more minorities than white Americans are 
uninsured, but that among racial and ethnic minority Americans, a 
substantially greater share are uninsured than are covered by health 
insurance. 
This disproportionate representation of minorities among the uninsured 
means that racial minorities are less likely to visit a primary care physician 
than whites; more likely to receive an inferior quality of care for cancer, 
                                                                                                                 
1. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 
Illusion, Fabrication,  and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1994). 
2. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERV., PUBL’N NO. 06-0017, 2005 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 119 
(2005) [hereinafter AHRQ DISPARITIES REPORT], available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/Nhdr05/nhdr05.pdf. 
3. See generally id. 
4. Id. at 91. 
5. Id. at 90-93. 
6. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUBL’N NO. P60-223, HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002 7 (2003), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-223.pdf. 
7. Id. 
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATE & COUNTRY QUICKFACTS 
(2008), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. 
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diabetes, heart disease and HIV/AIDS than whites; and by some measures, 
are more likely than whites to suffer iatrogenic injury when they do finally 
receive health care.9  The evidence shows that it does not matter whether 
one is a wealthy member of a minority group, or a poor one, a well-
educated or marginally-educated minority, a young or elderly minority; 
every member of racial and ethnic minority groups in America is more 
likely to have no health insurance than her white counterparts 
notwithstanding any other demographic characteristics they might share.  
Changing the health care system that has resulted in these disparities is 
currently the policy issue of choice. 
Health care reform has been a centerpiece of virtually all the 
presidential candidates’ platforms this election year.  Each major political 
party has articulated a general approach toward providing health insurance 
coverage for the 46 million uninsured in this nation.  Although the details 
of these various plans and approaches may differ, the many proposals to 
reform the American health insurance system fall into broad general 
categories, each likely to have an objectively identifiable, and predictable 
impact on people who are members of racial and ethnic minorities.  This 
essay examines and compares the likely impact of two major health 
insurance reform proposals on the health insurance disparities that persist 
for ethnic and racial minority Americans.   More specifically, this essay 
describes the extent to which these competing approaches to health 
insurance reform are likely to either help exacerbate or eradicate existing 
health care disparities.10 
 
                                                                                                                 
9. See AHRQ Disparities Report, supra note 2. 
10. My observations will depend on a few assumptions that I will state expressly at 
the outset.  There are many determinative factors that contribute to the health care 
disparities that separate the health status and outcomes of minority and majority Americans, 
socio-economic differences, levels of stress, social and behavioral choices such as diet and 
exercise, these and other factors all contribute to disparate health outcomes.  Some 
biological differences that trend along racial and ethnic lines, as well as environmental risk 
factors, and differences in morbidity and mortality rates that differ with ethnicity may all be 
responsible to some extent for disparities now well documented.  However, this essay is 
about the confirmed link between health insurance status and health status.  That is, I 
assume that the answer to the question of whether increased health insurance coverage will 
ultimately result in improved health care status is “yes.”  I assume that increased health 
insurance coverage will lead to increased access to health care, which will improve the 
quality of health care which will result in improving the health outcomes and status of those 
who are able to obtain health insurance. 
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MINORITY WORKERS AND EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH 
INSURANCE  
 
First and foremost it is important to understand that disparities in health 
care flow directly from disparate access to health insurance coverage that 
minorities experience through our employer-based insurance system.  
Employers are the source of health insurance coverage for nearly 60% of 
all Americans.11   Thus, the structural relationship between minority 
Americans and their level of employment, fundamentally determines their 
health insurance status.  For example, Latinos are far less likely to be 
insured simply because they are also far less likely to have jobs that 
provide health benefits.   
The dominance of employer-based health insurance is largely an 
accident of this country’s economic history.  Employers responded to post-
World War II wage freezes by offering health benefits as an alternative 
way to attract and retain labor.12  Later, the federal government began to 
subsidize this method of compensation.13  Beginning in 1954, federal tax 
subsidies available to employers made contributions they paid on behalf of 
employees to purchase health insurance premiums deductible as a business 
expense.14  Moreover, the amount of those health insurance premiums paid 
for employees is also excludable from the employee’s taxable income.15  
The outcome is that this federal tax subsidy of employer-based insurance 
was estimated to be worth $188.5 billion per year which is more than the 
approximately $171.9 billion spent on Medicaid public insurance for the 
categorically poor and disabled in the same period.16 
Poor Americans and those Americans belonging to ethnic and racial 
minority groups have not fared comparatively well under this employer-
based health insurance model.    Three sets of data explain why.  First, the 
number of minority workers employed by smaller firms; second the 
                                                                                                                 
11. David S. Johnson, Chief, Housing and Household Economic Statistics, U.S. 
Census Bureau, Remarks at the News Conference on 2006 Income, Poverty and Health 
Insurance Coverage Estimates from the Current Population Survey and the American 
Community Survey (Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/2007/djohnson_remarks07iph.htm. 
12. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States – 
Origins and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a 
More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 17 & n.117 (2005). 
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number of minority workers who are part-time rather than full-time 
employees; and third, the rate at which minority employees decline to 
accept partial payment of health insurance premiums offered on their 
behalf are datasets that all provide insight into the way that employer-based 
health insurance disadvantages minorities.  Understanding these three 
factors in turn is prerequisite to understanding the effect that insurance 
reform proposals have on minority versus majority Americans. 
Small employers provide less coverage than larger employers.  
Minority workers are disproportionately represented in smaller firms.  Only 
43% of firms employing fewer than 25 employees offer health benefits 
while over 81% of firms which employ 100 or more employees provide 
health insurance.17  However Hispanic-, Black-, and Asian-American 
employees comprise 25.2%, 16.6%, and 9.5% of all workers in firms with 
fewer than 25 employees.18  Put another way, over half the small-firm 
workers in America belong to these three minority groups who comprise 
only 30% of the general population.  Moreover, as the size of American 
firms increases, thus increasing the likelihood that an employer can afford 
to provide health benefits to its employees, the number of Hispanic 
employees in these large firms declines.19  It is easy, therefore, to see why 
and how Hispanic-Americans suffer a greater incidence of un-insurance 
than any racial or ethnic group in the nation.   
Most uninsured workers are low-income, part-time, minority workers 
who are most likely young, female members of racial and ethnic minority 
groups.  In 2003, 30% of workers earning less than $20,000 were uninsured 
while only 5.8% of workers earning $50,000 or more were similarly 
situated.20  Also, employers who do not offer health insurance are more 
likely to employ a higher number of part-time, rather than full-time 
workers, and part-time employees are more likely to be minority, female 
and poor. 
Poorer workers have lower “take-up” rates, declining partial assistance 
offered to pay their insurance premiums as part of employer-sponsored 
programs more often than wealthier workers; these poorer workers are 
disproportionately members of racial and ethnic minority groups.  While 
19% of workers making less than the federal poverty level decline 
employment-based health insurance when offered, only 2% of workers fail 
                                                                                                                 
17. Id. at 17. 
18. Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small Business Employees, MONTHLY LABOR 
REV. 13, 14-15 (April 2000). 
19. Id. at 15. 
20. Hermer, supra note 16, at 18. 
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to “take-up” employment-based health insurance when offered these 
benefits once their incomes reach or exceed 300% of the federal poverty 
level.21  This is because employees’ premium shares represent a higher 
percentage of poor employees’ incomes than of wealthier employees’ 
incomes.   
In summary, the racial and ethnic composition of America’s work-
force is structurally skewed to concentrate minority workers in those jobs 
where health insurance is least accessible.  Minority workers are more 
likely to be employed in part-time jobs with small employers who pay a 
smaller share of their health insurance premiums.  The outcome is 
predictable: more minority employees than majority employees are 
uninsured. 
 
MARKET-BASED PROPOSALS TO REFORM EMPLOYER-
BASED INSURANCE 
 
At this writing, four candidates remain in the race for the Republican 
nomination for president of the United States.22  All four have proposed a 
version of health insurance reform that they characterize as “market-based” 
reform and that features a role for individual health savings accounts.23  
Generally, health savings accounts (HSA’s) are tax-favored plans that 
allow consumers to self-insure to cover their first-dollar health 
expenditures, while carrying high-deductible health insurance policies to 
pay for catastrophic and last-dollar care. Professor Regina Jefferson has 
observed that these accounts benefit wealthy Americans more than they 
benefit middle-income or poor consumers.24  Moreover, HSA’s are most 
advantageous for the healthy that have relatively low medical expenditures 
and therefore can use the HSA account as a pre-tax savings plan.  Finally, 
individuals who are knowledgeable and able to be vigilant to control the 
order and timing of their medical expenses can take greater advantage of 
the limitations that apply to investing and deducting expenses from their 
                                                                                                                 
21. Id. at 19. 
22. John McCain, Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, and Ron Paul. 
23. See Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Policy Alternatives, Former 2008 
Presidential Candidate Health Care Proposals: Side-by-Side Summary (2008), 
http://www.health08.org/sidebyside.cfm (click on link to view pdf); On the Issues: Straight 
Talk on Health System Reform, John McCain 2008 – John McCain for President, 
http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/ (click on “Health Care” in left hand column) 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
24. Regina T. Jefferson, Medical Savings Accounts: Windfalls for the Healthy, 
Wealthy & Wise, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 685, 689 (1999). 
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HSA’s.  In a pithy but accurate summary, Jefferson points out that HSA 
plans disproportionately benefit those in society least in need of assistance:  
those who are already “healthy, wealthy and wise.”25 
The average American spends approximately $975 annually on health 
care.26  Individuals whose employers contribute more than this, either to 
their HSA accounts or to pay premiums, gain the most from these plans 
because they will be able to rollover the HSA funds not used to cover 
health expenses in a given year.  These accounts favor those who are able 
to pay the high deductibles on policies that accompany HSA’s, out of their 
current income.  Americans who do not have the discretionary income to 
cover several thousand dollars of health expenses out-of-pocket, are not 
helped by having access to these plans.  Moreover, low and moderate 
income taxpayers benefit significantly less than high income tax payers 
from HSA accounts because they tend to save less.  This is confirmed by 
evidence from IRA savings accounts which are analogous.  Only 26.5% of 
households earning under $25,000 made IRA contributions while 43.8% of 
those earning $200,000 to $500,000 made these IRA contributions.27  
Minority households are disproportionately over-represented among these 
lower income households and therefore are unlikely to efficiently make use 
of the savings benefits offered by HSA’s.28  Conversely, minority 
households are disproportionately under-represented in higher income tax 
bracket households which are those most able to benefit from the tax 
advantages available through HSA’s.  The exclusion benefits under HSA 
plans benefit wealthy more than moderate and low income taxpayers for 
two additional reasons.  First, the value of the exclusion increases as 
income rises because of the progressive tax structure that takes larger 
percentages of the exclusion for higher income families.  Second, upper 
income taxpayers are likely to work for employers who pay a more 
generous share of their health premiums or make a more generous HSA 
contribution.   
In summary, the feature shared by conservative health reform proposals 
is to place more discretion and control with the consumer.  HSA accounts 
                                                                                                                 
25. Id. 
26. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Healthcare Financing Trends, 2008 MED. COST 
REFERENCE GUIDE 10. 
27. P. Sailer, V. Bryant & S. Holden, Trends in 401(k) and IRA Contribution Activity, 
1999-2002 at 168-169, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05sailer.pdf. (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2008). 
28. William H. First, Overcoming Disparities in U. S. Health Care, 24 HEALTH AFF. 
445, 446 (2005). 
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are a key part of this approach to health insurance inform.  Yet, the impact 
of this market-based reform is likely to be less helpful to minorities than it 
will be to white Americans directly, and will be highly unlikely to have any 
meaningful impact on reducing health care disparities between minority 
and majority Americans.   
 
EXPANDING PUBLIC INSURANCE ALTERNATIVES TO 
EMPLOYER-BASED INSURANCE 
 
Two Democratic candidates for president remain in the 2008 election.29  
Both purport to advocate “universal health coverage” as their approach to 
reforming our current system of health care financing.  Both feature the 
Democrats’ standard approach to covering the uninsured:  expansion of 
current public insurance programs including Medicaid and the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program.30  This reform bypasses the 
vicissitudes of disparities associated with the employer-based insurance 
system discussed above.  However, increasing minority Americans’ 
reliance on public insurance programs exposes these beneficiaries to the 
most politically volatile and vulnerable sources of health insurance 
available.  Medicaid has never been politically popular as evinced by the 
annual efforts to cut back benefits and reduce expenditures to the disabled 
and “categorically needed” covered by these plans.  Yet, minority 
Americans rely on public health insurance programs more than white 
Americans.  In 2006, 24.35% of all American Indian and Alaskan Native 
Americans obtained Medicaid coverage; 26.8% of African Americans and  
23.1% of Hispanic Americans were covered by Medicaid in the same year.  
However, in 2006 only 9.5% of all Non-Hispanic Whites received 
Medicaid benefits. 31  Twenty eight percent of African-Americans, 23% of 
                                                                                                                 
29. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. 
30. See Edward M. Kennedy, The Role of the Federal Government in Eliminating 
Health Disparities, 24 HEALTH AFF. 452, 454 (2005) (stating that Senator Kennedy is the 
ranking Democrat  on the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and that in his 
view “[t]he most effective way to benefit minorities is through the expansion of Medicaid 
and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program…”); Kaiser Family Foundation & 
Health Policy Alternatives, 2008 Presidential Candidate Health Care Proposals: Side-by-
Side Summary (2008), http://www.health08.org/sidebyside.cfm (click on check boxes below 
Clinton and Obama and then click “compare”). 
31. National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 2007 With Chartbook 
on Trends in the Health of Americans at 402, Table 138 (2007) (Yet, this relatively small 
proportion of the Non-Hispanic White population accounts for over 43% of all Medicaid 
enrollees.  See, Department of Health and Human Services, A Profile of Medicaid 
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Latino-Americans, 10% of Asian-Americans and 12% of White-Americans 
rely upon Medicaid, Medicare, or other forms of publicly sponsored health 
insurance.32 
Ironically, although a greater share of minority groups rely upon public 
health insurance than white Americans, minorities in America are curiously 
under-represented in the most universal of all universal health insurance 
plans.  Medicare covers all Americans who reach age 65, regardless of 
race, ethnicity, income, health status, or any other demographic.  
Nevertheless, by comparing the race of Medicare beneficiaries to their pro-
rated representation in the general population, we can confirm that race 
matters even in universal health plans.  For example, whites comprise 82% 
of elderly Medicare beneficiaries, but represent just over 65% of the 
American population.33  Conversely, 7% of Medicare beneficiaries are 
Latino and 8% are African-American while these minority groups represent 
14% and 12% of the general population respectively.34  A partial 
explanation for this disparity must include the fact that minority Americans 
do not live as long as white Americans do and therefore are a smaller 
percentage of the elderly population covered by Medicare.  However, it is 
also important to recognize that even universal public health insurance 
coverage cannot, alone, erase health disparities between minority and 
majority Americans, and may, if not carefully structured, actually 
exacerbate racial health disparities. 
 
WHAT WILL WORK? 
 
Some reforms in private health insurance can reduce disparities.  For 
example, to the extent that health insurance reform addresses economic 
disadvantages faced by employees seeking to purchase health insurance 
through their employers, either by subsidizing those premium contributions 
or by limiting the premiums that can be charged to a percentage of income, 
minorities will be more likely to choose private health coverage for 
themselves and their families.  Further, those health insurance reform plans 
that include relief for small businesses facing catastrophic health expenses, 
                                                                                                                          
Chartbook 2000 at 24 (HCFA Form 2082) available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TheChartSeries/downloads/2Tchartbk.pdf). 
32. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KEY FACTS: RACE, ETHNICITY & MEDICAL CARE 14 
(2007), available at http://www.kff.org/minorityhealth/upload/6069-02.pdf. 
33. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare:  A Profile at 70 (July 2000) 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TheChartSeries/downloads/35chartbk.pdf. 
34. Id. 
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either through reimbursements or tax credits, are more likely to reduce the 
number of minorities who are uninsured.  But perhaps the most meaningful 
of all possible health insurance reforms is one that neither conservatives 
nor liberals have yet addressed.   
Health insurers are uniquely positioned to collect race and ethnicity 
data to evaluate demographically information such as the incidence and 
size of claims, usage of covered services, patterns of provider practices, 
availability of coverage plans, incidence of certain covered diseases and 
catastrophes, and a host of other indicators that would shed light on the 
facts about the access racial and ethnic minority Americans have to health 
insurance and care.  This data is largely unavailable from any other source.  
Yet, the 2004 report of the American Health Insurance Plans found that 
nearly half of health plan enrollees belong to plans that do not collect data 
on race and ethnicity.35   Here, the wisdom of the adage that is true for 
engineers and physicists is also true for health insurance reform: “that 
which can be measured can be changed.”   Current proposals to reform 
health insurance track political platforms and priorities and they accurately 
reflect the broad principles of their sponsors.  However, in order to 
purposefully address the racial disparities in health care access that are 
attributable to minorities’ status within the financing structure of the 
American health care system, reformers absolutely must not be afraid to 
“play the race card.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
35. AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS (AHIP), HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 
ADDRESS DISPARITIES IN CARE: HIGHLIGHTS OF A 2004 AHIP/RWJF QUANTITATIVE SURVEY - 
COLLECTION AND USE OF DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?bc=38|82|5859.  The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality have formed the National Health Plan Collaborative to reduce racial 
and ethnic disparities and improve the overall quality of healthcare in the United States.  
This Collaborative has sponsored efforts to improve collection of race and ethnicity data.  
NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN COLLABORATIVE, PHASE ONE SUMMARY REPORT 1-2, 7 (2006), 
available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/NHPCSummaryReport2006Revised.pdf. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The declaratory judgment action is the modern legal vehicle for 
determining whether coverage exists under an insurance policy.  Generally, 
declaratory judgments were not recognized as remedies in the United States 
until the early 1900’s.1  In 1922, the Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA),2 effectively 
standardizing declaratory judgments throughout the United States.3  The 
great majority of states have adopted some version of the UDJA.4 
                                                                                                                 
1. Russell B. Hill, Should Anticipation Kill Application of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act?, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 240 (2004); Mark Peter Henriques, Desuetude and 
Declaratory Judgment: A New Challenge to Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1060-61 
(1990). 
2. UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 1 to 17 (2007). 
3. See Hill, supra note 1, at 240; Sean Gay, Declaratory Relief and Sovereign 
Immunity in Oregon: Can Someone Tell Me if I Turned Square Corners?, 40 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 563, 567 (2004); See also Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord 
Over Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral 
Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory 
Judgments—1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1142 (1998). 
4.  See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-220 to -232 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1831 to -
1846 (2007); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-111-101 to -111 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-51-
101 to -115 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501 to -13 (2007); FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011 to -
111 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-4-1 to -10 (2007); IDAHO CODE §§ 10-1201 to -1217 (2007); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-701 (2007); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-14-1-1 to -16 (2007); IOWA R. 
CIV. P. 1.1101 to -1109 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1701 to -1716 (2007); LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. ANN. arts. 1871 to -83 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5951 to -63 (West 
2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-401 to -415 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 231A, §§ 1-9 (2007); MINN. STAT. §§ 555.01 to -16 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 527.010 to 
-130 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-101 to -313 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,149 to 
-164 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:16-50 to -62 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-6-1 to 
-15 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-23-01 to -13 
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2721.01 to -16 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1651 to 
-57 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.010 to -160 (2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7531 to -41 
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Following the states’ lead, in 1934 Congress enacted the Federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act5 (FDJA), and authorized federal courts to 
similarly grant declaratory judgment relief.6  As early as 1937, the United 
States Supreme Court held that an insurance coverage dispute presents a 
judicial controversy for which a District Court has the authority to hear and 
determine pursuant to the FDJA.7   
Declaratory judgment actions provide “a speedy and inexpensive 
method of adjudicating legal disputes without invoking coercive remedies 
…”8  Declaratory judgments may often be employed to dispose of issues in 
the initial stages of a dispute before the parties would otherwise need to 
                                                                                                                          
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-30-1 to -16 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2007); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-24-1 to -16 (2007); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 29-14-101 to -113 
(2007); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001 to -11 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-33-1 to -13 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4711 to -25 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 8.01-184 to -191 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.24.010 to -144 (2007); W. VA. 
CODE, §§ 55-13-1 to -16 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 806.04 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-37-101 
to -115 (2007). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). 
6. Rice, supra note 3, at 1143-44 (The FDJA provides in relevant part: “In a case of 
actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of 
an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested 
party seeking declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.  Any such 
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be 
reviewable as such.”); See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). 
7. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937); See also Am. Nat’l 
Fire Ins. Co. v. The Hungerford, 53 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We have 
previously held that a dispute between an insurer and its insured over the duties to defend 
and indemnify satisfies the requirement for purposes of the [Federal] Declaratory Judgment 
Act, whether or not there is an underlying state court action.”). The FDJA does not provide 
an independent basis for federal jurisdiction and a district court must rely upon its original 
jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory judgment action. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (noting that federal jurisdiction can be based upon 
diversity and the district court has discretion to exercise that jurisdiction); Wilton v. Seven 
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995) (“Brillhart makes clear that District Courts possess 
discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the [Federal] 
Declaratory Judgment Act.”).  
8. See Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 
1975); Beacon Const. Co., Inc. v. Matco Elec. Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975); 
See also Ryan R. Dreyer, Civil Procedure-Discouraging Declaratory Actions In Minnesota-
The Res Judicata Effect Of Declaratory Judgments in Light of State v. Joseph, 29 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 616 (2002); Eugene L. Stewart, Procedural Issues and Remedies in 
the Administration and Judicial Resolution of Customs and International Trade Cases: The 
Role of Sanctions, Contempt, Assessment of Costs, and Extraordinary Legal Remedies in 
Reforming Practice Before The Court of International Trade, 3 FLA. INT’L L. J. 341, 391 
(1988). 
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proceed to full blown litigation.9  Thus, declaratory judgments often serve 
to eliminate unnecessary time and expense otherwise incurred in fishing 
expeditions in many contexts.10   
In crafting the declaratory judgment complaint, as counsel begins to 
pencil in the captioned names, a question arises as to who needs to be 
named as defendants in the suit.  Obviously, in the insurance context, the 
insureds must be named since their policies are being interpreted.11  
Whether necessary or not,12 insurance companies also typically name the 
underlying claimants as defendants because they are considered to have an 
interest in the outcome of a declaratory judgment action that will determine 
insurance coverage for their claims and insurers wish to ensure that the 
determination is binding on all parties.  However, unique problems can 
arise based upon this practice.  One such problem, which is the focus of 
this article, arises where both the state and federal governments are the 
underlying tort claimants.  
It is not uncommon for the actions of an insured to implicate both state 
and federal regulations, especially in the area of environmental 
                                                                                                                 
9. Dreyer, supra note 8, at 616. 
10. Id.  
11. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hugee, 32 F.Supp. 665, 669 (E.D.S.C. 
1940); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. of Ill. v. Cieri, 23 F.Supp. 435, 435-36 (M.D.Pa. 1938); 
Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Dupont, 21 F.Supp. 606, 608 (D.Del. 1937); Cont’l Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Cochrane, 4 P.2d 308, 310 (Colo. 1931); See also Weissbard v. Potter Drug & Chem. 
Corp., 69 A.2d 559, 561 (N.J.Super.Ch. 1949)  (“A contract may not be declared null and 
void in the absence of a party to the contract.”).  
12. There is some debate among jurisdictions on whether a third-party claimant is a 
necessary and/or indispensable party in a declaratory judgment action filed by an insurance 
carrier against its insured for purposes of determining the insurance carrier’s liability for an 
incident between the insured and the third-party. Compare CFI Wis., Inc. v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 230 F.R.D. 552, 554 (W.D. Wis. 2005) ( “[An] injured third-party is a necessary 
party in a declaratory judgment action by an insurance company seeking to determine its 
liability arising from an occurrence between its insured and the injured party.”), and Am. 
Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Rogers, 123 F.Supp. 2d 461, 467 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in Am. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 507, 508-09 (N.D. Ill. 1997), with 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 230 (3d Cir. 2005) and Ace Am. Ins. 
Co. v. Paradise Divers, Inc.  216 F.R.D. 537, 540 (S.D.Fla. 2003) (holding that because the 
third-party claimant’s interests are adequately represented by the insured in a declaratory 
judgment action regarding coverage under the insured’s policy, the third-party claimant is 
not indispensable), and Austin Fireworks, Inc. v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 809 F.Supp. 829, 830-31 
(D.Kan. 1992), and Black Diamond Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 621 F.Supp. 96, 97-98 (S.D.W.Va. 1985), and County of Wyoming, NY v. Erie 
Lackawanna Ry. Co., 360 F.Supp. 1212, 1215 (W.D.N.Y. 1973). 
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regulation.13  For example, an insured performs clearing operations to 
prepare a piece of land for development.  However, the insured contractor, 
during the course of these clearing operations, discharged dredged or fill 
material into neighboring waterways.  Based upon these actions, both the 
federal and state governments asserted separate claims against the insured 
pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”)14 and the state clean 
water laws15 respectively.  The action brought by the federal government 
was filed in federal court and the action brought by the state government 
was filed in state court.  Based upon certain terms of the policy, it is the 
insurance company’s belief that the insured contractor is not covered under 
the policy for the allegations in either lawsuit.  Both lawsuits arise out of 
precisely the same actions committed by the insured.    It does not make 
judicial or economic sense to litigate the same coverage issue in two 
separate declaratory judgment proceedings which could result in 
inconsistent adjudications.16  Accordingly, the insurer wishes to file a 
                                                                                                                 
13. See, e.g. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423, 
1424 (1st Cir. 1991) ( involving lawsuitsfiled against insured company by both the United 
States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act [CERCLA] and other environmental and civil 
statutes seeking damages and cleanup costs resulting from pollution of the Acushnet River 
and New Bedford Harbor); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F.Supp. 731, 733 (W.D. 
Mich. 1991) (involving claims by both the United States and the State of Michigan under 
section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, for the recovery of response costs incurred in 
connection with the contamination of the Verona Well Field); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wausau 
Chem. Corp., 809 F.Supp. 680, 689-90 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (involving a declaratory judgment 
action brought by an insurer against an insured chemical company seeking declaration that 
there was no obligation to defend or indemnify the insured chemical company for CERCLA 
response costs incurred pursuant to consent decree with the United States and the State of 
Wisconsin); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1097 
(Ohio 1992) (involving a declaratory judgment action over right to defense and indemnity 
from insurers for lawsuits filed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and 
the State of Ohio due to leakage of pollutants from landfill). See also Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd's v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 2006 WL 2050962, *3-*4  (D. Colo. 2006) 
(involving a declaratory judgment action over coverage for claims alleged against an insured 
by both the United States and the State of Colorado for false or fraudulent claim 
submissions under Medicare and Medicaid). 
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2007). 
15. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, §§ 26-53 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 204.006-
.141 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-211 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 90.48.010-
.910 (2007). 
16. Courts have consistently recognized that inconsistent adjudications do not serve 
the interests of justice and judicial economy.  See Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 
776 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that one of the factors to consider in 
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single declaratory judgment lawsuit against the insured, the federal 
government, and the state government in order to resolve this single issue 
of coverage and have a single binding decision on all of the interested 
parties.   
It is at this point that the insurance company faces a conundrum: where 
should the insurer file this action, state or federal court?  Can the insurer 
file such a single action against both governmental entities in either state or 
federal court?  Does the insurer have to file two separate actions?  If so, 
will an insurer be faced with the possibility of two divergent and 
inconsistent decisions on the same issue?  These are just some of the issues 
that an insurer must grapple with when a contemplated declaratory 
judgment involves dual sovereigns—the state and federal governments.  
In order to be able to determine the best path through this maze of 
problems, it is important to first examine the history and development of 
the underlying principles.  The first part of this article discusses the concept 
of dual sovereignty of federal and state governments as was designed in the 
Constitution and preserved through judicial and legislative actions.  Part II 
analyzes the actions of the federal courts in preserving dual sovereignty 
through use of the abstention doctrine.  Part III addresses the enactment of 
the Eleventh Amendment and the impact of this Constitutional amendment 
on dual sovereignty through the delineation of sovereign immunity 
reserved by the States.  The second part of this article addresses the specific 
dilemma created by dual sovereignty principles, as set forth briefly above, 
where an insurance company wishes to file a declaratory judgment action 
against both the state and federal governments.  Each possible scenario is 
addressed separately:  (1) Part IV discusses the issues involved in filing a 
declaratory judgment against the federal government in federal court; (2) 
Part V discusses the issues involved in filing a declaratory judgment 
against the federal government in state court; (3) Part VI discusses the 
issues involved in filing a declaratory judgment against the state 
government in federal court; and (4) Part VII discusses the issues involved 
in filing a declaratory judgment against the state government in state court.  
                                                                                                                          
consolidation of cases under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the risk of 
inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)  
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate 
actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent 
or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, . . .  
 Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 551, 559 (D.Md. 2006). 
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Finally, in part VIII, the article addresses how to effectively try and rectify 
the procedural obstacle course created by dual sovereignty and reach a 
practical solution for this procedural conundrum.    
 
II.  PRESERVATION OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH 
FEDERAL ABSTENTION. 
 
Dual sovereignty is the foundation of the governmental structure of the 
United States.17  Under the concept of dual sovereignty, states hold 
sovereignty18 concurrently with the federal government.  This shared 
sovereignty is subject only to those limitations imposed by the supremacy 
clause of the United States Constitution.19  
Federal courts recognize duel sovereignty through the Federal 
Abstention Doctrine.  There are many types of abstention.20  The principle 
variants of abstention are:  Pullman,21 Burford,22 and Younger23 abstention.  
The various types of abstention “are not rigid pigeon holes into which 
federal courts must try to fit cases.  Rather, they reflect a complex of 
                                                                                                                 
17. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).   
18. For the advantages and disadvantages of the dual sovereignty system: see 
generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah J.  Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988). 
19. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (stating that the central purpose of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine is to accord the States the respect owed to them as “joint 
sovereigns”); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 
146 (1993). 
20. Many concepts can be labeled as part of the abstention doctrine.  A case in point is 
exemplified by the so-called Rooker-Feldman abstention which originated from Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
460 U.S. 462 (1983) (stating that under Rooker-Feldman abstention, the court recognizes 
that Congress has conferred original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction on the federal 
district courts.)  Rooker-Feldman abstention prevents a state court party from having two 
bites at the apple:  one through the state courts with a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the other through a subsequent collateral attack originating in the federal courts.  Where 
a party begins litigating a constitutional matter in state court and stops short of petitioning 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and then initiates litigation in federal court regarding the same 
constitutional matter, the federal district court can abstain.  Rooker-Feldman abstention 
essentially holds that the federal district court does not have appellate jurisdiction over the 
state court.  The state court party should continue through the state court proceeding up 
through the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. 
21. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
22. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
23. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that 
contemplates parallel judicial processes.”24 
Federal courts have original power to abstain from exercising 
jurisdiction through principles of equity.25  In order to maintain a balance 
between state and federal sovereignty, the abstention doctrine was 
judicially formulated.26   Cases merit abstention where the proceedings 
implicate some discernable state interest or state law.27  While the state 
interest test has been substantially mitigated recently,28 there must at least 
be a superficial state interest present to trigger abstention. 
Under the Pullman abstention, “when a federal constitutional claim is 
premised on an unsettled question of state law, the federal court should stay 
its hand in order to provide the state court’s an opportunity to settle the 
underlying state-law question and thus avoid the possibility of 
unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question.”29  Under Burford 
                                                                                                                 
24. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). 
25. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (“It has long been 
established that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it 
‘is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity.’” (quoting Fair Assessment in 
Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
26. See generally Charles Alan Wright, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 
4241 (1988).  (stating that supporters of abstention assert that it promotes a wiser balance of 
judicial federalism); see, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention, the Supreme Court and 
Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1151 (1974); David L. Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (writing that critics assert the 
superiority of federal courts over state courts as enforcers of federal rights);   Burt 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) (“The only judicial 
forums in our system capable of enforcing counter majoritarian checks in a sustained, 
effective manner are the federal courts.”).   
27. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).   
28.  Ann Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: 
Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1083-90 
(1988) (arguing that Pennzoil eliminates the state interest test as a requirement for 
abstention). 
29. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  Orr v. Orr, 440 
U.S. 268, 285 (1979) (Powell, L., dissenting) (quoting Harris County Comm'rs Court v. 
Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975)).  See also Moore, 442 U.S. at 427-28 ( “A federal action 
should be stayed pending determination in state court of state-law issues central to the 
constitutional dispute.”); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978); Ohio Bureau of 
Employment Serv. V. Hoodry, 431 U.S. 471. 477 (1898) ( “[Pullman abstention] involves 
an inquiry focused on the possibility that the state courts may interpret a challenged state 
statute so as to eliminate or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question 
presented.”); Boehning v. Indiana State Emp. Assn., Inc., 423 U.S. 6 (1975); Askew v. 
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 
378 U.S. 540 (1964); Dresner v. Tallahassee, 378 U.S. 539 (1964); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 
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abstention,30 the Federal Court considers the independence of state 
governments in carrying out domestic policy, and seeks to avoid conflict 
between state and federal courts.31  Burford abstention is not based on a 
need to defer to a concurrent state court proceeding.  Rather, Burford 
counsels that a district court should abstain from hearing a case if the case 
involves a difficult question of state law or if it implicates a state regulatory 
scheme, regardless of the presence of an ongoing state proceeding.32  Under 
Younger abstention33, “a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal 
prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except in very 
                                                                                                                          
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); 
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). 
30. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (stating that the origin of Burford 
Abstention is equitable in nature.  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (stating that lower federal 
courts have disagreed on the propriety of abstention in cases involving legal rather than 
equitable claims).  Compare Tribute Co. v. Abiloa, 66 F.3d 12, 16 (2nd Cir. 1995) (“Burford 
Abstention is generally appropriate in cases where equitable relief is sought.”); Garamendi 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A District Court may not abstain 
under Burford when the plaintiff seeks only legal relief.”); Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 
777 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Nigard, J., concurring) (“Burford Abstention is simply not available 
when legal, rather than equitable or declaratory, relief is sought.”); Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 
F.2d. 878, 882 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that abstention is improper in cases asserting only 
inequitable claims); University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 
271 (3rd Cir. 1991) (Burford Abstention is limited to federal courts sitting in equity); with 
Riley, 45 F.3d at 772, n.7, (expressing doubt that the restriction against applying Burford 
Abstention in non-equitable suits is still good law); Gen.l Glass Indus. v. Monsour Medical 
Found., 973 F.2d 197, 202 (3rd Cir. 1992) (“Decisional authority remains inconclusive as to 
whether Burford Abstention may be ordered only in cases of inequitable nature. . . .”); 
Taffet v. Southern Co. 930 F.2d 847, 853 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Though abstention rulings 
premised upon principles of comity and federalism were originally developed in the context 
of actions seeking equitable relief, those principles have also been applied to actions seeking 
monetary actions.”); Lac D’Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. Am.Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 
1033, 1044 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“If the relief sought is legal and the disruption is of the extent 
and character suggesting that Burford Abstention is appropriate, a refusal to abstain simply 
because the federal court is not sitting as a court of equity makes no sense.”).     
31. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 727-28.  Burford Abstention requires a district court to 
abstain from hearing a case if the case involves a different question of state law or if it 
implicates a state regulatory scheme, regardless of the presence of an ongoing state 
proceeding.  New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 
(1989).  As such, it is not predicated upon a need to defer to a concurrent state court 
proceeding. 
32. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 361. 
33. See Younger, 401 U.S. 37.  Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68 (1971).  See also 
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976) ( 
“[A]bstention is inappropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid 
state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state 
criminal proceedings.”).   
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unusual situations, where necessary to prevent immediate irreparable 
injury.”34  Although the Younger doctrine has equitable origins, the 
Supreme Court has, in large part, abandoned the equitable foundation in 
cases subsequent to Younger.35   
The court appears to be moving towards a merger of the various 
abstention doctrines.36  For example, in Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States,37 the court tied the variations on 
abstention together under the broader category of “exceptional 
circumstances.”38  The Court found that there are “exceptional 
circumstances” relating to “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to 
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of 
litigation,”39 and that the exceptional circumstances should be weighed 
against the duty to exercise federal jurisdiction.40  The Pullman, Burford 
                                                                                                                 
34. Samuels, 401 U.S. at 69.  See also Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816 (“Abstention 
is inappropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, 
federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal 
proceedings.”). 
35. See George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide--
Rethinking the Younger Abstention 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 120 n.56 (1990) (writing 
that post-Younger cases have strayed form the equitable rationale); Rehnquist, supra note 
36, at 1088 n. 219, 1089; Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: 
Pennzoil Co., v. Texaco Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1007 (1989) (writing that Younger’s 
progeny toppled the equitable pillar in favor of federalism and comity); Larry W. Yackle, 
Explaining Habeus Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1042 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court has eroded the equitable foundation to the doctrine).  Numerous lower court cases 
have addressed Younger as a case based on comity and federalism as opposed to equity.  
See, e.g. Warmust v. Melahn, 62 F.3d 252, 255 (8th Cir. 1995) vacated 116 S. Ct. 2493 
(1996) (stating that Younger Abstention has its roots in comity and federalism); Schilling v. 
White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1084 n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Younger doctrine is founded 
in federalism and comity); Gwyned Properties v. Lower Gwyned Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 
1199-2000 (3rd Cir. 1992) (same). 
36. See Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil:  The Consequences of Federal 
Court Deference to State Court Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 212 (1989) (stating 
that similarities between various abstention doctrines outweigh differences and therefore 
one test for abstention should be adopted); and Stephen Jon Moss, Comment, Pennzoil: A 
Merger of Federal Abstention, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 607 (1988) (stating that Pennzoil 
effectively merged Pullman and Younger abstention doctrines). 
37. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
38. Id. at 813-17. 
39. Id. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 
183 (1952)). 
40. Id. at 817-19.  A plurality of the court in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 
655, 665-67 (1978), contradicted the Colorado River “exceptional circumstances” doctrine.  
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist observed that the district court had discretion to 
accept concurrent jurisdiction of a state court matter.  Id. at 664.  Justice Rehnquist found 
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and Younger abstention doctrines are not the only three general categories 
of “exceptional circumstances.”41  If the facts of a case fall outside those 
three general categories, there are other principles which can give rise to 
application of abstention.42 
                                                                                                                          
that “it is well established that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to 
proceedings concerning the same matter in the federal court having jurisdiction.”  Id.  
Justice Rehnquist stated: “[I]t is equally well settled that a district court is ‘under no 
compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction’,... where the controversy may be settled more 
expeditiously in the state court.”  Id. at 662-63.  He emphasized that the “right to proceed 
with a duplicative action in a federal court can never be said to be ‘clear and undisputable’.”  
Id. at 666 n.8.  Five Justices joined the plurality in Calvert establishing the principle that any 
likelihood of duplicative litigation was sufficient to justify abstention.”  Id. at 663-64.  This 
plurality contradicted the exception.   
 The conflicting holdings of Colorado River and Calvert were clarified in Moses 
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).  The Court in Moses held 
that the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado River should be used by district courts 
in determining to stay an action in favor of state court proceedings.  Id. at 13-19.  The Moses 
court formulated two additional factors for the “exceptional circumstances” test:  (1) the 
determination of which forum’s substantive law would govern the merits of the litigation; 
and (2) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the parties’ rights. Id. at 23-27.  The 
Moses court reaffirmed the doctrine that federal courts have a “[virtual] unflagging 
obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given to them.  Id. at 15.  After Moses the circuit 
courts were divided over which standard governed a district court’s decision to stay or 
dismiss a declaratory judgment action where there were parallel state proceedings.  The 
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth circuits applied the discretionary standard articulated in 
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and Calvert.  See, e.g., Terra 
Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3rd Cir. 1989); Mitcheson v. Harris, 995 
F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado River 
and Moses is inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana 
Farm Bureau Fed’n Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 
Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1991); Chamberlin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 
1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (Colorado River test does not apply to declaratory relief actions 
because they have “special status”). 
 However, other circuit courts applied the narrow exceptional circumstances test 
developed in Colorado River and expanded in Moses.  See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wassau 
v. Missouri Elec. Works, 23 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (Following Colorado River 
and Moses the district court was not justified in staying or dismissing a declaratory relief 
action absent “exceptional circumstances.”); Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Connecticut 
Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2nd Cir. 1986) (same).  A middle ground between 
these two positions can be found.  See, e.g., Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gill, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 
308-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (ststaing that where the state court has expended significant resources 
through the adjudicatory process of the state law claims, federal courts may decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action). 
41. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-17. 
42. Id. at 817 (“Although this case falls within none of the abstention categories, there 
are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard 
 
2008]  PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY 455 
 
A separate line of abstention cases has developed defining the 
boundaries of discretion in the context of federal declaratory judgment 
actions (“FDJA”).43  Jurisdiction under the FDJA is discretionary and not 
compulsory.44  The Act itself states that the district court “may declare the 
rights and other legal relations of any interested party.”45  A separate 
variation of abstention has arisen in the context of the FDJA when a 
parallel case is pending in state court at the same time the federal district 
court is being asked to exercise its discretion to accept jurisdiction under 
the FDJA.46  The doctrine enunciated by the court in Brillhart v. Excess 
Insurance Company of America47 directs the court regarding its exercise of 
discretion to deny jurisdiction. 
In Brillhart, the insurance company brought suit for declaratory relief 
in federal court to determine its obligation in a pending state court 
proceeding.48  The Brillhart court found that it would “ordinarily be 
uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a 
declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court 
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same 
parties.”49  The Brillhart court indicated that district courts should assess 
whether the controversy could better be resolved in the state court 
proceeding in determining whether to abstain.50  This assessment may 
require “inquiry into the scope of the pending state court proceeding and 
the nature of defenses open there.”51  Further, “[t]he federal court may have 
                                                                                                                          
for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous 
exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts.”). 
43. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insur. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996), the Supreme 
Court found that the various forms of the abstention doctrine had been extended to “certain 
classes of declaratory judgments, the granting of which is generally committed to the court’s 
discretion” (citation omitted).  It is interesting to note that in Great Lakes Dredge & Duck 
Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-70 
(1971) the Supreme Court recognized that the actions were brought pursuant to the FDJA 
but did not apply the discretion under this statute but rather applied different forms of the 
abstention doctrine.  For a thorough discussion of the effects of Quackenbush on diversity 
jurisdiction in general see Lewis Yelin, Note, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1871 (1999). 
44. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-87; Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. 
Dizol,133 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998). 
45.  28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (emphasis added). 
46. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Knight, 96 F3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996). 
47. 316 U.S. 491, 495(1942). 
48.  Id. at 492-94. 
49. Id. at 495. 
50.  Id. 
51. Id. 
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to consider whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be 
adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, 
whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc.”52 
In Wilton v. Seven Falls Company,53 the Supreme Court established the 
Brillhart test and not the Colorado River exceptional circumstances” test as 
governing a district court’s exercise of discretion in a federal declaratory 
judgment action, brought during the pendency of parallel state court 
proceedings.54  “Congress, and not the judiciary, defines the scope of 
federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds.”55  This 
concept is foundational upon the idea that an exercise of judicial discretion 
to abstain constitutes a judicial usurpation of legislative power.56To 
function properly, American constitutional democracy requires courts to act 
within their congressionally-conferred jurisdictional province.57   
                                                                                                                 
52. Id. 
53. 515 U.S. 277 (1995). 
54. Id. at 289-90.   
55. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 
(1989) (citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)). 
56. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 79 (1984).  Some commentators have argued for the expansion 
of federal judicial power for two principle reasons:  (1) fear of perceived  local prejudices, 
and (2) fear that a local forum will ignore or disregard federal law.  David J. McCarthy, 
Note, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a Federal Suit in 
Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1985).  See 
also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM & 
MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (noting that federal courts are the preferred forum for 
determination and analysis of constitutional principles); David A. Sonenshin, Abstention: 
The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985) (noting that because 
federal judges have life tenure, they are less subject to the vagaries and pressures of local 
public opinion, Congress has preserved the federal forum to litigants). 
57. In Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) the court observed: 
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each 
branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the 
constitution.  While “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is,” … it is equally – and 
emphatically – the exclusive province of the Congress not only to 
formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but 
also to establish their relative priority for the Nation.  Once Congress, 
exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a 
given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the 
courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought. 
Id. at 194 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177(1803)).  See also California v. 
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 
(1979). 
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Although the Federal Abstention Doctrine has an essential role to play 
in judicial preservation of dual sovereignty within the judiciary, it has been 
criticized on constitutional grounds. 
A well established tradition of the common law is that a court must 
exercise the jurisdiction that it possesses.58  Chief Justice Marshall declared 
that judicial conduct contrary to this principle would be in direct defiance 
of the prerogatives set forth in the Constitution.  Marshall opined, “[we] 
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, 
than to usurp that which is not given.  The one or the other would be 
treason to the constitution.”59  “Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the 
                                                                                                                 
58. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971) (citing Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821)).  See also Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 
(1893) (“[T]he courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford 
redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends.  They cannot 
abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.”) (citations 
omitted); Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (“[W]hen a federal court is 
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such 
jurisdiction . . . The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a 
choice cannot be properly denied.”) (citations omitted).  McCLellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 
268, 282 (1910) (concluding that federal courts have no authority to abdicate jurisdiction 
because of a pending state proceeding). 
59.  Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added).  Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the 
Court, observed: 
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should 
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should.  The 
judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it 
approaches the confines of the constitution.  We cannot pass it by 
because it is doubtful.  With whatever doubts, with whatever 
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought 
before us.  We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.  The one or the 
other would be treason to the constitution.  Questions may occur which 
we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.  All we can do is, to 
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty. 
Id.  Justice Marshall’s comments have found resonance with the court.  See, e.g., 
Justice Brennan’s warning in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Co., 
460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983), where he stated that the Federal Courts have a “virtually unflagging 
obligation … to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”  This belief has been expressed 
through leading scholarly publications.  See, e.g., Redish, supra note 56 at 112 (“[V]esting 
of power in the Federal Courts to adjudicate the relevant claims without a corresponding 
duty to do so is unacceptable.”)  See generally Shapiro, supra note 26; Michael M. Wilson, 
Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court 
Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 641, 641-42 (1977) 
(observing that the right to a federal forum is secured by the Constitution); Note, Power to 
Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE 
 
458 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible 
bounds.”60   
Commentators have opined that abstention can be anathema to the 
doctrine of separation of powers where federal jurisdictional requirements 
have been legally met.61 
 
III.  PRESERVATION OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. 
 
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted to delineate the scope of 
sovereign immunity reserved by the States.62  The Eleventh Amendment 
guarantees that non-consenting states may not be sued by private 
individuals in federal court.63  Thus, states are immune from suits brought 
in federal court by their own citizens, and the citizens of other states.64   
                                                                                                                          
L.J. 978, 980 (1950); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently 
Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM L. REV. 684, 687 (1960) (stating that the right to a 
federal forum is secured by the Constitution and supportive judicial precedent).  Barry 
Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989); Linda S. 
Mullenix, A Branch Too Far, Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99 (1986). 
60. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 359 (1989) (citing Kline v. Burke 
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)). 
61. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 56, at 77-79.  Some commentators have argued for 
the expansion of federal judicial power for two principle reasons:  (1) fear of perceived  
local prejudices, and (2) fear that a local forum will ignore or disregard federal law.  David 
J. McCarthy, Note, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a Federal 
Suit in Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1199 n.66 
(1985).  See also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (noting that federal courts are the preferred forum for 
determination and analysis of constitutional principles); David A. Sonenshin, Abstention: 
The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985) (noting that because 
federal judges have life tenure, they are less subject to the vagaries and pressures of local 
public opinion, Congress has preserved the federal forum to litigants). 
62. See Id. at 722-23. The full breadth of the sovereign immunity retained by the 
States was not explicitly memorialized by Congress when the United States Constitution 
was ratified.  In ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, Congress chose only to address the 
specific historical concerns when, in 1793, the United States Supreme Court erroneously 
held that Article III of the Constitution authorized citizens of one State to sue another State 
in Federal Court.  Id.  As a result, the Court has concluded that the Eleventh Amendment is 
only one particular exemplification of the States’ sovereign immunity.  Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our 
constitutional structure which it confirms.”). 
63. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).  See 
also, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at  706 (1999) (applying the Eleventh Amendment to 
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Prior to the ratification of the United States constitution, States had 
inherent sovereignty and partial sovereignty was reserved under the Tenth 
Amendment.65  In contrast, the doctrine of inherent sovereignty does not 
apply to the federal government.66  The federal government is a sovereign 
                                                                                                                          
lawsuits by private individuals in state courts based upon federal causes of action); 
Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775 (applying the Eleventh Amendment  to lawsuits by Indian tribes); 
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (applying the Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits 
by foreign nations); In re New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (applying the Eleventh 
Amendment to admiralty proceedings); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (applying the 
Eleventh Amendment  to lawsuits by federal corporations); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890) (applying the Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by citizens of the State under 
federal-question jurisdiction). 
 The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not bar a suit against a State in that 
State’s own court system nor does it bar a suit against a state in a different State court.  See, 
e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). As discussed further in this Article, Congress can 
abrogate the state's immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of power, hence allowing a state to 
be sued in federal court. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).  There are 
other situations where a State can be sued in federal court.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (holding that a State can be sued in federal court by the 
United States); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (holding that a State 
can be sued in federal court by another State); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)(holding 
that a State can be sued in federal court by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in a suit 
against a state official). 
Some commentators believe that the Eleventh Amendment is more akin to a 
jurisdictional bar for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction than to true immunity.  See, 
e.g., J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (1983); Akil Reed Amar, 
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-84 (1987). See also, Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) ( “[An] Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently 
partakes of a jurisdictional bar that it need not be raised in the trial court”); Welch v. State 
Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476 n.6 (1987) ( “Eleventh Amendment 
immunity partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar”) (citation omitted). 
64. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63.  See also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363; Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–73 (2000); Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (1890). 
65.  The Tenth Amendment provides:  “The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
Respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  The Supreme Court has previously 
delineated the limits of a State’s sovereign as it relates to a dual sovereignty system: 
Where state antagonism to another State or Nation begins, the state 
sovereignty ends, and that is at just the point where the matters of exclusive regulation 
within the state boundaries, the things done by or in the State, tend to pass over into the 
other limited sovereignties, and then the exclusive power, the reserved power, falls, or 
rather stops. 
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 68 (1907).   
66. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 335 (1935) (citing Kansas, 206 U.S. 46). 
460 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
of delegated, limited, and enumerated powers.67  As a separate sovereign, 
States also inherently have sovereign immunity.68  Sovereign immunity, as 
embodied by the Eleventh Amendment, serves to avoid the indignity of 
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the request 
of private parties.69 
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could not directly 
legislate the American people, but could do so only with the approval of 
the States.70  The Constitutional Convention was convened, in part, because 
of the inadequacy of the federal government to directly legislate.71  
Throughout the Constitution’s ratification process States retained their 
sovereign immunity.72  The Constitutional Convention sought to restructure 
Congress and give it the power to legislate without the need of the state 
legislatures.73  During the Constitutional Convention, delegates debated the 
merits of the Virginia and New Jersey Plans under which the federal 
                                                                                                                 
67. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883).  “The powers of Congress are 
not given by the people of a single State; they are given by the people of the United States to 
a Government whose laws, made in pursuance of the Constitution, are declared to be 
supreme. Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will 
extend over them.” Kansas, 206 U.S. at 69-70. 
68. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 686 n.4 (1999); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 57 
(1994) (“Sovereign immunity, after all, inheres in the permissible exercise of state power.”); 
Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (1890) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable 
to the suit of an individual without its consent.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 
(Alexander Hamilton)). 
69. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Mefcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 146 
(1993) ([The Eleventh Amendment is a] “fundamental constitutional protection . . . rooted in 
a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, 
including sovereign immunity.  It thus accords the States the respect owed them as members 
of the federation”) (citation omitted). 
70. New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) (“Congress ‘could not directly tax or 
legislate upon individuals; it had no explicit “legislative” or “governmental” power to make 
binding “law” enforceable as such.’”) (citing Amar, supra note 63 at 1447. 
71. Id.  
72. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999). 
73. This issue was addressed by Alexander Hamilton: 
The new National Government must carry its agency to the 
persons of the citizens.  It must stand in need of no intermediate 
legislations . . . . The government of the Union, like that of each State, 
must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of 
individuals. . . .  
See Hamilton, supra note 68, at 116. 
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government could exercise its powers.74  Under the Virginia Plan, Congress 
could exercise legislative authority directly without employing the States as 
intermediaries.75  The New Jersey Plan mirrored the status quo and 
Congress would continue to require the approval of the States before 
legislating.76  
The New Jersey Plan was objected to because it might require 
Congress to coerce the States into implementing legislation.77  
Consequently, the Convention adopted the Virginia Plan which provided 
for a constitution in which Congress would exercise its legislative authority 
directly over individuals, rather than over States.78  One reason for adopting 
the Virginia Plan was to avoid coercing States as separate sovereign 
entities.  Instead, Congress would be able to legally coerce individuals.79  
In providing for a stronger federal government, the framers explicitly chose 
a constitutional framework that conferred upon Congress the power to 
                                                                                                                 
74. Various proposals for the structure of the new federal government were discussed 
during the Constitutional Convention.  However, two plans were dominant: the Virginia 
Plan and the New Jersey Plan.   New York, 505 U.S. at 164.   
75. Delegate Edmund Randolph first introduced the Virginia Plan.  Under the Virginia 
Plan, Congress would exercise legislative authority directly without employing the States as 
intermediaries. Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 21 (Max 
Farrand ed. 1911), hereinafter “RECORDS”).   
76. Delegate William Paterson first introduced the New Jersey Plan.  Under the New 
Jersey Plan, Congress would continue to require the approval of the States before legislating 
like it did under the Articles of Confederation.  New York, 505 U.S. 144, 164 (1992). (citing 
1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 243-44).  Although both the Virginia and New Jersey plans 
underwent various revisions during the Convention, they remained the two primary options 
discussed by the delegates.  Id.   
77. Id. (“The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan [i.e., the 
New Jersey Plan], or introduce the national plan.  The insufficiency of the former has been 
fully displayed. . . . There are but two modes by which the end of a Gen[eral] Gov[ernment] 
can be attained: the 1st is by coercion as proposed by Mr. P[aterson’s] plan[, the 2nd] by 
real legislation as prop[osed] by the other plan. Coercion [is] impracticable, expensive, cruel 
to individuals. . . . We must resort therefore to a national Legislation over individuals.”) 
 (quoting Edmund Randolph in 1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 255-56)); see also id. 
“The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political 
bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”  (quoting James Madison in 2 RECORDS, supra 
note 75, at 9)). 
78. Id. at 165 (noting the Constitutional Convention rejected the New Jersey Plan in 
favor of the Virginia Plan) (citing 1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 313). 
79. Id. at 165 (“This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, 
in their political capacity. . . .  But this legal coercion singles out the . . . individual.”) 
(quoting Oliver Ellsworth in 2 J. Elliot, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 197 (2d 
ed. 1863))). 
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regulate individuals, not States.80  The Constitution gives Congress the 
authority to enact legislation requiring or prohibiting certain acts; however, 
Congress lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or 
prohibit those acts.81  
Congress’ authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity is 
limited.  Because the “abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets the 
fundamental constitutional balance between the federal government and the 
states,”82 any judicial determination of whether abrogation has lawfully 
occurred are made with great care.  In order to lawfully abrogate state 
sovereign immunity, Congress must (1) act “pursuant to a valid exercise of 
power”; and (2) “unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the 
immunity.”83  The power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity 
resides in Congress’ enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.84  When Congress is operating under its Article 1 powers, 
Congress has no authority to nullify State’s Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.85  Under Section 5, Congress is authorized to enact remedial 
legislation focused on preventing violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.86  A valid exercise of this power requires Congress to 
“identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
                                                                                                                 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 166 (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n  v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
762-66 (1983), Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288-
89 (1981), and Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868)).  See also id. (noting that the 
Commerce Clause is a constitutional provision that authorizes Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce directly; but does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ 
regulation of interstate commerce). 
82. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) (citation omitted).  See Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (“Our reluctance to infer that a 
State’s immunity from suit in the courts has been negated stems from recognition of the 
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.”). 
83. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). 
84. Bd. of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). 
85. Id. at 365.  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to 
enforce the substantive guarantees contained in Section 1 by enacting “appropriate 
legislation.”; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). But see Seminole, 517 
U.S. at 59 (holding that Congress only has two constitutional sources to abrogate a State’s 
sovereign immunity; Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause) 
(citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 
1 (1989))). See also Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 647-48 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
Congress passed the ADA pursuant to its power to enforce the 14th Amendment and its 
power to regulate commerce). 
86. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,75 (2000). 
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provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or 
preventing such conduct.”87 
Congress has no authority to enact substantive legislation which 
defines the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on the States.88  
“It is the responsibility of [t]he court, not Congress, to define the substance 
of congressional guarantees.”89  In City of Boerne v. Flores90 the high court 
formulated the “congruence and proportionality” test to determine whether 
the exercise of Congress’ enforcement power was remedial and appropriate 
or definitional and not appropriate.  “There must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end.”91   
Courts must recognize or establish two facts through reliable fact-
finding to prove congruence.  First, to justify the federal intervention in 
their affairs, the court must establish whether the state or local government 
has done something unconstitutional or likely unconstitutional.92  Second, 
the means chosen must be “responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”93  These determinations are made by examining 
the legislative record to identify the reasons for Congress’ action.94 
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be waived.95  Generally, by 
participating in a federal spending program, States can waive their Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.96  Congress may offer federal funding with 
                                                                                                                 
87. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
639 (1999). 
88. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
89. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.  
90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
91. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“The appropriateness of 
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures 
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another lesser one.”); 
Bd. of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,  365 (2001). 
92. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 
(1883)).  
93. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509. 
94. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000). 
95. There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  First, Congress 
has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity without the state’s consent when 
acting pursuant to its enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Garrett, 531 U.Sat 365; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).  
Second, individual suits that seek prospective relief for ongoing violations of federal law 
may be brought against state officials pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123, 155-56 (1908).  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.  Third, states may voluntarily waive their 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1. 
96. Id. 
464 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
conditions attached as part of its Spending Clause powers.97  Congress may 
require states to waive their sovereign immunity as a condition for 
receiving federal funds.98  If Congress intends to impose this condition, the 
relevant statute must “manifest[] a clear intent to condition participation in 
the programs ... on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional 
immunity.”99 
The Supreme Court’s decision in College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board100 reaffirmed and 
strengthened the test to be applied in determining whether a state has 
waived its sovereign immunity.  The Court emphasized that a state’s 
“decision to waive ... immunity [must be] ‘altogether voluntary.’”101  
Courts may not find “implied” or “constructive” waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.102  “A state will be seen to have waived its Eleventh 
                                                                                                                 
97. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).  The 
Constitution empowers Congress “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defen[s]e and general Welfare of the United 
States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  “Incident to this power, Congress may attach 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”  Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081 ( quoting South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).  Congress has employed this power “to further 
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal mon[ies] upon compliance by the 
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.”  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Burger, C.J.).  See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) 
(“power to fix terms”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) 
(“impose reasonable conditions”). 
98. Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081.  Congress’s spending power is not unlimited.  Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981).  In South Dakota v. Dole, the 
Court reviewed the case law concerning the spending power of Congress, noting four 
general restrictions.  483 U.S. at 207.  First, “the exercise of the spending power must be in 
pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”  Id.  See U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 1.  See also Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).  Second, “if Congress desires to condition the state’s 
receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously ... enabl[ing] the states to exercise 
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”  Dole, 483 
U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).  Third, it has been “suggested (without 
significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are 
unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”   Dole, 483 
U.S. at 207. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)).  Fourth, “other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to [a] 
conditional grant of federal funds.”   Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. (citing Lawrence County. v. 
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985)). 
99. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.   
100. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666, 
675-76 (1999). 
101. Id. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858)). 
102. Id. at 680.  The Court recognized, in reaching this decision, that it was overruling 
its decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 
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Amendment immunity only ‘if the State voluntarily invokes [the federal 
court’s] jurisdiction, or else if the State makes a “clear declaration” that it 
intends to submit itself to’ the federal court’s jurisdiction.”103  In College 
                                                                                                                          
(1964)   “We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, 
and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it . . . [w]hatever may remain of 
our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.”  Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680.  Parden-
style constructive waivers that were held unconstitutional are viewed as being 
“fundamental[ly] different[t]” from situations where states voluntarily waived their 
immunity in exchange for federal funds.  Id. at 680-81.  In a different section of the College 
Savings Bank opinion, Justice Scalia reiterates that “conditions attached to a State’s receipt 
of federal funds are simply not analogous to Parden-style conditions attached to a State’s 
decision to engage in otherwise lawful commercial activity.”  Id. at 678-79 n.2.  The Court 
distinguished Parden from Atascadero which involved section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act.  Id.  In the Court’s view, Atascadero “suggest[ed] that a waiver may be found in a 
State’s acceptance of a federal grant.”  Id. (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234).  The Court 
in College Savings Bank appears to have reaffirmed this observation of Atascadero 
“mak[ing] the same suggestion today, while utterly rejecting Parden.”  Id. 
103. Pugliese v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 147 F. Supp 2d 985, 990 (D. Ariz. 
2001) (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-76.)  Following the College Savings Bank 
decision, several federal decisions have rejected the waiver concept in the Eleventh 
Amendment context.  E.g., Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 158 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (E.D. Pa. 
May 31, 2001) vacated (June 5, 2001), reconsideration denied (July 31, 2001) (rejecting 
former employee’s allegation that his state employer violated the RA thereby waiving its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, even though state employer received federal funds); Castro 
Ortiz v. Fajardo, 133 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 n.6 (D. P.R. 2001) (noting that “[p]laintiff[’]s 
claims under the Rehabilitation Act, although barred ... because of lack of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, on the merits would have suffered the same treatment of dismissal 
as to monetary damages based on the cases of [Garrett and Kimel].”(citations omitted)); 
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that New 
York did not waive its sovereign immunity to suit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act when it accepted federal funds).  See also New Holland Vill. Condo. v. Destaso Enters. 
Ltd., 139 F. Supp. 2d 499, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“There is little, if any, room under this 
stringent standard ... for the sort of ‘constructive’ waiver of immunity that plaintiff asks this 
court to apply based on [defendant’s] receipt of Federal funds under the Act.”).  Contra  ; 
Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000). Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 520-21 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
However, in different contexts, waiver has been found.  As an example, waiver 
has been found in cases involving the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §151, 
where courts have found that the College Savings Bank decision permitted waiver based on 
a state’s receipt of federal funds and permitted constructive waiver based on a state’s 
voluntary conduct in regulating telecommunications affairs. AT&T Commc’n v. BellSouth 
Telecomm., Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 645 (5th Cir. 2001); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois Bell 
Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 344 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1132 (2001) (“We 
believe that College Savings does not alter the principle that states may waive their 
immunity by accepting a benefit from Congress that has conditions attached ... .”); MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 216 F.3d 929, 937-38 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001). 
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Savings Bank, Justice Scalia discussed the rationale behind the requirement 
of a “clear declaration”: 
 
The whole point of requiring a “clear declaration” by the 
State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in fact 
consents to suit.  But there is little reason to assume actual 
consent based upon the State’s mere presence in a field 
subject to congressional regulation.  There is a 
fundamental difference between a State’s expressing 
unequivocally that it waives its immunity and Congress’s 
expressing unequivocally its intention that if the State 
takes certain action it shall be deemed to have waived that 
immunity.  In the latter situation, the most that can be said 
with certainty is that the State has been put on notice that 
Congress intends to subject it to suits brought by 
individuals.  That is very far from concluding that the State 
made an “all together voluntary” decision to waive its 
immunity.104 
 
IV.  DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN FEDERAL COURT. 
 
The federal government’s sovereign immunity is based upon the 
English Practice of granting sovereign immunity to the Crown.105  When 
the American Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English 
law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts.106  
                                                                                                                 
104. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680-81 (citations omitted). 
105. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 
419, 437-446, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting), as surveying English practice). 
The preeminent authority on English law at the time, Sir William Blackstone, described the 
relationship between sovereignty and immunity as follows: 
“And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of 
sovereignty, or pre-eminence.... Hence it is, that no suit or action can be 
brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can 
have jurisdiction over him.  For all jurisdiction implies superiority of 
power ....” 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *234-35 (hereinafter “Blackstone”). 
106. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) (“The immunity of a truly independent 
sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for 
centuries.  Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of that 
immunity”). 
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Sovereign immunity has its origins in the feudal system.107  As part of the 
feudal system, a lord could not be sued by a vassal in his own court.108  
However, a petty lord could be sued in the courts of a higher lord.109  The 
King’s court was the highest court in the land.  Consequently, there was no 
higher court where the King could be sued.110  Sovereign immunity not 
only rested on the structure of the feudal system, but also on the fiction 
that the King could do no wrong.111  The Supreme Court has rejected the 
concept that sovereign immunity is based upon the principle that the 
sovereign can do no wrong.112   
“Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English 
political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its 
consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and 
ratified.”113  In adopting our federal system, the founding fathers 
considered immunity from private lawsuits central to sovereign dignity.114 
                                                                                                                 
107.  Id. 
108. Id. at 414-15 n.6 (“He can not be compelled to answer in his own court, but this is 
true of every petty lord of every petty manor; that there happens to be in this world no court 
above his court is, we may say, an accident.” (citing 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1899))); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive 
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1972). 
109. Nevada, 440 U.S. at 415 & n.6. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 415 & n.7 (“The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but 
even thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing.” (quoting WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE , COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 246 (William S. Hein & Co, 1992) 
(1765))). 
112. Id. at 415 & n.8  (the Supreme Court based this holding on the colonies rejection 
of the principle because the Declaration of Independence referenced the repeated wrongs 
inflicted by the Crown on the colonies) (“The Declaration of Independence proclaims: 
‘[T]hat whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right 
of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government . . . and such is now 
the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history 
of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all 
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states’.”  (citing 
B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198-229 (1967))). 
113. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 715, 716 (1999) (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
419,  434-435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“I believe there is no doubt that neither in the State 
now in question, nor in any other in the Union, any particular Legislative mode, authorizing 
a compulsory suit for the recovery of money against a State, was in being either when the 
Constitution was adopted, or at the time the judicial act was passed.”)); See also Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) (“The suability of a State, without its consent, was a thing 
unknown to the law.  This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and 
jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted”). 
114. Alden, 527 U.S. at 716. 
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The United States, as sovereign, is immune from a lawsuit except when 
it consents to be sued.115  The terms of its consent to be sued defines that 
court’s jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit.116  Pursuant to the Tucker Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1491, the United States has sovereign immunity for claims for 
damages against it in excess of $10,000 unless the claim is brought in the 
Court of Federal Claims.117  The Little Tucker Act gives district courts 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims in most Tucker 
Act cases seeking less than $10,000.118  Claims in excess of $10,000 cannot 
be brought in a district court.119  The Court of Federal Claims has exclusive 
jurisdiction over such claims.120  Appeals of Little Tucker Act claims 
brought in district court are taken to the Federal Circuit, not the district 
court’s geographical Court of Appeals.121  
A lawsuit is considered against the United States regardless of whether 
or not the United States is a named defendant if ‘the judgment sought 
would expend itself on the public treasury or domain’.”122  A lawsuit is also 
considered against the United States when the judgment interferes with 
public administration, or when the judgment’s effect is to compel or 
restrain the government’s actions.123   
                                                                                                                 
115. Nevada, 440 U.S. at 415 (“Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the 
absolute character of that immunity.”).  
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (the Federal Question statute merely establishes the 
subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts over federal claims that are within the 
competence of federal courts to entertain and does not generally waive sovereign 
immunity);  United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Whittle v. United States, 7 
F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1993). 
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). The Tucker Act gives the United States Court of 
Federal Claims jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States 
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for 
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. Id. 
118. Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, Bd. for Corr. of Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 283 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988)). 
119. Cf. Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 1071 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting 
that so-called “exclusive jurisdiction” of Court of Federal Claims over Tucker Act claims 
depends not on language of the Tucker Act, but on fact that Congress rarely grants district 
courts jurisdiction over such claims). 
120. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48 (1988). 
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (2000). 
122. Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d 837, 839, 840 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Land v. 
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947)). 
123. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 
623, 624 (W.D. La. 2000) (suit against federal official in his or her official capacity is suit 
against United States).  In deciding whether a suit against an officer for non-monetary relief 
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The issue of declaratory relief poses a different situation.  A district 
court does not have jurisdiction merely because a lawsuit fails to seek 
monetary relief.124  Courts recognize that plaintiffs may seek to bypass the 
Tucker Act jurisdiction by converting complaints which “at their essence” 
seek money damages from the government into complaints requesting 
injunctive relief or declaratory actions.125  In order to prevent forum 
shopping which circumvents a primary purpose of the Tucker Act and to 
ensure that a central judicial body adjudicates most claims against the 
United States Treasury, “[j]urisdiction under the Tucker Act cannot be 
avoided by ... disguising a money claim” as a claim requesting a form of 
equitable relief.126  Absent other grounds for district court jurisdiction, a 
claim is subject to the Tucker Act and its jurisdictional consequences if, in 
whole or in part, it explicitly or “in essence” seeks more than $10,000 in 
monetary relief from the federal government.127  
Courts will look to the complaint’s substance, not merely its form to 
determine if a complaint is in essence seeking monetary damages when it is 
styled as seeking equitable relief.128  A complaint does not “in essence” 
seek monetary relief merely because it hints at some interest in a monetary 
reward from the federal government or because success on the merits may 
obligate the United States to pay the complainant.129  So long as the 
complaint only requests non-monetary relief that has “considerable value” 
                                                                                                                          
is in essence a suit against the United States, a court would engage in the legal fiction that a 
suit against a government officer in his official capacity is not a suit against the sovereign if 
(1) the government officer's powers in his official capacity are limited by statute and his 
actions were ultra vires, or (2) the officer was acting unconstitutionally or pursuant to an 
unconstitutional grant of power from the sovereign. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949). 
124. See, e.g., Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see 
also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 916 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Relying on multiple federal authorities) 
(“[D]istrict court jurisdiction is not established merely because a suit fails to pray for a 
money judgment.” (citing cases)). 
125. Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968. 
126. Van Drasek, 762 F.2d at 1071 n.11.  See also, United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 
71-73 (1987) (describing goal of uniformity behind creation of Federal Circuit); Vietnam 
Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing the 
Tucker Act's interest in uniformity). 
127. Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 967-68; Heller, Ehrman, White & MacAuliffe v. Babbitt, 
992 F.2d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Plaintiffs “may not, by creatively framing their 
complaint, circumvent a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
128. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 1987). 
129. Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 534 (“It is ... clear that a claim is not for money 
merely because its success may lead to pecuniary costs for the government or benefits for 
the plaintiff.”). 
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independent of any future potential for monetary relief, that is, as long as 
the sole remedy requested is declaratory or injunctive relief that is not 
“negligible in comparison” with the potential monetary recovery, courts 
will respect the party’s choice of remedies and treat the complaint as 
something more than an artfully drafted effort to circumvent the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.130  In such cases, even if a 
complaint is filed with a desire to seek a future monetary award, a district 
court with otherwise appropriate jurisdiction may hear the claim and grant 
the proper equitable relief.131 
Congress enacted the FDJA in 1934, thereby authorizing federal courts 
to grant federal declaratory judgment relief.132  The FDJA provides in 
relevant part: 
 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction … 
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an 
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other 
legal relations of any interested party seeking declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.  Any 
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. 133 
 
Federal jurisdiction under the FDJA is based solely upon the original 
jurisdiction of the court, namely diversity jurisdiction or federal question 
jurisdiction.134  District courts have discretion to exercise jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                 
130. See e.g., Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, Bd. for Corr. of Military Records, 56 F.3d 
279, 283-286 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Francis E. Heydt Co. v. United States, 948 F.2d 672, 677 
(10th Cir. 1991); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that 
district court did not have jurisdiction over request for money damages in complaint, but 
allowing it to retain jurisdiction over non-monetary claims also requested); cf. Vietnam 
Veterans, 843 F.2d at 535 (noting that courts are divided, in cases where plaintiffs request 
both monetary and equitable relief, over whether Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction 
precludes district court from hearing simultaneous request for equitable relief or vice-versa, 
and that this court has not decided issue).  
131. Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284; but see Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 535 (noting, but 
not deciding, that pursuit of equitable relief in district court may preclude plaintiff from later 
seeking monetary relief in Court of Federal Claims). 
132. See Id. 
133. Id. 
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2001). 
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declaratory judgment actions brought under the FDJA.135  The discretion 
granted under the FDJA is not unfettered.  A district court cannot decline to 
entertain a declaratory judgment action as a matter of whim or personal 
disinclination.136  The discretion granted by the FDJA essentially builds the 
abstention doctrine into this grant of jurisdiction.137 
In a declaratory judgment action involving coverage there is generally 
no request for monetary relief against the federal government.  Instead, the 
carrier is seeking a declaration of rights under the policy.  Unlike most 
previously decided cases where the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief with a 
desire to obtain monetary relief in the future, a carrier generally is not 
seeking monetary relief in the future.  In fact, if the carrier is successful in 
seeking declaratory relief that the policy does not provide coverage, then 
no money would be exchanged.  Even if the carrier is unsuccessful in 
seeking declaratory relief, the carrier would be responsible for any 
monetary award and not the federal treasury.  This distinction, however, 
does not necessarily allow the carrier to sue the federal government. 
The Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any 
substantive right enforceable against the United States for money 
damages.”138  A party must rely on some other independent, substantive 
right enforceable against the United States for money damages.139  Various 
statutes address whether the federal government has waived its 
sovereignty.140  No statute specifically confers jurisdiction over a 
declaratory judgment action against the federal government. 
A similar issue was addressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Anderson v. United States.141  In Anderson, the trustees of the Hermann 
Hospital Estate filed a lawsuit against the United States and the Veterans 
Administration seeking declaratory relief to determine the rights and legal 
relations of the parties with reference to a parcel of land that had been 
condemned and appropriated for public use.  The complaint alleged 
                                                                                                                 
135. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995) (“Brillhart makes clear that 
District Courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action 
under the [Federal] Declaratory Judgment Act”). 
136. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998). 
137. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282. 
138. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 
139. Rogers v. United States, 697 F.2d 886, 887 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983). 
140. See generally 14 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656 (3d ed. 1998) for a discussion of statutory exceptions 
to sovereign immunity in actions against the United States.  
141. Anderson v. United States, 229 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1956) 229 F.2d 675, 677 
(5th Cir. 1956). 
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jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which confers original 
jurisdiction on the district courts of all civil actions wherein the matter in 
controversy exceeds a specified sum and arises under the constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.  The Fifth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff could not rely upon Section 1331 because the United States cannot 
be sued without its consent.  In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted that the 
plaintiffs did not allege a claim for money damages cognizable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) and that there was no statute authorizing an injunction 
against the United States.142  Furthermore, the Court held that the Federal 
Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, did not grant any consent to 
sue the United States.143  Consequently, the Court affirmed the dismissal of 
the case, reasoning that the United States had never consented to be sued in 
an action.  
As discussed in Anderson, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 
empowers federal courts to give declaratory judgments in “a case of actual 
controversy within its jurisdiction,” but it is not an independent grant of 
jurisdiction.144 Rather, federal jurisdiction must be predicated on some 
other statute.145  Consequently, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is not 
a source of waiver of sovereign immunity that would allow a carrier to sue 
the federal government in federal court.   
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 
701 et seq., contains a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign 
immunity.  Section 702 provides in pertinent part: 
 
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, 
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof.  An action ... seeking relief other than 
money damages ... shall not be dismissed ... on the ground 
that it is against the United States. 
 
                                                                                                                 
142. Id. (citing Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703). 
143. Id. (citing Love v. United States, 108 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1939), Blackmar v. Guerre, 
342 U.S. 512, 515-16 (1952), Trueman Fertilizer Co. v. Larson, 196 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 
1952), and Mitchell v. United States, 111 F.Supp. 104, 105 (D.N.J. 1952)). 
144. Rueth v. United States EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993)(holding that federal 
court lacked jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to review EPA's pre-enforcement 
actions and that court could not grant declaratory relief). 
145. Id. 
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Agency action for purposes of the APA is defined as “the whole or a 
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or 
denial thereof, or failure to act”.146  The APA may be relevant in cases 
where the underlying litigation is filed by the United States at the request of 
a federal agency.  An insured, for example, may violate a federal law like 
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.  The administrator of the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) may seek to obtain 
injunctive relief and criminal penalties for alleged violations of the Clean 
Water Act and request that the Justice Department file a lawsuit against the 
insured.  The filing of the lawsuit could constitute “agency action” for 
purpose of the APA.  It is axiomatic that the insured is an aggrieved party 
by the EPA’s decision to seek injunctive relief and criminal penalties.  
Pursuant to state law in certain jurisdictions, an insurance company may be 
the real party in interest in liability cases where the conduct of the insured 
may operate to impair or impede the insurance company’s ability to protect 
its own interest with respect to the insurance policy under which coverage 
is claimed.147  Federal courts also recognize the insurer’s real party of 
interest status.148  Although no cases have specifically addressed the issue, 
it can be argued that the carrier is the real party in interest in the lawsuit 
filed by the Justice Department at the behest of the EPA and that the carrier 
is also aggrieved by the agency’s decision and has standing to seek review 
under the APA.  Because the APA contains a broad waiver to government 
sovereign immunity in agency review actions seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief,149 the APA would constitute an independent basis for 
jurisdiction in a lawsuit against the federal government.150 
                                                                                                                 
146. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) and 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (2000) (“For the purpose of this 
chapter ... ‘agency action’ ha[s] the meanin[g] given ... by section 551 of this title”). 
147. See, e.g., Comacho v. Gardner, 456 P.2d 925 (Ariz. 1969); East v. Hedges, 608 
P.2d 327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). 
148. Ocean Ships, Inc. v. Stiles, 315 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing when an 
insurer is a real party in interest); Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553, 554-555 (D. Kan. 1965) 
(holding that when an accident involved an insured automobile the insurance company is 
actually, in fact, if not in law, the real party in interest in the litigation). 
149. Cheyenne-Arapaho Gaming Comm'n v. National Indian Gaming Com'n, 214 
F.Supp.2d 1155, 1167 (N.D. Okla. 2002). 
150. Cf., Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1389 (5th Cir. 
1989) (holding that based upon the CERCLA statute, its structure, and legislative history, 
until the government initiates a cost-recovery action, a potential responsible party cannot 
obtain judicial review of the agency action under the APA). 
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In addition, a request for a declaratory judgment in the example given 
would not impose an intolerable burden on governmental functions.151  “A 
declaratory judgment is just that: a declaration of rights. It is not a coercive 
remedy like an injunction or a money judgment.”152  Consequently, 
sovereign immunity would not apply and would not preclude the carrier 
from seeking declaratory relief in federal court.153   
 
V.  DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN STATE COURT. 
 
As previously discussed, the United States, and its officers while acting 
in their official capacities, enjoy sovereign immunity.  Thus, a state court 
only has jurisdiction over an officer of the federal government if the United 
States has waived its immunity by consenting to suit or if the officer has 
exceeded any statutory or constitutional authority.154  “Federal courts 
generally deem a suit for specific relief, e.g., injunctive or declaratory 
relief, against a named officer of the United States to be a suit against the 
sovereign.”155  However, the protection of public officials from the fear of 
civil damages is not a concern when the lawsuit is for declaratory and 
injunctive relief.156  As previously discussed, it can be argued that the 
federal government waived its sovereign immunity under the APA for a 
declaratory judgment action.  The issue is whether the federal government 
can be sued in state court under the APA. 
Although Congress did not explicitly grant federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction to entertain APA lawsuits, it has been held that the federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over APA lawsuits.157  In Aminoil U. S. 
                                                                                                                 
151. Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d 837, 841 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982).  
152. Id. at 841. 
153. C.H. Sanders Co., Inc. v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 114, 119 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (“We hold that an action (regardless of the amount sought) may be commenced 
under § 1331 in the district court provided there is an independent waiver of sovereign 
immunity outside the Tucker Act.”). 
154. See Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 674 F.2d 1227, 
1233 (9th Cir. 1982). 
155. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Larson v. 
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949)).  
156. See B. C. Morton Int’l Corp. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 305 F.2d 692, 695-96 (1st 
Cir. 1962). 
157. See Aminoil U.S.A., Inc.,. 674 F.2d at1235 (9th Cir. 1982); 2 FED. PROC. L. ED. § 
2:267 (2006) (“It is not proper to permit a state court to review the decisions of federal 
agencies under the APA when, in fact, the APA provides no independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction and should provide no independent cause of action in state court either.”).  But 
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A., Inc. v. California State Water Resources Control Board,158 for example, 
Aminoil operated oil and gas wells at a site in Orange County, California. 
The various operations produced drilling wastes that were discharged into 
the surrounding environment.  The Fish and Wildlife Service of the United 
States Department of the Interior requested that the Santa Ana Region of 
the State Board (Regional Board) adopt an order declaring Aminoil’s 
disposal site a “wetlands” subject to the jurisdiction of the Clean Water 
Act159 and its companion California statute.160  The EPA and the Regional 
Board concluded that the disposal site could not be defined as national 
wetlands and, therefore, a permit for the discharge of pollutants into 
navigable waters was not necessary.  An environment group appealed the 
decision to the California State Water Resources Control Board (“State 
Board”), which reversed the decision.   
Aminoil originally filed a lawsuit in California state court to review the 
order of the State Board and joined the Administrator of the EPA as a real 
party in interest.  The Administrator removed the case to the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).  Upon removal, the Administrator filed 
a motion to dismiss, asserting that neither the state court, nor the district 
court upon removal, had jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit because of 
sovereign immunity. The district court granted the motion, holding that a 
state court does not have jurisdiction over a federal agency in a dispute 
over federal law when the federal court lacked jurisdiction.161 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, although the State court 
had general jurisdiction over Aminoil’s cause of action against the State 
Board, the State Court may not necessarily have the power to join the 
Administrator as a party. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it is well settled 
that the United States, and its officers while acting in their official 
capacities, enjoy sovereign immunity.  The Ninth Circuit noted that a State 
court may entertain an action against an officer of the federal government 
                                                                                                                          
see Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875-76(1981) (“[T]he mere grant 
of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent 
jurisdiction over the cause of action.”). 
158. 674 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1982). 
159. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000). 
160. CAL. WATER CODE § 13320 (West 1992). 
161. Aminoi U.S.A. Inc., 674 F.2d at 1231 n.3.(District court held that the EPA must 
take final action before it can be sued pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and that when the 
EPA is sued, it must be sued in federal court). 
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only if the United States has waived its immunity by consenting to suit or if 
the officer has exceeded his statutory or constitutional authority.162  
On appeal, Aminoil argued, among other things, that Section 702 of the 
APA applied and that the federal government waived its sovereign 
immunity.  The Ninth Circuit held that Section 702 was clearly 
inapplicable.  The Court noted that while Section 702 waives the sovereign 
immunity of the United States for non-monetary claims against the 
government, the waiver of sovereign immunity is expressly limited to 
actions brought “in a court of the United States ...”163  The Court based its 
decision on the legislative history of the APA which demonstrated that 
Section 702 was not intended to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity for 
suits against the United States or its officers in state courts.164 
Consequently, there is no state forum for a declaratory judgment action 
against the federal government.165 
 
VI.  DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST STATE IN 
FEDERAL COURT. 
 
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted to delineate the scope of 
sovereign immunity reserved by the States.166  The Eleventh Amendment 
provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
                                                                                                                 
162. Id. at 1233.  See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 623 (1963); United States v. 
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Martinez v. Marshall, 573 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 
1977); Smith v. Grimm, 534 F.2d 1346, 1351 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976). 
163. Animoil U.S.A. Inc.,674 F.2d at 1233 (citing Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098, 
1102 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
164. Animoil U.S.A. Corp., 674 F.2d at 1233(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 11 
(1976), as reprinted in (1976) U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6131 (“The consent to suit is also limited 
to claims in the courts of the United States; hence, the United States remains immune from 
suit in state courts.”)).  
165. In Aminoil, the Ninth Circuit also held that the removal of the state case to federal 
court did not confer jurisdiction on the district court because removal jurisdiction is entirely 
derivative of the jurisdiction of the state court.  Id. at 1232 (citing Minnesota v. United 
States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939)).  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that when the state court 
lacks jurisdiction, the district court does not acquire jurisdiction even if it would have had 
jurisdiction if the suit had originally been commenced in federal court.  Id. (citing Lambert 
Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1362 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
166. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999). 
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of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State.”167 
The Eleventh Amendment guarantees that non-consenting states may 
not be sued by private individuals in federal court.168  Thus, States are 
immune from suits brought in federal court by their own citizens, and the 
citizens of other States.169  “The Eleventh Amendment bar is not absolute. 
States may consent to suit in federal court and, in certain cases, Congress 
may abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”170 
Federal courts will give effect to a State’s waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity “‘only where stated by the most express language or 
by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for 
any other reasonable construction.’”171  “A State does not waive its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own 
courts.”172  “Thus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision to 
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the 
State’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court.”173  
States generally maintain their absolute and qualified sovereign 
immunity in various, enumerated circumstances by statute which may not 
be applicable to a particular declaratory judgment action.174  If the State, for 
example, sues the insured in State court, the filing of the suit does not 
waive the State sovereign immunity in federal court.  States typically do 
not specifically consent to being sued in federal court.  States may typically 
authorize tort and contract actions against the State.175  Such limited 
waivers of its sovereign immunity do not waive the State’s sovereign 
immunity such that it can be sued in federal court.176 
Congress can abrogate the State’s immunity pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power, hence allowing a State to be sued in federal court.177  
                                                                                                                 
167. U.S. CONST., amend. XI. 
168. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2000).   
169. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).  See also, Bd. of Trs. of the 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–73 
(2000); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 
170. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). 
171. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985) (internal 
quotations ommitted). 
172. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 495 U.S. at 306. 
173. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 241. 
174. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820.01 (2006). 
175. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821 (2007). 
176. Markowitz v. United States, 650 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1981). 
177. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 445-46 (1976). 
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According to the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a State can be sued in federal 
court by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in a suit against a state 
official.178  However, the Ex Parte Young doctrine only applies when “the 
relief sought is prospective in nature and is based on an ongoing violation 
of the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.”179  The Eleventh 
Amendment also bar claims in federal court asserted against state officers 
based on alleged violations of state law.180  
A lawsuit filed by the State for violations of state environmental laws 
would typically not contain any federal issues.  Consequently, the Ex Parte 
Young doctrine would be inapplicable and a federal forum is unavailable 
for a declaratory judgment action involving the state government. 
In addition, when “a corporation of one state sues another state, the 
action is deemed not to be between citizens of different states, and diversity 
of citizenship is therefore unavailable as a basis for federal jurisdiction.”181  
 
VII. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST STATE 
GOVERNMENT IN STATE COURT. 
 
The Eleventh Amendment, does not bar a suit against a State in that 
State’s own court system nor does it bar a suit against a state in a different 
State court.182  Most States have adopted the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act.  Arizona’s Declaratory Judgment Act, A.R.S. § 12-1832, 
presents as a typical enactment of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.  
A.R.S. § 12-1832 provides: 
 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract 
or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, 
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have 
determined any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or 
                                                                                                                 
178. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166-67 (1908). 
179. Cent. Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 
1988) (first emphasis added).  See Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. Sida of Haw., 
Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 874 (9th Cir. 1987). 
180. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). 
181. Cent. Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co., 852 F.2d at 1161 n.5 (citing State Highway 
Comm'n of Wyo. v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 200 (1928)). 
182. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979). 
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franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other 
legal relations thereunder. 
 
Arizona courts, like most jurisdictions, have held that the Arizona 
Declaratory Judgment Act is a means by which a party may seek 
declaratory judgment relief to resolve controversies involving public 
officials.183  In addition, declaratory relief is available to insureds, insurers, 
and other parties whose rights, status, or legal relations are affected by an 
insurance policy.184  Hence, based upon the State’s enactment of its 
declaratory judgment act and its waiver of sovereign immunity, a carrier 
can seek declaratory relief against the State and its agencies in state court.   
Based upon the relevant case law, a carrier typically cannot file one 
consolidated action involving the insured, the federal government, and the 
state government.  A carrier must file two separate actions: one in federal 
court against the federal government and another in state court against the 
state government.  Alternatively, the carrier may chose to file only one 
declaratory judgment action against either the federal government or the 
state government with the hopes that the other governmental entity may 
chose to intervene.  If the governmental entity intervenes in a court where it 
has sovereign immunity, the governmental entity has waived its sovereign 
immunity and jurisdiction in the court is proper.185   
 
VIII.  FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO 
FINDING A WAY THROUGH THE MAZE OF DUAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
It is not possible to force both the federal government and state 
government into one single unified declaratory judgment action in either 
state or federal court.  The question becomes whether there is a practical 
way to maneuver around the obstacle created through dual sovereignty to 
avoid the time and costs associated with bringing two separate actions, as 
                                                                                                                 
183. Riley v. Cochise County,  455 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969). 
184. See Connolly v. Great Basin Ins. Co., 431 P.2d 921, 926-27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). 
185. Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 (1933) (noting that State’s Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity may be waived by a voluntary proceeding in intervention, but 
holding no waiver under particular facts); United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that federal government waived its sovereign immunity by initiating 
suit); see also, 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1427, at 
197 (2d ed. 1990) (“[W]hen the United States institutes an action, defendant may assert by 
way of recoupment any claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the 
original claim in order to reduce or defeat the government's recovery.”). 
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well as to avoid the possibility of inconsistent results on the same issue.  
One strategic approach to this problem may be found within the doctrines 
of full faith and credit and comity. 
Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution provides that: “Full 
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State … Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings 
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”186  Strictly speaking, the full faith 
and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not require that the 
federal courts give full faith and credit to the judgments of state courts.187  
Similarly, judgments of the federal courts are generally not considered to 
be within the purview of the constitutional requirement that state courts to 
give full faith and credit to judgments from other states.188   
However, all federal courts are required by statute to give full faith and 
credit to valid state court judgments.189  Specifically, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738, “[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any court of any … 
State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, … 
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in 
the courts of [the[ State, Territory, or Possession from which they are 
                                                                                                                 
186. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (West 2007) (duly authenticated “records and judicial 
proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof … 
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its 
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the court[] [from] which they 
[were] taken.”).    
187. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986); Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 
1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[b]y its terms, and in light of its purpose, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause imposes no obligation whatsoever on the federal government.”); 
United. States. v. Carter, No. 05-5179, 2006 WL 2076807 at *3 (10th Cir. Jul. 27,2006). 
188. Supreme Lodge, K.P. v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 33 (1924); Del. Valley Citizens' 
Council for Clean Air v. Com. of Pa., 755 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1985); Puckett v. City of 
Emmett,  747 P.2d 48 (Idaho 1987); Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.2d 93 (1936).   
189. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Full Faith and 
Credit Act requires a federal district court to give the same, not more and not less, 
preclusive effect to a state court judgment as that judgment would have in the state courts of 
the state in which it was rendered); Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 
1256, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that federal courts must give state court judgments full 
faith and credit by applying the preclusion law of the rendering state); Genesys Data 
Technologies, Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 2000); Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 18 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (observing that the statute granting full faith and credit to state judicial 
proceedings requires the federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court 
judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the 
judgments emerged). 
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taken.”190  Thus, a federal court generally must give full faith and credit to 
a state court judgment, allowing it to have both res judicata191 and collateral 
estoppel effect.192  
Similarly, a state court must give a federal court judgment full faith and 
credit,193 and thus both res judicata194 and collateral estoppel effect.195  
Under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA),196 the 
term “foreign judgment” includes a judgment of any court of the United 
States.197  Thus, a judgment of a federal district court comes within the 
purview of the UEFJA.198  Under the UEFJA, a copy of a foreign judgment 
may be filed in a court of the state, in which case the judgment is treated as 
a judgment of a court of the state.199  
                                                                                                                 
190. 28 U.S.C. A. § 1738 (West 2007). 
191. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991); Americana Fabrics, 
Inc. v. L & L Textiles, Inc., 754 F.2d 1524, 1529 (9th Cir 1985). 
192. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980); Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 
1459 (10th Cir. 1991). 
193. Meyer, 265 U.S. at 33 (holding that “[w]hile the judicial proceedings of the 
federal courts are not within the terms of the constitutional provision, such proceedings, 
nevertheless, must be accorded the same full faith and credit by state courts as would be 
required in respect of the judicial proceedings of another state.”); Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 
437 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2006); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Com. 
of Pa., 755 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that “although Congress implemented the 
Constitution's full faith and credit clause of Article IV, § 1, in language referring only to 
state courts, there ‘is a clearly established rule that state courts must give full faith and credit 
to the proceedings of federal courts[.] That this is the rule is beyond doubt, and the state 
courts have generally accepted it.’”); Nottingham v. Weld, 237 Va. 416, 419, 377 S.E.2d 
621, 623 (Va. 1989); McAllister, 216 B.R. 957, 974 (Bankr. N.D.Ala. 1998); Rehabilitation 
of Frontier Ins. Co., 27 A.D.3d 274, 275 (N.Y.App.Div. 2006); Denny Wiekhorst Equip., 
Inc. v. Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 693 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Neb. 2005); 
Transamerica Trade Co., Inc. v. McCollum Aviation, Inc., 424 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
194. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2006); S. Coatings, Inc. v. 
City of Tamarac, 916 So.2d 19, 21 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005); Federated Mgt. Co. v. Latham & 
Watkins, 742 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Urlic v. Insurance Co. of State of 
Pennsylvania, 259 A.D.2d 1, 4 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999). 
195. Denny Wiekhorst Equip., Inc. v. Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 693 
N.W.2d 506, 511 (Neb. 2005); McCallum v. N. C. Co-op. Extension Service of N.C. State 
Univ., 542 S.E.2d 227, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
196. Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act §§ 1-10 (West 2007). 
197. Id. § 1.   
198. Bechtel Corp. v. W. Contracting Corp., 414 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987). 
199. Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964 § 2 (West 2007).  However, 
it is important to note that there is at least one state variation of the UEFJA Act that does not 
apply to federal court judgments.  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Panelfab Intern. Corp., 501 
So.2d 167, 168 (Fla.Disct.Ct. App. 1987). 
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The usefulness of the full faith and credit doctrine as it pertains to the 
subject matter of this article derives from the specific factual circumstances 
at issue.  While it is not possible to bring both the state and federal 
governments into one unified action, the insured will be a part of the action 
irregardless of the forum.  If the factual and legal issues pertaining to 
coverage are the same in relation to the claims by both the state and federal 
governments, any decision in favor of the insurance carrier against the 
insured should be given full faith and credit in either forum.   
For example, if the insurance carrier proceeds against the insured and 
the federal government in a federal declaratory judgment action, the 
decision should be given full faith and credit in any subsequent state court 
proceeding.   Technically speaking, because the state government was not a 
party to this proceeding, the state government would not be bound by the 
decision under either res judicata or collateral estoppel.200  However, the 
state government should, for all practical purposes, be bound to the 
judgment on the coverage issue via the decision against the insured.  More 
specifically, any possible recovery which can be obtained against the 
insurance policy by the state government in relation to a judgment against 
the insured in state court can only occur if the insured is entitled to such 
coverage under the terms of the insurance contract.  Since a judgment on 
the issue of coverage has already been rendered by the federal court under 
this scenario, the state court should be effectively precluded from 
recovering against the policy pursuant to the full faith and credit doctrine. 
Arguably, the above should work whether the declaratory judgment 
action is filed in either state or federal court.  However, the practical effect 
of the full faith and credit doctrine may be weaker as it pertains to the 
federal government giving full faith and credit to a decision of a state court.  
The federal full faith and credit statute may be subject to certain 
                                                                                                                 
200. It has been held that in order for a federal court judgment to have preclusive effect 
in a state court action the parties to the state court proceeding must be the same as the 
original federal court proceeding; the judgment is not binding on strangers but is conclusive 
only as against those parties or their privies or others who sufficiently participate or are 
represented in the action.  McCallum v. N.C. Co-op. Extension Serv. of N.C. State 
University, 142 N.C.App. 48, 51-52, 542 S.E.2d 227, 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Wagner v. 
Heavlin, 136 Ohio App.3d 719, 738, 737 N.E.2d 989, 1002-03 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Great 
Dane Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern Pulpwood, Inc., 301 Ark. 436, 439, 785 S.W.2d 13, 15 
(Ark. 1990); Waddell v. Stevenson, 683 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Silver v. 
Queen's Hospital, 63 Haw. 430, 435-36, 629 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Hawaii 1981). 
2008]  PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY 483 
 
exceptions,201 and the effect of state court judgments may be limited by 
competing federal interests or public policy.202   
In contrast, states do not appear to have such flexibility in applying the 
full faith and credit doctrine to federal court decisions.203  A judgment or 
decree which has been duly rendered by a federal court is binding and 
conclusive on the parties to that action in all subsequent state court 
litigation between them, and is not subject to review or reexamination by 
the state courts on the merits.204  Likewise, the procedural transfer of a 
federal court judgment to a state court pursuant to the UEFJA does not 
confer jurisdiction upon the state court to reconsider the merits of the case 
de novo.205  A judgment duly rendered by a federal court also cannot be 
                                                                                                                 
201. Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 84 F.3d 1388, 1392 (11th 
Cir. 1996); Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1995); 
In re Hale, 155 B.R. 730, 735 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 
202. U.S. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (9th 1980) (observing that in 
employment discrimination suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, several courts 
have refused to give collateral estoppel effect to prior decisions by state agencies under state 
law because of the countervailing public policy that a plaintiff is not to be deprived of a 
federal forum to adjudicate employment discrimination claims); Batiste v. Furnco Constr. 
Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974); Matter of Shuler  722 F.2d 1253, 1258 n.10 (5th 
Cir. 1984). 
203. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (holding that the doctrine of full 
faith and credit required Mississippi to extend full faith and credit to a judgment obtained in 
Missouri upon a gambling debt even though that debt was incurred in Mississippi and such a 
debt was not a valid legally enforceable obligation under Mississippi law); Hilton Intern. 
Co. v. Arace  35 Conn.Supp. 522, 530, 394 A.2d 739, 743 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); see also 
REST. (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971) ( “[a] valid judgment rendered in one 
State of the United States will be recognized and enforced in a sister State even though the 
strong public policy of the latter State would have precluded recovery in its courts on the 
original claim.”). 
204. Prina v. Union Canal & Irr. Co., 63 Ariz. 473, 163 P.2d 683 (1945); Meyer v. 
Milliken, 111 Colo. 113, 138 P.2d 276 (1943); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 151 
Fla. 564, 10 So.2d 85 (1942); Meyer v. Kenmore-Granville Hotel Co., 308 Ill.App. 78, 31 
N.E.2d 330 (1941);Union Pac. R. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 136 Kan. 166, 13 P.2d 276 
(1932); Hays v. Lundy, 293 Ky. 711, 170 S.W.2d 49 (1943); Real Estate Exch. Corp. v. 
Harte, 304 Mich. 596, 8 N.W.2d 652 (1943); In re McLure's Estate, 90 Mont. 502, 3 P.2d 
1056 (1931); Wehle v. Shanks, 35 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1942); Dittmar v. St. Louis Union Trust 
Co., 155 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941); State ex rel. O'Brien v. Superior Court for King 
County, 173 Wash. 679, 24 P.2d 117 (1933). 
205. U.S. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (9th 1980) (observing that in 
employment discrimination suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, several courts 
have refused to give collateral estoppel effect to prior decisions by state agencies under state 
law because of the countervailing public policy that a plaintiff is not to be deprived of a 
federal forum to adjudicate employment discrimination claims); Batiste v. Furnco Const. 
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impeached collaterally in a state court for any alleged irregularity or 
error.206  A state court can only reexamine a federal court judgment for 
purposes of determining the scope and extent of that judgment.207  
This approach may find further support depending upon the facts and 
regulations at issue.  Specifically, privity may be held to exist between the 
state and federal governments if the violations sued for and adjudicated in 
the federal case are the same as those presented in a state enforcement 
action.208  Although the state government may not be involved in the 
federal court action, if privity exists the state may nevertheless be bound by 
the decision under either res judicata or collateral estoppel because of the 
federal government’s involvement.   
For example, in State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,209 
the insured, Smithfield Foods, Inc., was sued by both the EPA and the 
Virginia State Water Control Board in separate proceedings for violations 
of a permit that regulated the discharge of wastewater into navigable 
waters.210  In the federal action brought by the EPA, it was determined that 
Smithfield had engaged in numerous violations of its permit.211  Smithfield 
subsequently filed a motion in the state action, asserting that the Virginia 
State Water Control Board’s enforcement action in state court was now 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.212  The central issue in that case was 
whether privity existed between the Virginia State Water Control Board 
and the EPA in the federal action.  The Supreme Court of Virginia held that 
                                                                                                                          
Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974); Tronagun Corp. v. Mizerock, 820 F.Supp. 225 
(W.D.Pa. 1993). 
206. Chapman v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Kentucky, 117 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 
1941); Mueller v. Elba Oil Co., 21 Cal.2d 188, 130 P.2d 961 (1942); Standard Accident Ins. 
Co. v. Simpson, 151 Fla. 564, 10 So.2d 85 (1942); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. 
Co., 136 Kan. 166, 13 P.2d 276 (1932); Real Estate Exch. Corp. v. Harte, 304 Mich. 596, 8 
N.W.2d 652 (1943); Cline v. Tait, 113 Mont. 475, 129 P.2d 89 (1942); U.S. v. President and 
Directors of Manhattan Co., 276 N.Y. 396, 12 N.E.2d 518 (1938); Upton's Estate, 199 
Wash. 447, 92 P.2d 210 (1939). 
207. State v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 258 S.W. 609, 162 Ark. 443 (1924). 
208. See, e g., State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 261 Va. 209, 215-16, 
542 S.E.2d 766, 769-70 (2001).  Cf. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1003 (holding that the 
relationship between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Washington Department 
of Ecology was sufficiently close such that the Environmental Protection Agency was 
collaterally estopped from re-litigating in a federal enforcement action under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act an issue which had already been decided in a state enforcement 
action in which the Washington Department of Ecology had been a party). 
209. State Water Control Bd., 542 S.E.2d 766. 
210. Id. at 768. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
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privity existed in that case because the interests and rights of both the state 
and federal agencies were vested in a single permit issued pursuant to joint 
program between the agencies.213  In other words, “the [Virginia State 
Water Control Board] and the EPA share[d] an identity of interest in the 
permit issued to Smithfield … such that the [Virginia State Water Control 
Board’s] legal right was represented by the EPA in the federal action when 
the EPA sought to enforce the provisions of the permit.”214 
It should be noted that whether privity exists between the parties in 
particular circumstances requires a case by case determination in which the 
traditional principles of the doctrine are applied.215  The mere existence of 
dual enforcement powers between the state and federal governments in and 
of itself neither compels nor precludes a finding of privity.216  Nevertheless, 
it is another factor which may work in favor of the approach to solving the 
dilemma which is the subject matter of this article, as outlined above.  
In sum, it would appear that the less problematic approach would be 
for the insurance carrier to file a declaratory judgment action in federal 
court against the insured and the federal government in these dual 
sovereignty situations.  If the insurance carrier is successful on the relevant 
coverage issues, the state government should be effectively precluded from 
recovering under the policy due to the full faith and credit protection 
afforded to the decision rendered on coverage between the insurance carrier 
and the insured.  Any state proceeding which may be necessary to enforce 
the federal judgment should be abbreviated, thereby avoiding the expense 
associated with prosecuting two separate actions.  This should also 
effectively avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions rendered on the 
same issue. 
Practically speaking, taking this approach to resolve this dilemma 
could also operate to force the state government to consider voluntarily 
waiving its immunity and participate in the federal declaratory judgment 
action, thereby avoiding the dilemma altogether.  If the state government is 
aware that the declaratory judgment action is proceeding and that a 
decision in that action could prevent the state from recovering under the 
policy, the state may seek to join the federal action in order to protect its 
interest in the resolution of the coverage issue.  
 
                                                                                                                 
213. Id. at 770. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 771. 
216. Id. 
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I CAME, I SAW, I UNDERWROTE: D & O LIABILITY 
INSURANCE’S PAST UNDERWRITING PRACTICES AND 
POTENTIAL FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Joshua Dobiac 
 
Underwriting is rarely easy.  For D & O liability insurance 
underwriting this is even truer.  A field that has long been recognized as 
more of an art than a science, many billions of dollars rest upon their 
accurately rating the risks that they underwrite.  This paper attempts to 
evaluate the current practices of D & O insurance underwriting with one 
goal in mind: Is there a better way of underwriting the risk? 
Part I of this paper provides a basic review of the D & O underwriting 
market and how underwriters go about underwriting risk, first in general 
and then specifically D & O risk.  Part II evaluates the how corporate 
governance may be a compelling factor in individualized underwriting.  
Finally Part III discusses an alternative to the current underwriting 
methods, with the goal of making D & O insurance underwriting less prone 
to errors. 
 
I. THE D & O INSURANCE MARKET AND D & O UNDERWRITERS 
 
All states in the U.S. have statutes allowing for the indemnification of 
Directors and Officers.1  Such indemnification is allowed even for those 
acts that the corporation is statutorily prevented from personally 
indemnifying.2  While historically states were silent on whether this was 
allowed, it soon became apparent that this type of insurance was not going 
to go away.3  This was the beginning of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 
as a bona fide line of insurance.4   
                                                                                                                 
1. For a complete list, see Joseph Warren Bishop, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS § 6:4 (2006).   
2. See Intermarque Automotive Products, Inc. v. Feldman, 21 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 
App. Texarkana 2000). 
3. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 22 BUS. LAW. 92 (1966).   
4. Although the first D & O policy was issued in the 1930s in the U.S. by Lloyd’s 
underwriters.  IAN YOUNGMAN, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE 144 (2d 
ed. 1999).  The insurance was a response to the wave of lawsuits following the 1929 stock 
market crash.  Id. 
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Starting in the 1960s, D & O insurance was created to protect directors 
and officers from derivative lawsuits.  In general, public policy did not 
allow for indemnification.5  By the 1970s, as the line of insurance 
continued to grow, coverage was readily available at relatively low cost, 
despite it being an otherwise unfriendly time for most lines of insurance.6  
However, the 1980s marked a time of significant change.  A major 
Delaware Supreme Court case is often regarded as the beginning of a new 
era of shareholder litigation and thus executive liability.7  Here, the court 
found the directors of a corporation personally liable for failing to make an 
informed business decision with respect to a recent merger.8  This was 
despite the absence of fraud or bad faith.9  On the tail of this decision, 
many other lawsuits increasingly revealed the substantial risks to which 
corporate officers were being exposed.10  Also just making this revelation 
was the D & O insurance market, which subsequently began to harden.  
Policy limits decreased, premiums increased and the list of exclusions in 
the policies multiplied considerably.11  By 1987 states began to reduce the 
potential exposure of Directors and Officers through legislation.12   
Again the market softened and became more accommodating to 
corporations.  However, a significant underwriting cycle was developing.13  
The market during 1990s was initially soft, but by the close of the decade 
began to harden appreciably.14  This problem persisted into the current 
decade.15  Following such large profile scandals such as Enron, Adelphia 
                                                                                                                 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 46 A.L.R.4th 821 (Del. 1985). 
8. Id. at 864. 
9. Under the business judgment rule, poor decision making is not defense.  Id. at 
872.  As the court stated, “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere 
absence of bad faith or fraud.  Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on 
a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical eye in 
assessing information of the type and under circumstance [in the case.]”  Id. 
10. See LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND 
INSURANCE § 8:1. 
11. Id.  For a detailed discussion of the crisis in the market in the late 80s, see Roberta 
Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1 (1989). 
12. See Id. §§ 7:22 et seq. 
13. This underwriting cycle, including its potential causes and effects, will bear 
significantly upon the topic in this paper.  It will be discussed in greater detail infra. 
14. See Tillinghast Towers Perrin, 2005 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 
[Hereinafter Tilinghast 2005 Survey]. 
15. Though there was a slight softening of the market around the turn of the century.  
See Tillinghast 2005 Survey. 
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and Tyco, the D & O insurance market paid out roughly twice as much as it 
brought in from premiums.16  The majority of these losses came from 
shareholder litigation.17  In 2002 alone, premiums were estimated to have 
increased anywhere from 25% to 400%, with the largest increases going to 
the more financially unstable companies.18  This trend continued into the 
next year.19  2003 was the zenith, however.20  In 2004 and 2005, premiums 
dropped significantly, returning to lows not seen since 2001.21  At the same 
time, for-profit corporations saw their average limits increase 9% in 2005 
alone.22 
These results are somewhat troubling, however.  Despite lower 
premiums23, higher limits24 and less restrictive policies, claims experience 
in 2005 was more severe.25  This is attributable to both higher frequency 
and greater severity in individual claims.26  In addition to this, legal costs 
have also increased by as much as 100% from 2004 alone.27  Whether this 
counterintuitive behavior is attributable to underwriting lagging market 
                                                                                                                 
16. Id. 
17. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 4 (reporting that responding companies experienced 
57% of their D & O claims from shareholders). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 61. 
22. Id. 
23. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 61(“reporting that average premium for all participants 
were approximately 13% lower in 2005 than in 2006”).  
24. Although it should be noted that average limits actually decreased for those 
corporations with assets greater than $5 billion.  Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 24.  Also, the 
most significant increase occurred with the excess layers.  There was little change in the 
limits of the primary layers.  This is particularly surprising, given that the average claim is 
increasingly more expensive and in any event the average is higher than the average primary 
layer.  Staid primary limits indicates greater excess layer exposure, which would imply 
lower excess layer limits or higher premiums, but the opposite occurred. 
25. Id. 
26. Severity can be measured in several ways, but a common one is average 
settlement amounts.  See Ronald I. Miller, et al., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action 
Litigation: Beyond the Mega-Settlements, is Stabilization Ahead? (NERA Economic 
Consulting, April 2006).  In 2005, settlements averaged over $24 million.  Id. at 5.  This was 
an increase of over 26% from 2004.  Id.  In fact, the average settlement from ’02 to ’05 was 
67.7% greater than the average settlement value for the years ’96 to ’01.  Id. 
27. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 112 (Average expense cost in 2005 was $781,000 per 
claim, up from $370,000 per claim in 2004). 
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forces or is the result of optimism or increased competition will be 
addressed below.28 
The rising and falling of premiums and limits only tell part of the D & 
O insurance story.  In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 
response to the highly publicized corporate scandals discussed above.29  As 
a consequence, the cost of doing business for publicly-traded companies 
increased by 90.4%.30  Furthermore, while asset size was the single largest 
determinant of premium level historically, industry and claims history now 
play a more significant role.31   Thus, large companies with negative claims 
histories are finding premiums increasingly more painful to pay.32  In fact, 
24% of respondents who did not purchase the insurance claimed they 
declined to do so because the cost was too high.33 
Other legal concerns inform D & O insurance.  In particular, most 
shareholder claims allege a violation of directors’ fiduciary duties34 or are 
securities-based lawsuits.35  Nor are these complaints repetitiously alleging 
                                                                                                                 
28. “We attribute this shift to the greater market capacity of the D & O insurance 
market.  However, it will be difficult to sustain this trend, and we expect capacity to begin to 
shrink.  This shrinkage will likely come not from companies exiting the market altogether, 
but from a reduction in the overall amount of D & O coverage they underwrite.”  Tillinghast 
2005 Survey at 3. 
29. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
30. This increase was the result of increased accounting fees, compliance rules, rising 
premiums for D & O insurance, increased director compensation, legal fees and auditor fees. 
31. Joseph Warren Bishop, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 8.02 
(2006).  How much this affects corporate conduct will be discussed in Part II, infra. 
32. At present no one is finding it difficult to find coverage, however.  Tillinghast 
2005 Survey (“[A]ll U.S. and Canadian participants reported that they were able to obtain D 
& O coverage”).  This indicates that insurers are still more than willing to underwrite a 
corporation regardless of the level of risk presented.  This is troubling, insofar as 
underwriters are tasked with risk selection as well as risk pricing.  There may be a time in 
the future when the market hardens appreciably that insurance will no longer be offered to 
the highest risk tier, whatever that may be determined to be.  Despite this, the fact that there 
are periods where the vast majority of companies can find coverage testifies to the degree of 
endogenous risk in the line. 
33. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 21.  However, those who gave this reason were only 
from two of the 6 principal business classes, Durable Goods and Nonbanking Financial 
Services.  Id. 
34. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomson, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004). 
35. These lawsuits are based upon both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  15 USCA §§ 77a-77aa (1997 and Sup 2005); 15 USCA §§ 78a-
78mm (1997 and Sup 2005). 
2008]   I CAME, I SAW, I UNDERWROTE  491 
 
the same violations.36  And shareholders are not the sole moving party in 
these lawsuits.  The SEC additionally is empowered to bring lawsuits 
against corporations suspected of securities violations.37  Most violations, 
however, are alleged to be caused by misrepresentations that adversely 
affected shareholders.38 The mechanism whereby this impacts the 
shareholders is stock price.39  These lawsuits typically rely upon a violation 
of Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.40 
 
A.  D & O INSURANCE POLICIES AND COVERAGE 
 
The line of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance can be divided into three 
distinct types of coverage: Side A, B and C.  Side A coverage is individual 
coverage that is meant to indemnify corporate officers for any sums for 
which they become liable to pay.41  There is often language in the policy 
that restricts this indemnification to circumstances where the firm is not 
permitted to indemnify the officer directly.42  Side B coverage “reimburses 
the corporation for its indemnification payments to officers and 
directors.”43  And finally, the least common type of D & O insurance.  Side 
C “protects the corporation from the risk of shareholder litigation to which 
                                                                                                                 
36. See William E. Knepper & Dan A. Baily, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND 
DIRECTORS § 17.02 (7th ed. 2003) (containing a list of 170 different bases for corporate 
liability in shareholder actions). 
37. See generally, 15 U.S.C. § 77s; § 77t; § 78u(a); § 78u(d). 
38. “Misstatements designed to keep the firm afloat, as opposed to those designed 
merely to pad executive pay packages, because they arguably benefit the firm may not seem 
to arise out of agency costs.  However, any benefit to current shareholders – through, for 
example, overstated earnings – comes at the expense of future shareholders – those who buy 
in under the misrepresentation and therefore pay too much for their shares and also those 
who fail to sell prior to the corrective disclosure.  This reveals a temporal conflict between 
investors generally.”  Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: 
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 CHICAGO L. REV. 
487,497 fn 38, citing Steven L. Schwartz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict 
Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005).  For a detailed 
discussion of why corporations are willing to mislead corporate investors, see Donald C. 
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock 
Market Investors, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000). 
39. See Generally, Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as 
Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 903 (2003). 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000); C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995). 
41. Baker, et al, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 38, at 499.   
42. See Id. at 499, note 51. 
43. Id. at 499. 
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the corporate entity is itself a party.”44  Side A and B coverage is generally 
referred to as “standard coverage.”45 
While the mechanics of each type of policy are different, so is the 
general liability structure and degree of protection.  For example, Side A 
insurance frequently does not have any deductible associated with the 
coverage.46  Side B and C, however generally have large retentions.47  
Some companies now purchase split retentions, where the deductible is 
higher for securities claims.48 
D & O insurance policies typically cover settlement amounts, legal fees 
and compensatory damages.49  This coverage is contingent upon the 
liability coming from the conduct of directors and officers in their 
professional capacity.50  The policies also have three distinct exclusions.  
The first exclusion removes coverage from claims involving “actual 
fraud.”51  Secondly, there is no coverage for acts that were committed prior 
to the start of the policy.52  This is called the “prior acts” exclusion.53  
Finally, because some acts may result in the Corporation suing its own 
directors or officers, there is the “Insured v. Insured” exclusion.54  This 
exclusion removes coverage for expenses arising out of litigation between 
named insureds on the policy.55  Myriad other exclusions exist,56 but since 
                                                                                                                 
44. Id. “The Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Loss which the Company 
shall become legally obligated to pay as the result of a Securities Claim…against the 
Company for a Wrongful Act…” Id. at note 53, citing Hartford Specimen Policy, §I.C. 
45. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 47. 
46. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 53 (98% of U.S. respondents with Side A coverage had 
no deductibles). 
47. Deductibles are averaged by asset size.  For firms with assets up to $400 million, 
the average retention or deductible in 2005 was $212,491.  Firms with assets from $400 
million to $1 billion saw an average that was $812, 500; between $1 and $2 billion: 
$1,217,000; between $2 and $5 billion, $3,327,966 and for firms with assets over $5 billion, 
the average retention was $6537,143.  Id. at 52, tbl 38. 
48. Id. at 53 (reporting that 4% of U.S. respondents and 57% of Canadian respondents 
had this type of split retention).  What is the cause of the marked difference between U.S. 
and Canadian firms is not explained. 
49. Hartford Specimen Policy § IV.J.   
50. Id.  
51. Chubb Specimen Policy §§ 7-8. 
52. See, e.g., AIG Specimen Policy §§ 4.h., 1. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at §§ 4.i., j. 
55. Id. 
56. See generally, Id. § 4 for list of these exclusions.  The most common types of 
exclusions are: illegal profit or gains, dishonesty or fraud, questionable payments, 
inadequate insurance, product defects, injury, sickness and damage, damage to property, 
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these contracts are negotiated by the insurer and insured, they are highly 
individualized and characterizing them with broad strokes would give a 
false sense of the industry uniformity.  Suffice it to say that potential 
insureds are concerned with shareholder litigation risk primarily and the 
policies will generally reflect that concern.57 
It should also be noted that each corporation does not have one D & O 
insurance policy from one insurer.  In fact, corporate insureds frequently 
possess many layers of insurance from several insurance companies.58   
These layers can be broadly termed primary or excess.59  Excess insurance 
generally exists simply because insurers are unwilling to underwrite the 
whole risk for a single large firm.60  To do so would place too much 
correlated risk in the insurer’s portfolio, with potentially catastrophic 
consequences.61  There is qualitative evidence which indicates that $50 
                                                                                                                          
guarantee or warranty, copyright, professional indemnity/liability, pensions, fines, failure to 
control pollution, known actions, deliberate acts.  IAN YOUNGMAN, DIRECTORS’ AND 
OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE at 37-39. 
57. The following is a partial list of risks for which firms would be concerned: 
employment, unfair practices, abuse of authority, wrongful dismissal, libel and slander, non-
payment or underpayment, misrepresentation, takeovers and mergers, wrongful trading, 
financial, contractual, personal (conspiracy or bribery), the state (for price-fixing or sundry 
under illegal acts), company regulations, mismanagement, intellectual property and 
corporate manslaughter.  IAN YOUNGMAN, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE 
at 12-16.  Corporations would like protection from as many of these as possible, but 
frequently will likely be able to receive cover on all of them. 
58. Outside D & O insurance, it has not been unusual historically for one company to 
have dozens of insurers covering different parts of the same risk.  This is quite common 
with CGL policies, the impact of which is best seen in the asbestos litigation in the last 30 
years. 
59. This, of course, ignores reinsurance, whether standard or retrocessionary.  
Although, non-treaty insurance can often look like excess-of-loss coverage, it need not and 
may look more like a vertical slice than the horizontal partitioning of the risk that defines 
traditional excess coverage. 
60. Insurers, like investors, generally wish to diversify their portfolio.  Since all 
insurers have finite resources, having a large part of their risk placed on one insured could 
lead to a devastating loss and possible bankruptcy.  As some corporations have upwards of 
$300 million in policy limits across all of their layers, potential exposure is considerable to 
any undiversified insurer.   
61. Offering a single insured too much insurance coverage is an easy example of 
excessive correlated risk.  However, it can pop up in other settings and natural disasters 
have been the historical culprit.  Both the San Francisco and Chicago fires are examples of 
disasters that bankrupted many local insurers precisely because their risks were 
geographically highly correlated.  
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million dollars is the largest single insurer limit currently available.62  In 
order to achieve the desired coverage, several policies must be purchased.  
The aggregation of the multiple policies is generally referred to as “towers 
of insurance.”63  The first layer of insurance, the one that would respond 
first to a lawsuit, is called the primary layer.64  All layers stacked on top of 
the primary layer are referred to as “excess layers.”  These excess layers 
could be vertical layers or horizontal layers.  The more common excess 
layer is the horizontal one, which means that the excess insurer would pay 
the first $X excess of the primary layer, after which it will have exhausted 
its liability.  The vertical layer can be seen as a proportional layer of 
insurance that pays a percentage of several excess layers.  So if two excess 
insurers each had $5 million in excess coverage, one on top of the other, for 
a total of $10 million of coverage above the primary layer, another insurer 
could agree to pay for 20% of both layers.  Thus, each excess insurer’s total 
liability risk is reduced to $4 million.  In this way, the proportional insurer 
could be seen as a type of reinsurer of the two excess insurers. 
The dynamics of this is important, because insureds want some degree 
of consistency with the policy.  This is generally referred to as 
“concurrency.”65  This is where the higher layer policies “follow the form” 
of the underlying policy.66  What this generally means in practice is that 
most definitions are omitted from the excess insurance policies, except to 
say that they take all the definitions, exclusions, etc from the underlying 
policy.67  The law surrounding these “follow the forms” clauses is little, but 
in recent years, considerable excess insurance and reinsurance losses in 
areas like asbestos has substantially increased the number of cases that 
discuss this historically esoteric area.68  
                                                                                                                 
62. Tom Baker, Predicting Corporate Governance, supra note 38, at 20.  In fact, as of 
late 2005, no one insurer was willing to offer a policy larger than $25 million. 
63. Id. 
64. The market for primary insurance is dominated by two firms: AIG and Chubb, 
which combine to control 53% of the market by premium volume.  Tillinghast 2005 Survey 
at 86.  However, this share decreases to only 36% of total policy count.  Id. 
65. See Barry R. Ostrager & Mary Kay Vyskocil, MODERN REINSURANCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE §2.03[a] (2d ed. 2000).  To see how courts have interpreted this clause, see North 
River Ins. Co.v. CIGNA Reins. Corp., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995);  
66. See Ostrager, supra note 65 at § 2.03[a]. 
67. Id. 
68. See Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne Reins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d295, 298, 
552 N.E.2d 139, 140 (1990) (“reinsurance is an area of law “in which differences [were] 
often…settled by handshakes and umpires, and pertinent precedents [were] few in number].  
See also Ostrager, supra note 65 at 1-3 (“The proliferation of reinsurance disputes, 
generated in large part by pollution and asbestos claims and insurer and reinsurer 
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Because of the nature of D & O insurance layers, the premiums paid in 
exchange for the higher layers are lower per dollar than the premium for 
the primary layer.69  This makes sense, since the further a coverage layer is 
from the base, the less likely any one claim or group of claims will exhaust 
all of the underlying layers. Thus, when one speaks of the premium paid for 
a firm’s D & O coverage, the number provided is actually a combination of 
the premiums paid to several insurers. 
 
B.  THE INSURANCE UNDERWRITING CYCLE 
 
An “underwriting cycle” can be described as the following: 
Profits in property and liability insurance have tended 
to rise and fall in fairly regular patterns lasting between 
five and seven years from peak to peak; this phenomenon 
is termed the underwriting cycle.  Stages of the 
underwriting cycle may be described as follows: initially, 
when profits are relatively high, some insurers, wishing to 
expand sales, start to lower prices and become more 
lenient in underwriting.  This leads to greater underwriting 
losses.  Rising losses and falling prices cause profits to 
suffer.  In the second stage of the cycle, insurers attempt to 
restore profits by increasing rates and restricting 
underwriting, offering coverage only to the safest risks.  
These restrictions may be so severe that insurance in some 
lines becomes unavailable to the marketplace.  Insurers are 
able to offset a portion of their underwriting losses through 
earnings on investments.  Eventually the increased rates 
and reduced underwriting losses restore profits.  At this 
point, the underwriting cycle repeats itself.70 
 
This underwriting cycle also does not generally coincide with the more 
well-known business cycle.71  There is a fair amount of uncertainty as to 
                                                                                                                          
insolvencies, has spurred reinsureds and reinsurers to rsort to litigation and arbitration wit 
much greater frequency”). 
69. See Tom Baker, et al, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 38, at 20-21.   
70.  Insurance, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-13260 (September 18, 2008). 
71. Barbara D. Stewert, Profit Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance, in 1 ISSUES IN 
INSURANCE 294, 294-295 (John D. Long & Everett D. Randall eds., Am. Inst. For Prop. & 
Liab. Underwriters 1984). 
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exactly what causes these cycles to persist, but a standard explanation has 
been provided for years.  This explanation is largely driven by economics.  
 The standard explanation relies upon three unique insurance 
economic characteristics.  The first is that the traditional economic 
balancing of supply and demand cannot be achieved in the insurance 
industry because the demand, i.e. the number of claims and their respective 
costs, cannot be accurately determined ex ante.72  The next problem 
originates from the unique nature of the insurance industry.  Profitability is 
not limited to bringing in more premium income than payments made 
under the policies, but also from investment income.  These investments 
are sensitive to the standard variables of investment theory, particularly 
interest rate.73  If the interest decreases, insurer reserves will be 
underfunded and additional income is required.  This can only be acquired 
from higher underwriting profitability.74  Finally, it has been argued that 
reinsurance capacity undermines the underlying insurance market 
whenever the capacity decreases.75  When this occurs, insurers lose an 
important means of risk reduction.76 
                                                                                                                 
72. Robert F. Wolf, Actuary Counters Hunter on Med Mal Insurance Crisis, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER  10 (Nov. 11, 2002).   
73. This is due to the required conservative investment strategies insurance companies 
must make in order to guarantee reserves are available to pay claims.  See Joseph D .Haley, 
A Cointegration Analysis of the Relationship between Underwriting Margins and Interest 
Rates: 1930-1989, 60 J. RISK AND INSURANCE 480, 486-487 (1993).  For a mathematical 
justification of the prior article’s methodology, see Scott E. Harrington & Tong Yu, Do 
Property-Casualty Insurance Underwriting Margins Have Unit Roots?, 70 J. RISK AND 
INSURANCE 715 (1997).  This asset-liability matching is so important that actuaries must 
learn the basics of it early in their examination process.  See generally The Society of 
Actuaries, available at www.soa.org.  This idea finds further quantitative traction in the 
degree of importance rho matching plays in risk hedging at insurance companies.  Rho is 
defined as the change in the value of an underlying asset or liability due to a change in the 
interest rate.  Being under- or over-hedged can significantly expose an insurance company 
to market risk, thereby causing substantial modifications in reserving needs.  Typically rho 
can be hedged by purchasing long or short positions in swaps.   
74. For a discussion of this in the medical malpractice field, see Tom Baker, The 
Medical Malpractice Underwriting Cycle. 
75. Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 18-19 (1989).   
76. Id.  See also Ostrager, supra note 65 at § 1.02[b] (“By ceding portions of their risk 
to reinsurers, insurers are able to assume more risk than would otherwise be possible”).  The 
basis for this is more than just unloading some risk: 
[I]nsurance companies must meet certain financial standards in 
order to do business.  The insurer must maintain specified minimum 
reserve requirements based on the amount and type of reinsurance in 
force and the insurer’s loss exposure.  The reserve requirements 
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The pricing problem seems to be the most significant driver of these 
underwriting cycles, giving rise to what is known as “the Winner’s 
Curse.”77  While analyses of the Winners’ Curse are often restricted to 
auction situations, there is an easy analog to the insurance market.78  
Studies done have shown that two principle risks affect the frequency and 
severity of the Winners’ Curse.79  The first is “the degree of uncertainty 
concerning the value of the item for bid.”80 The second is “the number of 
competing bidders.”81  The larger the number for either, the greater the risk 
of suffering from the Winner’s Curse.82   
The problem with this analysis, though accurate at describing the 
variables and mechanisms of the underwriting cycle, is that it does not 
address the “how.”  This has been well articulated in the following way 
(though with respect to the medical malpractice underwriting cycle): 
                                                                                                                          
establish the assets that an insurer must have available to pay all claims, 
losses, and adjustments and settlement expenses.  These requirements 
have the express purpose of adequately protecting the insured and 
securing the solvency of the insurer.  A contract of reinsurance is one 
by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against loss or 
liability by reason of such original insurance.  A fundamental purpose 
of reinsurance is to permit an insurer to reduce its reserve requirement.  
California requires insurers to file financial statements with the state.  
On those statements, an insurer may deduct certain risks from its 
liabilities, provided those risks are subject to reinsurance.  By utilizing 
reinsurance, therefore, an insurer can spread the risk its undertakes over 
a larger number of policies, effectively reduce the amount of reserves 
required to maintain its business, and increase its profitability. 
American Re-Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commission, 527 F. Supp. 444, 452-53 
(C.D.Cal. 1981). 
77. The Winner’s Curse “occurs in competitive situations when a successful buyer 
finds that he or she has paid too much for a commodity of uncertain value.”  Max H. 
Bazerman and William F. Samuelson, I Won the Auction But Don’t Want the Prize, 27 J. 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 618, 618 (1983).  See also, Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 191 (1988); Jeremey Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 
Prices and the Winner’s Curse, RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (2002). 
78. The insurance market, especially D & O insurance, is very much like an auction, 
with many bidders – the insurers – bidding for something of value – the insurance premium 
– the value of which is uncertain at the time of purchase and only becomes certain at a much 
later time. As Sean M. Fitzpatrick wrote, “the insurance market…is a particularly fertile 
ground for instances of the Winner’s Curse.”  Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A 
Behavior Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 Conn. Ins. L. J. 255, 260 (2002-2003). 
79. Bazerman & Samuelson, supra note 77 at 1. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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But [this analysis], like the economists and industry 
observers who preceded them, concentrated on the 
“proximate” causes of the medical malpractice crisis, 
without delving  more deeply to discover what might be 
called the “ultimate”  causes.  Put another way, the GAO 
study accurately reported what had occurred in the medical 
malpractice market and described the mechanics of how it 
had occurred, without finally addressing the more 
fundamental question: why?83 
 
This approach is the behavioral approach to the underwriting cycle.84  
The purpose of elaborating on these root causes is integral to thesis of this 
paper: that the underwriting cycle is explainable by behavioral factors and 
the heuristics of underwritings.  Especially in low frequency, large loss 
areas of insurance, like D & O or catastrophic risk insurance, where the 
dynamics leading to losses are many and fluid, these factors further 
exacerbate the cycle and destabilize the market sufficiently that 
profitability will always be difficult to achieve, or will be achieved with a 
dangerous amount of loss potential.85  However, before this can be fully 
                                                                                                                 
83. Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavior Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 
10 CONN. INS. L. J. 255, 263 (2002-2003). 
84. Id. at 264. The problem of applying traditional economic principles to insurance 
has long been questioned.  The following excerpt articulates the point well: 
[F]ew firms are able to determine their marginal revenue or cost 
curves.  To provide a profit, they rely on marking up the average cost 
per unit by some given percentage.  While prices may be allowed to 
decline below average costs, prices will not be set below variable cost.  
Insurers tend to follow the same pricing method but, in addition, must 
contend with the following problems. 
1) Average costs in insurance are predominately variable in nature 
and to a large extent beyond the control of the insurer. 
2) Accurate projections of average costs, particularly claims items, 
require sufficient numbers of exposures to allow the ‘law of large 
numbers’ to operate. 
3) Prices may violate the economic rule and be set below unit 
variable cost, if losses and claims expenses are far in excess of those 
projected by the actuaries. 
4) For many insurers, within the constraints of capacity, unit cost 
does not change significantly with sales. 
D.E. Ayling, infra note 91, at 24 (internal citation omitted). 
85. This should not be taken to mean that Catastrophic Risk Insurance lacks viability.  
In fact, engineering science has long utilized some tools for the situation in which there is 
very little data.  In particular, the Weibull Distribution is most effective when modeling 
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evaluated, a more detailed discussion of underwriting in practice must be 
done.  Then we can discuss what this means for the D & O Insurance 
market. 
 
C. UNDERWRITING PRACTICES 
 
In Part II, this paper will diffuse some of the public policy bases behind 
firm-by-firm underwriting of D & O insurance, but there yet may be an 
adequate economic basis for individualized ratemaking.  After all, if 
insurance companies can successfully distinguish good risks from bad 
during the underwriting process, then they would have a strong incentive to 
do so.  If an insurance company’s risk portfolio contains a higher 
proportion of good risks than its competitors, it will have more profitable 
claims experience.  Greater profitability in turn would allow the insurer to 
be more aggressive in attracting other clients.  Thus, market share would be 
increased.  This section will attempt to cast doubt on underwriters’ ability 
to do that.86 
Underwriting “is the process of accepting or rejecting risks.”87  
Underwritings focus on four general areas in assessing risks: the premium 
rate, the policy provisions, the hazard, and reinsurance arrangements.88  
Depending on the quality of risk, the underwriter has many different 
discretionary steps that can raise or lower the insurer’s exposure to that 
                                                                                                                          
phenomena for which little or no data is actually available.  The problem, however, is that 
for the modeling to be of any value, the mode of failure must be singular and quantifiable, 
something often missing in the D & O market.  That, combined with the more ethereal 
underwriting practices, militates against this methodology.   
86. This in no way contradicts the analysis in the next section, for there we are 
concerned with the market for D & O insurance in its entirety.  Here, we are focusing on the 
economic behavior of a single firm.  A firm that rates better than its competitors will have a 
competitive advantage, offering good risks lower rates.  If the insurer was equally good at 
pricing bad risks, they would not offer insurance at actuarially unsound premiums.  Other 
insurers, possessing less discerning underwriting practices, may undercut the more accurate 
competitor, yielding the result that insureds may still have little incentive to change their 
governance practices.  In any event, this discussion rests entirely upon the assumption that a 
particular insurer or subgroup of insurers possess unique underwriting prowess, the 
likelihood of which is at best questionable. 
87. ROBERT B. HOLTOM, UNDERWRITING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 11 (1973). “[It] is 
a systematic technique for evaluating risks which are offered by prospective insureds.  The 
function of underwriting involves evaluating, selecting, classifying and rating each risk, and 
establishing the standards of coverage and amount of protection to be offered to each 
acceptable risk.” Id. 
88. George L. Head, Underwriting in Five Easy Lessons?, 35 J. RISK AND INS. 307, 
308 (1968). 
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risk.89  However, experience is frequently mentioned as a key component is 
successful underwriting.90  That is why rating decisions are frequently 
made by the lead underwriter.91 After the initial rating decisions are made, 
more junior underwriters follow the guidelines the lead underwriter made.92 
In many traditional lines of insurance, both experience and scope of the 
line has created many mathematical models that allow underwriters to 
expeditiously price risks.93  However, such is not generally the case for D 
& O underwriters.94  Though, again, generalizations should be done 
carefully here, because the market for D & O is relatively young and 
various underwriting methods have been utilized by different insurers. 
The D & O underwriting initially focuses on three risks.95  The first 
part focuses on the individual application of the insured, which contains a 
questionnaire.96  The second part involves an independent investigation of 
all publicly available data.97  And finally, the application process finishes 
with acquiring as much private information about the firm as possible.98 
Again how this data is utilized is varied, but the following quote 
demonstrates the more informal nature of D & O underwriting:  
 
                                                                                                                 
89. Id. 
90. Id.  See also Tom Baker, et al, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 38, at 24, 
note 101 (“We literally sat at a round table and just based upon the experience of the more 
senior folks, we would say that this is a great number, and we just threw a number out of the 
hat,” citing Underwriter #6). 
91. D.E. Ayling, UNDERWRITING DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THE CATASTROPHE 
MARKET. 19 (1984). 
92. Id. 
93. See Neal Gendler, Rise in Automated Underwriting Spurs Credit Scoring Use; 
Computer Doesn’t Decide to Grant Loan, but Whether Secondary Loan Standards Are Met, 
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN January 2, 1999).  See also Tom Baker, et al, Predicting 
Governance Risk at 24, note 101. 
94. See note 75, supra. 
95. Baker, supra note 38, at 510. 
96. Id. (this “includ[es] the experience of covered officers and directors and the 
claims history of the corporation, plans for acquisitions or securities issuances, and whether 
any prospective insured has “prior knowledge” of acts or omissions likely to give risk to a 
claim.”) 
97. Id. at 511(“They use a wide variety of publicly available data sources including 
SEC filings, Bloomberg reports, analyst ratings, corporate governance reviews from 
specialized providers such as Corporate Library, and…forensic accounting.”) 
98. Id. (This is accomplished “through a series of meetings with the prospective 
insured’s senior managers – often the Chief Financial Officer or Treasurer as well as 
members of the accounting and legal departments and occasionally…the [CEO]”).  
2008]   I CAME, I SAW, I UNDERWROTE  501 
 
“We look at the industry that the company operates in, 
trying to figure out if we are in a mature industry, a growth 
industry, a start up section of the industry, whatever.  Are 
we working with proven technology, new technology, 
proven consumer goods, new consumer goods? 
We look at the history of the company and see if 
M&A is a prominent part of their planning process for the 
future or not.  We look if there are takeover risks.  We 
look if there is a restructuring perhaps necessary in the 
future of the company.  We examine the type of securities 
filings they did at the SEC… We look at any SPEs, SPVs, 
joint ventures that they are using to grow strategically. 
Then we dive into the corporate governance.  We 
examine who the directors and officers are, their 
applicable experience.  We look at interlocking board 
relationships.  We actually keep a separate database here.  
Since 1996 we can run our database and tell you if any one 
director or officer was a defendant in a securities class 
action or derivative action…[W]e record which company 
they were serving in when they were sued, but what we 
can then do is go back and look to see if the folks that we 
are underwriting now were sued in what was a fender 
bender or if it was a complete corporate meltdown…So we 
have a driving record in this. 
We look at the organization of the corporate 
governance committees and independence of those 
committees and how active they are and ten we look at 
insider ownership [and] compensation packages.  Then we 
move into a broader understanding of the entire ownership 
of the company…and what conflicts may or may not exist 
within ownership interests. 
We take a serious look at the equity trend of the 
company over recent years and what made its price 
earnings multiple what it is.  We examine insider trades.  
We look at any intellectual property that the company may 
be relying upon.  We look at the regulatory structure and 
who the regulators may be and what the history with the 
regulatory relationships were.  We look at both former 
existing director and officer litigation as well as general 
litigation that the corporation may be involved in that 
could be a threat to the future value of the company.  We 
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look at how they handle corporate investor 
communications.  We look at how they are handling 
legislative or environmental issues that may face the 
company.  We look at how they may handle employment 
practices and bankruptcy of course.  We have an entire 
dedicated review of the bankruptcy and potential 
emergency or liquidation. 
Then we go into a very meticulous breakdown of the 
financials of both the balance sheet and the cash flow 
statement and the profit and loss statement.  You know, 
your typical ratio analysis is supported by about 55 or so 
different ratios.  Underneath those ratios we look 
meticulously at who the auditors are, what the revenue 
recognition policies are, how they manage accounts 
receivable, inventory, payables, valuing intangibles, you 
know, formulating debt and appreciation, capital 
expenditures, pension obligations, and we look even at 
vendor financing if it exists.  We summarize, you know, 
what makes us want to write the account and what makes 
the necessity of the insurance relevant to the risk of the 
company.  And then we price it.99 
 
Thus, while a substantial amount of data is analyzed, it is frequently 
driven more by intuition than by an automated or computerized 
underwriting scheme. 
 
D.  BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND UNDERWRITING 
 
Behavioral Economics attempts to reunify psychology and economics.  
In other words, replace the utility maximizing homo economicus with a 
more empirically supportable version.100  Perhaps most important to 
underwriting is Prospect Theory.  This adjustment to the traditional Utility 
Theory stipulates that people use past experience to weight the likelihood 
                                                                                                                 
99. Id. at 512-514.   
100. More specifically, behavioral economics seeks to displace the following four 
principles: Expected Utility, Equilibrium, Discounted Utility and Own-Payoff 
Maximization.  The Behavioral Economic substitutes are Prospect Theory, Learning, 
Hyperbolic Discounting and Social Utility, respectively.  Colin Camerer, 96 Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 10575, 10576 (1999). 
2008]   I CAME, I SAW, I UNDERWROTE  503 
 
of future outcomes.101  While this theory is about how individuals attempt 
to maximize wealth102, its portability to underwriting is not that much of a 
stretch and has important implications.  For example, if past experience 
informs underwriting judgments for D & O underwriter’s risk selections 
and the efficacy of those past decisions in the present corporate climate is 
questionable, then it is likely that the resulting judgment will not be wealth 
maximizing for the insurance company. 
Underwriters are typically concerned with two things: “The desire for 
financial reward” and “the fear of losing one’s job.”103  The payment 
structure for underwriters is tied precisely to these two variables.  Insurers 
typically pay underwriters based upon how much insurance they write, not 
on the long term profitability of that insurance.  And even in the presence 
of long term incentives, the average underwriter is going to pursue those 
actions that are more likely to create immediate or near immediate gain.104  
This can be partly explained by the dominant evaluation schemes, such as 
annual bonuses, reviews and promotions.  This can be further exacerbating 
by the turnover rate among corporations in general.  If an underwriter does 
well this year, then they can jump ship to another insurance company 
before the full effects of his or her underwriting decisions are felt.105 
                                                                                                                 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 
10 CONN. INS. L. J. 255, 264 (2003-2004). 
104. Id. at 265.  This is also consistent with the hyperbolic discounting supposed under 
behavioral economics which strongly discounts the value of near future benefits in favor of 
more immediate gain or very long term gains.  See Peter D. Sozou, On Hyperbolic 
Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates, 265 PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 2015, 
2016-2017 (1998) (“arguing that experimental subjects preferences did not match 
exponential discounting and that hyperbolic discounting was consistent with subjects having 
exponential prior distributions with bayesian updating of an unknown hazard rate.”). 
105. Although this may not be likely.  A metastudy of performance and turnover rates 
found that high performers were less likely to leave their job.  Glenn M. McEvoy & Wayne 
F. Cascio, Do Good or Poor Performers Leave?  A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship 
Between Performance and Turnover, 30 THE ACAD’Y OF MANAGEMENT J. 744, 750 (1987).  
However, the study’s confidence interval included both zero and positive correlations, so the 
efficacy of this result is uncertain.  The underwriting profession also may have some 
different characteristics, such as transportability.  Compare William Wilt, et al, Leverage in 
All The Right Places, REINSURANCE: GLOBAL INSIGHTS, Oct. 1, 2003 at 8, 16 (noting the 
ease with which underwriters can change jobs) with John L. Cotton & Jeffry M. Tuttle, A 
Meta-Analysis and Review with Implications for Research, 11 THE ACADEMY OF 
MANAGEMENT REV. 55, 60 (1986) (“finding that the availability of opportunities elsewhere 
was positively correlated with job turnover rates”). 
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When profitability is up, relatively easy access to the insurance market 
causes an increase in the new entrants.106  New entrants further increase the 
availability of jobs.  This only exacerbates the turnover problem and 
diminishes the incentives generated by long term benefits.   
Finally, the structure of insurance companies power base and interests 
can sometimes empower the underwriter and sometimes not.107  When the 
support is behind underwriters they will generally try to write as much 
insurance as they can without any one in charge asking too many questions.  
Also, when corporate pressure to maintain market share increases, 
underwriters continually become more aggressive with their underwriting.  
When the market hardens, however, the adjustors’ and actuaries’ power is 
on the rise and conservative underwriting practices become the norm.108 
Thus, the structure of insurance companies combined with the extant 
compensation structures may play a role in the underwriting cycle.  But if 
this is true, it seems that insurance companies are behaving irrationally by 
maintaining this inefficient organizational scheme.109  And if they are 
behaving irrationally, it would seem likely for them to have recognized the 
problem long ago.  The end result is that cycle-mitigating strategies should 
have already been employed and the underwriting cycle should be less 
severe.110  The fact that they have not should then be regarded as some 
evidence that the organizational characteristics of insurance companies is 
not a significant driver of the underwriting cycle. 
But this conclusion is premature.  Recent scholarship has become 
interested in “system justification theory.”  This theory articulates and 
evaluates the tendency of individuals in a group to maintain the status 
                                                                                                                 
106. See Barbara D. Stewert, Profit Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance, in 1 ISSUES 
IN INSURANCE 288-89 (John D. Long & Everett D. Randall eds., Am. Inst. For Prop. & Liab. 
Underwriters 1984). 
107. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 103 at 266. 
108. Id. at 269. 
109. As Fitzpatrick observes, “the single best means of mitigating underwriting cycles 
would be to tie a more substantial portion of the overall compensation of underwriters, 
claims analysts, and actuaries – as well as the senior managers of their companies – to 
profitability achieved over time frames appropriate to their class of business.”  Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 103 at 274.  Based upon empirical support for hyperbolic discounting, this could 
be achieved with a combination of short-term rewards and very long term rewards, such as 
increased pension contributions or greater visibility to long-term career prospects.  For a 
discussion of hyperbolic discounting, see note 100 supra and accompanying text. 
110. Though it will never completely go away, as the unique characteristics of the 
insurance industry essentially guarantee the perpetuation of the cycle.  The use of behavioral 
economics is to evaluate root causes that can reduce the cycle, not eliminate it. 
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quo.111  This theory “suggests that people are motivated to accept and 
perpetuate features of existing social arrangements, even if those features 
were arrived at accidentally, arbitrarily, or unjustly.”112  The diverse 
application of this theory can be combined with corporate behavioral 
research.  In corporate settings, there is a strong motivation to resist change 
once a course of action is adopted.113  Furthermore, individuals who stand 
to profit because of a prevailing belief that serves there interests further 
complicates the problem.114 
The current corporate culture in the insurance industry manifests these 
characteristics.  There is a strong inertia keeping the current reward 
structure in place.  It is unlikely that this will change immediately.  
Furthermore, the evidence available is not absolute in the condemnation of 
the current system.  Finally, the other alternatives discussed above are not 
developed to the extent that they can be tried by an insurance company.  
Thus the current system will not likely change, even if it appears that a 
better system is available. 
 
E.  HEURISTICS AND UNDERWRITING 
 
A heuristic is a simple rule that helps analyze a large amount of data.115  
Underwriting can be compared to “risky choice heuristics.”  A risky choice 
heuristic contains three distinct components: “(1) The alternatives available 
to the decision maker, (2) Events or contingencies that relate actions to 
outcomes and (3) The values associated with those outcomes.”116  The risky 
choice heurist takes a “problem space” and through a series of rules of 
thumbs, simplifies that space to a manageable level.117  Researches have 
generally studies heuristics through the construction of mathematical 
                                                                                                                 
111. See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, Symposium on Behavioral Realism: System 
Justification Theory and Research: Implication for Law, Legal Advocacy and Social Justice, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2006) (“The theory…posits a general human tendency to 
support and defend the social status quo, broadly defined”). 
112. Id. at 1124. 
113. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), IN LAW AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 144, 151(Cass R. Sustein ed. 2000). 
114. Id. 
115. Don N. Kleinmuntz, Cognitive Heuristics and Feedback in a Dynamic Decision 
Environment, 31 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 680, 680 (1985). 
116. Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, Effort and Accuracy in Choice, 31 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 395, 396 (1985). 
117. Id. 
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models and computer programs.118  While the conclusions of this research 
are diverse, several observations are important to the scope of this paper. 
First, as the number of potential outcomes increases, the chances that 
these heuristics work efficiently at arriving at an acceptable outcome 
generally diminish.119  This is fairly problematic for underwriters, where 
the number of options available, such as whether to accept or reject the 
risk, the price and exclusions, is very considerable.  The research here 
would then recommend that the capacity to properly gauge the risk would 
be improved if the number of available decisions is decreased.  This can be 
accomplished by the method discussed in Section III, infra. 
Yet another difficulty to be contained is that the studies that show high 
accuracy with heuristics is that they assume all knowledge about the tasks 
is complete and accurate.120  A relaxation of that assumption can result in 
wildly different outcomes.121  In recognition the lack of clear information 
about outcomes in D & O underwriting, discussed supra, this questions 
whether heuristics can consistently predict the quality of a potential risk.   
Finally, increasing the complexity of the heuristic generally leads to, at 
best, marginally improved results.122  The solution, therefore, is not that 
underwriter’s should increase the complexity of their task in an attempt to 
improve their risk-rating ability, but rather to create a simple basis from 
which to work.  This can be accomplished by automating a reasonable 
portion of the process.  The end result will be a simplified solution space 
and limited options, both factors which are favorable correlated with 
efficient heuristics.123 
Underwriting is not easy.  It is full of compromises and rapid 
processing of noisy information, the value of which is not always.  In D & 
O insurance, this problem is even more of a threat to the efficacy of an 
                                                                                                                 
118. See generally Id.  See also Klenmuntz, note 115, supra; K.D. Glazebrook, et al, 
Cost Rate Heuristics For Semi-Markov Decision Processes, 29 J. OF APPLIED PROBABILITY 
633 (1992). 
119. See Johnson, et al, note 116, supra, at 403 (“Increasing the number of 
outcomes…does not affect the level of absolute and relative accuracy of the equiprobable 
heuristic.  Other rules, in contrast show decreases in accuracy as the number of outcomes 
increase”).  As the equiprobable heuristic (which implies all outcomes have the same 
probability, does not accurately represent underwriting, the conclusion above follows. 
120. Don N. Kleinmuntz, Cognitive Heuristics and Feedback in a Dynamic Decision 
Environment, 31 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 680, 697 (1985). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 696. 
123. See generally, Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, Effort and Accuracy in Choice, 
31 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 395, 402-412 (1985). 
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underwriter’s judgment.  The section evaluated the economic basis for 
individual underwriting.  The purpose was to determine whether or not 
there was substantial value to be added by individualized underwriting of 
corporations.  Through a survey of several different fields of economics, 
finance and behavioral theory (including heuristics), a strong argument can 
be made that individual underwriting does not necessarily lead to superior 
results and in fact  may even create greater variability in outcomes.124 
 
II.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND UNDERWRITING 
 
The purpose of criminal and civil penalties serve two purposes: one ex 
ante and the other ex post.  The ex post goal is to punish those who commit 
social wrongs.  The ex ante goal is to deter people from committing those 
social wrongs.  In this way, regulations of the SEC and statutes of the 
various states and the federal government are meant to either punish or 
deter directors and officers from committing what is perceived as socially 
harmful acts.  This dynamic, in the case of tortious acts, is upset when 
insurance comes into play.125 
Not all is lost, however.  Insurers revive the deterrence goals of tort law 
through a combination of factors.  These include the cost and availability of 
insurance, the exclusions of certain conduct, and the right to recover 
against insureds in certain circumstances.126  There are natural correlates in 
D & O insurance for these, as well. 
In D & O liability insurance, three methods of deterrence are available.  
The first means by which insurers the objectives of securities laws is by 
setting the price “based upon the best assessment of the liability risk of 
each individual corporation…”  The second means by monitoring and 
improving corporate governance.  The final method is by controlling the 
defense and settlement of the claims.  The issue of price has already been 
discussed above and third method is beyond the scope of this paper.  The 
second method, monitoring corporate governance, is the topic of this 
section.  One significant objection to the alternative underwriting method 
                                                                                                                 
124. Studies have indicated excess variability in stock prices as the result of irrational 
expectations.  See generally, George Bulkley & Richard D. F. Harris, Irrational Analysts’ 
Expectations as a Cause of Excess Volatility in Stock Prices, 107 THE ECON. J. 359 (1997). 
125. Though not in the case of criminal acts.  For policy reasons, intentional harms are 
not insurable.  In D & O insurance this translates to such acts as fraud.  See note 51 supra 
and accompanying text. 
126. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort 
Regulation: 6 Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (2005). 
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outlined in Section III, infra, is that it essentially causes insurers to 
completely abdicate their gate keeping role. 
This section answers that question in a two step process.  The first step 
will describe recent scholarship that calls into question whether insurers 
have ever fully occupied the gate keeping role.  This is in contrast to some 
other studies that indicate the opposite.127  The second step is to provide an 
economic argument for why the monitoring role of D & O insurance will 
not adequately punish or reward intransigent or compliant corporations, 
respectively. 
 
A. D & O INSURERS AS GATEKEEPERS? 
 
 The recent work of Professor Tom Baker and Sean Griffith point 
out an interesting anomaly: In the vast majority of instances, insurers do 
not provide corporate governance.128  As one of their interviewees stated: 
 
You had asked me on the phone whether companies 
changed their behavior for the benefit of their D & O 
insurers.  I don’t think they are.  I think the brokers 
sometimes can put lipstick on the pig, but that is a 
marketing feature.  And it seems to me that however high 
D & O premiums climb, they are not going to climb high 
enough to get the companies to really, really pay 
attention.129 
 
This also is relevant to the discussion, infra § II.B.  Even in instances 
where the insurer provides some services related to governance, they are 
generally ignored.130  Thus, the governance role of D & O insurance is 
minor and whatever effect poor governance has on pricing is not adequate 
to change corporate behavior. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
127. Clifford Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, 10 INT. R. LAW & 
ECON. 115, 116 (1990). 
128. See generally Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate 
Governance: The Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurer § II.A., available at 
www.ssrn.com. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 16.  Even those who had substantial loss prevention mechanisms in place at 
one time eliminated them because “[w]e couldn’t show the discount…”  Id. at 18. 
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B. PRICE AS A FAILED DETERRENT 
 
A qualitative explanation is available.  The D & O insurance market is 
characterized by lower regulation relative to other lines of insurance, lower 
barriers to entry and less orthodox underwriting processes.  By its nature 
then, there is greater competitive pressure on premium pricing.  Insurers, 
on the other hand, currently endeavor to price each insured according to 
their relative risk of loss, with the higher risk insureds thereby paying more 
for the same product as a lower risk insured.  This can be viewed as a type 
of price discrimination.131   
The goal of price discrimination is to capture consumer surplus.  
Consumer surplus, simply described, is the difference between the price a 
consumer is willing to pay and what they do pay.132  However, in order to 
capture consumer surplus, a firm must have some monopoly power over 
price levels.  In a competitive industry, any increase of market price would 
drive the demand for the firm’s product to zero.  Conversely, a decrease of 
price below the market level would have similarly disastrous effects.  This 
is because the market price is equal to the marginal cost of the good, so 
profit is already zero.  Any downward deviation from this would cause a 
firm to lose money for every unit sold.  Furthermore, ease of entry and exit 
in the market makes increasing market share virtually impossible.  In 
addition, firms supply relatively small amount of goods to the market, with 
the result that production decisions are insufficient to affect market price.  
Thus, there is little incentive for any firm to decrease price below market 
levels. 
                                                                                                                 
131. Price discrimination is the charging of different customers different prices for the 
same or nearly the same product.  There are classically three different types of price 
discrimination.  First-Degree Price Discrimination is when a firm charges a customer the 
most he or she is willing to pay for the product (called the reservation price). In Second-
Degree Price Discrimination, a firm charges a lower price upon the quantity consumed (so-
called bulk discounts).  This is generally considered the most common form of price 
discrimination.  And Third-Degree Price Discrimination is when a firm divides the market 
into different groups with different demand curves and determines the prices for each group 
separately.  In practice, a firm segments the market into large, discrete classes that are easily 
identifiable and charges each class a distinct price.  .  However, given the firm-by-firm 
underwriting in D & O insurance, it would be more accurate to view insurers as engaging in 
imperfect First-Degree Price Discrimination.  The thesis of this paper then can be seen as 
advocating that insurers switch from this form of discrimination to Third-Degree Price 
Discrimination. 
132. For an elementary treatment of Consumer Surplus and Price Discrimination, See 
generally Robert S. PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (6th ed. 2004).  For a 
more advanced treatment, See ELMAR WOFSTETTER, TOPICS IN MICROECONOMICS (1999).   
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If we view D & O premium pricing as a form of price discrimination, 
then the market structure becomes an integral part of the analysis.  While 
by no means a perfectly competitive market133, there is sufficient 
competitive pressure to limit the degree to which firms can price the 
premiums.134  The more competitive the industry, the less aggressively 
insurers can punish bad risk for their poor corporate governance practices.  
For if they offer them a premium sufficiently high to compensate the 
insurer for absorbing the risk, there is another insurer who will offer the 
same coverage for less.  This competitive pressure drives down the price 
and results in a lower premium. 
The same can be said for low risks, as well.  In instances where claims 
experience is low and profits are up, insurers are likely to be aggressive 
with respect to what they believe are good risks.  As such, during hard 
markets, premiums drop across the board in an attempt to create market 
share.  During soft markets, the same dynamics would drive up the 
premium of good risks more slowly than perceived poor risks.   
The problem with the analysis in the last paragraph is that it assumes 
that good risks and bad risks can be differentiated perfectly so that any 
difference in premium, even after accounting for competitive pressures, 
roughly equate to the difference in the expected loss between the good and 
bad risk insureds.  However, this is not a realistic assumption.  No matter 
how much underwriting an insurer engages in, there is a substantial 
informational discrepancy between what the insurer knows and what the 
insured knows.  Thus, for any firm an insurer classifies as low risk, there is 
a chance that it is a higher risk.  Similarly, firms classified as high risk may 
in fact be low risk.135   
                                                                                                                 
133. See Tillinghast 2005 Survey. 
134. In fact, the two largest players in D & O insurance comprise over 50% of the 
market.  It also bears noting that the insurance industry goes through underwriting cycles, 
where during some times premiums industry wide increase, followed by periods where 
premiums drop.  These underwriting cycles are described well in Fitzpatrick, supra note 
103.  However, what is true in all environments is that competition for business is real and 
this has an impact on what insurers can charge potential insureds. 
135. Of course firms that are truly low risk have every incentive to be classified as 
such, so it is unlikely that they would be misclassified.  However, low risk firms may have 
some high risk characteristics such as past directors, type of industry, or some combination 
of other factors.  This can be compared to auto insurance or credit scores.  Just because an 
individual was once a high risk does not necessarily mean that they cannot now be low 
risks.  But past performance informs present perceptions, so there is inevitably some inertia 
in risk-rating.  This also provides an explanation for why during very profitable periods 
insurance companies are more willing to bet that a particular risk is no longer as high a risk 
as it appears. 
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In George Akerlof’s seminal paper, The Market for Lemons, this 
dynamic is well illustrated.136  When informational asymmetries exist in a 
market, that is, where one side possesses more information pertaining to a 
product than another, the side with more information has an incentive to 
pass off a low quality product as a high quality one.137  This, in turn, slowly 
erodes the market for the high quality product until only low quality 
products remain.138  In the same way, high risk firms have an incentive to 
appear to be low risk.  Insofar as they are successful, insurers have little 
incentive to charge ostensibly low risk firms a lower premium.  The end 
result is that all firms would be charged the same, high risk premium.   
This extreme result has not occurred, however, because firms are 
obligated to reveal information about themselves.139  Furthermore, 
insurance companies are not completely unable to differentiate low risk and 
high risk companies.140  But what this does imply is that insurers have an 
incentive to charge low risk firms a higher premium than would be 
actuarially required to compensate for the risk acquired. 
Finally, corporate demand for D & O appears to be relatively inelastic.  
While there is not much research to support this contention, indirect 
evidence does exist.141  First and foremost, the underwriting cycles create 
large swings in premium pricing,142 yet the vast majority of publicly traded 
corporations still purchase D & O insurance.143  Second, though premiums 
                                                                                                                 
136. George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. This occurs through SEC and state filings, etc. 
140. For example, large market cap corporations are more susceptible to lawsuits that 
low market cap corporations.  High growth companies and those that go through frequent 
mergers are also higher risk.  See generally TILLINGHAST 2005 SURVEY. 
141. See Tillinghast 2005 Survey, infra note 146.  The basic idea here is that if the 
pricing was relatively elastic, there would be changes in market composition as a result of 
price movements.  However, the percentage of firms, year over year, that continue to 
purchase D & O insurance suggest that, even with significant changes in premiums, demand 
is relatively constant, hence inelastic. 
142. See Scott E. Harrington, Tort Liability, Interest Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in 
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: 2004 (Robert E. Liton & Richard 
Herring eds., 2004); J. DAVID CUMMINS, ET AL, CYCLES AND CRISES IN PROPERTY/CASUALTY 
INSURANCE: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Scott E. Harrington & Robert 
W. Kleins, eds., 1991).  See also Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance 
Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005).   
143. Tillinghast 2005 Survey.  Note that the sample in the survey is not random, so 
may not be representative of the corporations in general.  However, a substantial sample set 
exists, so very likely inferences can be drawn. 
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are not inconsiderable, if we look at the average cost of D & O insurance 
for large market cap companies, the cost represents far less than 1% of their 
total value.144  Finally, as derivative actions frequently settle within D & O 
policy limits,145 the purchase of D & O insurance trades a future 
indeterminate liability for a present known one.  As firms, like people, are 
generally believed to be risk adverse, there is an additional incentive to 
purchase this insurance even in the presence of escalating prices.146 
Given the foregoing, market forces tend to support the view that the 
premium differences between low and high risk firms are not as large as 
their level of risk would indicate.  The end result is that low risk firms are 
indirectly subsidizing high risk firms.  The gap between the two premiums 
therefore may not be large enough for high risk firms to change their 
governance structure because the cost of doing so would be higher than the 
savings associated with lower premiums.  This is further supported 
qualitatively by the recent scholarship of Tom Baker and Sean Griffith.  In 
particular, one insurer had bundled their insurance policy with active 
attempts to improve corporate governance.147  They discontinued the 
practice, however, because they could not show a benefit in the 
premium.148   
Thus, given the market structure of D & O insurance, the lack of 
demand for active assistance in improving governance149 and the inability 
to effectively demonstrate a significant quantifiable benefit supports the 
position that D & O insurance policies do not fully further the deterrence 
effects of tort law.  The other alternative, that D & O insurance provides an 
ex ante benefit to shareholders has been questioned by recent research, 
which demonstrates the anomalous result that D & O insurers neither 
                                                                                                                 
144. A more significant measure would be the cost as a percentage of revenue, but a 
review of the revenues of the Fortune 500 show that revenues and market cap are both 
several orders of magnitude larger than the average D & O insurance premium for large 
market cap companies. 
145. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV 
497, 512 (1997).  Roughly 96% of all cases settle within policy limits. 
146. As with all things, there is a limit, but given the pervasiveness of D & O 
insurance, that does not appear to be a substantial issue at present.  In fact, in the 2005 
TILLINGHAST survey, 100% of responding corporations purchased D & O insurance.  
TILLINGHAST TOWERS PERRIN, 2005 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 20, fig. 
21(2006). 
147. Tom Baker, et al, The Missing Monitor, note 128 supra at 514. 
148. Id. at 18. 
149. See Tom Baker, The Missing Monitor, note 128  supra at 515-517. 
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attempt to shape corporate governance practices before claims, nor attempt 
to manage costs during and after shareholder litigation is initiated.150      
However, there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of underwriters’ 
ratemaking.  In this section, current insurance underwriting practices will 
be discussed, with a particular focus on how D & O underwriting is 
different than more traditional lines of insurance.  Second, it will be shown 
how heuristic substitutes for more complex evaluations increase outcome 
volatility.  And finally, drawing an analogy to asset management research, 
this section will show how irrational optimism about one’s own 
performance combined with constant corporate pressure to price 
competitively leads to the outcome that underwriters will, over the long 
run, consistently understate the risk of potential insureds.151   
 
III.  MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY, VOLATILITY AND 
DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ INSURANCE 
UNDERWRITING 
 
Modern Portfolio Theory is, at its most basic level, the theory of how 
to combine a group of assets, with the goal of achieving efficient returns.152  
How this would apply to insurance underwriting is fairly straightforward.  
The goal would be to partition the group of insureds into several classes 
and create a standard insurance rate for those classes based upon several 
easily identifiable characteristics.153  In some ways this imitates auto 
underwriting, although D & O underwriting could not fully achieve that 
degree of precision.154  Whether some minor adjustments are made 
                                                                                                                 
150. Id. at Part II.C. 
151. This is well demonstrated by the following quote following a discussion of fund 
managers’ performance expectations: “We are reminded of a recent survey of the entering 
class of one of the countries top-rated colleges.  When students were asked if they expected 
to finish in the top 10% of their class, 87.5% responded that they did.”  EDWIN J. ELTON, ET 
AL, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (6th ed. 2003). 
152. See generally, EDWIN J. ELTON, ET AL, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND 
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (6th ed. 2003). 
153. For example, market cap, industry type, stock classification (such as growth, 
income, etc).   
154. This follows from a straightforward application of the Law of Large Numbers and 
the Central Limit Theorem.  In auto insurance there are far more policyholders and thus the 
loss data is much more consistent from year to year.  The number of companies purchasing 
D & O is incredibly small by comparison and loss exposure is far more variable. 
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subsequent to this partition is optional, although it would be well-advised 
to restrict it to some easily available data.155 
An analogy to indexed mutual funds accurately portrays the workings 
of this type of underwriting.  An indexed mutual fund is usually tied to a 
particular stock market or stock markets.156  For example, a fund indexed to 
the S & P 500 would purchase shares in companies in the exact proportion 
to the S & P 500.  As a result, the indexed fund’s return would be similar to 
the growth of the S & P year over year. 
Yet, this methodology is far too simplistic to be workable by any multi-
line insurer.  MPT informs capital allocation decisions that help protect 
against peculiar market risk.  An initial reaction to this may be skepticism.  
It would appear obvious that well-trained and intelligent mutual fund 
managers could actively manage a fund to superior performance.  In the 
same way, skilled and intelligent underwriters could select a group of 
insureds with risk below the market average. 
Research in mutual fund management calls into question the accuracy 
of this belief.  First, mutual funds, on average, have performed worse than 
portfolios consisting of a random selection of assets.157  Furthermore, 
actively managed funds generally do worse than passive funds, which can 
be considered a type of random fund.158  Not only is it difficult to predict 
the future, actively managed funds have additional problems that have to be 
overcome: more non-diversified risk, greater management costs, higher 
                                                                                                                 
155. Previous claims experience, for example.  The goal, however, is to minimize the 
expensive underwriting practices that add a great deal of time and expense, with perhaps 
small realized benefit. 
156. They can actually be tied to just about any type of asset market, real or not. 
157. See John McDonald, Objectives and Performance of Mutual Funds: 1960-1964, 9 
J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 311 (1974); Peter Williamson, Measurement and Forecasting of 
Mutual Fund Performance: Choosing an Investment Strategy, 28 FIN. ANALYST J. 78 
(Nov./Dec. 1972);  T.E. Crenshaw, The Evaluation of Investment Performance, 50 J.BUS. 
462 (1977); Bruce Lehman & David Modest, Mutual Fund Performance Evaluation: A 
Comparison of Benchmarks and Benchmark Comparison 42 J. OF FIN. 233 (1987); Edwin J. 
Elton, et al, Efficiency with Costly Information: A Reinterpretation of Evidence from 
Manager Portfolios, 6 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1 (1993).  All but the last, however, suffer from 
survivorship bias.  Survivorship bias is where the study overstates the return of mutual 
funds.  This occurs because funds are studied over a period of time, say 10 years, and thus 
the researchers require the funds to be in existence for those ten years.  Funds that failed 
during the interval are not evaluated.  And funds that fail have, on average, well below 
average returns.  
158. See Elton, et al, supra note 152 at 681 (“Although index funds have outperformed 
most active managers, most investors who hire active managers believe they can spot the 
manager who will outperform the index.  This belief persists despite the fact that there is 
very little evidence that superior performance is predictable [italics added]”).  
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transaction costs from increased asset turnover and more tax liability.159  
The last two reasons are particular to mutual funds, but the first two are 
equal concerns for underwriters.  Underwriters not only have to outperform 
the market in risk selection, they must generate even higher returns to 
compensate for increased underwriting costs. 
There is yet another danger.  D & O underwriters currently acquire and 
evaluate a dizzying amount of information on potential insureds.160  In 
economic environments of asymmetric information, there is a curious 
phenomenon called the “curse of knowledge.” 161 This phenomenon 
basically states that individuals who possess a large amount of information 
are unable to completely differentiate good information from bad.162  The 
result is that more knowledgeable actors may perform worse than the actor 
with inferior information.163  Combining this information loss with 
feedback shows little improvement.164  Furthermore, there exists a 
principle-agent problem in that the “curse of knowledge” often results in 
weaker punishments for poor performance and inadequate rewards for good 
performance.165 
The application of this to underwriting is straightforward. Consistent 
with the discussion above of heuristic theory,166 underwriters who possess 
too much information about a potential insured may unreasonably lend 
weight to certain variables and not adequately weigh other variables 
enough.  As the amount of data increases, this problem may be 
exacerbated.  The end result is that underwriters that possess less 
knowledge may perform better than their more knowledgeable peers. 
The idea behind an indexing approach to D & O underwriting is 
relatively simple.   The majority of D & O risk is tied to derivative 
                                                                                                                 
159. Id. at 680-681. 
160. See Part I. 
161. Colin Camerer, et al, The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An 
Experimental Analysis, 97 J. OF POL. ECON. 1232 (1989). 
162. Id. at 1233 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1246.  Incidentally, this may also strengthen the argument above relating to 
the poor governance oversight insurance companies have.  Again we have an informational 
asymmetry and both good and bad corporate performance could rationally be explained by 
factors that absolve them of blame or approbation.  Thus the benefits of good governance 
may not be fully manifest in the premium, diminishing the incentives of the firm to improve. 
166. See Part II, supra. 
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litigation.167 In fact, in 2005 and the first half of 2006, 93% and 92%, 
respectively, of all complaints alleged 10b-5 claims. 168  Furthermore, 88% 
and 90% of these claims alleged misrepresentations in financial statements. 
169  As a consequence, it is not too surprising that stock volatility is an 
important determinant in litigation activities.  But if stock volatility can be 
utilized to assess litigation risk, it can also be utilized to underwrite D & O 
insurance.   Supposing that is true, then, the first step in the underwriting 
process will be to partition the market into different “volatility tranches.”  
In order to fully appreciate the significance of this, however, some 
understanding of stock market volatility is in order. 
The inherent problem with volatility is that it is not directly observable.   
This has lead to several different techniques by which it can be measured.  
A simple metric, historical volatility, can be calculated using the following 
formula: 
 
Where εt = LN(St/St-1), the natural log of the change in the stock price.  
The problem with this form of volatility is that it is inherently backward-
looking; it says nothing about future or current prospects about volatility, 
which is predominantly what is of interest to D & O underwriters.   
Furthermore, it weights all periods equally, which may not be proper.  
Other types of historical volatility measures may used, such as Exponential 
Weighted Moving Average Volatility (or EWMA), which weight the 
volatility of more recent returns more, but they still suffer from the 
backward-looking issue.  Alternative measures include both Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedacity Model  (ARCH) or the Generalized version 
(GARCH).  Each of these have the advantage of a statistical forecasting 
framework, but further discussion will be omitted on each of these models 
to conserve a relatively simplicity.  Suffice it to say that no matter how you 
slice it, historical volatility may not adequately suggest future litigation risk 
(though, since litigation does lag volatility, past volatility may be a 
harbinger of current litigation risk).  To alleviate this problem, implied 
volatility can be used.   
                                                                                                                 
167. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS: 2006 
MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT (2006). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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Implied volatility is the volatility of a stock or index implied by its 
option.   An option, in its simplest form, is a contract to buy or sell a stock 
or index170 for a fixed price at some predetermined time in the future.   The 
volatility implied by an option is a function of both the option’s strike price 
and time to maturity.  This does create a selection problem; which volatility 
observed is the proper one?   
The impasse can be dealt with through the more advance financial 
models, of which the most common is probably the Heston Stochastic 
Volatility Model.171  Again, the specifics will be avoided, but the 
observation that should be taken away is that, given historical data, future 
implied volatilities can be observed.   
Once we have implied volatilities, excess volatility can be determined.  
Excess volatility simply means, relatively to an industry baseline, how 
much of a given firm’s volatility can be characterized as non-systemic.  We 
would expect, on average, that a particular industry, such as financial or 
aerospace, would have a certain level of volatility and an associated 
ambient risk of derivative lawsuits.  Firms that deviate from that baseline 
within the industry would then be expected to have either a greater or lesser 
risk of litigation depending on whether they have positive or negative 
excess volatility.      
When this process has been completed, you will have a list of industry 
volatilities and individual firm excess volatilities.  At the moment we are 
really only interested in the relative volatilities implied at the time the 
underwriting is being conducted.  As such, this analysis has much in 
common with nonparametric statistics.  From this list, industries and then 
firms can be classified into as many different risk classes as the underwriter 
desires.   Once this has been conducted, historical experience of litigation 
vs. implied volatility levels can be used to assess current claim exposure for 
each tranche.  Finally, depending on the insurer’s risk tolerances, a portion 
of the market can be assessed as preliminarily insurable.  Finally, premiums 
can be calculated in accordance with the various capital models insurers 
utilize that then take account the probable claims experience in each 
tranche.    
This formulation is certainly reductive in its current form, but it does 
provide a basis by which a D & O underwriting model could be 
implemented and backtested to check its veracity.  One particular benefit of 
                                                                                                                 
170. Id. 
171. For example, see ROBERT L. MCDONALD, DERIVATIVE MARKETS (2nd Ed. 2006), 
Chapter 23. 
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the model is its relative simplicity.  It utilizes a framework that requires 
only publicly available information that also does not require substantial 
vetting of potential insureds.  Though this is not to suggest no form of that 
is required; there are other exposures for which insurers should account.  
Litigation risk that is not tied directly to market performance is an example 
of this.  But what this does allow is a baseline model that can then be 
tweaked to accommodate peculiar firm risk at knowable at little expense.  
This should keep underwriting margins low and help improve profitability.  
A further concern is correlated risk.  For example, insuring only a 
select industry with low volatility may seem like a reasonably safe activity, 
but if the volatility is highly correlated, then each firm may be exposed to 
elevated litigation risk should volatility spike.  To protect against this, D & 
O insurers should aim to underwrite historically low-correlated risks, to 
help curb the possibility of this happening.172 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Directors’ and Officers’ insurance is a unique line of insurance.  It is 
also relatively young.  This youth is partially demonstrated by the myriad 
methods in which its underwriters price potential insureds.173  Which 
underwriting method is the best cannot be precisely answered.  What this 
paper has attempted to accomplish is to synthesize several aspects of 
economics, psychology, sociology, finance, insurance law and corporate 
governance to critically evaluate current underwriting practices in D & O 
liability insurance.  The success of this analysis is predicated upon several 
assumptions. 
First, underwriters are individuals of bounded rationality.  Much of 
behavioral economics presupposes that due to lack of time or lack of 
ability, people do not make fully rational choices, in the classical economic 
sense of the word.  Second, it is assumed that the D & O underwriting cycle 
exists and is, at least, partly explainable by behavioral and organizational 
characteristics of the insurance industry and its constituents.  And the final 
assumption is that the lessons of Modern Portfolio Theory are moderately 
transferable to underwriting.  There is, as discussed in the last section, at 
least some support for this assertion. 
                                                                                                                 
172. It is unlikely that negatively correlated risks are available.  Equities are almost 
always positively correlated, so the best scenario is likely only low correlation. 
173. See Baker, et al, supra note 38. 
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Several questions are left unanswered.  What are the market dynamics 
of a D & O insurance market consisting of “indexing” underwriters and 
“non-indexing” underwriters?  Would this create market share problems?  
Perhaps the nature of individual underwriting may make it difficult for the 
“indexing” underwriters to maintain market share.  Perhaps this will result 
in a shift away from the current market dynamics of increased 
specialization and back towards more carte blanche underwriting, with 
each insurer occupying a smaller sliver of risk for a greater number of 
insureds.  This paper does not address these issues, but their resolution is 
important to the value of the suggested type of underwriting. 
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STOLI ON THE ROCKS: WHY STATES 
SHOULD ELIMINATE THE ABUSIVE PRACTICE OF 
STRANGER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE 
 
      Eryn Mathews∗ 
 
“The objection is not that wholesale murder will ensue.  Such an 
assertion only trivializes the debate.  The objection is the third party owner 
of the policy benefits only from the death of the insured. The essence of 
sound underwriting is that the owner of the policy and the insurer both are 
better off if the insured continues to live.” 
 
Mike Nelson1 
 
 
“I have always depended on the kindness of strangers.” 
 
Tennessee Williams2 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The life insurance market is a burgeoning field of sophisticated 
investment transactions.  A life insurance policy, traditionally an illiquid 
asset, has developed into an asset-backed security which has proved quite 
profitable to investors and insureds alike.  These transactions allow 
insureds under certain circumstances to sell their policies to investors.  The 
development of this secondary market has injected competition into the life 
insurance business and resulted in better products with more options for 
consumers. 
                                                                                                                 
∗ Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2009; B.A., 
College of the Holy Cross, 2005. Many thanks to Professors Thomas E. Baker and Patricia 
McCoy for their invaluable assistance throughout the course of this project. Thank you also 
to the staff of the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal for their editorial assistance.  A special 
thank you to my parents, my sister Meghan, John Moran and all my family and friends for 
their support, patience, and guidance. 
1. Mike Nelson, Insurable Interest Under Siege, STEVE LEIMBERG’S ESTATE 
PLANNING NEWSLETTER #671 (2004) available at http://www.leimbergservices.com (last 
visited May 14, 2008). 
2. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREET CAR NAMED DESIRE (Signet 1951).  
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Stranger-owned life insurance, also known as STOLI, is an outgrowth 
of this legitimate secondary market.  It is a consequence of innovation and 
sophisticated investment planning, but has distorted the purpose of life 
insurance.  It allows strangers to benefit from the death of an insured, to 
wager on the lives of others for profit.  In STOLI transactions, this 
anticipated profit is the sole motivation for acquiring the life insurance.  
The potential risks STOLI transactions pose, not only for legitimate 
secondary market transactions and the insurance industry generally, but 
also for consumers and investors, need to be addressed.  STOLI, however, 
is cleverly structured and has, until recently, evaded state regulation.  State 
legislatures must confront this regulatory vacuum to counter the ever 
growing risks STOLI presents.   
Part I of this note addresses the history and development of the 
secondary life insurance market.  This section demonstrates the value of 
legitimate secondary transactions to the insurance market in contrast to the 
perversity of STOLI arrangements, emphasizing that regulation would be 
directed specifically at illegitimate STOLI transactions and not secondary 
market transactions generally.    
Part II examines the risks of STOLI transactions for life insurance 
companies, consumers, and investors.  This section also discusses the tax 
implications of STOLI investments.  Analysis of the adverse consequences 
to all involved in a STOLI transaction, including the negative and 
distorting impact it has on the life insurance market, demonstrates the need 
for regulation and prohibition. 
Part III explores the states’ roles in regulating STOLI.  Regulation of 
STOLI implicates states’ enforcement of insurable interest laws.  This Note 
analyzes both the minority and majority positions of states regarding 
insurable interest and how the prevalence of STOLI has resulted in a re-
evaluation of these laws.  This section also explores regulatory alternatives 
such as adoption of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
new model act limiting STOLI transactions. 
Part IV emphasizes the spectrum of regulatory options available to 
states and the increasing need to apply such regulations to prohibit STOLI 
transactions.  It argues that prohibiting STOLI is necessary because of the 
fundamental shift it creates in the life insurance paradigm and the 
fraudulent practices it promotes.  Further, regulation of STOLI transactions 
would not limit legitimate secondary market transactions or curb property 
rights or contract rights of those who no longer require insurance because 
of altered life circumstances. Consequently, state law should be utilized to 
eliminate the abusive insurance practices embodied by STOLI. 
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PART I: WHERE IT ALL BEGAN 
 
a. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF STOLI 
 
The development of the life settlement industry3 began with the AIDS 
epidemic in the late 1980s.4  At that time, HIV/AIDS victims required 
extensive, continuous treatment.  A victim’s chance of survival was 
minimal even with access to quality care.  In addition to its devastating 
physical impacts, HIV/AIDS was financially straining and often 
overwhelming.  The harsh reality of HIV/AIDS made access to funds a 
necessity if one hoped to receive treatment and survive. This necessity 
resulted in the creation of the secondary life insurance market which took a 
traditionally illiquid asset, life insurance, and made it possible for the 
insured to exchange his interest in the policy for cash.5  Thus, life insurance 
was transformed into an asset-backed security known as a viatical 
settlement.6 
In a viatical settlement the policyholder (“viator”), who has contracted 
HIV/AIDS or another terminal disease, directly or indirectly7 sells his 
interest in his life insurance policy to an investor.8  The investor’s payment 
in return for the policy provides the viator with immediate access to funds.9  
Typically, the viator is paid the present value of his policy.  The present 
value depends on the viator’s life expectancy, the face value of the policy, 
                                                                                                                 
3. STOLI transactions grew out of the life settlement industry and both life 
settlements and STOLI are secondary market transactions. 
4. Florence Bih Shu-Acquaye & Elisabeth Divine Reid, Viatical Settlement Industry: 
Does Mutual Benefits Render It Terminal, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. OF BUS. L. 7, 10 
(2005). 
5. Id. Viatical settlements give insureds access to death benefits that would normally 
be unavailable to them. 
6. A viatical settlement is defined as the purchase of a terminally ill person’s life 
insurance policy, by an investor or investment company, for a certain percentage of the 
policy’s face value. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
7. Most viatical settlement transactions contain intermediate investors, broker firms, 
promoters or financial institutions which evaluate the worth of the policy, market the 
investment to secondary investors, and provide loans for the purchase of the policy.  The 
result is that multiple parties often have an interest in the death of a single viator.  BARRY D. 
FLAGG, THEINSURANCEADVISOR.COM, INC., STRANGER-ORIGINATED LIFE INSURANCE: FREE 
INSURANCE? FOUND MONEY? A GOOD INVESTMENT? A SCAM? WHAT IS IT ANYWAY?, 1-2 
available at http://www.theinsuranceadvisor.com/documents/STOLIWhitePaper-Final.pdf.  
8. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 738 (11th Cir. 2006). 
9. Id. 
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and the cost of future premiums and administrative costs.10  Upon the death 
of the viator, the investor receives the proceeds of the insurance policy.  
His gain is the difference between the death benefit received and his 
payment to the viator plus premium payments and administrative costs.11 
Thus, viatical settlements provided HIV/AIDS patients with a much 
needed service and injected healthy competition into the market.  Insurance 
companies began offering accelerated death benefits as a means of 
competing with viaticals.12  The result was a competitive life insurance 
market which benefited consumers and responded to their needs.  These 
insurance developments combined with medical advances that increased 
the life expectancy of the insured, however, reduced the rate of return on 
investments and thus diminished the appeal of viaticals to investors.13  The 
viatical industry responded to this decline in demand by broadening its 
consumer base.14  Viatical settlements now encompass any insured who has 
a life expectancy of less than two years.15  Currently, most states have 
enacted Viatical Settlement Acts to regulate the industry.16 
Life settlements are an outgrowth of the viatical settlements industry.17  
A life settlement, much like a viatical, provides the insured the opportunity 
to gain financial liquidity through the sale of his life insurance policy.  
Instead of selling the policy for medical reasons, however, the insured 
seeks to sell the policy based on a change in life circumstances.  Examples 
                                                                                                                 
10. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996).   
11. Id.  The court defines an investor’s profit as the difference between “the 
discounted purchase price paid to the insured and the death benefit collected from the 
insurer, less transaction costs, premiums paid, and other administrative expenses.”  Id.  If 
the viator lives longer then expected the profit is correspondingly reduced. See Bih Shu-
Acquaye & Reid, supra note 4, at 7. 
12. An accelerated death benefits rider “provides terminally ill individuals with the 
immediate right to receive a small percentage of their death benefit” and thus enabled 
insurance companies to compete with viatical settlements. See Robert H. Heinrich, J.D. & 
Bradley K. Feldman, J.D., Wet Paper: Giving Secondary Market for Life Insurance a Bad 
Name, FEE ADVISORS NETWORK 2 (May 2007) available at 
http://investor.financialcounsel.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
13. Heinrich & Feldman,supra note 12, at 3; Bih Shu-Acquaye & Reid, supra note 4, 
at 11. 
14. Heinrich & Feldman,supra note 12, at 3. 
15. Id; Sachin Kohli, Pricing Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market fir Life 
Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 279, 281 (2006). 
16. Westlaw 50 State Statutory Surveys, Life Insurance -- Viatical Settlements 
(August 2007) available at www.westlaw.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).  Further, as of 
June 16, 2005 forty-seven states regulated viaticals as securities.  Bih Shu-Acquaye & Reid, 
supra note 4, at 11. 
17. Kohli, supra note 15, at 281. 
2008]   STRANGER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE 525 
 
include divorce, death of a spouse, retirement, disability, or bankruptcy.18  
The industry targets policyholders who are 65 or older with a life 
expectancy between two and twelve years.19  
An insured engaged in a life settlement transaction typically sells his 
policy for a sum greater than its cash surrender value but less than the death 
benefit.20  The price offered takes into account the administrative costs of 
maintaining the policy -- primarily continued payment of premiums.  The 
death benefit is ultimately paid directly to the investor, rather than to the 
initial insured, and the profit is computed just as in a viatical settlement.21  
The life settlement industry has filled the vacuum left by viatical 
settlements and is flourishing.22  The current market is estimated at thirteen 
billion dollars and is projected to exceed one hundred and sixty billion 
dollars in the future.23 
STOLI24 could be considered the illegitimate offspring of the viatical 
and life settlement industry.  STOLI transactions occur when elderly 
persons who do not already own life insurance decide to purchase a policy 
at the behest of investors and brokers.25  The investors initiate the life 
                                                                                                                 
18. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 3-4 
(March 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).  Typically, an insured 
is looking to enter into a life settlement when a change in their financial condition or their 
health has occurred. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3. 
19. Generally, a life settlement is desirable when: (1) the policy has been owned for 
longer then two years; (2) the policy has a lower premium obligation as well as a cash 
surrender value; and (3) candidate is over the age of 65 with “an impaired life expectancy”. 
Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3. 
20. Id. The cash surrender value of a policy is the money an insurance company 
would be willing to pay the insured if he were to surrender his policy to the company.  
Kohli, supra note 15, at 288.  However, when an insured’s health declines the surrender 
value of the policy is less than the market value making it a profitable sale. Id. 
21. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
22. Kohli, supra note 15, at 298 (“Demographic trends within the United States 
indicate that the market is positioned for tremendous growth.” The article cites such factors 
as increased life expectancy that correlates to less need for life insurance policies. It also 
predicts that the market for these transactions should increase at three times the rate of the 
general population in the next twenty-five years). 
23. R. Mark Keenan & Steven Seltzer, Life Settlements – Investors Beware Complete 
Your Due Diligence Before Buying (November 2006) available at www.andersonkill.com 
(last vis ited Oct. 10, 2008).  
24. STOLI is also referred to as speculator-initiated life insurance (“SPIN-LIFE”) and 
investor-initiated life insurance (“IOLI”). 
25. STOLI transactions generally deal with universal life insurance policies. See, 
Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement For Life Insurance: A Critical 
Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 478 (2005); Terry M. Magady, Practice Tips: Selling 
Life Insurance on the Secondary Market, 28 LOS ANGELES LAWYER 14, 14 n.7 (2006). 
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insurance transactions with strangers at the point of sale.26  The investors 
often characterize the life insurance purchase as “free insurance”, “risk-
free”, or “no-cost”, and offer other financial incentives such as upfront cash 
bonuses to induce purchase.27   Investors or agents often advertise STOLI 
through the internet and at fancy solicitation forums such as on cruises.28  
The target population is wealthy people who are 65 years or older with a 
limited life expectancy.29  The targeted consumer agrees to purchase a life 
insurance policy with a large face value with funds provided by the 
investor through an outside financial institution.30  A two-year non-
recourse31 loan is typically used to purchase the policy and to fund the 
insured’s payment of premiums.32  At the end of two years, the policy is 
usually assigned to the investor.33  The assignment functions, to some 
extent, as a repayment of the initial loan plus interest.  While assignment of 
                                                                                                                 
26. STOLI unlike life settlements involve mainly private rather than institutional 
investors.   
27. Stephen R. Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: Killing the Goose That 
Lays Golden Eggs!, THE INS. TAX REV. 811, 811 (May 2005) available at 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/2005-6866-1.pdf. (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); 
Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3; Ted Anagnoson, Is Death a Commodity?, CAL. ST. 
UNIVERSITY EMERITUS & RETIRED FACULTY ASS’N REPORTER 1,3 (March 2008). 
28. Anagnoson, supra note 27, at 3. 
29. Kohli, supra note 15, at 284. Prime candidates also have a life expectancy of less 
than fifteen years.  Id.  See also Written Statement of David M. Lewis, Representative of the 
Life Settlement Institute, Addressing the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Financial Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, at 3 (February 26, 2002) 
available at www.financialservices.house.gov (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
30. Kohli, supra note 15, at 3. 
31. Premium non-recourse financing means that the loan issued to pay the premiums 
on the policy is secured only by the policy itself.  If the borrower defaults the lender may 
only receive the insurance policy and can not go after the borrower’s other assets or 
finances. Louis S. Harrison, Death Don’t Have No Mercy When It Comes To Non Recourse 
Premium Financed Life Insurance, 41ST ANNUAL SOUTHERN FEDERAL TAX INSTITUTE 1, 13 
(Sept. 18-22, 2006). 
32. Though non-recourse financing is typically used in STOLI transactions recourse 
loans are also made in connection with such arrangements. Insurer Acts to Rescind Free Life 
Insurance, LEIMBERG INFORMATIONAL SERVICES (September 2006) [hereinafter LEIMBERG]. 
Recourse or semi-recourse financing is being used more frequently as insurance companies 
are refusing to issue policies to applicants who have received non-recourse financing due to 
its association with STOLI transactions.  FLAGG, supra note 7.  The loan, whether recourse 
or not, is made for two years in order to cover the contestability period on a life insurance 
policy.  Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3. Once that period passes an insurance 
company can only attempt to rescind the policy on the grounds of fraud or lack of insurable 
interest.  Id.  
33. The two year waiting period is utilized in order to avoid state wet ink laws and 
contestability clauses in the policies themselves. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3.  
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the policy is not technically required, it is inevitable given the size of the 
loan plus interest and premiums an insured would have to repay and 
continue to pay if he chose to maintain the policy.34  An insured’s other, 
less viable, options include: (1) continuing to pay the premiums himself 
and repaying the initial loan plus interest; or (2) selling the policy to a third 
party and using the return to repay the loan plus interest35.  Neither of these 
two options is as feasible or as frequently exercised as ceding the policy to 
the investor without having to repay any portion of the loan or interest. 
 
 
 
 
b. STOLI VERSUS LEGITIMATE LIFE SETTLEMENTS: WHAT ARE 
WE REGULATING? 
 
The Supreme Court iterated the basic premise for distinguishing 
legitimate life settlements from STOLI in Connecticut Mutual Life v. 
                                                                                                                 
34. A recent complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Central District 
of California, Lincoln National Life v. Fishman, emphasizes this point stating, “[i]ndeed the 
money used to purchase the policies was lent at such a usurious and exorbitant interest rate 
that when the note becomes due, the trust will not be able to repay the loan and will have no 
effective alternative but to forfeit the policies and assign them to the investor”.  National 
Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 2 STOLI Alert 1, 4 (March 2008) 
available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).  In this case Fishman, a retired 
physician took out three insurance policies each with a ten million dollar death benefit.  Id.  
Prior to applying for the policies it is alleged that Fishman accepted one million dollars from 
Mutual Credit Corporation.  Id.  Further, Mutual Credit Corporation provided all the 
financing in the form of a non-recourse loan.  Id.  The finance charge on the loan was more 
than 100 percent of the amount loaned assuring that then only way to satisfy the debt was 
the transfer of the three policies. Id.  See also, Alan Jensen & Stephan R. Leimberg, 
Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: A Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 THE AMERICAN 
COLLEGE OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL JOURNAL 110, 130 (Fall 2007). The authors describe 
a fraudulent scheme in which a broker, Joseph Gennaco, peddled free life insurance with an 
upfront cash bonus to those willing to purchase and then turnover life insurance policies. Id. 
The scheme involved use of a two year non-recourse loan secured only by the policy.  Id.  
The interest rate on the loan was prohibitively high such that at the end of the two year 
period the insured had no choice but to turn the policy over to the lender. Id. 
35. When the insured initially purchases the policy it is in connection with a particular 
investor or investment firm. Unless that firm declines to purchase the policy because of 
changed circumstances it is highly unlikely the insured will sell the policy to a third party. 
This is because in addition to finding a new investor the amount of the loan and interest rate 
are usually too high for the insured to make a profit upon sale.  See Jenson & Leimberg, 
supra note 34, at 130. 
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Schaefer.36  The Court held that, “[a]ny person has a right to procure 
insurance on his own life, and assign it to another, provided it not be done 
by way of cover for a wager policy” and that “the essential thing is that the 
policy shall be obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of 
speculating upon the hazard of a life in which the insured has no interest.”37  
Under this reasoning, legitimate life settlements are those in which the 
insurance was procured in good faith and the initial intention was to 
purchase insurance for oneself or a loved one.  Accordingly, traditional 
viatical and life settlements are lawful and serve legitimate purposes.  
These financial transfers were not planned prior to the purchase of the 
policy.  Rather, the insured legitimately obtained life insurance for the 
financial benefit and protection of family members or dependents.  As 
circumstances within their lives changed, access to those benefits became 
necessary and so the insurance market adapted to those needs.38  Without 
these secondary market alternatives, policyholders’ life insurance would 
remain an illiquid asset.39   
STOLI transactions, however, inherently conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning, because the consumer’s purchase of an insurance policy 
is a cover for the investor’s and consumer’s true intent.  People 
participating in these transactions do not want life insurance.  It is a 
financial transfer of the policy from inception to an unrelated party, 
literally a stranger.  It is speculation on the life of another.  STOLI is a 
means of circumventing states’ insurable interest laws by having the 
insured purchase the policy in his own name, but with the investor’s money 
and for the investor’s ultimate benefit.40  These transactions have broad and 
                                                                                                                 
36. See generally Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876). 
37. Id. at 457, 460.  See also Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 781 (1881) (applying 
the Schaefer Court’s distinction and ruling that “[t]o hold it valid for the whole proceeds 
would be to sanction speculative risks on human life, and encourage the evils for which 
wager policies are condemned”); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 480 F.3d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2007)(citing Schaefer in a unanimous decision rejecting 
a corporate party’s claim to death benefits from an insurance policy on a stranger’s life).  
38. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 3-4 
(March 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).   
39. Kohli, supra note 15, at 280. 
40. A permutation on these deals utilizes the loophole created by relaxed insurable 
interest laws which allows charities to take policies out on an individual’s life or to be 
named a beneficiary. In this type of transaction, “investors ‘borrow’ the insurable interests 
of charities to purchase insurance coverage on the lives of the organization’s older, wealthy, 
charitable-minded, and generous donor[s]”. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813. These 
arrangements are commonly referred to as COLI transactions. Id.  Further, STOLI 
transactions may be achieved through the use of irrevocable trusts and banks as well. 
2008]   STRANGER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE 529 
 
negative implications for all parties involved as well as for primary and 
secondary life insurance markets. State action is necessary to prevent this 
bad faith speculation on human life and its untoward consequences. 
 
PART II: WHY STOLI SHOULD BE PROHIBITED 
 
The practical and legal distinctions between legitimate secondary life 
insurance market transactions and STOLI provide a basis for regulation.  It 
is the risks STOLI poses to consumers, however, that make state action and 
elimination of STOLI essential.  These risks directly harm consumers 
through potential confidentiality breaches, misleading marketing strategies 
including false promises of financial security and certainty, and health 
risks.  STOLI derivatively harms consumers through its impact on 
insurance companies and tax consequences which result in market 
distortions, affect availability and affordability of life insurance, potentially 
negate positive tax treatment and consequently may result in a fundamental 
shift of the life insurance paradigm.  These risks are discussed in greater 
detail below. 
 
a. IMPACT OF STOLI ON THE INSURANCE MARKET 
 
Life insurance is a business. Thus, insurers calculate everything from a 
business perspective including premiums, value of policies, savings, and 
who will be insured.  In pricing life insurance, companies analyze and base 
prices on multiple factors including mortality and lapse rates.41  The first 
factor, mortality rates, is integral to pricing insurance policies as well as to 
the rate of return for STOLI investors.42  It is generally based on medical 
information and is important because a life insurer cannot raise premiums 
due to deterioration of an insured’s health.43  This factor remains virtually 
unchanged by the emergence of life settlements and STOLI transactions. 
The second factor, lapse rates, has the most potential to negatively 
affect availability and pricing of life insurance policies for the elderly.  
Under a regular life insurance contract, a certain percentage of 
                                                                                                                 
41. Cynthia J. Crosson, et. al., Fatal Attraction: Risks in the Secondary Market for 
Life Insurance, FITCH, INC., FITCH RATINGS LTD 1, 7 (2007) available at www.life-
investor.eu. (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
42. The rate of return for STOLI transactions or any viatical or life settlement is 
inversely proportionate to the health of the insured.  Therefore, a decline in the insured’s 
health increases profits for the investor(s). Id. 
43. Id. 
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policyholders will surrender their policies or allow them to lapse.44  In 
these cases the insurer retains all premiums which have been collected and 
never pays out a death benefit.45  Insurance companies have come to rely 
on this percentage and use the information to calculate premiums for all the 
policies they issue.46   STOLI transactions distort this percentage because 
STOLI is designed to ensure that policies never lapse and that the death 
benefit is always paid, just not to the original insured.47  This occurs 
because investors can usually afford to pay premiums and maintain the 
policy until the initial insured’s death.  In order to compensate for this 
additional and incalculable risk, life insurers will need to increase 
premiums, permanently, for all life insurance applicants, including those 
who genuinely need it, particularly the elderly.48  
Another reason STOLI is likely to increase life insurance premiums is 
the cost and resources insurance companies require to litigate STOLI issues 
such as fraud and misrepresentation.  Insurance companies have already 
begun expending valuable resources litigating whether STOLI policies 
must be paid.49  Increased litigation costs, coupled with increased 
                                                                                                                 
44. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison et al, 484 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir. 2007). 
45. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 2. 
46. Morrison, 484 F.3d at 295.  See Charles Duhigg, Late in Life, Finding a Bonanza 
in Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006 (noting that companies rely on policies lapsing 
so much so that on ninety percent of the policies companies never pay a death benefit and 
that last year (2006) “insurance companies reduced their financial exposure by $1.1 trillion 
when 19.8 million policyholders stopped paying premiums”.  Accordingly, death benefits 
were paid on only 2.2 million policies).  
47. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3-4.  
48. Id. This change in lapse rates will eventually force companies to revise previous 
statistics and assumptions.  This distortion is expected to drive up the overall cost of life 
insurance most notably for the elderly.  Id. 
49. Id. at 4 (noting that New York Life and Annuity Company and John Hancock 
brought legal actions alleging fraud because the policies were purchased as part of a STOLI 
transaction). See also complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, Lincoln National Life v. Fishman, in which Lincoln National requests 
rescission or voidance of three ten million dollar life insurance policies because of alleged 
misrepresentations by the insured and the investors’ lack of insurable interest.  National 
Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, supra note 34, at 4.  See generally Life 
Product Clearing, LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that 
investors were not entitled to the proceeds of a $10 million life insurance policy because the 
policy was always intended to benefit the investors and is therefore in violation of insurable 
interest laws and public policy). 
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regulation and monitoring costs, will drive up life insurance prices 
generally.50   
Moreover, because of this market distortion and increased payment of 
death benefits, there are potential solvency issues.  Insurance companies 
plan on a certain number of policies lapsing and so reserve funds 
accordingly.51  Potentially, with so many people unexpectedly collecting on 
very large policies, an insurance company will not have set aside enough 
funds to pay all the claims, legitimate and illegitimate.  While companies 
may adjust to some of these changes in the future, current unanticipated 
collections pose a threat.   
STOLI’s effect on insurance companies is important because it 
adversely affects the death benefits of those who legitimately purchased 
life insurance or who want to purchase life insurance in the future.  It does 
so by potentially diminishing an insurance company’s ability to pay claims 
and by driving up the average cost of life insurance. Accordingly, STOLI’s 
effect on insurance companies negatively reshapes the current life 
insurance market for consumers.  
 
 
b. IMPACT OF STOLI ON CONSUMERS/INSUREDS 
 
STOLI directly and derivatively harms consumers, particularly the 
elderly. The offer of a risk-free investment with a large payoff is enticing, 
                                                                                                                 
50. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3-4. The emergence of life settlements and 
STOLI markets will lead to the creation of new monitoring and tracking systems which may 
affect the pricing of ordinary policies.  Id.  John Hancock Life Insurance Co. of Boston is a 
prime example of the increased monitoring insurance companies are enacting while waiting 
for states to play a larger regulatory role. Sara Hansard, Hancock moves against ‘stranger-
owned’ policies, INVESTMENT NEWS (September 25, 2006) available at 
www.investmentnews.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).  John Hancock has modified a 
number of forms including two new forms now required of applicants over the age of 70 
that must be approved by each state.  Id.  Further the company is requiring new applications 
and certification forms for policies to be owned by trusts. Id.  All of this increases an 
insurance company’s overhead and is reflected in the price all consumers have to pay not 
just those participating in STOLI transactions.  See also, Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, 
at 123 (stating, “[i]nsurers are forced unnecessarily to spend millions of dollars to monitor 
and filter these fraudulent transactions” and questioning why insurers, a victim in the 
process, should be forced to single-handedly regulate STOLI). 
51. E-mail from Doug Head, LISA Executive Director, regarding Comments on 
NCOIL Model on Life Settlements (February 20, 2007) available at 
www.lisassociation.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).  See also Jenson & Leimberg, supra 
note 34, at 112 (noting that 89% of universal life policies did not pay benefits).  
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but misleading. The individual risks of these arrangements are not being 
regulated, nor are the resulting market distortions which adversely affect 
the availability and cost of life insurance for consumers.   
First, STOLI arrangements raise concerns regarding the relationship 
between the insured and investors.  The STOLI relationship is much more 
intrusive than that of an insured to an insurance company.  Under this 
multi-party arrangement, the investors may require more regular 
examinations as their profit is directly determined by the health of the 
insured.52  Further, a STOLI transaction involves an insured, a broker, and 
an investor at the very least.  Only the insured has an interest in his 
continued vitality.  While concern that an investor will murder an insured 
to increase profit may seem implausible, history and human nature 
advocate against such ready dismissals.53  Therefore, while the chances of 
an investor murdering an insured are rather small there is no guarantee that 
it will not happen.  
A larger concern is maintaining the confidentiality of an insured’s 
identity and medical history.  This information may be circulated to 
                                                                                                                 
52. FLAGG, supra note 7. 
53. In truth, the basis for prohibiting wagering contracts is not so historically distant 
as one might hope, consider, C. DiMassa, 2 Arrested in Homeless Life Insurance Scam, Pair 
Are Accused of Obtaining Policies on two men who later died in hit-and-run accidents, L.A. 
TIMES (May 19, 2006),  The article provides: “[t]wo women were arrested Thursday after 
they allegedly befriended two homeless men, took out 19 life insurance policies on them 
and filed claims worth more than $2.2 million after the transients mysteriously died in hit-
and-run pedestrian accidents in Los Angeles”.  See also Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 
879-880 (Wash. 2007) (Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of 
his wife and business partner. Stenson, in financial difficulty, had taken out a $400,000 life 
insurance on his wife prior to killing her); Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478, 485-86 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (in a petition for Habeas corpus the court noted that defendant was in dire 
financial straits and recently declared bankruptcy.  Further, less than a month before the 
murders of both his son and wife Williams “substantially increased” their life insurance 
coverage naming himself as the beneficiary. Williams was convicted and sentenced to death 
for both murders.); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (1972) (Defendant 
confessed that “Minnie Lee Claybon (the murder victim) and myself had an insurance 
policy together.  So I started thinking about the insurance and the money that I could get if 
something happened to her.  I knew that I could use the money if something happened…So 
I drived the car into the river and she was killed”. The defendant was convicted of murder.). 
These are just a few incidents and are representative of the potential for both strangers and 
loved ones to murder in order to make a profit.  It is fair to speculate that if family members 
are enticed to kill spouses and children an even greater temptation would exist with respect 
to strangers.  
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unsavory investors over whom the insured has no control.54  Providing this 
information exposes the insured to myriad breaches of confidentiality 
which could jeopardize his life or otherwise expose him to harm.  For 
example, in Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: A Point/Counterpoint 
Discussion, Stephen Leimberg notes that on April 5, 2007, “the federal 
court for the Southern District of Florida released information on a case in 
which Columbian drug cartel members bought life settlements to launder 
drug money.”55  This case demonstrates that STOLI investors are unknown 
figures who have absolutely no interest in the health or wellbeing of the 
insured.  Based on the potential attenuated chain of investors, an insured 
may not know who has an interest in his death.56  Moreover, the investor 
has a legal right to assign the policy to whomever he chooses, such that an 
insured cannot prevent a person from having an interest in his death.57  
These risks are the direct consequence of turning human lives into 
investments.   
Second, the insured is giving up the benefits of obtaining and owning a 
life insurance policy in the future. There is a maximum amount of 
aggregate coverage insurance companies are willing to issue to any 
individual.58  STOLI transactions are designed to maximize profits for all 
participants, so insureds are often encouraged to procure the largest policy 
possible irrespective of the insured’s future insurance needs.  In doing so, 
the consumer uses up his insurability.59  Uninformed or ill-informed 
participants may unwittingly sacrifice these rights and ruin any chance of 
obtaining needed life insurance after they participate in a STOLI 
transaction. 
Moreover, there are many uncertainties accompanying STOLI 
transactions. The contestability period of a life insurance policy plays a key 
                                                                                                                 
54. See J. Alan Jensen & Stephan R. Leimberg, supra note 34, at 118-19 (stating that 
“original investors have the legal right (and often the intent) to sell the policy individually or 
in a block with other policies immediately to a different group of investors. There is no legal 
limit to how many times the policy on your life can be sold or to whom. Therefore, the 
insured has no control or knowledge of who will own it and be its beneficiary”). 
55. Id. at 119. 
56. Id. 
57. Leimberg notes that the only way for an insured to prevent future assignment of 
the policy is by contractual agreement.  Id. at 126.  There is no incentive for an investor to 
agree to profit limiting provisions and given the unequal bargaining power between the 
investor and the potential insured it is unlikely that a STOLI company would.  Id. 
58. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 4. 
59. Id. 
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role in determining when, how, and if the death benefits are distributed.60  
There are two possibilities:  the insured will either die during the 
contestability period or after it.  If he dies during the contestability period, 
then the initial designated beneficiary will receive the death benefits, but 
the loan that the insured received in order to pay the premiums will need to 
be repaid plus interest and administrative costs to the lenders.61  Therefore, 
family members will not receive the full benefit of the policy.  
Additionally, there is a chance that the insurance company will try to 
rescind the policy based on the attempted STOLI transaction.62  If the 
insurance company succeeds, the family may be responsible to the investor 
for the loan.63  Therefore, the potential result is expensive liabilities and 
litigation for the decedent’s family. 
Alternatively, if the insured survives the contestability period, even 
though the investors have agreed to finance the loan, there is often no 
guarantee the investors will purchase the policy.64  The insured’s life 
expectancy may have changed and consequently the price originally 
offered may decrease accordingly, or the investors may no longer be 
interested in the policy.65  In this situation, the lender may seek repayment 
of the initial loan from the insured because it will no longer be repaid upon 
transfer of the policy.66  Thus, an insured may suffer an overall loss on the 
transaction.67  Lastly, even if the investor purchases the policy upon the 
insured’s death, his estate may still be liable to investors for the value of 
the policy.68 
                                                                                                                 
60. See supra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text. 
61. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3.  The lender is a creditor of the 
decedent’s estate such that it is entitled to repayment of the loan.  Because the loan is 
typically non-recourse the estate has two options, either repay the debt or the lender is 
entitled to assignment of the policy as the policy was collateral for the loan. If recourse 
financing was utilized, as is the growing trend, the decedent’s family is responsible for full 
repayment of the loan plus any accumulated interest. See supra notes 31 & 32 and 
accompanying text. 
62. If the insurance company succeeds in rescinding the policy because of a 
misrepresentation regarding the STOLI transaction then the nature of the loan often shifts 
from non-recourse to recourse rendering the decedent’s family liable for up the full face 
value of the policy.  See Harrison, supra note 31, at 14. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id.; Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 117.  
66. See Jenson & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 117. 
67. Id. This danger is mitigated if the transaction utilized non-recourse financing, as 
the lender’s only recourse is to acquire the policy.  Harrison, supra note 31, at 13. 
68. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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Given the potential illegality of STOLI transactions, insurance 
companies and states are increasingly challenging the validity of such 
agreements and insurance companies’ responsibility to pay the benefit.69  
This uncertainty, often lost on consumers, is not overlooked by investors 
who require consumers to execute complex legal documents guaranteeing 
payment of the proceeds.70  Therefore, when lenders and investors are 
denied recovery by insurance companies, they often have recourse against 
the estate.71  The one-sided nature of these provisions suggests that insureds 
do not understand the risks they are taking on, or lack the bargaining power 
to rewrite the STOLI contract to reduce these risks. What may seem like a 
good way to increase savings and provide relatively quick income can 
instead lead to devastating debt and financial insecurity.72   
In addition to fraud, confidentiality breaches, and health risks, STOLI 
has the potential to make life insurance prohibitively expensive for those 
who genuinely need or want it.  Consumers cannot protect themselves from 
these fundamental market shifts.  Further, consumers are the main target of 
STOLI and the harm it creates. Therefore, while STOLI may benefit some 
wealthy consumers and investors, the costs of treating humans as 
commodities adversely affects the entire population and exceeds any 
benefit received through these transactions.  The only way to protect 
consumers is through state action and prohibition. 
 
c. IMPACT OF STOLI ON INVESTORS 
 
Investors also must clearly understand the risks of STOLI transactions.  
As participants, their finances are exposed to the risk that the investments 
will either be unprofitable or nullified.  This is perhaps a familiar risk for 
some investors, but given the marketing of STOLI arrangements as safe 
investments, conservative investors with limited resources may be misled 
into investing.73  There are two levels of potential fraud that may affect the 
risk of investment and the rate of return. 
                                                                                                                 
69. It is much harder to challenge the validity of the policy once the contestability 
period has expired. See Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3.  However, most challenges 
to successfully alter the nature of the financing from non-recourse to recourse, involve 
misrepresentations in the insurance application or fraud on the insurer.  It is unclear whether 
the nature of the financing would shift based on a denial for lack of insurability.  See 
Harrison, supra note 31, at 14. 
70. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 117.  
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 811. 
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The first level of fraud may be perpetrated by either the insured or the 
investment broker/company.74  Investment return relies upon accurate 
estimates of life expectancy, so if an insured lies about his good health to 
gain more compensation, the investor’s profit may decrease.  Theoretically, 
companies promoting STOLI and corresponding brokers should evaluate 
an insured’s life expectancy independent of what is reported, but that is not 
always the case.75  
This form of fraud upon investors is often perpetrated by the STOLI 
company or broker.  Often the STOLI company handles most, if not all, 
aspects of the investment transaction, e.g., evaluation of life expectancy 
and payment of premiums.76  Therefore, the investment company retains 
most of the knowledge and control over the transaction.  Power often leads 
to abuse as evidenced by one of the most recent and biggest frauds upon 
investors, addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Mutual Benefits 
Corporation.77  In Mutual Benefits, the company defrauded approximately 
29,000 investors by using misleading life expectancies in predicting when 
the insureds would die.78  As insureds outlived these expectancies, the 
company used money from new investors to pay the premiums on the older 
policies rather than the ones they purportedly invested in, much like a 
pyramid scheme.79  Investors lost millions of dollars, including many 
people’s life savings.80 
                                                                                                                 
74. An indictment issued by United States Attorney McGregor W. Scott of the 
Eastern District of California evidences the type of fraud that is perpetrated upon investors. 
The indictment alleges a scheme to defraud approximately 500 investors in twenty states for 
over twenty-five million dollars. McGregor W. Scott, U.S. Atty, Eight Defendants Indicted 
On Major Viatical/Life Settlement Fraud Scheme, E.D. CALIFORNIA (August 23, 2007). The 
indictment alleges that the company involved made false and misleading statements 
regarding the safety and risk of the investment as well as that they were not required to be 
licensed. Id. at 2.  
75. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 739 (11th Cir. 2005) cert. dismissed 
(Mut. Benefits Corp. v. SEC, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8978 (U.S. 2007).  
76. Id. 
77. Id.  
78. Id.; National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 5 
(June 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Patrick Danner, 
Viaticals are now subject to regulation, RTG CONSULTANTS, LLC available at 
www.herald.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). The 29,000 investors purchased 7,322 life 
insurance policies valued at a total of 1.5 billion dollars.  Id. 
79. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 5 
(June 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Those responsible for 
the Mutual Benefits scandal were sentenced to five years in prison and ordered to pay $826 
million in restitution damages to investors. Id. 
80. Id.  
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The second level of fraud is on the insurer. As insurance companies 
have become increasingly aware of STOLI transactions, they have begun to 
tailor the application process to detect such arrangements.81  In order to 
avoid tripping the STOLI wire, insureds are often told to lie or omit 
information to induce the insurance company to issue a policy.  
Misrepresenting one’s intent when directly questioned qualifies as a 
misrepresentation of material fact, if the insurance company would not 
have issued the policy but for the lie or omission. This is insurance fraud, 
punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony depending on the state.82  
Also, the insurance company may contest the policy under insurable 
interest laws or even rescind it entirely based on these misrepresentations.  
New York Life and Annuity Corporation recently rescinded a one million 
dollar policy on the grounds that the trust involved was created solely for 
the benefit of investors rather than the insured.83  These investors were the 
beneficiaries and premium payors on the policy but had no familial or 
economic interest in the life of the insured.84  This action emphasizes not 
only the importance of disclosure regarding STOLI transactions but more 
importantly the risk to both the investor and the insured’s estate when 
participating in such arrangements.  Though with any insurance policy 
there is some risk that it may be rescinded, that risk is multiplied with 
STOLI because the legality and regulatory requirements remain unsettled.  
 
 
 
 
d. TAX IMPLICATIONS OF STOLI 
 
How the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) will treat money acquired 
through STOLI transactions as well as the transfer of the policy itself 
remains unsettled.  Tax analysis includes treatment of the initial financing 
loan, the payment on exchange, and the receipt of the death benefits by 
                                                                                                                 
81. As noted in Section II.a, insurance companies have great incentive to prevent 
STOLI transactions.  
82. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 115. 
83. See LEIMBERG supra note 32.  The complaint alleges a violation of New York’s 
insurable interest laws. Id. The company notes that the only remedy available to the 
company is to rescind the policy and return the premiums plus interest.  Id.  See also New 
Obstacles to Stranger-Owned Life Insurance Transactions (“SOLI”), GREENBERG TRAURIG 
SPECIAL REPORT (January 2007) available at www. Gtlaw.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
84. LEIMBERG, supra note 32.   
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investors.85  Resolution of these issues will greatly affect all involved in 
STOLI arrangements including the profit to investors and the financial 
compensation of consumers.  The tax consequences of these transactions 
may eliminate any promised financial benefit.86 
Typically, life insurance proceeds received as death benefits are not 
included in the beneficiary’s gross income or the insured’s estate and are 
thus tax-free money.87  The policy reason behind the tax exemption is that 
the proceeds are meant to protect against death and provides for one’s 
family.88  Conversely, based on this policy, if an insured decides to receive 
proceeds for his life insurance policy prior to death, then a portion of the 
proceeds will be included in his income and consequently taxed.89  With 
STOLI, it is unclear how the gains from the sale of the policy and the 
proceeds from the policy will be taxed.  Further, whether proceeds and 
financial gain are taxed as capital or ordinary income makes a significant 
difference as capital gains are taxed at a much more favorable rate than 
ordinary income.90 
There are several possible tax treatments for STOLI transactions, all of 
which lack the typically positive treatment life insurance proceeds receive 
                                                                                                                 
85. A whole paper could be written on the potential tax consequences of STOLI 
transactions. The purpose of this article, however, is to give only an overview of the 
problems that make state legislation and regulation of STOLI transactions imperative. 
86. See Raymond J Lehman, House Subcommittee Leaders Want Treasury Guidance 
on STOLI, BEST WIRE SERVICES (Nov. 28 2007).  Lehman reviews a letter to Treasury 
Secretary Paulson from several representatives expressing concern about STOLI and stating 
that “because tax rules governing settlements can be complex, including regulations on 
cancellation of indebtedness income, they raise the potential that an insured or his or her 
heirs could face an unexpected tax liability”.  Id.  “Some transactions may be classified 
under federal tax law as ‘split-dollar’ life insurance, while insured also may be unaware of 
their tax liability for any cash promotions they receive”. Id. 
87. I.R.C. §101(a)(1) (1986). 
88. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 819 (quoting Vaughn Henry, “It’s because life 
insurance protects widows, widowers, and children from becoming paupers when the 
breadwinner dies that it isn’t taxable.  But that may change if Congress or the Treasury 
Department thinks life insurance is becoming nothing more than a wager.”). 
89. I.R.C. §101(a)(2) (1986); I.R.C. §72(e) (1986).  The portion subjected to tax is the 
amount above the principal paid for the policy. This may be complicated by an annuity or 
similar arrangements. 
90. Under the IRC capital gains receive much more favorable treatment, being taxed 
only at a 15% rate. This is a very low capital gains rate that is subject to change in the 
future.  The treatment of death benefits, capital versus ordinary gain or the tax rate for 
capital gains, under such an investment scheme does make a difference as it directly impacts 
the rate of return on the investment.  FLAGG, supra note 7, at 29. 
2008]   STRANGER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE 539 
 
under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).91  First, the IRS may treat the 
initial loan as an option agreement and payment.92  Traditionally, loans are 
not taxed under the IRC.93  By treating the initial loan as a payment option, 
however, the IRS could tax the entire amount of the loan which could 
potentially exceed any initial financial incentive offered by the investor.94  
This creates a liquidity problem for the insured and may result in 
unanticipated financial problems. Conversely, if the payments are 
considered loans, then any amount the insured is not required to repay may 
be taxed as cancellation of indebtness income.95  This means that the 
insured will be taxed on the portion of the loan that was forgiven, which 
may or may not exceed the price he was paid for the policy.  Regardless of 
whether the policy is considered a loan, the insured will be taxed to the 
extent that cash value received exceeds premiums paid; thereby reducing 
the insured’s gain as well.96  Therefore, the same liquidity issues arise 
whether the transaction is treated as a payment option, subject to debt-
forgiveness, or treated as ordinary income. 
Further, recent IRS regulations called “split dollar regulations” have 
emerged.97  A split dollar arrangement is as: 
 
Any arrangement between an owner and non-owner of a 
life insurance contract that satisfies the following criteria: 
 
(i) Either party to the arrangement pays 
directly or indirectly all or a portion of the 
premiums on the life insurance contract including 
                                                                                                                 
91. I.R.C. §101(a)(1) (1986). 
92. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 8. 
93. This is because a loan is not viewed as income. The debtor has to pay the money 
back such that there is no basis in the loan and consequently no taxable gain. 
94. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3. 
95. I.R.C. §108 (1986). 
96. Again the tax analysis gets rather complicated. The idea is simple, the tax 
consequences of STOLI transactions are currently uncertain but may result in negating most 
and in some cases all of the insured’s gain, leaving the insured with next to nothing and the 
investors with millions upon the insured’s death. 
97. Margaret Gallagher Thompson, J.D., The Final Split-Dollar Regulations, J. OF 
ACCOUNTANCY (February 2004) available at www.aicpa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008)(noting a split-dollar arrangement exists when there is one policy between an owner 
and non-owner and one of the party pays the premiums and is entitled to recover the 
payment through the death benefit).  See Joshua E. Husbands & J. Alan Jensen, Split Dollar 
Life Insurance Funding: You Mean People Still Do That, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 1, 3 
(August 30, 2007).  
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a payment by means of a loan to the other party 
that is secured by the insurance contracts; 
 
(ii) At least one of the parties to the 
arrangement paying premiums under the paragraph 
above is entitled to recover (either conditionally or 
unconditionally) all or any portion of those 
premiums and such recovery is to be made from, 
or is secured by, the proceeds of the life insurance 
contract.98 
 
If this definition is satisfied, then the death benefit of an insured is 
included in the insured’s gross income and taxed accordingly.99  Due to the 
broad definition of split dollar arrangements, these regulations potentially 
apply to STOLI transactions.100  STOLI transactions typically utilize a non-
recourse loan such that the premiums of the policy are paid by a third party 
and the third party is entitled to recover those premiums from the proceeds 
of the life insurance which secures the loan.101  Consequently, STOLI 
proceeds and profits could face adverse tax treatment under the split dollar 
regulations.102 
Most importantly, STOLI transactions have the potential to strip all life 
insurance of favorable tax treatment.  If life insurance primarily becomes 
an investment vehicle rather than a means of providing protection and 
benefits to one’s family, then the reason for tax free treatment evaporates.  
This fundamental shift in the life insurance paradigm threatens the security 
most have come to expect by individually investing in life insurance and 
results in costs to those who seek life insurance for legitimate purposes and 
depend on the corresponding beneficial treatment of its proceeds.103  
                                                                                                                 
98. Husbands & Jensen, supra note 97, at 4.  
99. FLAGG, supra note 7, at 29. 
100. “The definition under the final regulations is so broad that arrangements not 
previously considered split-dollar may well be swept within its scope.” Thompson, supra 
note 97, at 3. 
101. Spilt dollar treatment has a greater impact if a trust is involved. With a trust, the 
insured would be taxed on both the death benefit minus premiums paid as well as assessed a 
gift tax. FLAGG, supra note 7, at 30. 
102. Due to the abusive practices of STOLI the IRS could determine that STOLI 
qualifies as a split dollar arrangement in order to deter insureds from entering into these 
transactions. See FLAGG, supra note 7, at 67. 
103. The risk of allowing STOLI to continue is the potential loss of tax benefits 
afforded to life insurance because of its social merits.  An Update on Recent Developments 
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PART III: STATES’ ROLE IN PREVENTING STOLI 
 
Based on these concerns, states have an interest in eliminating STOLI 
transactions.  An important role of government is to protect citizens from 
fraud, harassment, and abuse.  States have a responsibility to prevent the 
exploitation of elderly residents by institutional and individual investors 
and the brokers who seek them out.104  Another role of government is to 
ensure that citizens, both as insureds and investors, do not deceive 
insurance companies by circumventing insurable interest laws and 
generally concealing their intentions with regard to the transfer and 
assignment of policies.  As we saw, however, the most important reason the 
state has for preventing STOLI is to ensure that citizens have the ability to 
purchase necessary life insurance.  Given the detrimental consequences of 
STOLI, the state has a greater responsibility to its citizens to prevent the 
continued use of STOLI.105   
                                                                                                                          
Involving Stranger Owned Life Insurance (STOLI), MARKET INTELLIGENCE REPORT 
(December 2007).  While there are no current proposals to alter the taxation of life insurance 
the Treasury has been required to institute an extensive two-year Investor Owed Life 
Insurance study.  Id.  Further, the President’s Tax Advisory Panel’s 2005 report 
recommended a plan that “would remove all the favored buildup from life insurance and 
annuities.”  Id.  “With mounting deficits, a PAYGO regime in which all new expenditures 
must be offset with new revenue and efforts to pass a permanent [alternative minimum tax] 
‘fix’ we must continue to seriously consider the legislative vulnerability of life insurance.”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
104. Several states have issued alerts to warn residents, especially the elderly about 
STOLI. See Matt Brady, Texas Sounds Alarm On Wave Of STOLI Solicitations, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER. LIFE & HEALTH,Vol. 111, Iss. 24 pg. 6 (June 18 2007);Texas Department of 
Insurance, COMMISSIONER’S BULLETIN #B-0054-07 (December 21, 2007) available at 
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/bulletins/2007/cc53.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Consumer 
Alert: Stranger-Originated Life Insurance, ILLINOIS DIVISION OF INSURANCE available at 
http://www.idfpr.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008)( advising consumers to proceed with 
caution regarding STOLI and stating that the Illinois Division of Insurance does not approve 
of these transactions); Consumer Alert: Stranger-Originated Life Insurance(STOLI), OHIO 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE  available at http://www.ohioinsurance.gov (last visited Oct. 
10, 2008); North American Securities Administrators Association, State Securities 
Regulators Issue Senior Investor Alert (September 10, 2007) available at www.nasaa.org 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
105. Jennifer A. Lann, Viatical Settlements: An Explanation of the Process, An 
Analysis of State Regulations, and an Examination of Viatical Settlements as Securities, 46 
DRAKE L. REV. 923, 930 (1998).  States have the ability to enact licensing and disclosure 
requirements, minimum price regulations, general contract provisions, penalties for 
violation, and any other provision or regulation the state sees fit.  Id. at 931. 
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Finally, the state has the power and ability to regulate these 
relationships, as they relate to the business of insurance under the 
McCarran Ferguson Act (“MFA”).106  The ability of states to regulate life 
settlements and consequently STOLI transactions was affirmed in Life 
Partners, Inc. v. Morrison et al.107  In Life Partners, the Fourth Circuit held 
that state regulation of viaticals regarding price minimums constituted the 
business of insurance because the focus of the regulation was on the 
insurance contract.108 The Supreme Court has since denied review.109 The 
Fourth Circuit opinion reinforces the state’s regulatory power with respect 
to the consumer protection side of the secondary life insurance market and 
should be equally applicable to the regulation of STOLI. 
 
a. DO STOLI TRANSACTIONS VIOLATE STATE INSURABLE 
INTEREST LAWS? 
 
i. History of Insurable Interest Laws and Wagering 
Contracts 
 
Life insurance, historically, has only been enforceable where the 
contract includes an insurable interest in the life of the insured.110  Prior to 
the creation of the insurable interest requirement in 1774,111 persons were 
allowed to take policies out on anyone’s life.112  Thus, life insurance 
contracts were viewed not as investments but as bets on another’s life.  The 
perceived danger in this wager was that a person, with no interest in the 
continued life of the insured and who would gain by the insured’s death, 
might be induced to kill the insured to make a profit or win a bet.113  When 
the United States adopted the English common law system, it adopted the 
insurable interest requirement as well.  While the initial intent of the 
requirement, deterring murder, is important, there are equally important 
concerns such as fraud, consumer protection, and maintenance of the 
legitimacy of both the primary and secondary life insurance markets.  
                                                                                                                 
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13 (2008). 
107. See generally Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison et al, 484 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2007). 
108. Id. 
109. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12749 (Dec. 3, 2007). 
110. Swisher, supra note 25, at 478. 
111. The British Parliament in 1774 passed a statute providing that “any life insurance 
contract without an insurable interest in the life of the insured” would be void. Id. at 481 
112. Policies could be taken out on persons charged with serious crimes, famous 
people, and/or the elderly. Id. 
113. Id. 
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the 
insurable interest requirement,114 as have state legislatures and courts.115 
Under these statutes and the common law, the general requirements of 
insurable interest are: “love and affection” for the insured; that the 
applicant be “closely related by blood or law” to the insured; or “in the case 
of other persons, a lawful and substantial economic interest in the 
continued life, health, or bodily safety” of the insured is present.116  The 
existence of an insurable interest is generally only required at the time the 
contract is executed, not at the time of the insured’s death.117  The 
requirement must be met, however, regardless of who purchases the 
insurance but generally only becomes a concern when someone besides the 
insured is taking out, acquiring, or inducing the purchase of the policy on 
the insured’s life.118   
                                                                                                                 
114. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876)(stating 
that “mere wager policies – that is, policies in which the insured party has no interest 
whatever in the matter insured, but only an interest in its loss or destruction – are void, as 
against public policy…[i]n this country, statutes to the same effect have been passed in 
some of the States; but where they have not been, in most cases either the English statutes 
have been considered as operative, or the older common law has been followed…[a] man 
cannot take out insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not 
connected with him as to make the continuance of the life a matter of some real interest to 
him”) 
115. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.090(2) (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-
1104(A)-(C) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103 (WEST 2007); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 280, 
10110 (WEST 2007); DE. INS. CODE §§ 2704-05 (WEST 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3 
(WEST 2007); HI REV. STAT. § 431:10-204 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1804 (2007); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-450 ( 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 299.150, 304.14-040 (WEST 2007); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2404 ( 2007); MD CODE ANN. INS. § 12-201 (WEST 2007); MI. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 500.2211 (WEST 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251 (WEST 2007); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 33-15-201 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-4 (WEST 2007); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§3205(B)(MCKINNEY 2007). 
116. Swisher, supra note 25, at 480 (citing Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding 
Insurance Law 40, at 292-93 (3d ed. 2002). 
117. This is of course the provision STOLI transactions exploit to avoid the application 
of state insurable interest laws. However, this reality can and should be changed by states’ 
revision of current insurable interest statutes or through stricter interpretation. See 
Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813 (noting that unlike property and casualty insurance the 
owner must only have an insurable interest in the insured when the policy is purchased and 
need not exist upon collection of the death benefit). 
118. Swisher, supra note 25, at 484. “Every person has an unlimited insurable interest 
in his or her own life”.  Id.  Regarding STOLI transactions the focus of insurable interest is 
not on whether a person can take out a policy on his own life or designate his own 
beneficiary.  Rather, it is whether he may do so with the intention to sell the policy and if 
that investor has an insurable interest. 
544 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
STOLI transactions do not involve relationships characterized by love 
or affection, nor do they include family members. The investors are 
strangers who may never even meet the insured.  Therefore, the only means 
of satisfying the insurable interest requirement is if a “lawful and 
substantial economic interest in the continued life, health, and bodily safety 
of the person insured”119 is demonstrated.  The types of relationships that 
satisfy this prong are business relationships such as between partners, with 
regard to employees whose existence are critical to the operation of a 
business,120 or creditors with respect to debtors.121  In contrast, STOLI 
investors do not have a substantial interest in the continued life of the 
insured; in fact their interest is directly adverse to the health of the insured 
and they do not qualify under any of the three exceptional categories.122   
Based on this premise, if the STOLI contracts were executed by the 
third party investor for his benefit, then they would be void as against 
public policy.  STOLI transactions, however, are sophisticated enough to 
circumvent the requirement of insurable interest upon issuance of the 
policy.123  There are several schemes STOLI employs. The most common 
are: the insured takes out the policy himself and subsequently assigns the 
policy to the investor or names the investor as a beneficiary; an irrevocable 
trust is used as the beneficiary of the policy and the investor is the 
beneficiary of the trust; or a charity takes a policy out on the insured’s life 
with his consent.124  Another alternative is to exploit the creditor/debtor 
relationship established by the initial loan.  As a creditor, the investor may 
be designated as a beneficiary of the policy and thereby entitled to a portion 
of the death benefits.125  It is precisely because a majority of states only 
require insurable interest at the execution of the contract, and allow for the 
                                                                                                                 
119. Id. at 498. 
120. This type of insurance is commonly known as key-man or key-woman insurance. 
It is an exception to insurable interest laws which most states have accepted. Charity Rush, 
Corporate-Owned Life Insurance(A/K/A/ ‘Dead Peasant’ or ‘Dead Janitor’ Policies): Has 
Texas Buried The Insurable Interest Requirement?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 135, 140 (2004). 
121. Swisher, supra note 25, at 511-20. 
122. Id. at 510 
123. The use of deceit and technicalities should not be allowed to circumvent the spirit 
of insurable interest laws. Such subterfuge should not be rewarded by a windfall. See 
Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813 & 817. 
124. Many states have modified insurable interest statutes and provided that charities 
have an insurable interest in a donor’s life. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813. 
125. Swisher, supra note 25, at 519. There is a question of how much of the proceeds 
the creditor is actually able to collect.  Most courts limit collection to some reasonable 
amount. Id. at 520. What qualifies as a reasonable amount is unclear but courts often look to 
the proportion of the death benefit to the amount owed as a guide. Id. 
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free transfer and assignment of the policy, that STOLI practitioners have 
been able to circumvent insurable interest obligations.  
 
ii. Public Policy Concerns Regarding State Prohibition of 
STOLI  
 
All fifty states regulate insurable interest with respect to the purchase, 
assignment, or change in beneficiary regarding the life insurance 
contract.126  Each state defines insurable interest in conjunction with its 
public policies.  Some insurable interest laws are stricter than others.127  As 
discussed, some states require an insurable interest at inception but not on 
assignment based on priorities favoring the insured’s property rights128 and 
freedom of contracting and resale.129   
Prohibition of STOLI, however, does not necessarily curtail an 
insured’s ability to sell his policy if he does so legitimately, within the 
scope of the law.130  Prohibition is directed instead at the acquisition of 
insurance for the sole purpose of selling it to investors.  Further, any 
changes to insurable interest laws can carve out exceptions for legitimate 
secondary market transactions.131  Therefore, at least in the instance of 
STOLI, freedom of property and contract concerns may be accommodated.  
STOLI can be prevented through stricter application of insurable interest 
                                                                                                                 
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
127. Rush, supra note 120, at 141. 
128. Amick v. Butler, 12 N.E. 518, 520 (Ind. 1887); Grigsby v. Russell, 22 U.S. 149, 
156 (1911)(stating that to “deny the right to sell except to persons having such an 
[insurable] interest is to diminish appreciably the value of the contract in the owner’s 
hands”); Hawley v. Aetna, 125 N.E. 707, 712 (Ill. 1919)(noting that there is no “reasonable 
basis” for preventing an insured from selling or assigning his policy to anyone who would 
pay more than the cash surrender value “which the company is willing to pay”). 
129. This contrasting principle’s objective is to provide the insured with a valuable 
liquidity of investment that he otherwise would be deprived of if prevented from assigning 
his policy. Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying 
and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1121 (2000). 
130. STOLI transactions occur when a person buys insurance with the intent to sell it to 
a third party. See Rylander v. Allen, 53 S.E. 1032, 1034 (Ga. 1906)(stating that evidence of 
a “preconceived intent to assign the policy would tend to invalidate the policy); Steinback v. 
Diepenbrock, 52 N.E. 662, 664 (N.Y. 1899)(noting that in determining a parties intentions 
“all the facts and circumstances may be proven, and if it appears that the parties intended by 
the contract to enable a third and uninterested party to speculate on the life of another, the 
court will declare such a contract invalid, not because of the assignment, but in spite of it”).  
Decisions emphasize that transactions which are a mere cover for wagering contracts or to 
circumvent the insurable interest laws will be invalidated. Kreitner, supra note 129, at 1121.  
131. See infra note 176-80 and accompanying text. 
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laws and the alteration of ineffective insurable interest laws132, while 
legitimate viatical and life settlement transactions are preserved. 
 
iii. State Insurable Interest Laws 
 
A minority of states maintain strict insurable interest laws that require 
the assignee or beneficiary to have an insurable interest in the insured at the 
time of death.133  Assignments have been held void for lack of insurable 
interest even if the transfer was made in good faith and was not intended as 
a wagering contract.134  This prohibition remains regardless of any 
surrounding circumstances that would justify the transaction or render it 
valid in other states.135  This rule, that the policy is void if no insurable 
interest exists at death, has been affirmed even in cases where the insured 
paid all the premiums himself,136 and regardless of the lapse of time 
between issuance and assignment,137 or whether assignment was made 
                                                                                                                 
132. State insurance departments have begun to define what constitutes STOLI 
transactions.  New York issued an opinion which defined it as “the procurement of 
insurance solely as a speculative investment for the ultimate benefit of a disinterested third 
party.”  OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Dec. 19, 2005).  Utah has defined it as a scheme 
“whereby a third party initiates, arranges the transaction, and ultimately expects to receive 
the proceeds of the insurance policy” and Louisiana has defined it as a scheme involving 
premium financing where the investor “contemporaneous with the initiation of the life 
insurance policy, taking an interest in the death benefit above and beyond the repayment of 
principal and interest of the loan”. Head, supra note 51. 
133. C.T. Drechsler, Validity of assignment of life insurance policy to one who has no 
insurable interest in insured, 30 A.L.R.2d 1310 (West 2007) 
134. RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:122 (4th ed. 2008). 
135. See e.g., Helmetag’s Adm’r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (Ala. 1884)(stating that a policy 
issued to one on his own life could not be assigned by him to a person or entity having no 
insurable interest in his life); Missouri Valley L. Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 12 P. 517 (Kan. 
1887)(affirming decision that assignment of policy to a person without insurable interest is 
void against public policy and stating that such assignment constitutes a fraud upon the 
insurance company); Shaw v. M. Livingston & Co., 169 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1943)(noting that 
where the transaction constitutes a wagering contract the policy was void and the insurance 
company was not required to pay the death benefit);  C.T. Drechsler, Validity of assignment 
of life insurance policy to one who has no insurable interest in insured, 30 A.L.R.2d 1310 
(West 2007)(noting that the minority view has generally prevailed in Kentucky); Mayo v. 
Hartford Life Ins. Co.220 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002)(stating that it is against public 
policy “of the State of Texas to allow anyone who has no insurable interest to be the owner 
of a policy of insurance upon the life of a human being”); Crismond’s Admrx.v. Jones, 83 
S.E. 1045 (Va. 1915)(holding that an assignment is invalid if no insurable interest exists). 
136. Schlamp v. Berner, 51 S.W. 312 (Ky. 1899). 
137. Missouri Valley L. Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 18 Kan. 93 (Kan. 1877). 
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pursuant to a prior agreement.138 States that follow the minority rule 
include: Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas.139 
The majority of states allow assignment as long as it is not intended to 
circumvent the law and it is not a cover for a wagering contract.140  Forty-
four states follow this rule.141  Here, as with the stricter minority rule, it is 
the spirit of the law which is emphasized.142  Majority jurisdictions, like the 
minority, will render a policy void if the transaction was made in bad faith, 
was fraudulent, or was simply a means of circumventing the wagering 
prohibition.143  The majority states, however, focus on the public policy 
that an insured should be able to sell his policy on the market for the most 
advantageous deal.144  This position, in theory, should prevent STOLI, but 
in reality it has not.  This reality has been worsened by the loosening of 
insurable interest laws in order to accommodate key-man insurance as well 
as insurance transfers for charities, and religious or educational 
institutions.145  As STOLI becomes increasingly prevalent, however, states 
are beginning to pull back on those accommodations and are now trying to 
curb the practice of STOLI through stricter enforcement of insurable 
interest laws. 
 
b. STATE ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT STOLI UNDER INSURABLE 
INTEREST LAWS 
                                                                                                                 
138. Bromley’s Amdrs. v. Washington L. Ins. Co., 92 S.W. 17 (Ky. 1906); Thomas v. 
Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 257 P. 727 (Kan. 1927). It should be noted that under the 
majority rule the policy would be void as well. 
139. RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:122 (4th ed. 2008). 
140. Drechsler, supra note 133, at 42; RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§49:122 (4th ed. 2008). 
141. RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:122 (4th ed. 2008) (noting 
that many jurisdictions have permitted assignment where there is no insurable interest). 
142. Id. 
143. “[I]t should be made clear, an assignment to an assignee devoid of any insurable 
interest in the life of the insured is only prima facie valid. Suspicious circumstances will 
cause a court to deny validity to colorable assignment as being only a cloak for a wagering 
transaction.”  Id. 
144. Grisby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). 
145. In 2004 several states were poised to enact legislation which would expand 
insurable interest laws to accommodate charities, religious institutions and the like. Recent 
Developments in Insurable Interest and Investor Owned Life Insurance, SL043 ALI-ABA 
339, 376 (West 2007). However, only two states, North Carolina and Tennessee, ended up 
enacting such legislation.  The states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, 
and Oklahoma also proposed similar legislation that was never enacted.  Id.  
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States have begun to target and address the insurable interest problem 
either through legislation or opinions issued by state insurance 
departments.146  Several States have issued opinions regarding STOLI in 
light of insurable interest requirements.147  The first state to issue an 
opinion was New York.148  The opinion addressed N.Y. INS. LAW §3205 
and stated:  “New York has a strong public policy against speculation on 
the death of individuals. Accordingly, one may not, with limited 
exceptions, take out a policy of life insurance on the life of another.”149  
What is unique about New York’s insurable interest law is that it not only 
requires an insurable interest at the time the policy is procured, but it also 
prohibits the solicitation or assignment of life insurance policies procured 
for the benefit of an investor not having an insurable interest.150  Section 
                                                                                                                 
146. Maine will consider a bill regarding STOLI and consumer protection in the 
upcoming year.  Rep. Brautigam’s Bill to Scrutinize Questionable Trend in Life Insurance 
Markets, US STATE NEWS (October 30, 2007). See also OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Jun. 
3, 2003)(regarding Insurable Interest, N.Y. Ins. Law §3205); James J. Donelon, Insurance 
Commissioner, BULLETIN NO. 06-05 (September 5, 2006); D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance 
Commissioner, BULLETIN 2006-3 (July 10, 2006) available at www.insurance.utah.gov (last 
visited May 14, 2008); W.W. Deal, Director of the State of Idaho Department of Insurance, 
BULLETIN NO. 07-03 (April 2, 2007).  Other states have issued warnings regarding free 
insurance offered to senior citizens. See supra note 97.    
147. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, STOLI Alert 1. 3-4 
(March 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).   
148. OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Jun. 3, 2003)(regarding Insurable Interest, N.Y. Ins. 
Law §3205). See also, Trevor Thomas, New York Department Bars Investor-Owned Life 
Scheme, NAT’L UNDERWRITER. LIFE & HEALTH, Vol. 110, Iss. 7 pg. 1 (February 20, 2006). 
Further in an opinion issued in December of 2005 General Counsel found four possible 
violations of New York law with respect to STOLI transactions. John Gallo, J.D., Sorry, 
SOLI: Good-Bye ILITs?, J. OF FIN. PLANNING Art. 4 (April 2006) available at 
www.Fiparent.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). The violations were; whether or not that 
insured purchased the policy on his own initiative, whether there was a rebating violation; 
whether it violated insurable interest laws, and whether it was against public policy. Id. at 3. 
149. OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Jun. 3, 2003) (regarding Insurable Interest, N.Y. 
Ins. Law §3205). See N.Y. INS. LAW §3205(a)(1)(McKinney Supp. 2003) defining insurable 
interest as: 
(a) in the case of persons closely related by blood or by law, a 
substantial interest engendered by love and affection; 
(b) in the case of other persons, a lawful and substantial economic 
interest in the continued life, health or bodily safety of the person 
insured, as distinguished from an interest which would arise only 
by, or would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement or 
injury of the insured. 
150. N.Y. INS. LAW §3205(b)(2), (b)(4)(McKinney Supp. 2003) provides: 
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3205(b)(2) prohibits investors or promoters from soliciting consumers to 
purchase policies with the intent of later assigning them to either 
institutional or individual third parties but does not adversely affect 
legitimate secondary market transactions.151  This law combats the 
circumvention of the New York insurable interest laws.  New York took an 
even stronger stance in 2006.  The December 2006 opinion of the Office of 
the General Counsel banned STOLI contracts entirely as “speculative 
investments” pursued for the “ultimate benefit of a disinterested third 
party” who lacks an insurable interest.152 
Louisiana also specifically addressed STOLI in Louisiana Bulletin No. 
06-05.153  The Bulletin not only addresses violations of state insurable 
interest laws but also considers whether such transactions are a potential 
violation of state anti-rebating laws.154 Further, the Bulletin provides 
guidance regarding the types of questions an insurance company may ask 
when determining whether to issue policies that may involve STOLI 
arrangements.155  Questions regarding whether the applicant has been 
offered cash or other inducement to purchase a life insurance policy; 
whether the applicant has been offered free insurance; and whether any 
finance agreements are in place are all seen as legitimate questions.156  
Allowing insurers to ask these questions is important because it establishes 
                                                                                                                          
(b)(2) No person shall procure or cause to be procured directly or 
by assignment or otherwise any contract of insurance upon the person of 
another unless the benefits under such contract are payable to the person 
insured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time 
when such contract is made, an insurable interest in the person insured. 
(b)(4) If the beneficiary, assignee or other payee under any contract made in 
violation of this subsection receives from the insurer any benefits thereunder 
accruing upon the death, disablement or injury of the person insured, the person 
insured or his executor or administrator may maintain an action to recover such 
benefits from the person receiving them 
151. Id. 
152. Gary S. Mogel, Investor-Initiated life may be in jeopardy, INVESTMENT NEWS 
(February 27, 2006). 
153. Id.; James J. Donelon, Insurance Commissioner, BULLETIN NO. 06-05 (September 
5, 2006).  
154. “Such arrangements may, depending on the facts, violate some or all of the 
following Louisiana Insurance Code provisions, or other Louisiana statutes or jurisprudence, 
including, but not limited to, insurable interest; prohibition on wagering policies; rebating; 
prohibition on “wet ink” life settlements; premium finance; and usuary.” James J. Donelon, 
Insurance Commissioner, BULLETIN NO. 06-05 (September 5, 2006). 
155. Id.  
156. Id.  
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a basis for a fraud action by the insurance company and authorizes a 
rescission of the policy if a misrepresentation was made.157   
Utah’s insurance department issued a bulletin stating that STOLI 
transactions do not comply with the state’s insurable interest 
requirements.158  Under Utah law, a “person may not knowingly procure, 
directly, by assignment, or otherwise, an interest in the proceeds of an 
insurance policy unless that person has or expects to have an insurable 
interest in the subject of the insurance.”159  The bulletin continues by 
defining STOLI transactions and noting that the entire transaction will be 
reviewed to determine whether it complied with insurable interest laws.160  
More recently, Idaho issued a Bulletin addressing “stranger or investor 
owned life insurance arrangements”.161  The stated purpose of the Bulletin 
is to alert licensees and residents that acquiring life insurance with the 
intent of “assigning policy benefits to investors” is illegal under Idaho 
law.162  The insurance department further notes that formation of a 
partnership or other joint arrangement which allows investors to 
circumvent state insurable interest laws by allowing the investor to become 
a beneficiary also violates Idaho law.163  Generally, such arrangements 
violate insurable interest and state anti-rebate laws.164  The Bulletin’s 
solution to STOLI requires a review of the transaction by the department of 
insurance to see if it was designed to circumvent the state’s insurable 
interest laws.165  The department will examine the entire transaction to 
                                                                                                                 
157. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 115. 
158. D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance Commissioner, BULLETIN 2006-3 (July 10, 2006) 
available at www.insurance.utah.gov (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
159. UTAH CODE ANN. 31A-21-104(1)(b)(West 2007). 
160. Michie, supra note 146.  The comment specifically notes the validity and 
necessity of specific viatical and life settlements but emphasizes that these transactions are 
separate and distinct and thus will be limited according to Utah law.  Id. 
161. W.W. Deal, Director of the State of Idaho Department of Insurance, BULLETIN 
NO. 07-03 (April 2, 2007). 
162. Id.  The bulletin then goes on to explain the type of transactions they are referring 
to, stating that a typical arrangement involves, loans in order to pay premiums, assignment 
of policy to investor after specific period of time.  Id.  
163. Id. 
164. Rebate laws generally prohibit the use of inducements to purchase insurance. 
Individual states employ varied approaches.  Idaho law specifically prohibits any rebates or 
inducements greater then fifty dollars if not included in the policy terms… [t]herefore an 
investor offers to pay premiums, provide financing for the insurance or promises future 
payment for the policy may violate this law. Deal, supra note 146.  In reference to insurable 
interest, Idaho law does allow legitimate assignment regarding key-man insurance and 
where the irrevocable beneficiary is a charity or religious or educational institution.  Id. 
165. Id. 
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determine the intent of the parties.166  This includes reviewing the 
solicitation materials including who initiated the transaction, the terms of 
any and all written agreements involved, incentives for assignment, 
promises of future compensation, time between the inception of the policy 
and the assignment, who pays the premiums, and any other documents or 
transactions related to the arrangement.167  
The movement of states to either stop liberalizing insurable interest 
laws or narrow them through the opinions of state attorney generals or 
insurance departments shows that prohibiting STOLI is required.  It also 
preserves the legitimate secondary market in the process. The many 
concerns STOLI transactions raise168 warrant this treatment and parallel 
treatment in other states that have yet to address the implications of STOLI 
transactions. 
 
c. NAIC MODEL LAW AND THE STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
 
Several organizations have been instrumental in influencing state 
regulation of the business of insurance. The National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners is such an organization which frequently 
promulgates model codes.169  The NAIC was integral in encouraging states 
to pass laws regulating viatical settlements.  After the creation of its model 
viatical settlements act, many states passed similar acts, and the same 
process took place regarding life settlements.170  In general the NAIC has 
an interest in regulating these types of transactions in order to create greater 
uniformity in the law.  
                                                                                                                 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. See supra Part II. 
169. The NAIC was created in 1887 and is one of the oldest and largest “organizations 
of state regulatory officials in the country….it has developed more than 200 model laws to 
meet the needs of state insurance regulators…It has had a primary goal of creating 
uniformity in state insurance regulatory laws.” Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General for the 
State of Alaska, Letter to State Senator Dave Donely, n.17 (April 22, 1996) (on file with 
author).  Another industry organization that establishes model laws is the National 
Conference of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”). They too have sought to regulate STOLI 
transactions but have in force a two year moratorium on the sale of such policies rather than 
the five year moratorium imposed by the NAIC model regulation. This note focuses on the 
NAIC regulation rather then any upcoming NCOIL regulations because the NAIC 
regulations do more to prohibit STOLI transactions. 
170. Gary S. Mogul, As Life Settlements gain acceptance, regulators rev up their 
security, INVESTMENTNEWS (March 27, 2006) available at www.lisassociation.org (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
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With the emergence and growth of STOLI, the NAIC has revised its 
viatical and life settlements model act to incorporate and address STOLI 
concerns.171  The new model act, adopted by the NAIC on June 4, 2007, 
would make STOLI transactions virtually impossible.172 
The main objectives of NAIC’s revisions are to increase the regulation 
of the secondary life insurance market in general,173 but more importantly 
to eliminate STOLI arrangements.174 This is achieved through a five-year 
moratorium on policy sales after the purchase and issuance of the policy.175  
The moratorium is designed to deter investment in STOLI transactions by 
reducing investors’ rates of return. The exceptions to the moratorium are if 
the transaction qualifies as a viatical settlement176, if the transaction 
                                                                                                                 
171. Recently, the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”) also 
issued standards for regulating STOLI.  The NCOIL legislation broadens the definition of 
STOLI classifying those transactions as fraudulent, sets forth new reporting requirements, 
and increases penalties for those who engage in STOLI.  An Update on Recent 
Developments Involving Stranger Owned Life Insurance (STOLI), supra note 103, at 2. The 
key difference between NCOIL and NAIC regulations is that NCOIL does not call for a five 
year moratorium of STOLI but rather focuses on regulation and best practices.  These are 
positive steps but because of the numerous adverse public policy consequences including, 
the ethical and moral implications, as well as economic, elimination of STOLI is more 
appropriate. Further without the moratorium it is easier for states to manipulate the language 
of the NCOIL model so that while the state looks like it is curbing the practice of STOLI in 
actuality it is not.  See National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, STOLI 
Alert, VOL. 2 ISS. 1 (March 2008) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); 
(“In reality, the Kentucky bill [based on the NCOIL model act] guts key provisions of the 
NCOIL model, rendering it ineffective”). 
172. NAIC Adopts Viatical Settlements Model Act Revisions, National Association of 
Insurance, News Release (June 2007) available at www.naic.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
The adoption of the model act has been a fairly contentious process with those opposed 
arguing that the model act will negatively and inappropriately limit legitimate life settlement 
transactions as well as infringe upon an insured’s property rights. Jim Connolly, Proposed 
5-Year Ban Remains Sticking Point On Viatical Draft, NAT’L UNDERWRITER. LIFE & 
HEALTH 110, 35 (Sept. 18, 2006). These concerns are largely unfounded as the act contains 
specific exceptions which would allow legitimate life and viatical settlements to occur 
during the five year moratorium. See supra note 176-180 & accompanying text. 
173. New Obstacles to Stranger-Owned Life Insurance Transactions (“SOLI”), 
Greenberg Traurig, LLP Special Report (2006) available at www.GTLAW.com (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2008). The amendments to the model act create additional disclosure requirements 
for brokers as well as advertising and marketing restrictions and strengthen insurance 
companies rescission rights. Id.   
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. This means if the person is terminally or chronically ill.  Id. 
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qualifies as a legitimate life settlement177, or if the insured’s spouse passes 
away.178  Further, certain policies may be sold after two years if premiums 
are paid only with “unencumbered assets”, if financing is limited to the 
cash surrender value of the policy and a recourse loan is utilized, if there is 
no agreement or understanding regarding the liability of the loan used to 
purchase the policy179, or if there has been no evaluation of the insured or 
the policy for settlement.180 
Under this model, legitimate life and viatical settlements, which are 
considered beneficial to the secondary life insurance market, are allowed to 
continue.  The prohibition only applies when there has been no change in 
an insured’s circumstances or where premium financing or an agreement 
regarding the purchase of the policy is utilized.181 Obviously this catches 
the most basic of transactions but it also catches the most egregious and 
harmful to those seeking insurance and to the industry. 
States have begun to respond by amending their insurance codes, often 
based upon the NAIC model act.  Legislation has been enacted in Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota and West Virginia.182  North 
Dakota has adopted the model act put forth by the NAIC.183  Indiana’s 
House and Senate adopted House Enrollment Act 1379 which establishes a 
statutory definition of STOLI and maintains that it is an unlawful 
                                                                                                                 
177. Therefore if there is some change in life circumstance like divorce, disability, 
retirement, or bankruptcy the transaction would be legitimate.  Id.  
178. Id.  There is also an exception if the policy was issued based upon the insured’s 
conversion rights.  Id. 
179. This includes the investors assuming the loan upon sale.  Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Jim Connolly, Pace of Anti-STOLI Legislation Picks Up, NATIONAL 
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (2008) available at www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Indiana has adopted the NCOIL definition of STOLI.  Id. See 
also Indiana Legislation Strong First Step In Battle Against Abuse Of Life Insurance, ACLI 
NEWS RELEASE (March 17, 2008) available at www.acli.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); 
Landmark West Virginia Law Protects Seniors; Leads Way For Rest Of Nation, INSURANCE 
NEWSNET (March 13, 2008) available at www.insurancenewsnet.com (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008). 
183. North Dakota S.B. 2268 was unanimously passed by the North Dakota Senate and 
closely resembles the NAIC model act with regards to the STOLI amendments. Jim 
Connolly, North Dakota Bills Advance, NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH 7 (March 26, 
2007).  North Dakota was the first state to enact a statute based on the NAIC Model Act. 
Missouri Panel Eyes Abusive Life Insurance Transactions, ACLI PRESS RELEASE 
(September 2007). 
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practice.184  The legislation is awaiting the approval of the Governor.185  
West Virginia has enacted and the Governor has signed into law 
legislation, S. 704, which establishes a legal definition of STOLI, identifies 
it as a fraudulent act and establishes a five year ban on the settlement of 
STOLI policies.186  Other states either close to enacting STOLI legislation 
or considering STOLI legislation include Ohio, Oklahoma, Illinois, 
Connecticut, California, New York, Florida, Arizona, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
North Carolina, and Rhode Island.187  STOLI bills failed to pass in Georgia 
and Massachusetts.188  No action has been taken to date in Idaho, Utah, 
Wisconsin, Arkansas, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Texas.189 
 
d. HOW STATES SHOULD RESPOND TO STOLI TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Regulating the business of insurance is almost entirely the province of 
states.190  This means states have a responsibility to fill the regulatory 
vacuum that has developed with respect to STOLI transactions.  The 
responses of state insurance departments are the first important step.  A 
legislative or judicial response is necessary to support insurance 
departments’ declarations.  In addition to providing greater authority to 
regulate STOLI, states need to actively enforce laws already in place. 
Consumers and companies need strong and effective legal remedies in 
order to counteract the abusive practices of STOLI.  
 
                                                                                                                 
184. Indiana Legislation Strong First Step in Battle Against Abuse of Life Insurance, 
ACLI NEWS RELEASE (March 17, 2008) available at www.acli.com (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008). 
185. Id.  
186. West Virginia S. 704 combines features of both the NAIC and NCOIL model acts. 
Landmark West Virginia Law Protects Seniors; Leads Way For Rest of Nation, ACLI News 
Release (March 13, 2008) available at www.insurancenewsnet.com (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008).  
187. Jim Connolly, Pace of Anti-STOLI Legislation Picks Up, NATIONAL 
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (2008) available at www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com 
(last visited May 14, 2008). Ohio, Oklahoma and North Carolina all track the NAIC model.  
Id.  Illinois is considering both the NAIC and the NCOIL models.  Id.  Arizona, 
Connecticut, California, Hawaii, Louisiana and Rhode Island are all considering the NCOIL 
model.  Id.  Further, New York is enacting legislation based on neither model and it is 
unclear what Florida is basing their reforms on.  Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13 (2008); Life Partners Inc. v. Morrison et al, 484 F.3d 284 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
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PART IV: CONCLUSION 
 
STOLI transactions do not create beneficial competitive practices but 
rather abuse the life insurance market and raise bars to seniors trying to 
obtain insurance coverage. Unchecked, STOLI has the potential to 
permanently and negatively alter the life insurance paradigm.  It creates 
dangerous financial and legal risks for purchasers, investors and life 
insurance companies, and also raises serious ethical concerns.  It would be 
insufficient to ensure that all participants are made aware of the risks so 
they can make informed judgments.  A practice as egregious as STOLI 
should be eliminated entirely.  
The permanent damage caused by STOLI to both the secondary and 
primary life insurance markets is a major issue.  STOLI raises potential 
solvency issues, increases premiums for those in need of life insurance, and 
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the industry as a whole. Moreover, states 
have an interest in protecting vulnerable senior citizens from the 
misleading promises of free insurance and quick returns.  
State legislators and regulators have an “unprecedented opportunity to 
take a leading role in protecting consumers from a growing national abuse 
that threatens to undermine the social purpose of life insurance.”   Only 
nineteen states191 have adopted or proposed bills or regulations regarding 
STOLI, while the remaining states have not enacted any form of regulation 
for the secondary life insurance market or for STOLI specifically.192  These 
states should be enforcing their insurable interest laws and should strongly 
consider the five-year moratorium promulgated by the NAIC.  The 
moratorium seeks to diminish the rate of return for investors and thereby 
deter the STOLI scheme.  Regardless of the method employed, states 
should prohibit the use of STOLI transactions.  The statutory structure for 
doing so is already in place in all 50 states and should be fully utilized.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
191. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.  The point remains that a majority 
of states are not regulating or preventing STOLI.  Because STOLI often involves 
transactions across state lines it is important that all states address the abusive practices of 
STOLI. 
192. David Giust, Scrutinizing Life Settlement Sales, Bank Insurance & Securities 
Association (2008) available at http://www.bisanet.org/bism/2008/life_settlements.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
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REGIONAL SHORTCOMINGS AND GLOBAL 
SOLUTIONS: KIDNAP, RANSOM AND INSURANCE IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
 
Samantha Kenney* 
 
It takes only a few clicks of the mouse while on the internet to realize 
the face of insurance in America, and much of the Western world, has 
changed dramatically since its inception.  Insurance agencies no longer 
offer just the traditional auto, health and life insurance policies.  Today, 
certain types of specialty insurance have become increasingly popular and 
are now available from major insurance companies.1  With consumers 
having the option to purchase plans that protect their weddings, household 
help, college students, “twenty-somethings”, and even their identity from 
theft,2 it seems that insurance can protect anyone from anything so long as 
they are willing to pay the premium.   
As such, it is unsurprising that in today’s increasingly global, and often 
volatile, world, the demand for a unique specialty insurance to protect 
against kidnap for ransom has grown.3  With boundaries that once created a 
marked separation between countries growing more and more obsolete in 
the business world,4 kidnap and ransom insurance  (“K & R”) is being 
purchased by large fortune 500 companies, as well as small to midsized 
companies, manufacturing and service firms and financial institutions to 
protect their employees.5  This insurance is not limited to companies 
                                                                                                                 
* University of Connecticut Juris Doctorate candidate, 2009. I would like to thank 
Professsor Angel Oquendo for his help in writing this comment.  
1. Three major insurance companies offering specialty insurance are Lloyds of 
London, AIG, and Victor O. Schinnerer & Company offer specialty insurance.  This can be 
found on their websites at 
http://www.lloyds.com/About_Us/What_is_Lloyds/at_a_glance.htm, 
http://www.aig.com/specialty_20_7402.html, and http://www.schinnerer.com/index.html 
respectively.  
2. Insurance Information Institute, Major Types of Specialty Insurance, 
http://www.iii.org/individuals/other (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).  
3. Maria O’Brien, Preparing for the Worst, LATIN FINANCE, June 2001, at 42.  
4. V.A. Tommy, Managing Risk While Crossing Treacherous Boarders, GULF 
NEWS, May 24, 2006, http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/05/24/10042030.html.   
5. Barbara Bowers, Hostage Situations: Kidnappings for Ransom are on the Rise 
and Insurers are Selling More Policies to Protect Executives Who Travel in High-Risk 
Countries, BEST’S REVIEW, Mar. 2001, at 70, 71.  
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though; increasingly more often, individuals are even purchasing plans to 
protect themselves and their families.6   
Latin America has long held the dubious honor of being the most 
dangerous area in the world for kidnappings.7  Of the countries with the 
highest risk of kidnapping for ransom or hostage taking, Mexico, Colombia 
and Brazil all top today’s list.8  In fact, Colombia has been dubbed “the 
kidnapping capital of the world”9 where kidnapping is more than a crime; it 
is a business.10  Specifically troubling in Latin America is the kidnapping 
activity of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a rebel 
group who uses kidnapping as their second largest source of financial 
support.11 As such, K & R policies are being purchased more frequently; 
providing an abductee’s family the financial means necessary to ensure 
their loved one’s safe and reasonably swift return.12   
Despite its benefits, K & R insurance has recently come under scrutiny 
for providing customers with precisely what they have paid for; the 
assurance that if abducted, their families will be able to pay the ransom 
demanded and bring them home safe.13  Alleging that K & R plans are 
undermining American counterterrorism policies, it has been suggested that 
the insurance industry adopt a voluntary no-pay policy, whereby K & R 
insurance could continue to exist, but without providing reimbursement for 
any ransoms paid.14  Instead of reimbursement, the focus of K & R policies 
under a no payment scheme would be enhanced kidnap prevention training 
and providing crisis management services.15  This proposal is intended to 
                                                                                                                 
6. Id. at 72. 
7. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, USA TODAY, Aug. 
14, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-08-14-samerica-
kidnappings_x.htm.  
8. V. A. Tommy, supra note 4.  
9. Susan Hansen, High Net Worth Families, Kidnapping Risk, TRUSTS & ESTATES, 
April 2003, at 35.   
10. Id.  
11. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42. 
12. These policies help ensure the return of kidnapping victims by providing the 
money necessary to pay the demanded ransom.  They have a proofed effective because 
kidnappers’ motives are more often than not financially driven. Id.  
13. Meadow Clendenin, No Concessions with No Teeth: How Kidnap and Ransom 
Insurers and Insureds are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY L. J. 741, 
741-42 (2006).  
14. Id.  
15. Id. at 743. 
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bring the insurance industry in line with the U.S. government’s “no 
concessions” stance regarding terrorism.16  
This Comment takes the position that a necessary element of any K & 
R policy is its ability to reimburse an insured’s family or employer for 
payment of a demanded ransom.  While kidnap prevention training and 
crisis management services are valuable and necessary, absent payment, 
they are insufficent in the event of abduction.  Moreover, if payment 
reimbursement is removed from K & R policies, these plans will be 
effectively eliminated.  Looking at the situation of the Northrop Grumman 
employees being held in Colombia,17 this Comment will demonstrate how 
the alternatives suggested in a no payment policy would not only be 
ineffective in preventing kidnappings but instead, would increase barriers 
between kidnap victims and a safe return home.  Additionally, this 
Comment will demonstrate that, given its international nature, instituting a 
no payment policy for the entire insurance industry is simply not possible.  
Instead, an international solution ought to be sought through the United 
Nations. 
Part I of this Comment describes the history of K & R insurance, the 
general coverage provided by a policy and the history and law governing 
the American insurance industry.  Part II discusses the statistical realities of 
kidnapping, including data on those groups of individuals most at risk for 
abduction worldwide and more specifically, within Latin America. Part II 
also addresses the increased rate of kidnapping in Latin America. Part III 
discusses how citizens of the most affected Latin American countries are 
adapting and dealing with this crisis, and Part IV relates the saga of the 
three defense contractors of Northrop Grumman who have been held 
hostage in Colombia since 2004.18   
Part IV will also assert how it is the “no concessions” policy of the 
U.S. and the absence of the ability to make a ransom payment which has 
kept these men from a safe return.  Lastly, Part V discusses the potential 
alternatives to the proven ineffective domestic “no-concession” approach. 
                                                                                                                 
16. Id. 
17. See infra Part IV A.  While this Comment was pending for publication, the three 
Northrop Grumman employees, along with former Columbia presidential candidate Ingrid 
Bentacourt and eleven other hostages were rescued from the FARC.  See Bentacourt, U.S. 
Contractors rescued from FARC, CNN.COM, July 3, 2008, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/02/betancourt.colombia/index.html (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2008).  This was achieved only after the Columbian military secretly 
infiltrated the group. Id. 
18. See infra Part IV A. 
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It discusses why the appropriate way to deal with the Latin American 
situation, an international crisis, is through an international system of 
accountability and assistance from the United Nations, rather than 
unilateral American action.  
  
I. THE HISTORY AND COVERAGE OF K & R POLICIES 
 
A. HISTORY OF K & R   
 
Kidnapping is a centuries old crime; a crime historically prolific during 
times of great social and economic transition.19 Many countries are 
currently experiencing this type of social and economic transition.20   Just 
as the crime of kidnapping is not new, neither are efforts to protect oneself 
and ensure access to necessary means to pay a ransom.  The first K & R 
policy dates back to 193221 and was offered by Lloyd’s of London.22 This 
specialty insurance was first offered shortly after the highly publicized 
kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh’s baby son.23  
Despite its early entrance on the insurance scene, K & R policies did 
not achieve prominence until the 1960’s when a series of bank executives’ 
wives were kidnapped.24 After that point, the market for K & R insurance 
exploded and became Lloyd’s single most important growth area from the 
middle of 1970 to the mid-1980s.25  This trend has generally continued.  As 
recently as  2005 80% of Fortune 500 companies had purchased K & R 
policies.26  While a seemingly untraditional corporate investment, these 
                                                                                                                 
19. Hansen, supra note 9, at 35. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 36. 
22. Lloyd's is the world's leading insurance market providing specialist insurance 
services to businesses in over 200 countries and territories. Lloyd’s About Us, available at 
http://www.lloyds.com/ About _Us/ (last visited July 9, 2008).  In 2007, 66 syndicates were 
underwriting insurance at Lloyd's.  Id.  Lloyd’s has long been a pioneer in the insurance 
industry, beginning in 1688 when it was operated in Edward Lloyd’s Coffee House. Lloyd’s 
Chronology, available at http://www.lloyds.com/About_Us/History/Chronology.htm (last 
visited July 8, 2008). Starting with its roots in marine insurance, Lloyd’s has grown over 
300 years to become the world’s leading market for specialty insurance. Id.  
23. Hansen, supra note 9, at 36. 
24. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 750. 
25. Id. 
26. Id.  The total of the annual premiums paid for those policies was estimated at 
more than $250 million.  Id.  The Lloyd’s of London syndicate, Hiscox, held between 60% 
and 70% of these policies. Id. at 751. 
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policies have become popular for filling the gaps that other, more 
customary forms of insurance do not cover.27  
 
B. MAIN AREAS OF K & R POLICY COVERAGE  
 
Though Lloyd’s of London was the first to offer K & R policies, today, 
they are just one among many who offer this specialty insurance.28  A 
standard K & R policy has five main components, four of which encompass 
reimbursement of money lost from a kidnapping.29  These four 
reimbursement components are as follows: (1) reimbursement of any 
ransom paid; (2) reimbursement for expenses related to securing the release 
of a kidnap victim or resolution of extortion threat;30 (3) reimbursement of 
expenses relating to securing the release of a detained or hijacked victim; 
and (4) reimbursement of money lost when being delivered as ransom.31  
The fifth, non-reimbursement component of a K & R policy is access to 
                                                                                                                 
27. Id. at 748-49. 
28. While many insurers offer K & R plans, the coverage varies greatly from policy to 
policy.  Id. at 753. This Comment will be looking at the K & R plan by Victor O. Schinnerer 
& Company, carried by Great American Insurance Company and underwriting support 
provided by the Lloyd’s of London syndicate Hiscox. Victor O. Schinnerer Policy 
Highlights, available at 
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/k_r_program.html (last visited 
July 9, 2008). The Schinnerer K & R policy is available for any for profit or non profit 
organization, including religious organizations and educational institutions.  Victor O. 
Schinnerer Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/k_r_faq.html (last visited July 9, 
2008). It also may be converted to provide coverage for high net worth individuals and 
families.  Elisabeth Eaves, Most Dangerous Destinations 2007, FORBES.COM, Feb. 1, 2007, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/travel/2007/01/31/most-dangerous-destinations-
forbeslife-ee_0201dangerousdestinations.html (last visited July 9, 2008). Most individual 
policies purchased will pay for the cost of dealing with a kidnapping, but unlike the 
corporate plans, do not reimburse the amount of the ransom payment.  What Does Kidnap 
and Ransom Insurance Cover, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE available at 
http://www.iii.org/individuals/business/optional/kidnapandransom/ (last visited July 9, 
2008).  
29. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 751-52. 
30. Extortion is defined by the Victor O. Schinnerer & Company policy as the 
following types of threats made in conjunction with a ransom demand: “A threat to kill, 
injure or abduct, [a] threat to damage property, [a] threat to contaminate products; [a] threat 
to divulge trade secrets, [a] threat to introduce a computer virus.” Victor O. Schinnerer 
Extortion Highlighted, available at 
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/pdfs/extortart.pdf (last visited July 
9, 2008).  
31. Clendenin, supra note 13 at 752–53.   
562 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
security consultants for preventative measures as well as access to 
individuals experienced in hostage negotiation, risk management and crisis 
response in the event of an abduction.32  The “crisis management team” to 
whom the insured’s family or employer has access to are often consultants 
with military, intelligence and police backgrounds. 33 Specifically, they 
have extensive experience dealing with kidnap and extortion situations.34 
While the above mentioned are the main components of a K & R 
policy, plans can be tailored to an individual or company’s specific needs.  
The options for coverage outside the five main areas are expansive and can 
cover everything from providing reimbursement of reward money provided 
to an informant, reimbursement of fees incurred in securing and employing 
an interpreter,35 and reimbursement of lawyers expenses36 to 
reimbursement of personal financial loss of a kidnap victim,37 and payment 
of a victim’s cosmetic surgery for injuries sustained as a result of kidnap.38    
These options, along with the varying level of danger posed in different 
countries and an individual clients’ history with kidnap incidents, cause 
plan premiums to vary greatly.39  Just as important as the area where the 
work is being done, the type of work in which a client is engaged can also 
affect the cost of a K & R policy.40 
                                                                                                                 
32. Id. at 752. 
33. See Victor O. Schinnerer Policy Highlights, supra note 28.  These services are 
provided by an outside company like the international crisis and response company, Control 
Risk.  See id.  When handling a case, Control Risk has four main objectives: (1),in the event 
of a kidnapping, a “safe, timely and secure” victim release, (2) handling extortion within the 
interests of their client, (3) for business clients, safeguarding the continued business 
operations and (4) to always act within the law.  Id.  
34. Id. 
35. Victor O. Schinnerer Extortion Highlighted, supra note 30. 
36. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 752. 
37. Victor O. Schinnerer Extortion Highlighted, supra note 30. 
38. Victor O. Shinnerer Policy Highlights, supra note 28. 
39. See Clendenin, supra note 13, at 753.  While the premiums vary dependent upon 
the policy limit, the area of the world in which an individual is looking to be covered for is 
of greater consequence.  See id.  For example, a policy with a $1 million limit can be 
purchased by some for as little as $700 a year.  Monica Perin, Kidnapping for Ransom a 
Rising Risk Overseas, HOUSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, (Mar. 4, 2005), available at 
http://houston.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2005/03/07/story5.html (last visited July 9, 
2008).  However, for coverage somewhere with as great a risk as Colombia, for the same $1 
million policy limit the premium can be as much as $20,000 a year.  Id.  This does not mean 
that only those able to pay a premium in the tens of thousands can afford a K & R policy for 
higher risk areas around the world.  Other corporate K & R policies are offered between 
$1,500 and $5,000 a year for companies in high risk situations.  Id.   
40. See Clendenin, supra note 13, at 753. 
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C. HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW GOVERNING INSURANCE  
 
American law governing insurance has had a long and complicated 
history.  The greatest difficulty surrounding insurance law has been the 
struggle between the Federal and State governments as to who should 
regulate it.41  Until 1944, insurance regulation was left to the sole discretion 
of the states, as insurance was not considered “commerce” and thus, was 
not subject to federal jurisdiction.42  This distinction was made largely 
because insurance was not a tangible good43 and therefore, not commerce.  
This left insurance regulation to the discretion of states, rather than 
Congress.44 
However, in 1944, the case of United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association, the Supreme Court held that persons engaged in 
the insurance business are subject to federal regulation since insurance 
involves the transmission of “money, documents, and communications 
across dozens of states lines.”45  In 1945, with the passage of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, Congress declared the power 
of the states to regulate the insurance industry, but retained Federal 
authority over areas of the insurance industry that where unregulated by the 
states.46  Within 3 years of the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
states enacted similar anti-trust laws to those passed by the Federal 
Government; allowing them to maintain regulatory control of the insurance 
industry after July 1, 1948.  Consequently, until recently, states have 
maintained complete control over the insurance regulation.47  
The most recent action in the struggle to balance state and federal 
insurance regulation came late in 1999 when President Clinton signed the 
                                                                                                                 
41. Who Regulates Insurance, Bayland Insurance  Group, available at 
http://www.baylandinsurance.com/regulatinginsurance.html (last visited July 9, 2008).  
42. Cornell University Law School Insurance Law: An Overview, 
http://www.law.cornell. edu/topics/insurance.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).  
43. Bayland, supra note 41.  
44. Id.  
45. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 549-553 
(1944). 
46. Cornell, supra note 42.  Specifically, Congress held that the Sherman Act, the 
Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act are applicable to insurance business to 
the extent it is unregulated by state law.  Id. 
47. Bayland, supra note 41.  There are specific Federal statutes that regulate insurance 
other than 15 U.S.C. § 1011, among them are 15 U.S.C. § 6701 and 18 U.S.C. § 1033 (f).  
Id. 
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act.48  This Act 
was signed into law as a response to the changes and developments in both 
the marketplace and technology that have blurred the lines demarcating 
traditional roles of various financial service providers.49  The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act removed then existing distinctions between insurance 
companies, banks and investment services and as a result, impacted 
insurance industry regulation. 50  The probable long term impact of the Act 
will be greater federal regulation of the insurance industry.51 However, as 
the implications of this Act are still being understood and playing out in 
Washington, navigation of both state and federal insurance statutes still 
determines whether state or federal law is applicable in a given situation.52  
Though state statutes for insurance override most federal laws, some 
portions of federal law are always commanding.53 Therefore, when 
determining whether state or federal law governs a particular insurance 
issue, the inquiry ought to be whether the issue is related to the "business of 
insurance", making state law applicable, or whether the issue relates to 
issues related to of the insurance industry,54 where federal law governs.55  
The essential point of this analysis is that each issue must be looked at 
individually to see whether state or federal law applies.56 What makes this 
problematic is that when state law is applicable rather than federal, the 
same claim could potentially have a different result in every state.57  
 
II. WHERE, WHO AND WHY OF KIDNAPPINGS 
 
The world that we live in today is dramatically different than it was just 
a short time ago.  As a result of globalization and easy, cheaper travel, 
                                                                                                                 
48. Bayland, supra note 41. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. Id.  
53. Cornell, supra note 42.  An example of where portions of federal law are always 
commanding is federal tax law. Id.  
54. Some examples of peripheral related issues would be labor, tax or securities 
issues. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Looking at the applicable laws of every state is the only way to determine whether 
state or federal law applies.  See generally Cornell University Law School Law By Topic, 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/state_statutes3.html#insurance (last visited 
July 9, 2008).  
57. See id.  
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business is expanding into regions once thought too risky to work. 58  This 
kind of expansion is occurring so as to allow companies to minimize the 
cost of materials and labor in order to maximize profit margins.59  With this 
explosion of globalization comes the need to evaluate the areas in which 
companies are moving.  Particularly important for a company to consider in 
selecting an international location is the danger that will result from being 
in a foreign and often less developed and volatile country.  With many 
companies capitalizing on the absence of import tariffs from fellow 
NAFTA countries and moving production cites into Latin America, it is 
necessary to consider that area’s epidemic of kidnap for ransom; where the 
most dangerous countries within Latin America are, who faces the greatest 
risk of abduction, and why kidnapping is so problematic in these countries.  
 
A. WHERE: THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACES IN THE WORLD 
 
There are many places in the world which American’s traveling for 
both business and pleasure know to be dangerous.  The threat of being 
mugged or murdered while in a foreign country is not something that 
people often forget when traveling abroad and they often take measures to 
prevent its occurence.  However, being kidnapped and held for a ransom is 
not something for which many people plan.  This is likely because there is 
little concern of being kidnapped while traveling within the United States.60  
Here, kidnappings are few and far between and when they do occur, 95% 
of all kidnappers are caught and punished.61  However, in other areas of the 
world, this is not the case.  Those areas where the risk of kidnapping for 
extortion is the greatest are the regional trouble spots of Southeast Asia,62 
areas of the former Soviet Union, and Latin America.63   
It is this last region where kidnapping has reached a point that the 
number of abductions are deserving of the term epidemic.  Of the known 
kidnappings worldwide between 2000 and 2004, 73% were in Latin 
                                                                                                                 
58. Eaves, supra note 28. 
59. Id. 
60. Hansen, supra note 9, at 35. 
61. Steve Macko, Kidnapping: A Latin American Growth Industry…, ENN DAILY 
INTELIGENCE REPORT, (April 30, 1997), available at 
http://www.emergency.com/latnkdnp.htm. (last visited July 9, 2008). 
62. Specifically, the Philippians has been most problematic area in Southeast Asia. Id. 
63. Hansen, supra note 9, at 35; V.A. Tommy, supra note 4. 
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America.64  Despite the dynamic and widely publicized videotaped 
kidnappings that have recently occurred in Iraq, Latin America has not 
received the same media attention for what is a more serious problem than 
the Middle East kidnappings.65  In fact, in 2005 that figure continued to 
increase, up to 75%.66   
It is estimated that 7,500 kidnappings a year occur in Latin America67 
and in Colombia and Mexico alone, each year there are between 2,000 and 
4,000 kidnappings annually.68  While these statistics are individually 
astounding and terrifying, it is even more disconcerting when the following 
is considered.  The number of annual abductions released is more likely 
than not significantly lower than the true number of kidnappings.69 These 
numbers are prone to deflation since so few kidnappings are actually 
reported.70 Kidnappings may not be reported for a number of reasons.  
Mainly because (1) a victim’s fear of re-kidnap if they come forward to 
report the crime and (2) a victim’s sensitivity after the trauma they 
experienced.71 While Colombia has long held the dubious honor of being 
the kidnapping capital of the world,72 in 2007 Mexico saw an increase in 
violence and kidnappings that resulted in higher kidnapping rates than 
Colombia.  This caused Mexico to garner the title of ransom capital of the 
world.73   
The situation in Mexico has been getting progressively worse since 
1994.74  In March of that year, Alfredo Harp Helu, a prominent executive in 
Mexico’s largest financial group and close friend to then President Carlos 
                                                                                                                 
64. Victor O. Schinnerer Partnering With Experience, available at 
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Salina, was kidnapped and released after a ransom was paid.75  The $30 
million ransom was paid to the kidnappers and Helu’s family announced 
it’s payment on television.76  This announcement seemed to inspire other 
kidnappers in Mexico and in April of 1994, another prominent 
businessman, Angel Losada Moreno, vice president of a Mexican 
supermarket chain, was abducted and released for a $50 million ransom.77 
After 1994, kidnappings in Mexico became more frequent and kidnappers 
were requesting increasingly higher ransoms.78 As a result, kidnapping in 
Mexico has grown to be more prominent than anywhere else in the world. 
  
B. WHO: MOST COMMON KIDNAPPING VICTIMS 
 
Between 2000 and 2004, the two most common victims for kidnapping 
were dependents79 and business personnel.80  These two groups constituted 
one half of the world’s abduction victims.81  The remaining 50% of victims 
were made up of non professional employees,82 government officials and 
security forces,83 professionals, including journalists,84 ranchers,85 project 
workers, including engineers,86 tourists, aid workers, religious staff, and 
sports and media personalities.87  At the start of 2006, dependents and 
business employees remained the most common victim of kidnapping and 
abduction of foreign nationals has increased by over 275% since 1996.88 
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While important, raw statistics can only tell part of the story in 
identifying those at highest risk for kidnapping within Latin America.  
When considering who may be a potential victim in Latin America, it is 
important to account for where the business, and hence a kidnapping, 
would take place.  For example, in Guatemala, where only about 100 
people a year are kidnapped, the victims tend to be children of wealthy 
local or foreign businessmen.89  Kidnappers who “do their homework” on 
their victim, following them and learning their habits, are present 
everywhere though people with no ties to the area are less likely to be 
abducted.  These kidnappers will patiently investigate potential targets and 
take husbands, wives, children or the elderly from wealthy citizens in order 
to garner a large ransom.90  In these kidnappings, the victims are carefully 
chosen, the kidnappers are highly sophisticated and they go to great lengths 
to get valuable information for selecting their victims.91  Therefore, 
tourists, people visiting briefly or those passing through a country generally 
are not there long enough to fall prey to this kind of abduction.92 
Other kidnappings are kidnappings of opportunity; in the Colombian 
cities of Bogata, Medellin, Call and Cartagena, abductions in taxis are 
particularly prolific.93  As are abductions late at night, close to midnight, 
where a victim is taken and held only long enough to make withdrawals 
from an ATM on two separate posting days.94  Anyone alone late at night 
could fall victim to this kind of kidnapping.95 These abductions have great 
prominence in the big cities of Brazil, Mexico and Colombia96 and even 
those passing through the country driving an expensive car or drawing 
attention to themselves for their wealth could be taken, even if only in the 
country for a few hours.97 On the other hand, also in Brazil, it is usually 
local residents, rather than foreigners, that fall victim to the sequestros 
relampagos.98 As can readily be seen, the type of kidnappings most 
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prominent in a given area will influence those most at risk for becoming a 
victim of abduction.  
  
C. WHY: KIDNAPPING FOR PROFIT 
 
Kidnapping in Latin America is a business.99  Like any business, 
individuals may have different way of accomplishing their work, but their 
ends are ultimately the same: to make as great a profit as possible.  If 
nothing else, kidnapping for profit is certainly profitable in Latin America.  
Whether it is the secuestro al paso 100 which are increasing all over Latin 
America,101 sequestros relampagos which are particularly prolific in Brazil 
and Colombia,102 cross boarder kidnappings, where one group kidnaps a 
victim and then sells them to another group,103 virtual kidnappings,104 or a 
more traditional kidnap for ransom, where an individual is kidnapped by 
one group and held by them until they receive the ransom they desire, 
kidnappers are making huge profits.105   
A combination of factors has led to the current kidnapping crisis 
overtaking Latin America.  Drastic social change and an increase in the 
economic split between the rich and the poor have both contributed to the 
growing problem.106  As discussed, a recent increase in violence and crime 
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can be tied to the present surge in kidnapping in Mexico,107 while in 
Colombia, the history of socio-political factors that have made kidnapping 
for ransom problematic for so long are still present. With many victims 
refusing to cooperate with the local police, few suspects are ever being 
caught108 and weak, inefficient and corrupt law enforcement in these 
areas109 make Latin America a particularly attractive niche for the kidnap 
for ransom industry.   
The United States also bears some responsibility for the surge of 
kidnappings in Latin America.  In 2000, former President Clinton signed 
into law Plan Colombia; a $6.7 billion program set to receive $1.7 billion in 
U.S. aid110 intending to change the face of Colombia.111  Originally called 
the Marshall Plan for Colombia,112 the goals of Plan Colombia were 
simple; support the peace process with FARC (who make up the largest 
and oldest rebel group within Colombia), reactivate the Colombian 
economy, reform the Colombian judicial system, increase respect for 
human rights and reduce the drug market by fifty percent.113  While all the 
objectives of Plan Colombia seem worthwhile, it was the promise to reduce 
cocaine trafficking to the United States by fifty percent over five years that 
led the plan to receive the necessary congressional support for passage.114   
By 2005, however, Plan Colombia had racked up $10.6 billion in aid, 
$3 billion over the stated budget, and achieved none of its stated goals. 115  
Analysis showed an increase in both cocaine trafficking and use., as well as 
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a decrease in its street price116 translating into more, cheaper cocaine on 
American streets.117  As of 2007, the amount of cocaine trafficked between 
Colombia and the U.S. has continued to increase.118  Despite receiving 
some of the highest amounts of financial aid from the United States 
government, third only to the Middle East and Afghanistan,119 Plan 
Colombia seemes to have thus far, failed on all fronts.120  While Congress 
has recently taken steps towards improving where the plan has failed,121 
until such improvements are put in place and proven effective, Colombia, 
Latin America and ultimately the rest of the world, are left to deal with the 
consequences of its failure. 
By instituting Plan Colombia, the United States has aided in causing 
economic upheaval in Colombia.122  This has led to major unanticipated 
side effects.  One unanticipated side effect of Plan Colombia is the marked 
increase in kidnappings.123  It would be easy to think that Plan Colombia 
only had an impact on its target country of Colombia.  However, the effects 
of the plan can be seen all around Latin America.  It is particularly notable 
with the increase of kidnappings in Colombia’s neighboring Latin 
American countries of Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.124  
Another unanticipated effect of Plan Colombia is that as large numbers 
of Colombian citizens have fled the country, they export crimes.125   This 
phenomenon is known as the Ecuador effect126 and is just another way in 
which the plan’s negative effects can be seen around Latin America.  
Additionally, it is estimated that the FARC makes between $250 and $300 
million each year between protecting and promoting the illegal drug 
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industry and collecting ransoms from kidnappings.127  Therefore, by 
interrupting the FARC’s main source of revenue, drugs, Plan Colombia has 
likely been responsible for the increase in the FARC’s kidnap for 
ransom.128  While increased kidnappings may have been an unanticipated 
side effect of Plan Colombia, the United States failure to take any action to 
mitigate this negative and dangerous consequence is short sighted and 
irresponsible.    
These factors collectively, coupled with the unavoidable fact that 
kidnapping is a relatively safe crime to commit in Latin America, 129 
provide some insight as to why kidnap for ransom has become so 
widespread in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the rest of Latin America.  It 
also helps shed some light on America’s shared responsibility for the 
increase in kidnap for ransom in Latin America; that despite setting out 
with good intentions, American dictation of policy in other parts of the 
world does not assure improvement.   
  
III. LATIN AMERICAN OPTIONS 
 
A. DEALING WITH THE KIDNAPPINGS: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
With the kidnapping industry netting hundreds of millions of dollars 
each year, criminals once engaged in Latin America’s more petty crimes, 
such as drug smuggling or car theft, have begun to shift their focus.130  
Seeing huge ransoms paid, coupled with little success for prosecutors 
seeking kidnappings conviction, these criminals have started to move into 
what they see as a career with less risk and more reward.131 While 
American businesspeople have been targeted for kidnapping, at least within 
Mexico, many kidnapping groups seem to avoid such foreigners.132 In 
Mexico, for example, only 1 in 10 kidnappings are estimated to be reported 
each year,133 the effect on locals is undeniable.  
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While wealthy Americans and corporations have turned to the 
insurance industry for protection, their counter parts in Latin America have 
taken a more conventional approach.  Guarded by security, they move in 
armored cars, rarely traveling anywhere other than to and from work 
because the risk of going to or being elsewhere is just too great.134  For 
those daring enough to travel outside the armored fortresses equipped with 
expensive security systems they call home, security guards are an 
indispensable part of their lives.135  They stand watch outside restaurants 
and private schools, giving the appearance of protection for those whom 
they are protecting.136  They provide a sense of safety in Latin America to 
those whose lives have come to be built around fear,137 and a legitimate 
fear at that.  
However, the presence of these guards, reminiscent in appearance to 
the United States Secret Service,138 comes neither cheaply nor with any 
assurances.  With the bare minimum security measures for a company’s 
vice president coming to about $80,000 in the first year,139 and the cost of 
armoring a sport utility vehicle being about $70,000,140 it is easy to see why 
only the very rich are able to afford the luxuries of such protection.  Even 
when these security measures are in place, safety is not assured.  A notable 
instance of this was in August of 1996 when Mamoru Konno, Vice 
President of Sanyo Video Components, was kidnapped in Tijuana, Mexico 
surrounded by employees at a company picnic and baseball game.141  While 
Latin America’s wealthiest citizens are able try and hide behind the 
protection their money provides, kidnappers are turning to those citizens in 
Latin America’s middle class and as a result, treating victims more brutally. 
142 
The effect of these actions against Latin America’s citizens is that the 
people are calling for government action.143  Taking to the streets, they are 
demanding their presidents do something to stop these brutal abductions, 
though realistically, in the short term, there is little the government can 
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do.144  As stated before, kidnapping in Latin America is a business.145  Just 
as with any other industry netting millions of dollars each year, the 
business of kidnap for ransom will continue to thrive until it is no longer 
profitable.146   
With governments unwilling and, truthfully, unable to protect it’s 
citizens, many of the middle class living in Latin America are left with only 
two choices; stay in the country they have known their entire life and take 
their chances at being abducted or killed, or be a “refugee from fear”147 and 
start a new life in the safety of America. Those families opting to move to 
the United States generally have dual citizenship or achieve United States 
residency status though family or marriage.148  But for those unable to meet 
the requirements to cross the boarder, the remaining options are limited.  
Generally, they have little choice, but to remain in their home country.  As 
kidnapping increasingly affects the middle class, rather than just the 
wealthy, growing numbers of families are desperately trying to emigrate.149 
This trend has been noted by both United States law enforcement and 
observers of crime trends, as well as real estate agents.150  Agents in San 
Diego County claim to be seeing more clients from Tijuana and in affluent 
Tijuana neighborhoods, more houses seem to be for sale. 151  Moreover, real 
estate agents are capitalizing on this market, traveling to countries such as 
Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico to sell properties located in Miami, 
Florida,152 and making it that much easier for those inclined to leave Latin 
America for the United States to have their lives established here as soon as 
they arrive.  For Latin American citizens without the means to procure 
armored vehicles and a private force of security guards, leaving the country 
has become the best and most common course of action. These “refugees 
from fear” are clear examples that preventative measures can only take you 
so far before more drastic steps must be taken in order to afford one true 
protection from abduction. 
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IV. “NO CONCESSIONS”: POLICY ON PAPER ONLY  
 
Like many K & R insurance plans the Schinnerer plan, one of the most 
comprehensive of it’s kind, covers more than just the individual insured.153  
Included under the plan are all directors, officers and employees of the 
assured, relatives154 of the insured, individuals who work or reside in the 
insured’s household, guests in the insured’s household, guests and 
customers of the assured either on their premises or during transport and 
the individual negotiating and/or delivering a ransom.155  However, despite 
this extensive coverage, government employees cannot be covered under 
such a plan.156  In fact, governmental institutions are specifically noted as 
being ineligible for coverage.157  
That K & R policies specifically preclude governmental institutions 
from taking out plans and covering their employees seems irrelevant, as 
most plans providing financial assistance to the insured do so in the form of 
reimbursement.  In order to be reimbursed, the initial payment must be 
made and since the government has been unwilling to make payment for 
any abductees, reimbursement would be unnecessary.  As reimbursement is 
one of the most important features of an effective K & R plan, if 
government institutions were permitted to purchase and carry K & R 
insurance, it would be unlikely any government institution would find it 
worth the price.  This isn’t to say however, that the government has not 
been using other means at its disposal to undermine its own “no 
concessions” policy. 
 
A. NORTHROP GRUMMAN EMPLOYEES ABDUCTED IN COLOMBIA 
 
While abduction of government officials accounts for less than eight 
percent of all abductions worldwide,158 there are obviously situations where 
K & R plans would be most beneficial to those employed by governmental 
institutions and private corporations simultaneously. This point is most 
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readily illustrated by the kidnapped Northrop Grumman employees being 
held hostage in Colombia by members of the FARC.  
Thomas Howe, Keith Stansell and Marc Gonsalves are three American 
citizens employed by the Los Angeles based Northrop Grumman 
Corporation.159 Northrop Grumman is the fifth biggest multinational 
defense corporation in the United States and has been involved with the 
cocaine eradication missions in Colombia.160  In 2003, while in a small 
airplane doing drug surveillance over a rural Colombian jungle, these three 
Americans were shot down and captured by the FARC.161 Since their 
abduction, little progress has been made towards achieving the safe return 
of the three men.162  This is because the FARC is designated as a terrorist 
group by the United States government and hiding behind their “no 
negotiations with terrorists” policy, the government has yet to secure their 
release.163  If these men were just employees of a private corporation, they 
would likely already be free.164  It is however, the fact that they are 
government contractors and it is a direct result of the governments refusal 
to negotiate with the FARC which has kept these three men imprisoned for 
over 4 years.165   
The “no negotiations with terrorists” is the very same justification 
given by some as to why insurance companies ought to adopt a voluntary 
no payment scheme for K & R policies.166  The allegations are that by 
meeting the ransom demands of terrorists, American companies are 
undermining United States public policy.167  However, the situation of 
Thomas Howe, Keith Stansell and Marc Gonsalves seems to clearly 
demonstrate that the “no negotiations” stance does little more than 
reinforce that abducted individuals will be held indefinitely by groups like 
the FARC until they are paid. 
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Recently, the ineffectiveness of the “no negotiations” approach in the 
Colombian situation seems to have reached its peak and come to the 
attention of those in the government. In July of 2007, the United States 
Justice Department made a move in direct contrast with the “no 
negotiations” policy in an attempt to get Howe, Stansell and Gonsalves 
home.168  The Justice Department offered the FARC leniency in the 
sentencing of Ricardo Palmera, an influential member of the FARC who 
was convicted in federal court of helping in the three men’s kidnapping in 
exchange for his release.169  The men still remain held captive in Colombia. 
This recent action by the Justice Department is an indication that 
America’s “no concessions” stance in Colombia is not as inflexible as 
initially thought.  As such, to say that reimbursement for ransom payments 
by insurers to individuals holding K & R policies is contrary to American 
policy, is misleading and untrue. The payment of ransom by a private 
corporation cannot be held out as contrary to an American governmental 
policy when the government itself is not consistent with that policy.  The 
government seems to have recognized that in order to assure the safe return 
of the abductees, they will have to give into the demands of the FARC 
somehow; hence the offer for leniency.  An offer for leniency to a prisoner 
in exchange for a kidnap victim’s release is, however, a luxury to which the 
government is privileged but private corporations are not.   
Where the government can offer leniency, the only weapon at an 
individual or private corporation’s disposal to get kidnap victims back is 
payment of the ransom demanded. A non payment scheme would emulate 
hundreds of times over the scenario of the Northrop Grumman employees.  
Moreover, to hold private corporations to a higher standard, regarding the 
government policy, than the government holds itself to is hypocritical and 
unjustified. 
 
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF A NO PAYMENT SCHEME 
 
America has yet to find an adequate and effective solution to the 
kidnappings epidemic in Latin America.  It is sheer American arrogance to 
believe that if the United States insurance companies instituted a voluntary 
no payment policy in kidnap for ransom situations that kidnappings in 
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Latin America and around the world would decrease, or even stop.   Any 
domestic insurance regulation by the United States has no authority over 
the insurance industry in other countries.  As such, insurance companies in 
these other countries will still be selling K & R policies to corporations and 
businesspeople, all the while repaying the ransoms the United States 
insurance industry will not.   Absent a voluntary no payment agreement 
from every insurance company in the world that provides K & R policies, 
the end result of such a scheme would be to put American citizens at 
greater risk.   
Further, kidnap victims are 4 times more likely to be killed by their 
abductors when they are uninsured than when insured.170 Partially, this is 
because insured victims have the benefits of professionals who know how 
to handle the abduction properly.171 The benefit of these crisis management 
professionals is that, in handling the abduction, they do not make the same 
fatal mistakes that relatives of an uninsured victim tend to make.172  While 
this seems to lend support to the supposition that a voluntary no payment 
policy would be effective, as the professional support a K & R policy can 
provide is often highly effective, there are additional factors that warrant 
consideration in this situation.   
First, as many K & R policies provide crisis management services as 
well as reimbursement for ransoms paid,173 it must also be considered that 
these numbers reflect a decrease in the likelihood of a victim being killed 
when a ransom is paid, as opposed to not paid.  Up until 2001, the killing of 
kidnap victims was relatively rare.174  However, when seven oil workers 
were taken in the northeast Amazon region of Ecuador and one was killed 
after the deadline for payment expired,175 this seemed to be the beginning 
of an increasingly violent breed of kidnappers.176  This breed of kidnapper 
is the kind that will hold oil workers abducted from Colombia in Guerrilla 
hideouts for years, rape women after taking them from shopping mall 
parking lots in Brazil, torture businessmen in Argentina while negotiating a 
multimillion dollar ransom and return children taken in Mexico one finger 
at a time to their parents as they await the meeting of their demands.177  
                                                                                                                 
170. Macko, supra note 61. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.  
175. Id. 
176. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7. 
177. Id. 
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This is also the kind of kidnapper that, if their demands are not met, will 
simply kill an abducted victim and keep taking others until they get paid.  
A no payment policy will put American business people at greater risk 
because their families may lack the means necessary to secure their 
release.178  In America in 2007, seventy percent of Americans held 
mortgages on the homes they lived in,179 and the average household carried 
close to $8,500 in credit card debt.180  If the average American is taken 
while out of the country on business, there is a good chance his family will 
not have the means to obtain the ransom without liquidating their life.  
Even then, there is a chance that an abductee’s family will still lack the 
necessary funds, as ransoms have in the past been reported to be as high as 
over one hundred million dollars.181 And increasingly often, lack of 
payment translates out into loss of life.       
Because of the secret nature of K & R insurance,182 foreign 
businesspeople in Latin America are not taken because it is known that 
they have K & R policies.183  In fact, many, if not most, abductees do not 
even know that there is a K & R policy in place for them.184  This is 
because it is a fundamental condition of most policies that its existence be 
kept confidential and a policy can be voided if this is breached.185 Rather, 
individuals are taken because, as a fact of life, people will pay whatever 
they have to in order to get their family member back.   
Kidnappers in Latin America do not care if American law suggests an 
insurance company not pay reimbursement.   What they know is how to run 
their business; they know if they send the fingers of someone’s husband, 
wife or child to them, they will do anything to get them back.  All a K&R 
                                                                                                                 
178. This point is clearly illustrated in the case of Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London, where the family of Thomas Hargrove, an American employee of a company in 
Colombia kidnapped by the FARC, wanted to pay the ransom demanded by the FARC but 
could not afford to pay the multi-million dollar ransom. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 766.  
While Thomas Hargrove was eventually released by the FARC, it was only after 11 months 
in captivity in addition to two ransom payments by his family totaling $250,000. Id. at 767.  
179. Credit Card Debt Statistics, MONEY-ZINE (2007) http://www.money-
zine.com/Financial-Planning/Debt-Consolidation/Credit-Card-Debt-Statistics/ (last visited 
June 20, 2008). 
180. Id. 
181. Victor O. Schinnerer Why Kidnap, supra note 88. 
182. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.  
183. See Hiscox Frequently Asked Questions, HISCOX ASM, 
http://www.hiscox.com/hiscox-asm/41.html (last visited June 20, 2008). 
184. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42. 
185. Hiscox, supra note 183. 
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policy does is ensure that a family not lose everything of value they have in 
trying to get back the one thing they value most.186   
Secondly, it is necessary to consider the premiums paid for these plans.  
About fifty percent of the world’s K & R policies specifically cover Latin 
America,187 and depending on the risk of the country where coverage is 
provided, plan premiums vary greatly.188  For example, the annual premium 
for a family of 5 ranges between $18,000 to $30,000 for a $1 million 
policy.189 For a $5 million policy, the premium would be about $70,000.190  
When companies191 pay out such high premiums, they expect results.  If a 
company pays for a K & R policy that only provides prevention training 
and access to security experts in the event of an abduction,192 the need for 
the insurance itself is eliminated.   
Rather than pay out, conservatively, $25,000 a year for a policy with a 
$1 million premium covering an executive living and working in Colombia, 
the company would be in a better position to save that money and in the 
event an abduction takes place, hire the same security experts the insurance 
policy would provide.193  By doing this, the company would pay only for 
service when it was needed rather than pay out hundreds of thousands, even 
millions, of dollars in premiums over the years.194  While paying such high 
                                                                                                                 
186. See id. 
187. Macko, supra note 61. 
188. Id. 
189. Id.  The premium of a $1 million policy would be lower somewhere like Brazil, 
where the premium for that policy would be only about $9,000 - $10,000.  Id.  By contrast, 
the same plan would be much higher in Colombia. Id.   
190. Id.  
191. Companies that are wealthy enough to afford a high end K & R plan with a 
premium in the tens of thousands of dollars.  
192. Macko, supra note 61. 
193. The three security companies used by the top K & R insurers are Kroll Associates, 
Ackerman Group and Control Risks Group. Id.  These security companies can all be readily 
found on the internet at their websites, available at http://www.kroll.com; 
http://www.ackermangroup.com, and http://www.control-risks.com, respectively.  
194. Under the Schinnerer policy, as representative of K & R policies, once a company 
receives notification of an abduction, the company then contacts the crisis management 
company. Victor O. Schinnerer Extortion Highlighted, supra note 30.  A crisis management 
team has 4 main objectives; the safe, timely and secure release of the victim, the correct 
handling in the interest of the client, of extortion, safeguard the continued operations of a 
client, and to act within the law at all times.  Id.   To achieve these goals they work with 
management to develop a strategy and tactical options as well as using the company’s 
database and research for support.  Id.  Also, in the even that the story becomes public, the 
crisis management team may act as a media liaison.  Id.  It is clear that a crisis management 
team provides everything that would still be permitted under a non payment scheme, as the 
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premiums over time might be worth it to a company who will be 
reimbursed for any ransoms paid out, from a financial perspective, it makes 
much more sense to, rather than pay premiums, to use that money to pay a 
ransom the company would have to pay out on it’s own anyway. 
Additionally, the prevention training which is emphasized by the non 
payment scheme195 could be provided in the same manner by these private 
companies; on an as needed basis.  The voluntary no payment scheme is 
effectively a complete elimination of K & R policies.  
 
V. AVENUES FOR CHANGE 
 
Having determined that a voluntary non-payment scheme is an 
impractical, and potentially dangerous approach to take in an attempt to 
improve the kidnapping situation in Latin America, the question becomes 
what is the appropriate avenue to make the necessary changes.  While the 
American infrastructure provides a few different options, none are 
particularly suited for this issue and the only way in which Latin America 
will make any kind of meaningful change is to deal with the underlying 
issues on an international scale.  
 
A. US COURT INVOLVEMENT 
 
The American court system has litigated issues arising from K & R 
policies in the past; most notably in Curtis v. Beatrice Foods196 and more 
recently in Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London.197  It has been 
claimed that the court’s decision in Beatrice Foods stands for the 
supposition that in general, employees do not have a duty to rescue 
employees who have been abducted that were warned they may be a target 
of kidnapping.198  That ruling has been taken to say199 that because of 
extensive media coverage on international kidnappings in areas like Iraq 
and Colombia, it is unreasonable for Americans to claim they are unaware 
                                                                                                                          
only link in the abduction process for the insurance company the reimbursement of costs 
and fees associated with abduction, including payment of ransom.  See id. 
195. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 773-774. 
196. 481 F. Supp. 1275, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
197. 937 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
198. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 768-69. 
199. This case has not been interpreted by the Court since it was decided and the 1980 
ruling is still the controlling decision.  
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of kidnapping risks and as such, employers have no duty to rescue them if 
abducted.200   
However, in the Beatrice Foods case, Curtis had been personally 
warned by the U.S. Embassy that he might be at risk of kidnapping after his 
picture was obtained from an underworld figure.201 Though Curtis attended 
a security briefing with Control Risks and another arranged by the State 
Department’s Office to Combat Terrorism, he still remained in the country 
and made none of the suggested changes to his behavior.202  The only 
action he took to change his routine, predictable behavior and to increase 
security was investigatory.203  Analogizing the situation of Curtis, who had 
extensive warning of his particular personal risk of kidnapping and still 
failed to take any meaningful action, to the general knowledge possessed 
by Americans that certain areas of the world pose a greater risk of 
kidnapping, is to stretch the Beatrice Foods decision beyond it’s practical 
limit. 
Moreover, to imply that a corporation only pays a ransom because they 
fear litigation from a victim’s family if that person is killed or injured, is to 
appeal to the lowest common denominator.  This assumes the worst of 
multinational corporations; that they would chose not to pay a ransom for 
financial reasons.  It is not unreasonable to believe that a corporation would 
go to great lengths to secure the safe return of their employee because they 
do not want to see anything happen to them.204  Or, to take a more selfish, 
self serving approach to their actions, it is not unreasonable to think that a 
corporation would pay out a ransom to avoid negative publicity or to deter 
future employees from being willing to take overseas positions.  
In essence, the courts have been involved with K & R policies in the 
past but only in the role that they were meant to fill; interpretation of the 
law.  Any action by the courts to limit the scope or application of K & R 
policies would amount to judicial activism and be an improper exercise of 
their power.  Since there is no law regarding K & R policy repayment (or 
non repayment), there is nothing for the courts to interpret.  Therefore, until 
                                                                                                                 
200. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 770. 
201. Curtis v. Beatrice Foods, 481 F. Supp. 1275, 1280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
202. Id. at 1280. 
203. Id.  
204. Particularly this was seen in the Beatrice Foods case.  Given that Curtis had clear 
personal knowledge he was a target for kidnapping, the court states “Faced with a 
staggering demand for $5 million, Beatrice could have washed its hands of the whole affair 
without incurring any legal liability. However, it instead took the conscientious course of 
hiring a firm it knew to have dealt with kidnap situations previously to master-mind the 
negotiations.” Id. at 1293.  
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legislative action is taken, the courts do not have a role in the modification 
of K & R insurance coverage.  Moreover, a voluntary non payment scheme 
is not legislative action; it creates no law for the court to interpret.  This 
lends further weight to the futility of the adoption of a voluntary scheme, as 
any insurance company who chooses to reimburse the payment a ransom 
could not be brought into court for violation. 
 
B. LEGISLATIVE ACTION   
 
As established above, a necessary precursor to a court response to the 
payment of ransom for those taken in Latin America is American 
legislative action.  However, previous attempts to curb kidnappings through 
legislative action by both the United States and Colombia have proven 
ineffective.205 Colombia’s failed Anti-Abduction Act of 1993 and the 
United States’ Patriot Act and Hostage Taking Act of 1984 illustrate the 
many difficulties of a legislative solution to this problem.206   
Moreover, American legislation, in the form of Plan Colombia, shares 
partial responsibility for pushing kidnapping into its current state.  
Congress’ failure to understand the interconnection between Colombian 
economics, illegal drugs and kidnappings, as well as their failure to 
simultaneously take precautionary measures to ensure United States 
citizens and Latin Americans alike were protected from consequences.  
This demonstrates that the American legislature is improperly situated to 
address and resolve the issue.  In fact, as we have seen, unilateral American 
action207 has resulted in unanticipated side effects that have only made the 
situation worse.   
 
C. INTERNATIONAL ARENA  
 
Having resolved that neither American judicial nor legislative action is 
the appropriate avenue to address the kidnap for ransom epidemic ravaging 
Latin America and Latin American countries domestic regulation has 
proven time and again to be ineffective, it seems that if the kidnap for 
                                                                                                                 
205. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 760-763,765, 773.  
206. Id. at 773. 
207. The action is being categorized as unilateral because even though Plan Colombia 
was a bilateral plan between America and Colombia to which the European community 
gave financial contribution, America’s resolution that it determine what any money 
contributed be spent on makes it’s use the functional equivalent of American unilateral 
action. 
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ransom problem is going to find resolution, it will come as a result of 
international cooperation. This Comment takes the stance that international 
assistance and accountability is the only way the cycle of abduction 
established in Latin America will ever stop.  This Comment takes the 
position that it is not the insurance companies selling K & R policies, nor 
the United States who ought to be taking the forefront in the battle against 
kidnap for ransom.   
Instead, it is the United Nations (UN)208 who ought to be taking steps 
towards resolving this crisis.  Today, there are 192 member states in the 
UN, representing almost every nation in the world.209  As such, it is 
unsurprising that the two countries where kidnapping for ransom has 
reached its peak, Mexico and Colombia, are both UN member states.210  
When a country becomes a member to the UN, they agree to accept the 
obligations set forth in the UN Charter,211 an international treaty setting out 
basic principles of international relations.212  They are also able to take 
advantage of the UN to help resolve international conflicts and create new 
policies.213 
The UN has had involvement in everything from improving 
telecommunication to assisting refugees, and despite its efforts in drug 
trafficking and terrorism, 214 it has yet to take any specific action directed at 
reducing the kidnapping problem in Latin America.  While it has created 
the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,215 this was 
                                                                                                                 
208. The United Nations, or UN, was established October 24, 1945 by 51 countries.  
How the UN Works, http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/chapter1_intro.html, (last 
visited July 12, 2008).  These 51 countries were committed to preserving peace through 
international cooperation and collective security.  Id.  Though the UN is not a world 
government, nor does it make laws, it provides the means to help resolve international 
conflicts and help create policies on matters that affect everyone.  Id.  
209. United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml#m (last 
visited July 12, 2008) 
210. Id.  
211. The UN charter establishes four basic purposes for the UN; one, to maintain 
international peace and security, two, to develop friendly relations among nations, three, to 
cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights and 
four, to the a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. How the UN Works, supra note 
208. 
212. Id. 
213. See id.  
214. Not So Well Known…, http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/index.html (last 
visited July 12, 2008).  
215. What the UN does for Justice, Human Rights and International Law, 
http://www.un. org/Overview/uninbrief/chapter3_law.html (last visited July 12, 2008). 
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aimed at combating terrorism against a country, not an individual.216  The 
first step that the UN needs to take is for the Security Council to create the 
International Convention against Kidnap for Ransom.   
This Convention would be a resolution that member states could either 
have the option to sign or the Security Council could require, setting forth 
the general expectations for a country experiencing dramatic numbers of 
kidnap for ransom.  It would include expectations of the average numbers 
of cases that ought to be prosecuted each year as well as unannounced 
reviews of a given country’s police reports and investigations.  It would 
also lay out repercussions for countries which fell short in these areas, but 
rather than provide negative consequences, their failure to alert to the UN 
that further action must be taken on their part to assist governments losing 
the battle against kidnappings.   
This international agreement would simultaneously further the four 
basic goals set forth in the UN charter while giving these countries serious 
about resolving their problems with kidnap for ransom the opportunity to 
reply to their citizen’s outcry for governmental action.217  It also provides 
international accountability for those countries both party to the agreement 
and who have not signed.  For those who have signed the agreement, it is 
an assurance that they are not alone in their fight to improve their citizen’s 
lives.  For those who have not signed, their failure to is a message to the 
world that they are not doing all they can to stop kidnap for ransom in their 
country.  While this may not seem that devastating, it may serve as a 
deterrent for companies that set up manufacturing sites and therefore create 
an economic incentive for Latin American governments to sign onto the 
agreement.  
Another point to address is the reason kidnap for ransom developed.  
While poverty in these countries has played a large part, one of the main 
reasons kidnap for ransom has flourished in Latin America has been weak, 
inefficient and corrupt law enforcement.218  While a kidnapper’s ability to 
demand and secure ransom payments has had some effect on their 
continued abductions, it is not the payment of ransom alone that has caused 
kidnappings to spiral out of control.  Rather, it has been kidnappers ability 
to abduct people without personal consequences.  Because Latin American 
kidnappers are rarely caught and prosecuted,219 there is nothing stopping 
                                                                                                                 
216. See id. 
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219. See SCHINNERER KIDNAP, supra note 105. 
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them from taking people time and again.  A key service which the UN 
could provide Latin America would be UN Police.  
UN Police have become an increasingly important part of the UN.220  
First deployed in 1960’s to the Congo, playing a role in the 30 years of UN 
presence in Cyprus and in 1988 taking part in the UN mission in Namibia, 
the UN Police have been a key element in restoring conditions that create 
social, economic and political stability.221  Consisting of 7,000 police 
officers from 80 different countries, the UN Police have been proven to 
deter, disrupt and prevent criminal activity.222  While the UN Police have 
been involved in a number of missions spanning many activities,223 in Latin 
America, they would be most effective in their “supervisory”, monitoring 
local police services, and training roles.    
By bringing UN Police officers to these countries to monitor local 
police, corruption would be more apt to become discovered and reported.  
Since these UN Police officers would be there specifically to monitor the 
local police, they would not face the moral challenge of reporting a fellow 
officer in the way another Latin American officer would.  Additionally, 
where police are simply weak or inefficient, UN Police would be able to 
work with existing officers to improve their skills and help train new 
recruits.  Given time, with the improved Latin American officers leading 
the forces, the training provided by the UN Police could be continually 
passed on.   
By taking the necessary actions to improve the police forces in Latin 
America, absent corruption, the domestic laws and legal system within 
these countries could operate as they are supposed to.  When this is 
realized, kidnappers will be prosecuted and convicted, much as they are in 
the United States, and this ought to effectively curb kidnapping.  The UN 
also plays a role around the world reducing poverty.224  As poverty does 
play a part in this epidemic, many of the countries where kidnap for ransom 
is so profound are already benefiting from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP).225  The UNDP, coupled with the UN Police and an 
                                                                                                                 
220. The Growing Role of the UN Police, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko 
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222. United Nations Police, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/civpol/civpol1.html 
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International Convention against Kidnap for Ransom would address the 
causes of the kidnap for ransom epidemic and as such, be a much more 
effective remedy than adoption of a voluntary no payment scheme by the 
American insurance industry.  
There are of course potential draw backs to the involvement of the 
United Nations in Latin America.  The first is that the Security Counsel 
may not consider the Latin American situation an appropriate arena in 
which it should get involved.  As the Security Counsel generally resolves 
issues of armed conflict, 226 they may consider the kidnapping issues in 
Latin America too trivial to warrant UN involvement.  Even if a resolution 
or an optional agreement were passed, it may receive no member state 
signatures and then, it has as little effect on the problem as a voluntary no 
payment scheme.   
Assuming the UN were willing to get involved, a possible problem to 
the placement of UN Police in the affected countries would be twofold.  
First, there is the potential that local police would resist the UN Police’s 
involvement or worse, refuse their assistance.  There is an element of insult 
in sending another police force to monitor the Latin American police 
departments.  Given that, there is a chance that the local officers would not 
be receptive to the help offered by the UN and their cooperation and 
willingness to learn is crucial to the success of the UN Police in Latin 
America.   
Finally, there is the problem that the UN Police will not be sufficient to 
meet the needs of police forces in Latin America.  While there are 7,000 
police officers in the UN Police,227 they are currently spread across 13 
missions.  The number of officers needed to achieve any real results may 
number greater than those available.  Moreover, the involvement of the UN 
Police in Latin America may have the unanticipated effect of worsening 
other situations around the world.  This could happen if UN Police are 
taken out of other places around the world where they are just as needed to 
fill the demand in Latin America.  However, despite any potential problems 
and difficulties, the fact remains that the UN is the single body most 
appropriately situated body to handle this crisis and they could, and should, 
take action to reduce or stop its occurrence.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Kidnap for ransom in Latin America is a growing problem and 
something needs to be done to stop it.  United States and Latin American 
policies alike have been ineffective in creating change and a voluntary no 
payment policy will serve no purpose other than to take a spot on the list of 
actions proven to provide no results.  International intervention by the 
United Nations is the best option available to make real improvements to 
the kidnap for ransom issue and effect the kind of change needed to save 
lives and restore order in Latin America.    
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